David Hume: Reason Slave of Passions?

[Jimmy Snyder]

In A Treatise of Human Nature, what did David Hume mean when he said, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them"?

 

[arildno]

In A Treatise of Human Nature, what did David Hume mean when he said, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them"?

Hmm..that reason's main purpose is to avert Civil War within the individual, perhaps, by pointing out how a particular passion's demands can be met, without infringing upon the demands of the other passions?

Honestly, I don't know, though..

 

[Math Is Hard]

I think Hume did joke a lot, and in some cases he seems to be a complete, but entirely respectable, smart-***, but I think he was dead serious here.

What I gather is that if you scratch the surface of your rational reasoning deeply enough, you always hit an emotional root that is the driving force of your decisions. It's counter-intuitive because we think of ourselves as superior reasoning animals that crack the whip over our base emotional instincts.

More is said about it here by a very smart person, but I did not completely pick up on everything that was being expressed:

http://everything2.com/title/Reason+is%2C+and+ought+only+to+be+the+slave+of+the+passions

 

[ThomasT]

In A Treatise of Human Nature, what did David Hume mean when he said, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them"?

What I gather is that if you scratch the surface of your rational reasoning deeply enough, you always hit an emotional root that is the driving force of your decisions.

This makes sense to me, and is consistent with the results of much scientific reseach. I would suppose that Hume is referring to his realization that the ultimate roots of our actions are not rational, but emotional.

Whether reason "ought only to be the slave of passions" is an arguable assertion, but only insofar as it might ignore the notion that passions can be influenced by reason.

My current opinion (which might change depending on replies) on the wisdom to be gotten from Hume's observation is that if, by reasoning, one has arrived at a better or best course of action, then the only way of assuring that that course of action will actually be taken, and adhered to, is to make that course of action an emotional imperative. In other words, it only matters and will only consistently happen if one feels compelled to make it happen.

This is, afaik, the basis of all effective behavioral engineering, personal and social. Reproducible results from Pavlov to Skinner to modern advertising/marketing confirm this. It's why the "dog whisperer" is effective, it's why some people who want to quit smoking or drinking actually do so, and it's why the propaganda campaign leading up to the invasion of Iraq was effective.

It's counter-intuitive because we think of ourselves as superior reasoning animals that crack the whip over our base emotional instincts.

But of course we all know that we can't really do that. The positive alternative is to use our reasoning abilities, in conjunction with emotional dispositions arising from our emotional nature, to engineer environments, both personal and social, that maximize the probability of behaviors that we deem, via reasoning, to be the most inducive to behaviors that we have rationally deemed most desirable.

It isn't that reason 'ought' to be the slave of passions. Reason 'is' the slave of passions. However, passions can be 'engineered', through reason, to be the slave of reason -- but still passions nonetheless. Which is fundamental? Passion, I would guess. We're animals after all. But we can use reason to control and direct our passions. So, I guess I'm disagreeing with Hume. Or am I?

Further, there are questions regarding what fundamentally motivates sociopathic and psychopathic individuals. Are these unimportant, superfluous, distinctions? I don't know.

This is an interesting and deep topic. Hopefully more learned pundits will clarify, including, but not limited to, MIH. I go now to the link that MIH has supplied, from which "by a very smart person" I will hopefully "pick up on" some of the stuff that MIH might not have.

 

[Q_Goest]

For reference, Hume's "A Tretise of Human Nature" can be found online here.
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm

The section in question can be found by searching on "slave" and hitting enter 5 times.

Since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition, I infer, that the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion. This consequence is necessary. It is impossible reason coued have the latter effect of preventing volition, but by giving an impulse in a contrary direction to our passion; and that impulse, had it operated alone, would have been able to produce volition. Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse; and if this contrary impulse ever arises from reason, that latter faculty must have an original influence on the will, and must be able to cause, as well as hinder any act of volition. But if reason has no original influence, it is impossible it can withstand any principle, which has such an efficacy, or ever keep the mind in suspence a moment. Thus it appears, that the principle, which opposes our passion, cannot be the same with reason, and is only called so in an improper sense. We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. As this opinion may appear somewhat extraordinary, it may not be improper to confirm it by some other considerations.

A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. It is impossible, therefore, that this passion can be opposed by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, with those objects, which they represent.

Doesn't sound too humerous to me.

 

[Archosaur]

In A Treatise of Human Nature, what did David Hume mean when he said, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them"?

Hume is definitely not joking (though his use of the word "ought" is interesting).
At the core of this quote (and its context, quoted above) is the "is-ought problem," which made Hume famous, woke Kant from his "dogmatic slumber," and is still taken very seriously by philosophers today.

The idea is that an "ought" statement (e.g. "I shouldn't beat up on my little brother") can never be derived (i.e. reasoned) from any number of "is" statements (factual statements about reality).

Continuing the example above, you might say "I shouldn't beat up on my little brother."
Well, why not.
"Well, because it causes him physical pain." (an "is" statement)
So what?
"I don't want to cause him physical pain!" (A statement of passion)

Ah Ha! As Hume says - and I am inclined to agree - at the root of any "ought" statement ("I shouldn't beat up on my little brother") is ultimately a "passion".

Try it yourself! There are plenty of things you think you "ought" to do. Try to justify them with only "is" statements.