Determinism: Can Scientific Explanations Explain Human Behaviour?

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The discussion centers on the complexities of determinism and free will, particularly in relation to human behavior and genetic programming. Participants explore whether human actions can ultimately be traced back to quantum interactions within the brain, questioning if science can ever fully explain human decision-making. The conversation contrasts deterministic views, likening them to a mechanical system like Niagara Falls, with the unpredictability of quantum mechanics and the emergent properties of consciousness. There is acknowledgment of the significant influence of both genetics and environmental factors on behavior, while also debating the implications of determinism on individual agency. Ultimately, the dialogue reflects a nuanced understanding that human behavior is shaped by a combination of genetic, social, and developmental influences, rather than being purely deterministic.
  • #31
disregardthat said:
I only discussed the argument, it's fine if you don't support it. But back to the argument. Discussing free will has its difficulties, as both sides will have difficulty explaining what free will is (even if it proposed that it doesn't exists; what is it that doesn't exist?). The explanations usually does not run further than saying that free will is will that is not bound by physical causality. What does this mean? Does it make sense? I don't think it does, but it is certainly not an explanation at all.

It's fine if one relax at the notion that free will is non-sense, it can't really be explained because we don't know what we are talking about. But why does it interest us so? Certainly there must be something to discuss. But I am confident that "free will" we do have is unproblematic and tautalogical.

Why do we say that the will is free? Can one imagine, or give an example of a free willed action? And why don't human will qualify? (qualify for what)



- Locke


We are free in the sense that we are not constrained. Physical causality (in the brain) is reason for our actions, but in what respect is this a constraint? Isn't freedom really to have the possibility to act as one wishes? (even if wishes are also physically caused)

The problem is a blurry notion of the self, or the person, as something affected by physical causality; when, really, all that comprise us is physical.

A cell is the basic unit of life (some may even call DNA to be so, at least philosophically). The problem ( as per my belief) is that cell is the effect of a phenomena where the final outcome is greater than the sum of its constituent parts. We just go after the physicallity of things whereas there are realms that are beyond mere physicallity. These are yet to be explored by science.

Prevoiusly scientists were 100% certain about the determinism of science. But with the advent of quantum mechanics they had to accept uncertainty as something ingraned in this universe ( maybe this uncertainty points to some sort of order in the distant future). Previously we had 4 dimensions, now M-theory talks of 11 ( an error of more than 70% within a few decades). I believe (may be wrongly) that life is not mere physicality of things but some kind of energy that arises ( or performs its role) when certain very-2 complicated and precise configurations of matter become possible randomly or by design. May be after 300 yeras or so, humans will create their own forms of life ( I am not just talking about genetically modified beings but those that will be created from the rudimentary material configurations, provided we get to know about the mechanism that instills the 'energy' of life in matter).
 
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  • #32
What in this world happens out of necessity? Not a free will.
 
  • #33
disregardthat said:
I only discussed the argument, it's fine if you don't support it. But back to the argument. Discussing free will has its difficulties, as both sides will have difficulty explaining what free will is (even if it proposed that it doesn't exists; what is it that doesn't exist?). The explanations usually does not run further than saying that free will is will that is not bound by physical causality. What does this mean? Does it make sense? I don't think it does, but it is certainly not an explanation at all.

I agree. One of the problems is what people think "free will" really means.
disregardthat said:
It's fine if one relax at the notion that free will is non-sense, it can't really be explained because we don't know what we are talking about. But why does it interest us so? Certainly there must be something to discuss. But I am confident that "free will" we do have is unproblematic and tautalogical.

From my point of view we make decisions but they are not "free" in the sense that it is inevitable that we will make those decisions (caveat: unless some quantum effect causes a chaos like change in the whole system, but this is out of our control anyway).
disregardthat said:
Why do we say that the will is free? Can one imagine, or give an example of a free willed action? And why don't human will qualify? (qualify for what)

- Locke

We are free in the sense that we are not constrained. Physical causality (in the brain) is reason for our actions, but in what respect is this a constraint? Isn't freedom really to have the possibility to act as one wishes? (even if wishes are also physically caused)

The problem is a blurry notion of the self, or the person, as something affected by physical causality; when, really, all that comprise us is physical.

You're right in that last part but I disagree that we have possibilities to act in other ways than we do, instead we have the illusion that we do. As for the notion of self I'm inclined to lean towards an epiphenomenon explanation for consciousness. We think we make decisions but in reality decisions are made and our consciousness is just the ghost in the machine.

Deepak Kapur said:
A cell is the basic unit of life (some may even call DNA to be so, at least philosophically). The problem ( as per my belief) is that cell is the effect of a phenomena where the final outcome is greater than the sum of its constituent parts. We just go after the physicallity of things whereas there are realms that are beyond mere physicallity. These are yet to be explored by science.

Prevoiusly scientists were 100% certain about the determinism of science. But with the advent of quantum mechanics they had to accept uncertainty as something ingraned in this universe ( maybe this uncertainty points to some sort of order in the distant future). Previously we had 4 dimensions, now M-theory talks of 11 ( an error of more than 70% within a few decades). I believe (may be wrongly) that life is not mere physicality of things but some kind of energy that arises ( or performs its role) when certain very-2 complicated and precise configurations of matter become possible randomly or by design. May be after 300 yeras or so, humans will create their own forms of life ( I am not just talking about genetically modified beings but those that will be created from the rudimentary material configurations, provided we get to know about the mechanism that instills the 'energy' of life in matter).

There is nothing that makes life special. When we say something is alive we mean that it has certain attributes compared to non-living things, in our experience this is caused by a vast collection of semi-contained chemical reactions that give rise to an organism. There is nothing that separates an organism from the components of that organism, no "energy" or anything like that. It's merely that different configurations give rise to different behaviours in a system and some of those behaviours are judged to be "life".
 
  • #34
disregardthat said:
What is a possibility then?

A measurement of likely hood when the factors are not known perfectly i.e. a coin toss is not 50/50 because all of the factors involved (if you could replicate mechanical forces, environmental factors etc perfectly the same thing would happen) but because we don't know them we can only say the probability. This is the basis of determinism, where it conflicts is with quantum effects that are inherently random.
 
  • #35
I'm sorry, I deleted the post before I was about to edit it.

Answering your post: A probability is a degree of confidence, but a possibility is an event that could happen. Why is it wrong to say that I could lift my arms in the air? Is this not a possibility even if I choose not to? See that whether my actions are predetermined or not does not come into question. It is a psychological thing.

Again, why is physical causality a constrain on the will? What does it constrain?
 
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  • #36
disregardthat said:
I'm sorry, I deleted the post before I was about to edit it.

Answering your post: Probability is a degree of confidence, but a possibility is an event that could happen. Why is it wrong to say that I could lift my arms in the air? Is this not a possibility even if I choose not to?

The problem is defining the terms. It is a possibility but whether or not you will or won't do it is determined. For example; I could eat something I don't like but if I'm offered a choice between my favourite meal and the one I detest the most In reality I'm never going to pick the last. So whilst it is feasible that I could eat the last it will never happen. It's the confusing part of this is the definition; what does possibility mean in a deterministic system? What does free mean in a deterministic system? What is will? What does free will mean in a random system?
 
  • #37
What is the will?

This coming down to he mind body distinction again. But, even if we were to say that the mind is the brain, then that wouldn't explain everything that goes on in the brain.
 
  • #38
disregardthat said:
I'm sorry, I deleted the post before I was about to edit it.

Answering your post: A probability is a degree of confidence, but a possibility is an event that could happen. Why is it wrong to say that I could lift my arms in the air? Is this not a possibility even if I choose not to? See that whether my actions are predetermined or not does not come into question. It is a psychological thing.

Again, why is physical causality a constrain on the will? What does it constrain?
First, I would say that if one takes a purely deterministic point of view, the train of thought of a mind is just as determined as any other 'physical' thing. You strongly imply that thought is purely thought, as you put it a psychological thing.
There was an interresting series on BBC a few years ago on conciousness. I just dug up the dvd copy of the vcr I made of the one show I caught, which dates the show to more than 10 years ago.
In it Professor Susan Greenfield, hosting the show was hooked up with a 'cap' of measuring electrical activity in her brain. All she was required to do was make a decision and then follow through with this decision. In this case it was trying to randomly pick one of two keys on the keyboard and then decide the moment to actually press the keyboard. The 'moment' that she pressed the key was over 2 seconds after brain activity indicated preparation for muscular movement. Her 'decision' of when to press the key had already taken place. Dr. Patrick Haggard, University College, London conducted experiments of this type.
In another portion split brain subjects,-radical treatment for epilepsy, saw two different words- one by each eye. Only one set of words was 'seen' but when the subjects were asked to draw a picture of the word they invariably drew a picture that meshed the meaning of both words -for example "glass" was 'seen' but "hour" was 'not seen' but they drew an hourglass. When asked to explain why they drew the hourglass, they made no reference to it 'probably' being conected to the 'unseen' word, instead they explained that they remembered talking recently about time and their watch and the hourglass idea just 'came to mind'. Prof. Michel Gazzaniga, Dartmouth College New Hampshire, conducted these type of experiments.
Conciousness is predominantly just a story teller, making our world-view remain 'consistent' and manageable.
Concious control of actions inevitably get's in the way of any type of performance,be it an athlete, musician for example. The vast majority of our day to day life is predominantly unconcious.
Conciousness is directly asociated with the verbal side of the brain (the left hemisphere). This conversation could be said to involve conscious behavior. In the end though, what makes any conversation 'interesting' for each individual are the ideas that 'come to mind'.
mathal
 
  • #39
mathal said:
In it Professor Susan Greenfield, hosting the show was hooked up with a 'cap' of measuring electrical activity in her brain. All she was required to do was make a decision and then follow through with this decision. In this case it was trying to randomly pick one of two keys on the keyboard and then decide the moment to actually press the keyboard. The 'moment' that she pressed the key was over 2 seconds after brain activity indicated preparation for muscular movement. Her 'decision' of when to press the key had already taken place. Dr. Patrick Haggard, University College, London conducted experiments of this type.

This is called the Libert's delay and is an interesting example of epiphenomenalism.
 
  • #40
Yes, I am familiar with the type of experiments which makes the observer capable of predicting behavior before the subject is aware of his choices. But in what sense is this capability of predicting the choice a constraint on the will of the subject? Why do we dismiss it as free? As I see it, the problem is the idea that the will is affected by physical causes. What is affected?

I do insist on that the idea of the will as free is problematic, but not because it is contradicted by physical causality.

The main points are these:
Can we imagine the will as free? Can we give an example of a free willed action? If not, what are we arguing against, and why does determinism matter?
 
  • #41
disregardthat said:
Can we imagine the will as free? Can we give an example of a free willed action? If not, what are we arguing against, and why does determinism matter?

I don't understand the questions. We act as if we have a free will. Why not assume that it is.
 
  • #42
Willowz said:
I don't understand the questions. We act as if we have a free will. Why not assume that it is.

If you believe

1) The mechanisms of the brain is the entire cause of behavior in human beings

and critically

2) This makes free will impossible

then the questions are perfectly valid.

If not, please explain why our will is free (I agree).
 
  • #43
disregardthat said:
1) The mechanisms of the brain is the entire cause of behavior in human beings

and critically

2) This makes free will impossible

then the questions are perfectly valid.

If not, please explain why our will is free (I agree).
That's a dishonest conclusion. Nobody yet knows the entire mechanisms of the brain. The conclusion is unwarranted.
 
  • #44
Willowz said:
That's a dishonest conclusion. Nobody yet knows the entire mechanisms of the brain. The conclusion is unwarranted.

This is not the place to throw out the "we can't know for certain" cliché. We know enough to conclude that it is indeed the mechanisms of the brain that causes all muscular movement for example.
 
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  • #45
We don't need to know the "entire mehanism" of the brain, we just need to know that every mechanism so far (memory, perception, prediction) has followed the same rational course that every other scientific study has. Big surprise.
 
  • #46
Pythagorean said:
We don't need to know the "entire mehanism" of the brain, we just need to know that every mechanism so far (memory, perception, prediction) has followed the same rational course that every other scientific study has. Big surprise.

I don't mean to be abrasive, but what do you mean by "rational course", that almost sounds like some scientific dogmatism.
 
  • #47
Willowz said:
I don't mean to be abrasive, but what do you mean by "rational course", that almost sounds like some scientific dogmatism.

Er...what? Why do you think that rational investigation is dogma :confused:
 
  • #48
Let's discuss determinism. And I'd first like an answer for proponents of determinism: What does it mean that something is determined? If an event A happens, why was A determined?
 
  • #49
disregardthat said:
Let's discuss determinism. And I'd first like an answer for proponents of determinism: What does it mean that something is determined? If an event A happens, why was A determined?

Because of causality. The determinist principle is that cause and effect are absolute. Therefore everything that happens is contingent on the past, in other words every atom of your and your environment's existence is governed by physical laws through time. Considering this the determinist would argue that we have no "free will" because there is no such thing as choice. Instead everything that happens is inevitable. So for a determinist the idea of "choice" is moot.

Compatibilism takes a different stance by saying that even in a deterministic universe free will is still possible. This is because whilst our choices may be inevitable we still make them and we still have the concept of choice. In other words we have the free will to make choices even if the choices we make are ultimately determined.

At the other end of the spectrum is metaphysical libertarianism. There's many schools of thought here but ultimately the argument is that there is something about an intelligent agent that is not subject to the same rules as the everything else. Many metaphysical libertarian ideas stem from the idea that there is something more than the physical world and that having a mind means that human beings are exempt from cause and effect when it comes to free will. Obviously this view is the one most favoured by religionists.
 
  • #50
ryan_m_b said:
Er...what? Why do you think that rational investigation is dogma :confused:
That's not what I meant. But, let me clarify. Scientists have operated on the principle of sufficient reason as a sort of pragmatic "code of conduct" (no mysticism). I think, people interested in science happen to believe in this blindly (science as some sort of religion). But, the people who actually do science nowadays would know better.

Leibniz's view said:
For every entity x, if x exists, then there is a sufficient explanation why x exists.
For every event e, if e occurs, then there is a sufficient explanation why e occurs.
For every proposition p, if p is true, then there is a sufficient explanation why p is true.
 
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  • #51
Let me go off the deep end here.

Say the mind operated on the quantum level in some respect. So, if quantum mechanics is not deterministic, then so isn't the mind and the resulting will. But, this is just speculation which I suspect won't be taken seriously.
 
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  • #52
Willowz said:
Let me go off the deep end here.

Say the mind operated on the quantum level in some respect. So, if quantum mechanics is not deterministic, then so isn't the mind and the resulting will. But, this is just speculation which I don't suspect to be taken seriously.

Taking into account quantum aspects then determinism changes from strictly deterministic to probabilistic. Either way it doesn't get around the fact that "will" is the result of uncontrolled cause.
 
  • #53
ryan_m_b said:
Taking into account quantum aspects then determinism changes from strictly deterministic to probabilistic. Either way it doesn't get around the fact that "will" is the result of uncontrolled cause.
The mere existence of a possibility that can be acted upon, gives rise to a free will.
 
  • #54
ryan_m_b said:
Because of causality. The determinist principle is that cause and effect are absolute. Therefore everything that happens is contingent on the past, in other words every atom of your and your environment's existence is governed by physical laws through time.

This is the answer I had hoped for.

I believe there is a grave mistake in this type of view.

Causality is the relationship between physical events. But what are such relationships? This can only be answered by referring to physical models. But models are descriptions, with built-in rules for inference. (e.g. Newtons laws of mechanics) The inferences are logical. Thus causality is simply a logical connection between descriptions of events, but has no fundamental connection to the physical world (other than that it is what that is described).

Models need not be mathematical models; the physical models we are familiar with. They can be simple (even primitive) forms of expressing relationships between events.

Just as the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, so too the only impossibility that exists is logical impossibility.

- Wittgenstein

You mention as an explanation (or example) of causality as the interaction between atoms. This is certainly correct, but in the proper manner of in the context of the models we have for atoms. I don't propose that we "just haven't got deep enough in the physics", nor that "causality is found at the "deepest" level of natural laws".

However, it seems to be very clear that what happens is inevitable. But this does not depend on causality. Rather, what is the meaning of the word inevitable? When do we use it, and why? If an event has happened, of course it is inevitable. This is actually a tautology. But can we ever say that an event is inevitable if it has not happened? Not by far. (We can predict the future to a certain degree, but the predictions are interpretations of the logical implications within a model for the phenomena we are describing, not carrying any fundamental connection with the actual physical phenomena).

The use of the word inevitable is misplaced in this context. "Everything that happened was inevitable" is meaningless (unless it is used in the fashion that we expected it to happen with great certainty, which is not what is meant by inevitability here). It is a linguistic error, it seems obvious since it always is obvious whenever used correctly. But a subtle change in the logical place of the word (unnoticably) lead us into believing it with absolute certainty.

Don't interpret this as me saying that everything is random (or worse: stochastic). I'm saying that determinism as a stance is an error of language, not of ontology (and that it is meaningless as an ontological fact).

The only reasonable use of the word deterministic as I can see is "a deterministic model".
 
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  • #55
Willowz said:
The mere existence of a possibility that can be acted upon, gives rise to a free will.

The probability comes from quantum effects only. I.e. a dropped ball may hit the ground or may just disappear (with a 1/1^10^10^10^10 chance). The fact that there are possibilities based on the chances that a quantum event may go one way or another does not change the fact that at macroscale levels everything is mechanical.

Another way of putting it is this:

I will flip a coin
If it is heads I will say "yes"
If it is tails I will say "no"

Let's propose this is a quantum coin. Regardless of how it goes I haven't really made a choice. The decision to partake in this endeavour and decide it's parameters was caused by all the phenomenon in my past. So in reality even with randomness the deterministic argument against free will holds.
 
  • #56
Ah. Makes sense. So, determinism implies an observer that cannot be within the deterministic system to call it deterministic. Truly, incoherent.
 
  • #57
disregardthat said:
But can we ever say that an event is inevitable if it has not happened? Not by far. (We can predict the future to a certain degree, but the predictions are interpretations of the logical implications within a model for the phenomena we are describing, not carrying any fundamental connection with the actual physical phenomena).

There is a great problem with the semantics of this issue. However I disagree with this statement partially. Arguably the future is inevitable in the sense that there are a number of possible futures with different likelihoods born out of the fundamental probabilistic nature of the universe. For example, it is most like that if I throw a rock at my neighbours window it is most likely that it will break and my neighbour will call the police. There is a smaller chance that my rock will phase right through the house, this will cause different effects i.e. my neighbour will never know what I tried to do.

Regardless of if the universe is fundamentally deterministic or not the argument still stands that "free will" in the sense of being able to take any path available is fallacious.
 
  • #58
Willowz said:
Ah. Makes sense. So, determinism implies an observer that cannot be within the deterministic system to call it deterministic. Truly, incoherent.

Sorry? I don't get how you concluded this.
 
  • #59
ryan_m_b said:
The probability comes from quantum effects only. I.e. a dropped ball may hit the ground or may just disappear (with a 1/1^10^10^10^10 chance). The fact that there are possibilities based on the chances that a quantum event may go one way or another does not change the fact that at macroscale levels everything is mechanical.

Another way of putting it is this:

I will flip a coin
If it is heads I will say "yes"
If it is tails I will say "no"

Let's propose this is a quantum coin. Regardless of how it goes I haven't really made a choice. The decision to partake in this endeavour and decide it's parameters was caused by all the phenomenon in my past. So in reality even with randomness the deterministic argument against free will holds.
I don't think it's randomness but indeterminacy.
 
  • #60
ryan_m_b said:
Sorry? I don't get how you concluded this.
I was referring to disregardthat previous post. But, I'm getting ahead of myself. Time to shut up.
 

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