Does the world operate deterministically?

[moving finger]

Now, this thread is in the philosophy section, you have to first understand this unusual for me (I prefer the mathematics and physics "rigor"/constraints/reductions: bias choice), so forgive me for all my non-orthodox philosophical words.

I apologise if I seem to be forcing the debate onto unfamiliar terrirory. Please understand that I am open-minded and rational, and my only objective is truth and understanding. If it helps to discuss these concepts and issues in mathematical terms then I shall do my best to cooperate within my abilities.

However, I may try to answer to some of your questions with my own knowledge.
Note that this is a personal opinion, who tries, when I am able to, to make logical assertions based only with logical deductions. However, as a human being, I often make mistakes (i.e. what I can say may be false or the worse totally stupid :).

Believe it or not, I am human too, and (as you know already) I do make mistakes. Mistakes are nothing to be ashamed of – only “refusing to admit a mistake” is something we should be ashamed of.

First, if you look at the physical theories (e.g. Newtonian mechanics, special/general relativity, Quantum physics), you will note that no one really defines the determinism. When this label is used within these theories, it is rather an ad hoc construction/deduction/choice. This is why I cannot say I have a determinism definition or may be causality definition.
In this post, I will mix “causality” with “determinism” as long as I (personal) think it is not important for the debate (I think I understand better “causality” rather than “determinism” “concepts” ;).

Hmmm. OK, but I have a problem with the concepts surrounding the word “causality”. As a scientist familiar with QM, you are obviously aware that there is little (if any) evidence for causality at the quantum level. Quantum events simply seem (experimentally) to “happen” without any prior “cause” being identifiable, whereas macroscopic events seem (intuitively) to always have some “cause”. It may be the case, therefore, that causality is not present at the quantum level and “emerges” as a possible epistemic “macroscopic illusion”. For this reason I am always very wary of arguments based on a concept of “causality”.

I have rather multiple definitions of causality (and may be determinism). I have given some examples, in a previous post of how these labels may are defined in given physical theories.

Now, if I have to give you what I think could be a common denominator between all these definitions (of causality: easier to defined than determinism for me ;), I would say:
Causality is when there exists of a partial ordering relation (represented by a symbol label “ -->”: A -->B) on the elements of a given ZFC set.

Hmmm. Can you translate this into plain English please?
In plain English, does “ A-->B” mean something like “if A then necessarily B”?
(This to me could indeed represent a causal relation. It could also represent a deterministic relation, in the sense that B is determined by A.)

This is what I think, the more abstract and concrete definition of causality (i.e. I am assuming already restrictions: the domain of validity of definition: ZFC sets).
The only advantage of this definition is that I can always define such an ordering relation as long as I stay with the ZFC axiomatic sets: we can always construct logical causal structures (~local determinism).
In other words, with this type of definition, the existence of a causality property (or may be the determinism t.b.d.) in a system is a matter of [logical] choice rather than an a priori obligation (~ontology).

I do not understand this. Are you saying that the relation “ A-->B” is an epistemic property of the given set (it somehow depends on our knowledge), and not an ontic property (is independent of our knowledge)? Can you elaborate please?

Now, If I look at your definition, the first problem I see is that you, implicitly (as I interpret it), assume that there should only be one definition for this label. How can you logically conclude that?

What “label” are you referring to please?
By “label” do you mean the word “determinism”?
If your answer is yes, then (with respect) surely the whole concept of a definition (the “definition of a definition” if you like) is that a label should have a unique definition. Are you suggesting one should allow multiple, possibly conflicting, definitions for the same label?

Take your symbolic labelling “A-->B” for example. Is it legitimate for me to also suggest (as you do) that you implicitly (as I interpret it), assume that there should only be one definition for this label? To use your logic : How can you logically conclude that?

The answer to this is : One must “define” in advance the symbolic labelling to “mean”, insofar as possible, something unique and unambiguous. If one does not define this in advance then the symbolic notation “ A-->B” means nothing. Going back to the word “determinism” we must do the same thing, we must choose (define) a meaning for the word before we can usefully use it in a logical argument.

In addition, if you assume that there is a single definition, the main problem becomes its undefined domain of validity:

Again, the entire concept of a “definition” is to have, insofar as possible, a unique and unambiguous semantic meaning for a particular word. Or, if the meaning is context-dependent, to specify the nature of that dependency.

Definition of Determinism
The universe, or any self-contained part thereof, is said to be evolving deterministically if it has only one possible state at time t1 which is consistent with its state at some previous time t0 and with all the laws of nature.

Your are using many undefined (context dependant) words like: universe, self-contained part, evolution, states and time, “consistent”, previous (i.e. you are implicitly assuming an ordering relation: partial, total ? etc ...), “laws of nature”. As long as I have no logical ground to attach these words, it is rather difficult for me to understand your definition without making my own implicit assumptions.

I agree, and that is why my definition does not translate easily to a rigorous mathematical definition. But with respect, this is true of the definitions of most words.

Currently I only know one tool to make logical deductions: mathematics.

Perhaps I could introduce you to “logic”? Mathematical logic is a particular subset of logic, but not all logic is necessarily expressed in mathematical terms.

Therefore, I need that you attach all your words to mathematics. For example, does a state is an element of a set (ZF axiomatics?)? If yes, what set? What do you mean by consistent, in this context? Etc ...

I understand the problem. But just as you have problems debating issues in logic outside of mathematics, so I have problems translating everything into mathematics. I will study this and get back to you.

In your definition, I may decide to add a parameter to all the “true” states, we human can take as “true”, or “consitent” (the “past”, the “present” and the “future”). (up to you to adapt these words such they are consistent with your own implicit assumptions and definition). In addition, if I suppose that the collection of these parameters is a ZFC set (my freedom with you definition), I may define, a posteriori an ordering relation on these parameters (existence). Now if I assume that these parameters are what you call “time”, I have defined an ad hoc causality relation, i.e. the “universe” may be deterministic.
Therefore, assuming only the ZFC set, I conclude I know that the universe is deterministic. Great, isn’t it?

I fail to see above how you get from the assumption “the ‘universe’ may be deterministic” to your conclusion “the universe is deterministic”.? Can you explain please?

Well, now, the main question, what type of new “useful” information does this property bring?
I think it explains well the fact that I may choose the universe to be deterministic or non-deterministic, just by selecting my own definition (choice).

I think you and I have a problem communicating, which is deeper than the “English language/mathematical” barrier.
The purpose of my post is NOT to show by logic alone that the universe is either determinisitic or indeterministic depending upon one’s choice of definition. I do not personally believe that this can be proven (by logic alone) one way or another (and I suppose that this is what you have been trying to show)
.
The purpose of my post is instead to show that “given an agreed definition of determinism, the experimental evidence of QM does not allow us to conclude whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic”.

Physics mainly focus on the explanation of the experimental results. What additionnal usefull information bring the ontology to such a choice?

I would be very happy if you agree that physics provides only an epistemic view of the world, and tells us nothing of ontic value – this would in effect accord with my ideas in this thread – that QM allows us to make conclusions about epistemic properties of determinism, but does not allow us to make any conclusions about the ontic properties of determinism. Is this in effect what you are trying to say here?

MF

 

[seratend]

Hmmm. OK, but I have a problem with the concepts surrounding the word “causality”. As a scientist familiar with QM, you are obviously aware that there is little (if any) evidence for causality at the quantum level. Quantum events simply seem (experimentally) to “happen” without any prior “cause” being identifiable, whereas macroscopic events seem (intuitively) to always have some “cause”. It may be the case, therefore, that causality is not present at the quantum level and “emerges” as a possible epistemic “macroscopic illusion”. For this reason I am always very wary of arguments based on a concept of “causality”.

Well, we are now in the world of interpretation of physics where we can say almost all what we want if it does not change the theory predictions (otherwise we must construct a new theory).
I think you are making implicit assumptions (/interpretations) concerning the use of the word “causality” in QM. In my modest opinion, this is the source of much confusion with QM.
In QM, we may simply notice the words we need to use in this theory are very different from their usual definition (dictionary). Most of the words of QM are first introduced by an analogy with the words definitions at the classical limit of the QM theory (position, momentum, etc ...): they are only labels that reflect the experimental results. Many interpretations are based on this classical limit. However, we are now with interpretations: as long as they do not change the theory predictions (taking the words as simple labels of the theory definition), we are free to choose the one we prefer (choice): we have many possible interpretations (orthodox view, CI, MWI, Bohmian, MMI, etc ...).
Now, let’s say that we decide that causality applies to the states of quantum systems: given an initial state, an observable, a value we know surely the new state (collapse postulate). Therefore, I may define a causality function in QM (and a deterministic evolution), if I want.
Now, you can say this is not the “real” causality definition (your choice). However, for me it is one possible abstract causality definition of QM (my choice). However, I accept both possibilities as long as they do not change the theory.

Hmmm. Can you translate this into plain English please?
In plain English, does “ A-->B” mean something like “if A then necessarily B”?
(This to me could indeed represent a causal relation. It could also represent a deterministic relation, in the sense that B is determined by A.)

Your answer is surprising and underlines may be some mutual understanding problem (your intrinsic need to associate the adequate English words to labels, while I do not reall care). It is unusual for me to discuss with philosophers, but interesting to understand the communication problems when the common knowledge ground is somewhat different ; ).
“-->” is the label of a partial ordering relation (I could have used R or f or whatever you want).
If the relation has the additional property to be a functional relation (i.e. A-->B, A-->C => B=C), then you have what I think you implicitly (for me) call a deterministic relation.
You can say A then necessarily B, even if I am not sure of the implicit definition (and conclusions you may attach to “necessarily”. For me it is just a simple mathematic formal definition.

I do not understand this. Are you saying that the relation “ A-->B” is an epistemic property of the given set (it somehow depends on our knowledge), and not an ontic property (is independent of our knowledge)? Can you elaborate please?

Well, if your knowledge can be mapped (at least a representation) into a ZFC set, then we can define (choice) what I think you call an epistemic property on this representation.
However, we may have other choices. For example in bohmian mechanics formulation of QM, we define an external new property (ontic property): the path of a particle (where the path word is chosen with the classical mechanics analogy). Based on this new property, we may define a new causality relation definition (another choice) and this time, I think this is what you call an ontic property (we choose to explain the theory with the path of particle and the causality we define on it).

What “label” are you referring to please?
By “label” do you mean the word “determinism”?

Sorry, Yes I mean “determinisn”

If your answer is yes, then (with respect) surely the whole concept of a definition (the “definition of a definition” if you like) is that a label should have a unique definition. Are you suggesting one should allow multiple, possibly conflicting, definitions for the same label?

Yes, but one is true at time: I have chosen the word label (the identifier of the concept if you want) to try to remove implicit assumptions (may be it is not the better “word” ; ). In mathematics, we define objects and attach a label to these objects.
For example the label “ssezrzer” may represent a function relation (a mapping), a relation, a set, a property, etc ...
However, “at a time”, it only represents one definition (required by my basic logic) otherwise we will have to accept the definition of a new objects that are something more complicated than the usual ones I am currently able to use. In other words to use 2 incompatible definitions at time in my basic logic, I must attach a different label (e.g. determinism1, determinism2, etc ...) to solve the possible logic conflicts.

Take your symbolic labelling “A-->B” for example. Is it legitimate for me to also suggest (as you do) that you implicitly (as I interpret it), assume that there should only be one definition for this label? To use your logic : How can you logically conclude that?

The answer to this is : One must “define” in advance the symbolic labelling to “mean”, insofar as possible, something unique and unambiguous. If one does not define this in advance then the symbolic notation “ A-->B” means nothing. Going back to the word “determinism” we must do the same thing, we must choose (define) a meaning for the word before we can usefully use it in a logical argument.

Well, we may proceed differently (another point of view, I am playing within the possibility of words): we may define a single property “determinism” and call determinist any object that has this property. Therefore, in this aspect we have many determinist definitions (the definitions where the determinism property is true).
For example, in my common denominator function of causality, I just define such a property: any ordering relation is a causality relation. If I define, for example, now “determinism” as an additional property (let’s say the relation is a functional relation), any ordering functional relation is determinist.
However, our problem is that I am using words as labels: they are only defined relatively to a context while you seem to want an absolute definition that holds for different contexts. This is, I think a personal choice and not a fundamental need. My choice tries only to reflect what I see (In a dictionary for one word, most of the time I have several definitions: e.g. the word Earth is such an example, it is what I call a label to different meanings/definitions). However, we can create a new labelling such that we have a simple one to one correspondence (once again it is a choice).

Again, the entire concept of a “definition” is to have, insofar as possible, a unique and unambiguous semantic meaning for a particular word. Or, if the meaning is context-dependent, to specify the nature of that dependency.

I agree, therefore I think you need to specify the context of your definition to avoid the implicit interpretations. In other words, I have specified the context of my causality definition: the ZFC axiomatic set theory. With you definition, I do not know what I can assume for granted and not (consistence pb)

I agree, and that is why my definition does not translate easily to a rigorous mathematical definition. But with respect, this is true of the definitions of most words.

Well, if the context of this thread is really words significations (without a given logic ground selection, nor a context), I am completely lost. In addition if the context is a not science theory, how can you apply conclusions to science
I currently see no practical need for a determinism definition/conclusions that are independent of physical theories (using the word determinism in conversations in pubs is not current nowadays ; ). However, for philosophers (pubs ; ), I may understand this can be important. However for me, it is difficult to understand why (may be I am too short minded?).
You must understand me; I voluntarily [try to] reduce the words to labels in the context of a theory (physical or mathematical) in order to make logical deductions (basic binary logic). I admit that I do not know all the theories (personal knowledge restriction and brain capacity :) and I try to take into account these restrictions when I try to answer. Without that, I am in a terra incognita.
Therefore, if you want to create an “ontic” definition of determinism, I will say great, that’s all (and surely I will use it and adapt it to the context of physical theories).
Note, that I still have not find a usefull application of the word “god” to a physical theory.

Perhaps I could introduce you to “logic”? Mathematical logic is a particular subset of logic, but not all logic is necessarily expressed in mathematical terms.

Yes I will appreciate it (i have always been reluctant/frightened to extend my logical knowledge). Currently, I only understand my binary logic within the usual classical mathematical context (mainly the ZF axiomatic basis) that can be extended somewhat to multivalued logic.
Can you explain what you intend by “not all logic is necessarily expressed in mathematical terms”? (or may be give a simple example in order to understand better what you assume in this sentence).

I fail to see above how you get from the assumption “the ‘universe’ may be deterministic” to your conclusion “the universe is deterministic”.? Can you explain please?

Well I thought I was clear (even if my English is poor ;):
In the beginning of the sentence I have used “I may define ... an ordering relation”. Therefore, I ended with the “universe may be deterministic”. In the last sentence, I assume (true) the ZFC set, this assumption implies the existence of an ordering relation (with some properties), therefore, this time (true), I conclude the universe is deterministic. This is only deductions.

I think you and I have a problem communicating, which is deeper than the “English language/mathematical” barrier.
The purpose of my post is NOT to show by logic alone that the universe is either determinisitic or indeterministic depending upon one’s choice of definition. I do not personally believe that this can be proven (by logic alone) one way or another (and I suppose that this is what you have been trying to show)
.
The purpose of my post is instead to show that “given an agreed definition of determinism, the experimental evidence of QM does not allow us to conclude whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic”.

This is the general problem of communication. Due to the multiple word meanings and without a common context and ground (to solve the implicit assumptions), most of the time one do not understand the other one. This is why I implicitly choose the mathematical/physics bias/constraint (to define a common ground). However now we are in the philosophy domain and I am lost.
However, if you choose to allow all the possibilities to get an agreed definition (e.g. by the context by the definition update), just say that at the beginning: I think we have already your conclusion. No need to develop to conclude “given an agreed definition of determinism, the experimental evidence of QM does not allow us to conclude whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic”, because I am not even sure that we can have an agreed definition (by a universal mutual agreement ; ).

I would be very happy if you agree that physics provides only an epistemic view of the world, and tells us nothing of ontic value – this would in effect accord with my ideas in this thread – that QM allows us to make conclusions about epistemic properties of determinism, but does not allow us to make any conclusions about the ontic properties of determinism. Is this in effect what you are trying to say here?

As long as I choose the epistemic view of physics, yes (the shut up and calculate choice). However, I may choose to define on ontic point view (this is what I call the interpretation of physics). This is another choice that is in general well separated from the “epistemic” part. However, it may lead to paradoxes (e.g. if the ontic part is not completely independent from the epistemic part: e.g. the reality problem of the path of a bohmian particle in QM associated with the formal collapse postulate)

Seratend.

 

[moving finger]

Well, we are now in the world of interpretation of physics where we can say almost all what we want if it does not change the theory predictions (otherwise we must construct a new theory).

Would you perhaps prefer that we make no “interpretation of physics”?
Why are “theory predictions” sacrosanct? Surely the only important issue is whether the “interpretation” agrees with the “experimental results”.

I think you are making implicit assumptions (/interpretations) concerning the use of the word “causality” in QM. In my modest opinion, this is the source of much confusion with QM.

My apologies. You introduced the word “causality” into this thread – rather than me make implicit assumptions perhaps you can define exactly what you mean by causality, so that the “confusion” can be removed?

In QM, we may simply notice the words we need to use in this theory are very different from their usual definition (dictionary). Most of the words of QM are first introduced by an analogy with the words definitions at the classical limit of the QM theory (position, momentum, etc ...): they are only labels that reflect the experimental results.

Yes, you have mentioned this before – that “words in QM may have different meanings” – and I have asked you to clarify by defining for example “determinism”, but (with respect) you seem to wish to prevaricate.

Many interpretations are based on this classical limit. However, we are now with interpretations: as long as they do not change the theory predictions (taking the words as simple labels of the theory definition), we are free to choose the one we prefer (choice): we have many possible interpretations (orthodox view, CI, MWI, Bohmian, MMI, etc ...).

Now you are talking about “interpretations of QM”. Are you suggesting that each of these interpretations has a different “meaning” for concepts such as “causality” and “determinism”?

Now, let’s say that we decide that causality applies to the states of quantum systems: given an initial state, an observable, a value we know surely the new state (collapse postulate).

Sorry, what is the “collapse postulate”?

Therefore, I may define a causality function in QM (and a deterministic evolution), if I want.
Now, you can say this is not the “real” causality definition (your choice). However, for me it is one possible abstract causality definition of QM (my choice). However, I accept both possibilities as long as they do not change the theory.

I disagree. I would say one could accept both possibilities as long as they do not conflict with experimental results. Surely it is the result of experiment, and not the prediction of theory, which determines the validity of a possible definition?

In plain English, does “ A-->B” mean something like “if A then necessarily B”?
(This to me could indeed represent a causal relation. It could also represent a deterministic relation, in the sense that B is determined by A.)

Your answer is surprising and underlines may be some mutual understanding problem (your intrinsic need to associate the adequate English words to labels, while I do not reall care).

With respect, I did not “answer”, I asked you a question. You introduced a new expression “ A-->B” into our discussion, why should it be surprising to you that I ask you to define what it means?

My ”intrinsic need”, as you call it, is an attempt to reach a common understanding, rather than to continue with obfuscation. With respect, I might also say that you have an “intrinsic need” to reduce everything to mathematics, or that “I do not really care what mathematical symbols you use”, but that would not really help us very much in communicating would it?

It is unusual for me to discuss with philosophers, but interesting to understand the communication problems when the common knowledge ground is somewhat different ; ).

What makes you think I am a philosopher? Maybe it is unusual for me to discuss with someone who finds it hard to communicate in anything but mathematics, but so what?

“-->” is the label of a partial ordering relation (I could have used R or f or whatever you want).
If the relation has the additional property to be a functional relation (i.e. A-->B, A-->C => B=C), then you have what I think you implicitly (for me) call a deterministic relation.
You can say A then necessarily B, even if I am not sure of the implicit definition (and conclusions you may attach to “necessarily”. For me it is just a simple mathematic formal definition.

I believe the symbolism that you suggest “A-->B”, based on your (with respect, reluctant) explanation, is probably accurately expressed in English as “if A then necessarily B”.

I do not understand this. Are you saying that the relation “ A-->B” is an epistemic property of the given set (it somehow depends on our knowledge), and not an ontic property (is independent of our knowledge)? Can you elaborate please?

Well, if your knowledge can be mapped (at least a representation) into a ZFC set, then we can define (choice) what I think you call an epistemic property on this representation.
However, we may have other choices. For example in bohmian mechanics formulation of QM, we define an external new property (ontic property): the path of a particle (where the path word is chosen with the classical mechanics analogy). Based on this new property, we may define a new causality relation definition (another choice) and this time, I think this is what you call an ontic property (we choose to explain the theory with the path of particle and the causality we define on it).

Sorry, this still makes no sense to me.
It seems that you are saying the truth of the statement “A-->B” depends on the QM interpretation that we choose to use? Is that correct?
If yes, does this mean that the truth of the statement “A-->B” is subjective?

surely the whole concept of a definition (the “definition of a definition” if you like) is that a label should have a unique definition. Are you suggesting one should allow multiple, possibly conflicting, definitions for the same label?

Yes, but one is true at time: I have chosen the word label (the identifier of the concept if you want) to try to remove implicit assumptions (may be it is not the better “word” ; ). In mathematics, we define objects and attach a label to these objects.

Well that’s good, because in common language we do the same – we define a word (object) and attach labels (definitions) to these words (objects). Sometimes it may not be as rigorous as in mathematics, but we find that it tends to be much more flexible and useful for communication.

For example the label “ssezrzer” may represent a function relation (a mapping), a relation, a set, a property, etc ...
However, “at a time”, it only represents one definition (required by my basic logic) otherwise we will have to accept the definition of a new objects that are something more complicated than the usual ones I am currently able to use. In other words to use 2 incompatible definitions at time in my basic logic, I must attach a different label (e.g. determinism1, determinism2, etc ...) to solve the possible logic conflicts.

OK. I can accept that there are multiple definitions of “determinism”, differentiated by “determinism1”, “determinism2” etc. Now, can we define “determinism1” as I suggested in my first post, and proceed from there? Or do you still have a problem with this?

Take your symbolic labelling “A-->B” for example. Is it legitimate for me to also suggest (as you do) that you implicitly (as I interpret it), assume that there should only be one definition for this label? To use your logic : How can you logically conclude that?

The answer to this is : One must “define” in advance the symbolic labelling to “mean”, insofar as possible, something unique and unambiguous. If one does not define this in advance then the symbolic notation “ A-->B” means nothing.

Agreed, which is why I asked you “what does it mean”, which you then seemed “surprised” that I should ask, and reluctant to answer. We now seem to “agree” that any symbols (bet they mathematical symbols or words) need clear definition. Wow.

Going back to the word “determinism” we must do the same thing, we must choose (define) a meaning for the word before we can usefully use it in a logical argument.
That is exactly why I offered definitions in my first post in this thread. Those definitions may not have been “mathematical” definitions, they were in fact English language definitions, but that is hardly the point.

Well, we may proceed differently (another point of view, I am playing within the possibility of words): we may define a single property “determinism” and call determinist any object that has this property.

That is your choice.

Therefore, in this aspect we have many determinist definitions (the definitions where the determinism property is true).

No. From what you have said, it follows only that we may possibly have many objects which have determinist properties, but it does not follow that we would have many determinist “definitions”. The only “definitions” we have allowed in this context are (1) the definition of “determinism” and (2) the definition of “determinist”. It does not follow from this that this leads to many determinist definitions.

For example, in my common denominator function of causality,

What is a “common denominator function of causality”?

If I define, for example, now “determinism” as an additional property (let’s say the relation is a functional relation), any ordering functional relation is determinist.
However, our problem is that I am using words as labels: they are only defined relatively to a context while you seem to want an absolute definition that holds for different contexts.

I agree some definitions can be contextual.
This is why the definition needs to take account of the context in which the word is used.
Can you explain how you think the meaning of determinism as defined in my first post could be contextual?

Again, the entire concept of a “definition” is to have, insofar as possible, a unique and unambiguous semantic meaning for a particular word. Or, if the meaning is context-dependent, to specify the nature of that dependency.

I agree, therefore I think you need to specify the context of your definition to avoid the implicit interpretations. In other words, I have specified the context of my causality definition: the ZFC axiomatic set theory. With you definition, I do not know what I can assume for granted and not (consistence pb)

I believe this gets back to making the definition meaningful in mathematical terms. We may have to agree to disagree here.

I agree, and that is why my definition does not translate easily to a rigorous mathematical definition. But with respect, this is true of the definitions of most words.

Well, if the context of this thread is really words significations (without a given logic ground selection, nor a context), I am completely lost. In addition if the context is a not science theory, how can you apply conclusions to science

The context of this thread, and the entire forum, is an attempt at understanding. Most participants in the forum communicate in the English language rather than in mathematics. If you are saying that you can only accept a mathematical discussion, and not an English language discussion, then with respect I think we are wasting our time continuing.

I currently see no practical need for a determinism definition/conclusions that are independent of physical theories (using the word determinism in conversations in pubs is not current nowadays ; ). However, for philosophers (pubs ; ), I may understand this can be important. However for me, it is difficult to understand why (may be I am too short minded?).

I did not suggest that a definition of determinism needs to be independent of physical theories. For most of us, an English language definition of concepts is important, but perhaps not for all of us.

You must understand me; I voluntarily [try to] reduce the words to labels in the context of a theory (physical or mathematical) in order to make logical deductions (basic binary logic). I admit that I do not know all the theories (personal knowledge restriction and brain capacity :) and I try to take into account these restrictions when I try to answer. Without that, I am in a terra incognita.

And with respect, you must understand me, I try to interpret symbols in terms of meanings, and conveying meaning requires communication, and it seems we have trouble communicating. Sorry.

Therefore, if you want to create an “ontic” definition of determinism, I will say great, that’s all (and surely I will use it and adapt it to the context of physical theories).
Note, that I still have not find a usefull application of the word “god” to a physical theory.

You have no need of that hypothesis?

I fail to see above how you get from the assumption “the ‘universe’ may be deterministic” to your conclusion “the universe is deterministic”.? Can you explain please?

Well I thought I was clear (even if my English is poor ;):
In the beginning of the sentence I have used “I may define ... an ordering relation”. Therefore, I ended with the “universe may be deterministic”. In the last sentence, I assume (true) the ZFC set, this assumption implies the existence of an ordering relation (with some properties), therefore, this time (true), I conclude the universe is deterministic. This is only deductions.

You conclude determinism logically from the prior assumption of an ordering relation? OK, but this is (with respect) not the idea I was trying to convey. As explained, the purpose of my original post was instead to show that “given an agreed definition of determinism, the experimental evidence of QM does not allow us to conclude whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic”.

I think you and I have a problem communicating, which is deeper than the “English language/mathematical” barrier.
The purpose of my post is NOT to show by logic alone that the universe is either determinisitic or indeterministic depending upon one’s choice of definition. I do not personally believe that this can be proven (by logic alone) one way or another (and I suppose that this is what you have been trying to show)
.
The purpose of my post is instead to show that “given an agreed definition of determinism, the experimental evidence of QM does not allow us to conclude whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic”.

This is the general problem of communication. Due to the multiple word meanings and without a common context and ground (to solve the implicit assumptions), most of the time one do not understand the other one. This is why I implicitly choose the mathematical/physics bias/constraint (to define a common ground). However now we are in the philosophy domain and I am lost.

I think we will not resolve this. It seems to me that you are insisting I must translate my argument into mathematics for it to have any relevance to you, and I am saying that I do not have the mathematical skills to do that. Perhaps we must simply agree to disagree.

However, if you choose to allow all the possibilities to get an agreed definition (e.g. by the context by the definition update), just say that at the beginning: I think we have already your conclusion. No need to develop to conclude “given an agreed definition of determinism, the experimental evidence of QM does not allow us to conclude whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic”, because I am not even sure that we can have an agreed definition (by a universal mutual agreement ; ).

An “agreed definition” need not be universal – in the context of a debate it needs to be agreed only between the debating parties. Why are you not sure that we can have an agreed definition?

As long as I choose the epistemic view of physics, yes (the shut up and calculate choice). However, I may choose to define on ontic point view (this is what I call the interpretation of physics). This is another choice that is in general well separated from the “epistemic” part. However, it may lead to paradoxes (e.g. if the ontic part is not completely independent from the epistemic part: e.g. the reality problem of the path of a bohmian particle in QM associated with the formal collapse postulate)

Can you explain this paradox in more detail please? My understanding is that there is no “collapse postulate” in Bohmian mechanics?

MF

 

[seratend]

Originally Posted by seratend
Your answer is surprising and underlines may be some mutual understanding problem (your intrinsic need to associate the adequate English words to labels, while I do not reall care).

With respect, I did not “answer”, I asked you a question. You introduced a new expression “ A-->B” into our discussion, why should it be surprising to you that I ask you to define what it means?

I am sorry, but I am very disappointed by your post, I have found it unconstructive (too many questions, very few answers) and very difficult to understand the place where you want to go. [However, I see this is no more true in the second part of your post].

I have selected the above section of your post, just to underline our current problem: the word meanings in a discussion between 2 persons without a common ground.
I think (or may be I understand, may be it’s wrong) that you need to get some truth behind every words you use while I do not (my labelling preference). I do not mean that your choice (whatever it could be) is true or false, I just say that we have many possibilities (our choices) and we should take them into account in such a discussion. In other words, both parts need to build a common ground, and it is very difficult when we get misunderstandings and almost only questions from one side.

Your reply (now I try to avoid the word answer ; ) and the subsequent questions in this section perfectly highlights this problem. You have interpreted the word “your answer” in my reply as an answer to a question while it was simply meaning “your reply” in this context (my context).
You may argue that, in good English the answer word must be applied to a question, however, I think you are also able to understand the context of the post to make some basic deductions. If it is not the case, we are just playing with words and it is not very constructive (at least for me).

I understand you better now, you are in the mode “I write” (a definition always selects one word) and I am in the mode “I read” (from a word, and a partly known context, I have to recover a single definition: not always possible). This is why, generally, I prefer the mathematics and physics restrictions: we loose less time in communicating and defining a common context/ground.
Now, as long as you cannot understand both modes of communication, we are in troubles: I understand that you cannot understand my words. However, do you understand the same thing applies to your words?

I believe the symbolism that you suggest “A-->B”, based on your (with respect, reluctant) explanation, is probably accurately expressed in English as “if A then necessarily B”.

Well, even with symbols, we may have the problem of implicit associations! I should have used instead of “A-->B”, P(A,B) where P is a proposition that depends on 2 parameters A and B. This proposition is only defined by the following properties:

P(A,A) is true
If P(A,B) true and P(B,A) true then necessarily A=B
If P(A,B) true and P(B,C) true then necessarily A=C

Seratend edit: big mistake, I hope everyone has corrected it:we should not read:
If P(A,B) true and P(B,C) true then necessarily A=C
but rather:
If P(A,B) true and P(B,C) true then necessarily P(A,C)
(this is the well known transitivity relation on the partial ordering relation)
(shame on me ! errare humanum est : )
end of edit

Therefore, I think the interpretation of the sentence “if A then necessarily B” may be adequate and sometimes inadequate: we may have several possibilities (to be choosen before the use of the property P(A,B)):
* P(A,B) is A equivalent to B or
* P(A,B) is A equals B
* P(A,B) is A included in B
* P(A,B) is A => B
* P(A,B) is B => A
etc ...
Therefore, If you decide to use the English words “if A then necessarily B” instead of “P(A,B)” or “A -->B”, please do not try to attach any other intrinsic meaning. The only true definition that applies to the word you select for conveniance is the properties cited above (and not its definition in a dictionary).

Originally Posted by seratend
Yes, but one is true at time: I have chosen the word label (the identifier of the concept if you want) to try to remove implicit assumptions (may be it is not the better “word” ; ). In mathematics, we define objects and attach a label to these objects.

Well that’s good, because in common language we do the same – we define a word (object) and attach labels (definitions) to these words (objects). Sometimes it may not be as rigorous as in mathematics, but we find that it tends to be much more flexible and useful for communication.

Thanks a lot: we may get our first common ground in this discussion and explain some of the problems we have encountered:

(me) objects <--~--> labels (you)

If we understand that the definition meaning is common for us. Otherwise we still have some problems (and I think there may be)

(me) label <--~--> word (you)

and the understanding problems:

(me) object is equivalent to a definition [versus] (you) word is equivalent to an object

(you) label is equivalent to a definition [versus] (me) object is equivalent to a definition

We are thus using inverse procedures (and I think I remember a long time ago a course on that):
You are using a definition to identify a single word, the object (what a brain normally does to speak) and I use a word to identify a single definition (what a brain normally does to understand)!

This explains well the confusion on the word “label”, “word” and, definitively, I am lost in this country.

In your language, can we say that 2 different definitions may call the same word?
Can you confirm that (at least for what I have expressed as your part)?

Note: to avoid non-useful comments, what I have written above does not mean that your language choice is worse or better, just they are different.

Therefore, to use your words, I need a context and effectively we may use the word determinism1 to choose unambiguously your definition of determinism (I have a headache now).

Originally Posted by seratend
The answer to this is : One must “define” in advance the symbolic labelling to “mean”, insofar as possible, something unique and unambiguous. If one does not define this in advance then the symbolic notation “ A-->B” means nothing.

Agreed, which is why I asked you “what does it mean”, which you then seemed “surprised” that I should ask, and reluctant to answer. We now seem to “agree” that any symbols (bet they mathematical symbols or words) need clear definition. Wow.

It was not originally posted by seratend but by yourself. It is a pleasure for me to check that you are self-consistent with yourself! : ).
Now, in the context of what I understand you may say, I am not sure I understand at all this post section.

I give up, for the moment, for your comments in definitions (as I am afraid we may have again some mutual comprehension problem).

Can you explain how you think the meaning of determinism as defined in my first post could be contextual?

Just by the words used in the definition of determism1 (you write, I read therefore I interpret if I have not a sufficient context/ground/reference).
In order to be able to understand your definition of determinism1, one must know what single definition applies to each word (note: this just an extreme view). However, if, in your definition of determinism1, you allow one to choose its own definition for each word, we have not one determinsm1 definition, but a collection of determinsm1, 2 etc ... definitions that may be use for determinism1.

For example: I may choose for the word t1 a real number, a vector space, a set, a state of a hilbert space etc...
I may choose as the definition of the universe, a collection of sets, a separable hilbert space, a Lorentzian manifold etc ... (I also may choose other definitions where I cannot apply my logic).

I believe this gets back to making the definition meaningful in mathematical terms. We may have to agree to disagree here.

Not necessarily: i am flexible (or i try to). The advantage of mathematics is mainly on the definition of the context: it is very concise. My example: the ZFC axiomatic set theory.
Now, if you do not want to use mathematics, I think it is your job (the writer), to explain all the words you use such that you are sure the reader only gets one possible meaning: the meaning you use when writing your definition at the beginning of this thread. This can be very short (e.g. something like: I do not care of the meaning the reader has of my definition) or very long or impossible as it depends on what you really mean with your definition.

An “agreed definition” need not be universal – in the context of a debate it needs to be agreed only between the debating parties.

Always interesting, how you seem to take, usually, the extreme definition of words (in this case “universal”).
If I was saying the universe (my universe) is made of our 2 persons (or the debate group), what do you think of the meaning of “universal agreement” in this context?

Why are you not sure that we can have an agreed definition?

Simply by a formal choice. If I decide not to agree with your definition, can we say we have an agreed definition? I think no. (However, my answer remains context dependant : ).

Sorry, what is the “collapse postulate”?
...
Can you explain this paradox in more detail please? My understanding is that there is no “collapse postulate” in Bohmian mechanics?

Well, It is very difficult for me to understand what you may understand if you do not know the collapse postulate (the resulting state of the system "after" a measure has given a certain result is the projection of the initial state "before" the measure: it is important to note that "after" and "before" are only a logic order not a time ordering).
In the “genuine” bohmian mechanics, probably there is not the full collapse postulate (however, I am not sure it is 100% consistent), but the adapted one of the q representation of QM in Bohmian mechanics.
In my statement, I just take the formal part (the mathematical part) of bohmian mechanics that is compatible with QM (i.e. I have the abstract usual QM theory with the collapse postulate + an abstract “bohmian particle”, the ontic part, that respects this collapse postulate).

Seratend.

 

[Billy T]

To Seratend - I don't want to interfere in your and MF's efforts to find a common language, so I won't, but may have a little fun with it.

I have asked MF if he had any ideas as to how a Non deterministic, Non random "agent" could be logically implemented (or something essentially like that) and he "answered" (that word should be OK with both of you as it was a question): "beats me." and I replied: "me too" (could not answer him as it was not a question - just trying to have some fun, no offense to either of you.) But inspite of this fun?, please read my request for help below your quoted text.

...Well, even with symbols, we may have the problem of implicit associations! I should have used instead of “A-->B”, P(A,B) where P is a proposition that depends on 2 parameters A and B. This proposition is only defined by the following properties:

P(A,A) is true
If P(A,B) true and P(B,A) true then necessarily A=B
If P(A,B) true and P(B,C) true then necessarily A=C

Therefore, I think the interpretation of the sentence “if A then necessarily B” may be adequate and sometimes inadequate: we may have several possibilities (to be choosen before the use of the property P(A,B)):
* P(A,B) is A equivalent to B or
* P(A,B) is A equals B
* P(A,B) is A included in B
* P(A,B) is A => B
* P(A,B) is B => A
etc ...
Therefore,...Seratend.

From above and your reply to me about mappings between axiomatic structures and real world procedures (especially as we agreed) I am now impressed by your precise nature also. So I want to ask you also for help: Do you have any ideas as to how a Non deterministic, Non random "agent" could be logically implemented in a simulations?

I don't know to what extent you are aware of my strange views. MF and I have had several long exchages and some understanding of them although he has never commented directly on my ideas about perception, our essential nature as only information in a real time simulation of the physical world, etc.
You are a "reader" needing context. You can get a quick idea about the context of my request for help above from my response to MF in post 48 of thread "Has determinism ever bothered you?" but if interested in seeing ideas and context more fully, the attachment to first post of thread "what price free will" is where to look (It prints as about four pages if margins not wide.) It is mainly about why the standard view of perception held by cognitive scientists is wrong (three independent proofs given -if not "proofs" at least quite persuasive arguments - I recognize I'm dealing with two very strick guys here ) but concludes with idea that my alternative view of perception may open a crack that genuine free will can slip thru and exists. I never claim GFW is demonstrated, only that it may not be impossible as I believed for at least three decades.)