Local realism ruled out? (was: Photon entanglement and )

[Gordon Watson]

What am I missing?

If I prepare photon-pairs correlated via identical linear polarization (say, some pairs V-correlated and some pairs H-correlated) then Bell-tests show Bell's inequality to be satisfied ... with no suggestion of nonlocal influences. Right? [Let's call these photon-pairs classically correlated.]

BUT if I prepare more highly correlated photon-pairs (say, correlated via identical angular momentum) then Bell-tests show Bell's inequality to be false. [Let's call these photon-pairs quantum-mechanically correlated.]

Why should more highly correlated results (from more highly correlated photon-pairs) be attributed to nonlocal influences?

 

[DrChinese]

What am I missing?

1. If I prepare photon-pairs correlated via identical linear polarization (say, some pairs V-correlated and some pairs H-correlated) then Bell-tests show Bell's inequality to be satisfied ... with no suggestion of nonlocal influences. Right? [Let's call these photon-pairs classically correlated.]

2. BUT if I prepare more highly correlated photon-pairs (say, correlated via identical angular momentum) then Bell-tests show Bell's inequality to be false. [Let's call these photon-pairs quantum-mechanically correlated.]

3. Why should more highly correlated results (from more highly correlated photon-pairs) be attributed to nonlocal influences?

1. These are not polarization entangled. The Bell Inequality does not really apply.

2. These are polarization entangled. The Bell Inequality should apply if you assert local realism, but experiments show the inequality is violated.

3. Because the inequality is violated, you must reject local realism. Essentially, the correlation level crosses a boundary. You shouldn't be able to have this level of correlation if locality and realism apply. So many people reject locality, and assert non-locality.

 

[Gordon Watson]

1. These are not polarization entangled. The Bell Inequality does not really apply.

2. These are polarization entangled. The Bell Inequality should apply if you assert local realism, but experiments show the inequality is violated.

3. Because the inequality is violated, you must reject local realism. Essentially, the correlation level crosses a boundary. You shouldn't be able to have this level of correlation if locality and realism apply. So many people reject locality, and assert non-locality.

Thank you DrC.

1, was given to show that entangled photons are not just of identical linear polarization.

2, was given to question why locality would be abandoned, in that the correlations in #1 do not require such abandonment.

3, in view of the HUP, appears to require the abandonment of EPR elements of reality. That seems to be easy, because EPR-realism neglects the quantum-of-action in any measurement.

4. So why is it not the case that EPR-realism is universally abandoned while locality (and hence relativity) is retained?

5. Does the double-slit experiment favor nonlocality?

6. There must be some strong reason for nonlocality being widely supported? As against the easy job of dropping EPR-realism: Yes?

 

[DrChinese]

Thank you DrC.

1, was given to show that entangled photons are not just of identical linear polarization.

2, was given to question why locality would be abandoned, in that the correlations in #1 do not require such abandonment.

3, in view of the HUP, appears to require the abandonment of EPR elements of reality. That seems to be easy, because EPR-realism neglects the quantum-of-action in any measurement.

4. So why is it not the case that EPR-realism is universally abandoned while locality (and hence relativity) is retained?

5. Does the double-slit experiment favor nonlocality?

6. There must be some strong reason for nonlocality being widely supported? As against the easy job of dropping EPR-realism: Yes?

1, 2: Sorry, not sure I follow what you are saying. If Bell's Inequality is respected, the photons are not polarization entangled. Entangled photons can be entangled on one or more pairs of observables.

3. Yes and no. There is no quantum of action to figure in for the realistic argument.

4. Some in fact do abandon realism. I personally lean in that direction a bit. But I am also slippery and sometimes change my mind.

5. Double slit is not a factor either way.

6. There are reasons, although they are subjective: a) It is easier to picture a non-local influence than the non-realistic alternative. I.e. thinking of a physical mechanism. b) Bohm worked out a non-local model to a sufficient level as to show it is conceptually viable.

 

[RUTA]

1, was given to show that entangled photons are not just of identical linear polarization.

2, was given to question why locality would be abandoned, in that the correlations in #1 do not require such abandonment.

3, in view of the HUP, appears to require the abandonment of EPR elements of reality. That seems to be easy, because EPR-realism neglects the quantum-of-action in any measurement.

4. So why is it not the case that EPR-realism is universally abandoned while locality (and hence relativity) is retained?

5. Does the double-slit experiment favor nonlocality?

6. There must be some strong reason for nonlocality being widely supported? As against the easy job of dropping EPR-realism: Yes?

I took the non-separable approach (aka non-EPR-realism) in my interpretation (“Reconciling Spacetime and the Quantum: Relational Blockworld and the Quantum Liar Paradox,” W.M. Stuckey, Michael Silberstein & Michael Cifone, Foundations of Physics 38, No. 4, 348 – 383 (2008), quant-ph/0510090 & “Why Quantum Mechanics Favors Adynamical and Acausal Interpretations such as Relational Blockworld over Backwardly Causal and Time-Symmetric Rivals,” Michael Silberstein, Michael Cifone & W.M. Stuckey, Studies in History & Philosophy of Modern Physics 39, No. 4, 736 – 751 (2008). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2008.07.005 ).

I've given many presentations to experts in the foundations community and even though the formalism is textbook (irreps of spacetime symmetry group (FoP supra) or path integrals over graphs (arXiv 0908.4348)), people have a very difficult time with our brand of nonseparability, i.e., ontic structural realism. It runs contrary to the fundamental manner by which our brains construct perceptions -- things moving in space as a function of time, i.e., dynamism. In all honesty, my colleagues and I sometimes find ourselves asking questions in the wrong (dynamical) fashion and we've been working with RBW for 5 yrs.

So, I suspect we hear more about non-local solutions to EPR than non-separable ones because at least people can imagine a non-local dynamism.

 

[Gordon Watson]

I took the non-separable approach (aka non-EPR-realism) in my interpretation (“Reconciling Spacetime and the Quantum: Relational Blockworld and the Quantum Liar Paradox,” W.M. Stuckey, Michael Silberstein & Michael Cifone, Foundations of Physics 38, No. 4, 348 – 383 (2008), quant-ph/0510090 & “Why Quantum Mechanics Favors Adynamical and Acausal Interpretations such as Relational Blockworld over Backwardly Causal and Time-Symmetric Rivals,” Michael Silberstein, Michael Cifone & W.M. Stuckey, Studies in History & Philosophy of Modern Physics 39, No. 4, 736 – 751 (2008). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2008.07.005 ).

I've given many presentations to experts in the foundations community and even though the formalism is textbook (irreps of spacetime symmetry group (FoP supra) or path integrals over graphs (arXiv 0908.4348)), people have a very difficult time with our brand of nonseparability, i.e., ontic structural realism. It runs contrary to the fundamental manner by which our brains construct perceptions -- things moving in space as a function of time, i.e., dynamism. In all honesty, my colleagues and I sometimes find ourselves asking questions in the wrong (dynamical) fashion and we've been working with RBW for 5 yrs.

So, I suspect we hear more about non-local solutions to EPR than non-separable ones because at least people can imagine a non-local dynamism.

Dear RUTA: Your alternative approach sounds interesting, and worthy of extra study, and in line with my own thoughts, so I'd encourage you to put ALL your papers on arViv (with hot-links on PF, if that is permitted). Or open a PF IR page with hot links?

"Studies in History & Philosophy of Modern Physics" is not available at my library.

I would introduce RBW as an explicit non-EPR-realism [nEPRr] approach <full stop> on the grounds that you see clearly that EPR "elements of physical reality" are false and that (as a consequence), locality does not need to be abandoned until we have explored more realistic [i.e., nEPRr] approaches. [EPR-realism being totally unrealistic, IMO.]

In this way you can introduce strangers such as me to your "non-separable" approach without the suspicion that "non-separable" is sneaky shorthand for "non-locality". As to the difficulty of imagining your approach? Can it be more difficult than imagining that the speed of light is constant?

I'm off to study your RBW.

Is RBW the correct and universal designation of your approach?

 

[Gordon Watson]

1, 2: Sorry, not sure I follow what you are saying. If Bell's Inequality is respected, the photons are not polarization entangled. Entangled photons can be entangled on one or more pairs of observables.

3. Yes and no. There is no quantum of action to figure in for the realistic argument.

4. Some in fact do abandon realism. I personally lean in that direction a bit. But I am also slippery and sometimes change my mind.

5. Double slit is not a factor either way.

6. There are reasons, although they are subjective: a) It is easier to picture a non-local influence than the non-realistic alternative. I.e. thinking of a physical mechanism. b) Bohm worked out a non-local model to a sufficient level as to show it is conceptually viable.

Dear DrC, what I was saying in my 1 and 2 is not that important. It was not (in your words)

"If Bell's Inequality is respected, the photons are not polarization entangled"

but rather:

"Classically-correlated photons satisfy BI, quantum-correlated photons do not."

This view leads me to reject EPR-realism (which I view as so amateurish as to be not worthy of a second thought). IMO, EPR-realism neglects the measurement interaction (for I understand EPR-realism to mean that measurement outcomes reflect "one-to-one" input properties) and yet we see that (in a Bell-test) even classically-correlated photons are modified by measurement.

So my 1 and 2 were to explain why I reject EPR-realism ... and seek a new REALISM ... before I reject locality.

That is why I am interested in (and don't understand) those who take the opposite approach. And why I'm interested especially in what leads you to occasionally flip-flop?

Also, how do you view RUTA's RBW approach?

 

[RUTA]

Dear RUTA: Your alternative approach sounds interesting, and worthy of extra study, and in line with my own thoughts, so I'd encourage you to put ALL your papers on arViv (with hot-links on PF, if that is permitted). Or open a PF IR page with hot links?

"Studies in History & Philosophy of Modern Physics" is not available at my library.

You can get the RBW papers from my homepage: http://users.etown.edu/s/stuckeym/

I would introduce RBW as an explicit non-EPR-realism [nEPRr] approach <full stop> on the grounds that you see clearly that EPR "elements of physical reality" are false and that (as a consequence), locality does not need to be abandoned until we have explored more realistic [i.e., nEPRr] approaches. [EPR-realism being totally unrealistic, IMO.]

In this way you can introduce strangers such as me to your "non-separable" approach without the suspicion that "non-separable" is sneaky shorthand for "non-locality". As to the difficulty of imagining your approach? Can it be more difficult than imagining that the speed of light is constant?

I'm off to study your RBW.

Is RBW the correct and universal designation of your approach?

Thanks for the hints as to how to explain RBW :-) Yes, Relational Blockworld or RBW is the "universal designation."

 

[DrChinese]

Dear DrC, what I was saying in my 1 and 2 is not that important. It was not (in your words)

"If Bell's Inequality is respected, the photons are not polarization entangled"

but rather:

"Classically-correlated photons satisfy BI, quantum-correlated photons do not."

This view leads me to reject EPR-realism (which I view as so amateurish as to be not worthy of a second thought). IMO, EPR-realism neglects the measurement interaction (for I understand EPR-realism to mean that measurement outcomes reflect "one-to-one" input properties) and yet we see that (in a Bell-test) even classically-correlated photons are modified by measurement.

So my 1 and 2 were to explain why I reject EPR-realism ... and seek a new REALISM ... before I reject locality.

That is why I am interested in (and don't understand) those who take the opposite approach. And why I'm interested especially in what leads you to occasionally flip-flop?

Also, how do you view RUTA's RBW approach?

Flip flop! Me?

I flip flop a bit on interpretations, mainly because I am always trying to determine if any interpretation might make a subtle assumption which could lead to a test.

I really like the RBW approach. It considers future context as relevant to fundamental quantum interactions, which seems to make sense (to me).

On the other hand: I would not be so quick to reject the EPR definition of realism. It is a powerful definition, a good line in the sand.

 

[IcedEcliptic]

how do we talk about local realism without invoking EPR? "real" has too many definitions otherwise, we need somewhere to begin, yes?

 

[yoda jedi]

how do we talk about local realism without invoking EPR? "real" has too many definitions otherwise, we need somewhere to begin, yes?

be real is independent of any conceptual consideration.

 

[IcedEcliptic]

be real is independent of any conceptual consideration.

We need to discuss something yoda jedi, and reality is a standard we believe we experience. Contrasting with that seems sensible.

 

[RUTA]

I had just posted this reference in another thread, but maybe you should read it to if you're not aware of it.

M.D. Reid et al. Rev. Mod. Phys. v.81, p.1727 (2009).

If you think that none of the violation of EPR/Bell, GHZ, CHSH, Leggett, etc. inequalities constitutes a violation of local realism, then you ARE proposing something that is not already established. This means that you need to back this up with a published work to support that you are not proposing your own personal theory.

Zz.

Do you have a title for that reference? The title is required for my interlibrary loan request.

 

[yoda jedi]

We need to discuss something yoda jedi, and reality is a standard we believe we experience. Contrasting with that seems sensible.

Reality does not need you, to exist.

 

[IcedEcliptic]

Reality does not need you, to exist.

Cute, but metaphysics and philosophy, and not helpful when discussing non-locality.

 

[yoda jedi]

Cute, but metaphysics and philosophy, and not helpful when discussing non-locality.

i am not discussing NON LOCALITY.

"real" has too many definitions otherwise, we need somewhere to begin, yes?

be real is independent of any conceptual consideration.

We need to discuss something yoda jedi, and reality is a standard we believe we experience.

Reality does not need you.

 

[Frame Dragger]

Ahh, it's good to be back. I see this thread has not changed much.

@Yoda Jedi: what kind of reality are you talking about in a local realism thread? I'm not getting what you're driving at, and I've been reading this thread for a while. The title is photon entanglment, so, I'm genuinely not getting your drift here.

 

[IcedEcliptic]

i am not discussing NON LOCALITY.

You are not discussing the topic of the thread? I'm completely confused, perhaps if you spoke in more than single sentences I could learn more from you.

 

[yoda jedi]

You are not discussing the topic of the thread? I'm completely confused, perhaps if you spoke in more than single sentences I could learn more from you.

Discussing:

"real"has too many definitions otherwise, we need somewhere to begin, yes?

be real is independent of any conceptual consideration.

reality is a standard we believe we experience.

Reality does not need you.

 

[DrChinese]

Ahh, it's good to be back. I see this thread has not changed much.

 

[Eye_in_the_Sky]

say NO to "local realism" – say YES to 'nonlocal' 'reality'

I think it is true to say that Quantum Mechanics implies 'nonlocality'.

This 'nonlocality' is either in a sense of 'causation' or in a sense of 'existence' or (say maybe) 'identity'.

 

[Eye_in_the_Sky]

Your use of the term "locality" encompasses both causal locality and separability, but otherwise it looks like the EPR argument with the same conclusion. To finish the story you've only to add QM's predicted violation of the Bell inequality with its subsequent experimental confirmation whence people believe QM is complete. Get rid of superdeterminism (keep free will) and that leaves you having to discard causal locality and/or separability, which is where the debate is centered.

______________

As a matter orientation with regard to perspective, here are three (takes on) takes on "separability" I have come across:

State Separability: The "state" 'assigned' to a "compound physical system" at any time is supervenient on the "states" then 'assigned' to its "component subsystems".

... that which we conceive as 'existing' ('real') should somehow be localized in time and space. That is, the 'real' in one part of space, A, should (in theory) somehow 'exist' independently of that which is thought of as 'real' in another part of space, B. If a physical system stretches over the parts of space A and B, then what is 'present' in B should somehow have an 'existence' independent of what is 'present' in A.

SEPARABILITY: mutually independent 'existence' of spatially distant 'things'.
______________

In connection with the scenario of Alice and Bob, I am trying to imagine a 'reality' in which the "microsystem" 'exists' in a 'manner' which is not "existentially separable", whereas, on the other hand, the "macro-instruments" (of Alice and Bob) do 'exist' in a 'manner' which is "existentially separable".
______

So, for example – as applied to the "macro-instruments" (of Alice and Bob) – by "existentially separable" I mean (something like):

The 'real' "state of Alice's instrument" and the 'real' "state of Bob's instrument" 'exist' independently of one another.

That is ... in any theory in which a notion of "state" is 'assigned' to the "instruments" of Alice and Bob, the following two conditions will hold:

1) The "state of Alice's instrument" and the "state of Bob's instrument" can be 'specified' independently of one another;

and

2) A 'specification' of the "joint state of Alice's instrument and Bob's instrument" is equivalent to a joint 'specification' of the "state of Alice's instrument" and the "state of Bob's instrument".
______

So, to repeat:

I am trying to imagine a 'reality' in which:

the "microsystem" (i.e. "singlet state") 'exists' in a 'manner' which is not "existentially separable",

whereas, on the other hand,

the "macro-instruments" (of Alice and Bob) do 'exist' in a 'manner' which is "existentially separable" [... except(,) perhaps(?) possibly(??) where/when their mutual "instruments" happen to be 'linked' via a common, "existentially nonseparable" 'onething' (such as, a "singlet state")].


... I seem to be getting stuck at this spot.

 

[Eye_in_the_Sky]

This was the EPR argument. Local causality + HUP -> (QM is incomplete) or (Reality is observer dependent - in this case Alice).

Yes. The only essential difference between the argument I have given and that of original EPR lies in the "completeness" condition.

I agree. Even if the argument I have posed can go through, its 'lesson' can be no different from that of original EPR.

So ... I see then ... as far as original EPR is concerned, you have no objection to the type of CF used. Okay. That helps clarify for me your position on CF. Good.

So, we are left with the question of which notion(s) ought to be relinquished:

... one of the following must be relinquished:

(i) 'free-choice' ,

(ii) QM is "local" ,

(iii) QM is "complete" ,

(iv) some other (implicit, currently unidentified) assumption .

You suggest:

... Bob's reality is dependent on a choice made by Alice if QM is complete. I would say this is a generally accepted conclusion: that either locality does not hold, or reality is dependent on observeration.

Okay. Let us write this as:

(QM is complete) Λ (local causality) → Bob's 'reality' depends on Alice's choice ,

where the 'reality'-dependence is "non-causal".
_________

For clarity, let us consider an example.

Suppose Alice measures S_x and gets the result "+". Then Bob's 'reality' is such that

if Bob measures S_x then he cannot obtain the result "+".

On the other hand, if Alice had measured S_y (instead of S_x), then Bob's 'reality' would have been such that

if Bob measures S_x then he can obtain the result "+".

... DrC, is this example included in what you mean by "Bob's reality is dependent on a choice made by Alice"? ... or is it not?
__________________________

Only now is it beginning to become clearer to me (although, not yet quite 'altogether') what is going on here.

First, let me explain the two motivations I had for my having posed the argument in the manner I did:

motivation 1: Somehow, vaguely, I felt that by stripping the microsystem of all 'reality', then (as a consequence) the "nonseparability" issue would – simply – disappear; [... Now, however, I see it seems that the issue has not just disappeared, but rather, it has been transferred over to the macroscopic experimental arrangement;]

and

motivation 2: Since Bell's "local causality" criterion is about 'probability' 'assignments' made on the basis of "complete" 'information', I suspected that by couching the quantum state in terms of 'information', then somehow, a previously hidden insight would emerge. [... And indeed (... I think)... I see it now.]

Bell's "local causality" criterion goes like this ["types" of emphasis added] (diagram[/color]):

A ["complete" stochastic] theory will be said to be "locally causal" if:

The 'probabilities' 'attached' to 'values' of "local beables" in a spacetime region 1 are unaltered by 'specification' of 'values' of "local beables" in a spacelike separated region 2, when what happens in the backward light cone of 1 is already sufficiently 'specified', for example by a full 'specification' of ['values' of] "local beables" in a spacetime region 3.

Now here comes the 'catch':

... what sort of 'existence' do these "local" 'beables' have?

These "local beables" belong to a 'realm' regarding which the principle of "separability" applies.
________

For example, the following four quantities are all construed (by Bell) as being "local beables":

a ≡ Alice's setting ,
b ≡ Bob's setting ,
A ≡ Alice's outcome ,
B ≡ Bob's outcome .
________

So ... "separability" as applied to (these) "local beables" (in this context of Alice and Bob) would (seem to) mean (among other things (something like this)):

The 'real' "state of Alice's instrument" and the 'real' "state of Bob's instrument" 'exist' independently of one another.

This then is (supposed) to imply that in any theory in which a notion of "state" is 'assigned' to the "instruments" of Alice and Bob, the following two conditions will hold:

1) The "state of Alice's instrument" and the "state of Bob's instrument" can be 'specified' independently of one another;

and

2) A 'specification' of the "joint state of Alice's instrument and Bob's instrument" is equivalent to a joint 'specification' of the "state of Alice's instrument" and the "state of Bob's instrument".
_____________________

I believe it is correct to see the conjunction of assumptions in Bell: locality + realism.

In connection with "stage 2" of Bell's argument, I agree with you. But in connection with "stage 1" I do not see it.

Okay, now I see it. That is, what I am now seeing regarding "stage 1" (in terms of a conjunction of assumptions) in Bell is very much along the lines of what you had put as:

locality + realism .

(After quite some thought ... I think) I would (like to) put it like this:

Bell's "local causality" criterion ↔

"causally local" 'reality' Λ "existentially separable" 'macro-apparatus-world' .


... Does this make sense to you?

 

[DrChinese]

Y

For clarity, let us consider an example.

Suppose Alice measures S_x and gets the result "+". Then Bob's 'reality' is such that

if Bob measures S_x then he cannot obtain the result "+".

On the other hand, if Alice had measured S_y (instead of S_x), then Bob's 'reality' would have been such that

if Bob measures S_x then he can obtain the result "+".

... DrC, is this example included in what you mean by "Bob's reality is dependent on a choice made by Alice"? ... or is it not?
__________________________

Yes, that pretty well sums it up. By the EPR reasoning, Bob's reality is determined by a choice of measurement by Alice. This is required by the HUP.

 

[RUTA]

I think it is true to say that Quantum Mechanics implies 'nonlocality'.

This 'nonlocality' is either in a sense of 'causation' or in a sense of 'existence' or (say maybe) 'identity'.

Or both.

 

[RUTA]

motivation 1: Somehow, vaguely, I felt that by stripping the microsystem of all 'reality', then (as a consequence) the "nonseparability" issue would – simply – disappear; [... Now, however, I see it seems that the issue has not just disappeared, but rather, it has been transferred over to the macroscopic experimental arrangement;]

Correct. This is the basis for the Relational Blockworld interpretation, i.e., no microsystem plus nonseparable experimental equipment.

 

[DevilsAvocado]

Suppose Alice measures S_x and gets the result "+". Then Bob's 'reality' is such that

if Bob measures S_x then he cannot obtain the result "+".

And if we add http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity" to that – I say Bob can do whatever he likes = free-choice.

 

[jambaugh]

For clarity, let us consider an example.

Suppose Alice measures S_x and gets the result "+". Then Bob's 'reality' is such that

if Bob measures S_x then he cannot obtain the result "+".

On the other hand, if Alice had measured S_y (instead of S_x), then Bob's 'reality' would have been such that

if Bob measures S_x then he can obtain the result "+".

... DrC, is this example included in what you mean by "Bob's reality is dependent on a choice made by Alice"? ... or is it not?
__________________________

There is a critical distinction I would make here. When you speak of what might happen from Bob's end you are not describing an Objective Reality (what is) but rather as you've presented it the actuality of what may happen.

If you further interpret the "Why" of this actualization then you may invoke an objective reality, i.e. the state of Bob's system is in the subset of states which exclude those where property S_x has value "+". In so doing you will run into the Bell type inequalities which are violated by QM because the presumption that the system and its environment is in a set of states implies the probabilities of outcomes defines a probability measure over that set.

It is this transition from "what happens" actuality to a "what is" reality that we non-realists object to. But note that you can avoid this, still speak of what happens in an objective way (which is why in CI you need the measuring devices to be classical level, you need objective reality of your measurement record) and avoid the need to invoke non-local causation.

That's I believe the heart of classic Copenhagen interpretation.

You needn't invoke CI if you prefer another interpretation (though I think you'd be incorrect) but you should be careful to distinguish when you are describing a reality=objective state of existence vs. actuality=behavior.

It is hard to recognize this distinction at first since we grow up thinking classically where all that happens can be equivalently described in terms of what is.

 

[Count Iblis]

It is not clear to me how you can get an "objective reality" at all from a theory in which it doesn't exist at the fundamental level.

 

[jambaugh]

And if we add http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity" to that – I say Bob can do whatever he likes = free-choice.

Speaking of Relativity of Simultaneity, our heritage of thinking in terms of objective realty goes back to the fiber-bundle structure of pre-Einstein space /time. Space/time was a http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiber_bundle" with time as the base and each slice of space (and the state of all within it) is a fiber indexed by this time base. Very much the continuum analogue of a movie with each frame a reality snapshot.

Relativity of simultaneity already begins to sand away at our old concept of objective reality. To preserve it in classical SR we invoke the frozen history of all past and future in a composite space-time. This of course doesn't allow choice or change except by selecting a whole new space-time universe.

In order to still speak of possibilities and probabilities and choices in a deterministic setting we invoke typically a classical field theory, again a fiber-bundle (space-time base with fibers the possible configurations of local reality and typically also some gauge degrees of freedom).

Now any time we see fiber-bundles we can be sure there is a relativity principle which may unify base with fiber and with is a group deformation of actions where the one-way dependence of fiber action on base coordinate becomes a two-way interaction. In this case matter affects the space-time just as space-time affects the matter and we get GR.

Well I'm getting off track... the point is that we already have good reason to soften up our traditional "objective reality" mindset and begin thinking in terms closer to the epistemological basis of science, the actuality of what we observe instead of the imagined state of reality with which we modeled it in past.