Dmitry67 said:
MWI is very logical.
1. We take QM in its purest form, without all weird and magic 'observers', 'measurements', 'our knowledge' etc.
What's weird about observers, measurements, and our knowledge. All of these have objective physical referents. On the other hand the parallel, but unobservable outcomes of MWI refer only to mathematical creations.
MWI is logical, but it's based on the faulty premise that quantum wavefunctions refer to real propagations in some quantum underworld. There's no reason to assume that. What we do know is that they describe the 'evolution' of probabilities in mathematical spaces, and the probabilities are associated with the behavior of instruments in real 3D space and time.
Dmitry67 said:
2. We make an experiment with a Schodienger cat, and based on the calculations there are 2 cats, dead and alive!
Standard QM says there's one cat, and assigns probabilities to the two possible, mutually exclusive, results, dead cat or alive cat. This fits with what's observed. No problem.
Dmitry67 said:
3. But we make another calculations (described in the Quantum decoherence article) and we find out these these 2 cats do not interact with each other, and it explains why we see only one of them.
The more parsimonious explanation for why we only see one of them is that the 'other' one doesn't exist except as a mathematical fiction.
Dmitry67 said:
4. However, we need to conclude that the symmetry is preserved, and all other outcomes do exist.
Very often people try to eliminate MWI using Occams razor. But it is a logical mistake: you percieve only one world, so you think that MWI suggests something EXTRA: another worlds. Then you try to cut these extra worlds using Occams razor or falifiability blah blah blah.
But in fact, it is CI (and other interpretations) which adds something extra: it adds a symmetry-breaking mechanism (called 'randomness') to explain why some cats are real and why some are not.
Randomness isn't something added by the theory or CI. It refers to the observed unpredictability of individual quantum experimental phenomena. Recorded data define reality. Metaphysical speculations don't.
Aggregated correlations reveal nonrandom data trends. This suggests a deterministic world.
The problems that the MWI approach purports to solve are pseudoproblems that can be satisfactorily dealt with by simply interpreting quantum theory in terms of what all can agree that it does refer to, rather than what some say it might refer to.
By the way, I don't mean to disparage metaphysical speculation in general. It's an important part of the development of ever deeper and more encompassing physical theories.