Problems with Many Worlds Interpretation

[eqblaauw2]

This poll is nonsense.

First of all, your options are very poorly defined. An interpretation of a physical theory is always an interpretation of mathematical objects and their relations. So in order to get useful options for a survey, the first step is to present a generally accepted mathematical formulation of the theory. The second step is to choose different -well-known to be consistent- ways to interpret the mathematics in physical terms. And the third step is to draw conclusions from these interpretations.

You only did the third step, which of course is not do-able in a satisfactory manner if you skip the first two. So you chose two popcultural statements which have something to do with the MWI, and added the options to contradict them or be indifferent. How shall such a survey be able to produce reasonable results?

Plus, your survey is not at all representative. Why do you think these 30 people represent the physics community?

I don't think they represent it, I think it's only a very good indication because they where randomly selected and all where very much highly regarded, and the most likely thing is that these participants where in fact more in favor in respect to 'normal' physicists, because they where all theoretical physicists and cosmologists. Maybe according to your definition a good poll must have a formula, but I think the physicists where aware of the formula of bryce, and if not they knew that A and B contained copies and parallel universes and that's the main thing, and if they did subscribe to this general notion they WOULD mention it (think, I didn't do a poll course, but this is **** logic, maybe it does not meet your scientific standards, but it does meet the standards of sense and that's what matters and should be the main reason you should have scientific standards in the first placee) for the rest your post is clearly a reaction of someone who has in this case only thinks in general rules and not by himself (a bit like someone who stops at a red light, when you are the only person in the world) cause this poll no matter how you interpret it, does refute raub. And I'm not going to repeat the obvious reasons besides what I said in this post. And if you like you can of course do step 3 yourself, though I suggest you do it with some logic.
byebye

 

[Hlafordlaes]

... And I'm serious, it may sound a bit harsh, but will you (and I mean everyone on this forum) please stop posting things that just don't make sense (not because it's against my own personal opinion, but just because it doesn't make sense, and confuses people, you can of course advocate every opinion you like) so I don't have to come back here and post obvious posts again and again.

I liked your poll as a contribution to the discussion, but I like the discussion even more. There are many useful insights apart from strict MWI-or-not, not least of which relates to the relative value, and role, of theory. Fra's musings on some deeper work he is doing, and Ken G's trademark cautionary reasoning are lots of fun! So, no need to come back and post anything over and over again; let's just enjoy the journey, whatever the destination.

 

[eqblaauw2]

I liked your poll as a contribution to the discussion, but I like the discussion even more. There are many useful insights apart from strict MWI-or-not, not least of which relates to the relative value, and role, of theory. Fra's musings on some deeper work he is doing, and Ken G's trademark cautionary reasoning are lots of fun! So, no need to come back and post anything over and over again; let's just enjoy the journey, whatever the destination.

thank you for your nice comment. I just wanted to say that I find it insulting (and I normally dislike that word) that someone said that the poll I conducted is nonsense , especially when someone (me in this case) has really put energy in it. And the statement is also utterly ridiculous (and for this I have given plenty enough arguments). I hope most will agree, and I hope this will be the last post. I still got some evidence (a mail I sent to all the participants to inform them about the results, so if you really doubt my honesty you can send me a message and I will post it to you).
I can also say this poll is conducted because I really wanted to know what highly regarded physicists thought about this subject, and that I used it also for my own information and I wouldn't let myself to be easily convinced, because I really wanted to get a true reliable result to get the uncertainty out of my head. I also will say that I would be depressed if everyone voted a or b, but that would be the price I had to pay. Luckily for me, and some certain person with a psychosis, this is not the case.

 

[nazarbaz]

Actually I would argue, as pertinent to MWI, that this is precisely what we can not infer. Making scientific progress does not require, and probably does not even suggest, that we are getting "closer to the right picture." I say this for three reasons:
1) scientific progress is always measured in terms of the increasing power it gives us over our environment and the increasing accuracy in our predictions, never by how right our picture is,
2) the pictures change so dramatically with each increment of accuracy and predictive power that no convergence of the "pictures" is in evidence, and there is also no direct connection between how much the picture changes and how much the accuracy improves,
3) there is no scientific evidence whatever that there is any such thing as "the right picture" that we could be moving "toward" in the first place.
These are important facts to bear in mind, because otherwise we fall victim to the same kinds of unjustifiable conclusions we turn up our noses at in pseudo-scientific endeavors.

That's exactly what I'm criticizing. The "dichotomy" of the "scientific accuracy" and the "ontological claims" behind it is not obvious to me. It is meaningless to talk about accuracy and progress if our well known theories doesn't tell us something about the world. What accuracy do we talk about otherwise ? Consistency with its own premise ? Aren't confusing science and circular thinking ?
I'm not pretending that our actual theories are fully describing the whole process, I'm not even assuming that they will one day, I'm just asserting that our actual knowledge is describing correctly some aspects of nature. No way to save the scientific point of view without this assumption, and no way to explain the efficiency of technology.
But science is neither reducible to philosophy nor technology even if it needs them to think it's own status and direct its practice. It is all about linking propositions and objects consistently despite what the diffuse postmodernist culture tells us. In that sense, the most dangerous threat science must face is the epistemological nihilism that some esthetes instilled in our understanding of it.

 

[nazarbaz]

I'm sorry but this must be one of the biggest pieces of crap I have ever read.
The newest theory (because at this moment I came up with it) is that the universe is a game played by Crocodile Harry, who has an Oedipuscomplex, and bad teeth.

I do however think a poll can indicate what the sciense community generally thinks at a certain moment, and that what the sciense community thinks generally is more correct then what the sciense community thinked in the past. However at this point the newer theory (MWI) isn't a populair theory at all (as I think I succesfully demonstraded). If and this is a big if, because I think if you do some reliable research you will find that there are other interpretations still more populair then MWI, MWI is the most popular theory that also doesn't mean it is a populair theory since the majority clearly rejects it. Then the most populair idea would be we don't know. But again this is an if, because the MWI theory isn't that populair at all (more populair then you would think at first notice when you read the rather extreme point of view, but still not close to being populair).

P.s. sorry that I couldn't resist login in again, but I really hate ********

Wonderful theory... Stop thinking, that's the climax of science... Crocodile harry...

 

[Ken G]

The "dichotomy" of the "scientific accuracy" and the "ontological claims" behind it is not obvious to me.

Then I'll give you some examples:
1) Aristotelian vs. Newtonian vs. Einsteinian gravity. The represents a clear sequence in converging accuracy-- Aristotelian is not quantitative at all, Newtonian is magnificently accurate for celestial motion. In most applications, Einstenian gravity adds little in the way of increased accuracy, yet holds that gravity is not a force but a bending of spacetime-- two more different ontologies would be hard to find. Einstein's theory essentially widens the domain of high accuracy outcomes, so is clearly moving toward some kind of convergence in accuracy, but the ontology borrows nothing at all from Newton other than some dependence on mass.

2) Classical vs. Quantum mechanics-- again we have two theories that agree essentially completely on some scales of phenomena, but QM extends the domain of high-accuracy outcomes to smaller systems. So there is clearly a convergence of accuracy happening when you pass from CM to QM, but the ontology is completely different once again-- we go from motion being described by position as a function of time to motion being ruled by inobservable mathematical entities that only pass into the real domain when they are in some sense forced to choose a definite outcome by their environment.

3) Thermodynamics vs. Statistical Mechanics-- here we have general laws about how heat and temperature behave, accurate for large systems in thermodynamic equilibrium, transitioning into statistical rules that apply to systems of particles. The latter extends the accuracy of the predictions to systems with fewer particles and different kinds of interparticle forces. The ontology is again completely different-- thermodynamics is a continuous description, statistical mechanics is an atomic description.

And the list goes on. In each case, we find advances that extend the domain of accuracy from one theory to the next, exhibiting a clear convergence of predictive reliability, so show a clear "arrow of progress" in regard to predictive power. Yet, these advances are accomplished via radical shifts in the basic ontology, exhibiting no tendency at all for the ontologies to "converge" other than the most basic consistency requirement. And today, we have research into "string theory", another complete change in ontology, targeted at achieving accuracy improvements that are so tiny they as yet cannot even be probed by our technology.

I'm not even assuming that they will one day, I'm just asserting that our actual knowledge is describing correctly some aspects of nature.

All well and good to say, but what does this really mean? When gravity was a force, was that "actual knowledge" of some aspect of nature, even when it became a curvature of spacetime? Or when it is something that strings are doing? All we ever get to know is the accuracy of our predictions.

 

[eqblaauw2]

STRAWMAN ALERT

Wonderful theory... Stop thinking, that's the climax of science... Crocodile harry...

-

stop thinking? where did I exactly promote this idea? you seem to suggest that newer theories are better then older ones, I don't agree with that, and I gave an example where that idea could logically lead to. This of course doesn't mean that newer theories not in the majority couldn't be true, it just means that you cannot say that they are most likely better because they are newer.If you meant to say that newer theories close to being generally accepted theories or at least have a majority are more likely to better then the older theories I fully agree with you. This standpoint of course doesn't mean that newer theories not hold by the majority of physicists couldn't be true, it just means that you cannot say that they are most likely better because they are newer.
P.s. sorry for being a bit rude in the previous post. But I stay with my point, without the rudeness.
I also wanted to say that I also got a email from an eminent physicist (I don't now who it was anymore, so you may just ignore it if you don't think it's useful, because I've got serious lack of evidence to back it up, I know it's true, but I can understand that you won't believe I got this email, this is a really long sentence ) that said that mwi isn't inconsistent. That's another argument then usually is being brought foreword , but you might look into that, if you want, if you just think it's evidentially bull it would be a little pointless.

 

[Hlafordlaes]

... And the list goes on. In each case, we find advances that extend the domain of accuracy from one theory to the next, exhibiting a clear convergence of predictive reliability, so show a clear "arrow of progress" in regard to predictive power. Yet, these advances are accomplished via radical shifts in the basic ontology, exhibiting no tendency at all for the ontologies to "converge" other than the most basic consistency requirement...

All well and good to say, but what does this really mean? When gravity was a force, was that "actual knowledge" of some aspect of nature, even when it became a curvature of spacetime? Or when it is something that strings are doing? All we ever get to know is the accuracy of our predictions.

I think the confusion I often have is, on one hand, the obvious value of our everyday mental models, based on unexpressed "theories" about how the world works, and which by their practical results seem to indicate we are in close touch with reality. OTOH we have scientific theories that delve into modeling that which is beyond the everyday and shift radically in ontology, as you point out in 1-2-3.

I tend to transfer the idea that we are capable of mentally modeling our environment accurately enough to survive and prosper, to the misguided idea that scientific theories converge on a true description in similar fashion. Still, it does seem that at least in part we do uncover new realities, such as, say, a predicted particle that is found and measured only as a consequence of a theory. That isn't only predictive power, is it? I mean, aren't we also uncovering something "real" and converging in some way on a more accurate description?

 

[Ken G]

Still, it does seem that at least in part we do uncover new realities, such as, say, a predicted particle that is found and measured only as a consequence of a theory. That isn't only predictive power, is it? I mean, aren't we also uncovering something "real" and converging in some way on a more accurate description?

I think what you're basically saying is, if we drop a block, a coin, a doll, a horse, a jack, and a toy car, and they all fall, have we not learned something about our reality that allows us to expect that when we drop a book it will fall too? I think the answer is yes-- we learn consistencies of experience, which we can then reliably generalize to "similar" situations via some sort of unifying theory, even if we can't ever be exactly sure what is going to prove similar and what isn't (like, when we drop a leaf in the wind and it blows away instead of falling). But consistencies of experience that we give a name to, like "gravity" or "conservation of energy" are not quite the same thing as an ontological description. What is it about gravity that requires that things fall? What is it about energy that requires it be conserved? Those are the kinds of questions, the "what's really going on here" kinds of questions (similar to interpretive questions about quantum mechanics or any other theory), that never seem to reach any kind of convergence in the progress of science. I think it is easy to overlook that, and tell ourselves things that simply aren't in evidence, when we imagine some kind of "destination" for scientific understanding rather than the simple process of doing science. That's why I'm skeptical of using science to create worlds views, such as a belief in the actual existence of "many worlds."

 

[Hlafordlaes]

... and a toy car...

gosh, Ken G, gimme a break

... That's why I'm skeptical of using science to create worlds views, such as a belief in the actual existence of "many worlds."

and he deftly puts the thread back on track...

 

[nazarbaz]

Then I'll give you some examples:
1) Aristotelian vs. Newtonian vs. Einsteinian gravity. The represents a clear sequence in converging accuracy-- Aristotelian is not quantitative at all, Newtonian is magnificently accurate for celestial motion. In most applications, Einstenian gravity adds little in the way of increased accuracy, yet holds that gravity is not a force but a bending of spacetime-- two more different ontologies would be hard to find. Einstein's theory essentially widens the domain of high accuracy outcomes, so is clearly moving toward some kind of convergence in accuracy, but the ontology borrows nothing at all from Newton other than some dependence on mass.

2) Classical vs. Quantum mechanics-- again we have two theories that agree essentially completely on some scales of phenomena, but QM extends the domain of high-accuracy outcomes to smaller systems. So there is clearly a convergence of accuracy happening when you pass from CM to QM, but the ontology is completely different once again-- we go from motion being described by position as a function of time to motion being ruled by inobservable mathematical entities that only pass into the real domain when they are in some sense forced to choose a definite outcome by their environment.

3) Thermodynamics vs. Statistical Mechanics-- here we have general laws about how heat and temperature behave, accurate for large systems in thermodynamic equilibrium, transitioning into statistical rules that apply to systems of particles. The latter extends the accuracy of the predictions to systems with fewer particles and different kinds of interparticle forces. The ontology is again completely different-- thermodynamics is a continuous description, statistical mechanics is an atomic description.

And the list goes on. In each case, we find advances that extend the domain of accuracy from one theory to the next, exhibiting a clear convergence of predictive reliability, so show a clear "arrow of progress" in regard to predictive power. Yet, these advances are accomplished via radical shifts in the basic ontology, exhibiting no tendency at all for the ontologies to "converge" other than the most basic consistency requirement. And today, we have research into "string theory", another complete change in ontology, targeted at achieving accuracy improvements that are so tiny they as yet cannot even be probed by our technology.
All well and good to say, but what does this really mean? When gravity was a force, was that "actual knowledge" of some aspect of nature, even when it became a curvature of spacetime? Or when it is something that strings are doing? All we ever get to know is the accuracy of our predictions.

1. What is problmatic with your view is the fact that you treat the aristotelian, Newtonian and einsteinian physics as equivalents, almost like there is no progress over time and no widening of our perception of the universe.
2. There is a certain trivialization of science findings in your approach and I suspect that you are confusing science facts and scientific hypotheses. If you are right : does it mean that the electron is an "interpretation" of something unreachable to our brains and that light bending next to huge masses is a "metaphor" ? If yes, justify it.
3. My main argument is the fact that our actual science is well grounded relating definite objects with consistent propositions, not general ontological claims with profound global theories. What is matter and energy ? How the universe was born ? That's exactly our wide margin of progress.
4. As I told you, your approach could be useful with highly hypothetical claims but cannot stand as foundation to an epistemology. Somehow you're urging science to give an explanation to almost everything in order to give it the right to make ontological claims, which is not reasonable.
5. The radical distinction between "calculation" and "ontology" seems like a fallacy. In physics, there's no other way to study our objects of interest than mathematics. To find or decide which mathematical model could give us an insight on the object is the main goal of science. The process is obviously contingent, not all of our physical theories are equally right or close to the true nature of objects. Remember : the relation between the subject and the object is the essence of the scientific experience.
6. Science is a work in progress with both nicks and continuities. So nuance.

 

[eqblaauw2]

1 So you think science has progress (a view In my opinion also adequately defended by Popper, so I agree with you)
2 but you agree with me that newer theories aren't in itself better then older ones (a statement that cannot be derived from point (1). (if that's what you said, my english isn't perfect)
I also agree with you (again if that's what you're trying to say) that if we talk about mwi it would be better if we all would talk about mwi with parallel universes and copies of ourselves, because that would help a lot of confusion out of the way. (that's also the 'version(s)' of mwi (s) that I at least tried to get clear in my poll))
That being said the drastically ontological claims, just like a theory being newer isn't an argument for it's quality, aren't itself an argument for it's quality. Most physics find 'that' mwi a bridge to far, and they have their reasons.
I don't want to make a discussion about mwi impossible, I just want to make the discussion fair and square.

 

[BruceW]

I also agree with you (again if that's what you're trying to say) that if we talk about mwi it would be better if we all would talk about mwi with parallel universes and copies of ourselves, because that would help a lot of confusion out of the way. (that's also the 'version(s)' of mwi (s) that I at least tried to get clear in my poll))
That being said the drastically ontological claims, just like a theory being newer isn't an argument for it's quality, aren't itself an argument for it's quality. Most physics find 'that' mwi a bridge to far, and they have their reasons.
I don't want to make a discussion about mwi impossible, I just want to make the discussion fair and square.

About earlier, I understand that you put energy into making a poll, which is good, and I didn't mean to say that it was useless. I just meant to say that it helps to define exactly what you mean when you say 'MWI' or 'CI'.

You've said here that your poll was on the MWI of 'literal' parallel universes. This is very different to the MWI of 'no non-unitary collapse'. Did you explain to the people you were polling that you wanted to know their opinion on 'literal' parallel universes? Because its important that all the people you polled were answering the same question.

For example, for me, I think 'no non-unitary collapse' is a useful interpretation. And I think allowing non-unitary collapse is also a fine interpretation (as long as the non-unitary collapse happens only for the 'end-user' of the calculation). But I think any interpretation that uses the existence of parallel, non-interacting universes to be totally ridiculous.

Although, if that interpretation can be used to predict physical phenomena, and if it agrees with all experimental results, then it is still not really 'wrong'. Its just that it makes unnecessary postulates, in my opinion.

 

[eqblaauw2]

About earlier, I understand that you put energy into making a poll, which is good, and I didn't mean to say that it was useless. I just meant to say that it helps to define exactly what you mean when you say 'MWI' or 'CI'.

You've said here that your poll was on the MWI of 'literal' parallel universes. This is very different to the MWI of 'no non-unitary collapse'. Did you explain to the people you were polling that you wanted to know their opinion on 'literal' parallel universes? Because its important that all the people you polled were answering the same question.

For example, for me, I think 'no non-unitary collapse' is a useful interpretation, and so is allowing non-unitary collapse as an interpretation. But I think any interpretation that uses the existence of parallel, non-interacting universes to be totally ridiculous.

Although, if that interpretation can be used to predict physical phenomena, and if it agrees with all experimental results, then it is still not really 'wrong'. Its just that it makes unnecessary postulates, in my opinion.

yes I did, I said in the introduction as clear as I could that the poll was only relevant for the mwi that stated that there where parallel universes and copies, that actually existed. I don't know if I used the word literally, but I think there was no reason what so ever why you could think this wasn't meant to be taken literally. I think how I said it thus maid it clear that I was interested in the opinion of the literally existence of those universes and persons.
That being said 6 persons of the 28, and the 18 that voted c said (without being asked) informed me that they disliked any version of mwi whatsoever (that they where aware of).
(you can read the poll on the site, but I didn't mention the introduction I think)

 

[Ken G]

1. What is problmatic with your view is the fact that you treat the aristotelian, Newtonian and einsteinian physics as equivalents, almost like there is no progress over time and no widening of our perception of the universe.

Why would anyone treat those as equivalents?

2. There is a certain trivialization of science findings in your approach and I suspect that you are confusing science facts and scientific hypotheses.

Well I see no trivialization, I just see the unembellished facts of the situation. If we stick to what there is actual evidence of, then it is what I said.

If you are right : does it mean that the electron is an "interpretation" of something unreachable to our brains and that light bending next to huge masses is a "metaphor" ?

Yes, I would say those things are pretty obviously interpretations and metaphors, that's what scientific ontology always is.

If yes, justify it.

What requires justification is anything else. It is clearly the null hypothesis that these things are interpretations and metaphors. What do you think they are, and how can you make a logical argument they are that?

3. My main argument is the fact that our actual science is well grounded relating definite objects with consistent propositions, not general ontological claims with profound global theories. What is matter and energy ? How the universe was born ? That's exactly our wide margin of progress.

Hmm, you know what matter and energy are? You know how the universe was born? The rest of us are all ears.

4. As I told you, your approach could be useful with highly hypothetical claims but cannot stand as foundation to an epistemology.

And where did I say I was laying out a foundation for an epistemology? That's the scientific method, we already have that.

Somehow you're urging science to give an explanation to almost everything in order to give it the right to make ontological claims, which is not reasonable.

I am? Almost everything? I'd settle for just one thing, actually, one explanation that "gives us the right" to make ontological claims. And what happens when that explanation gets replaced by a totally different one with a completely different ontology?

5. The radical distinction between "calculation" and "ontology" seems like a fallacy. In physics, there's no other way to study our objects of interest than mathematics.

So calculations are ontology? That is the claim you are making? Have you really thought that through?

To find or decide which mathematical model could give us an insight on the object is the main goal of science.

Yes, here you are making sense. Insight, not ontology.

Remember : the relation between the subject and the object is the essence of the scientific experience.

Agreed, this is a demonstrable crux of the scientific method.

6. Science is a work in progress with both nicks and continuities.

Yes, it is a work in progress. So that is an argument that ontologies do converge?

 

[Ken G]

1 So you think science has progress (a view In my opinion also adequately defended by Popper, so I agree with you)

Yes, science demonstrably makes progress.

2 but you agree with me that newer theories aren't in itself better then older ones (a statement that cannot be derived from point (1). (if that's what you said, my english isn't perfect)

Which theory is "better" is highly context dependent, yes. Which theory has a "truer ontology" is highly questionable. Ontologies behind theories are fascinating glimpses into the meaning of a theory. Reality is another matter.

I also agree with you (again if that's what you're trying to say) that if we talk about mwi it would be better if we all would talk about mwi with parallel universes and copies of ourselves, because that would help a lot of confusion out of the way.

I wouldn't presume to tell people who use MWI how they should use it, except to say that they should use it for what interpretations should always be used for-- a way to motivate a sense of understanding of a theory in a way that resonates with some set of philosophical priorities. They should not confuse themselves that they are talking about some reality that is independent of those priorities.

Most physics find 'that' mwi a bridge to far, and they have their reasons.
I don't want to make a discussion about mwi impossible, I just want to make the discussion fair and square.

I agree that in my experience, most physicists are not as drastically rationalistic as is required to see MWI as a "truth" about reality.

 

[juanrga]

Hello,

While the majority of physicists embrace the Many Worlds interpretation of quantum decoherence, I am holding out hope for the Copenhagen interpretation or better yet, a undiscovered interpretation.

Please allow me to pose three problems I have with the MW interpretation.

1) There is a nonzero prob of me spontaneously becoming a miniature sun. Let me elaborate. Since I am made of atoms, there is a nonzero prob that all of the subatomic particles comprising each of the nuclei of my atoms are all one kilometer away except for a single proton and single electron in each atom. I.e. I am now spontaneously comprised of only hydrogen atoms. Now let's say that since even the exact position of these hydrogen atoms is uncertain they are close enough that gravity overpowers all and nuclear fusion takes place. I.e. I have become a miniature sun.

The probability of this happening is obviously miniscule, but nonzero. With the CI interpretation this will never happen because the probability is so small that the universe is not old enough for such a low probability to have been realized. However with MWi since the probability is nonzero, it has happened. Moreover it has been happening every second of every day since the minute I was born in some parallel universe.

2) My second problem with MW intepretation is how can an interference pattern result in a double slit experiment if the particle is actually traveling through a different slit in separate universes. Shouldn't the interference only occur if the particle is traveling through both slits simultaneously in the same universe?

3) My third problem with MW is that it really does away with the concept of probability although many quantum experiments have shown that the concept does exist. For example, take a weighted coin which is 99% more likely to flip heads, than tails. CI predicts that a 100 flips would yield 99 heads and 1 tail. With a single flip, one is much more likely to get a head than a tail. However with MW, one flip will result in head in one universe, tail in another so therefore 50-50 probability.

Can someone help me to understand these issues any better? Thanks!

The standard interpretation is the Copenhagen one. Many worlds (MW) is a collection of nonsense as has been repeatedly showed in the literature. It is still maintained alive from people who do not understand QM.

Maybe you would take a look to Streater list of lost causes in physics, the section about MW: http://www.mth.kcl.ac.uk/~streater/lostcauses.html#XII

 

[eqblaauw2]

The standard interpretation is the Copenhagen one. Many worlds (MW) is a collection of nonsense as has been repeatedly showed in the literature. It is still maintained alive from people who do not understand QM.

Maybe you would take a look to Streater list of lost causes in physics, the section about MW: http://www.mth.kcl.ac.uk/~streater/lostcauses.html#XII

well that's a little bit strong (although I think I agree with you, it's a possibility that this statement causes a strong reaction of people who feel misjudged).
Maybe, to be a little arrogant, my poll is a better way to make a similar (tough a little less strong) point. Do I think it wouldn't be bad to read the website you mention.

 

[nazarbaz]

Why would anyone treat those as equivalents?
Well I see no trivialization, I just see the unembellished facts of the situation. If we stick to what there is actual evidence of, then it is what I said.
Yes, I would say those things are pretty obviously interpretations and metaphors, that's what scientific ontology always is.
What requires justification is anything else. It is clearly the null hypothesis that these things are interpretations and metaphors. What do you think they are, and how can you make a logical argument they are that?
Hmm, you know what matter and energy are? You know how the universe was born? The rest of us are all ears.
And where did I say I was laying out a foundation for an epistemology? That's the scientific method, we already have that.
I am? Almost everything? I'd settle for just one thing, actually, one explanation that "gives us the right" to make ontological claims. And what happens when that explanation gets replaced by a totally different one with a completely different ontology?
So calculations are ontology? That is the claim you are making? Have you really thought that through?
Yes, here you are making sense. Insight, not ontology.
Agreed, this is a demonstrable crux of the scientific method.Yes, it is a work in progress. So that is an argument that ontologies do converge?

Your approach is not scientific, it is philosophical. The progress means the ability to meet and understand, even partially, the objects, not to make calculations about them. I am of course aware that we are far away from being able to make sense of the physical world but I manage to make a room for it in the near or the far future. Because that's the true mission of science.
I was right, you are a postmodernist who lives in "interpretations", "narrativities" and "metaphors". What kind of effectivity could have a technology if we don't have the shadow of a clue of what things are... ? Magic, maybe ?

 

[eqblaauw2]

Your approach is not scientific, it is philosophical. The progress means the ability to meet and understand, even partially, the objects, not to make calculations about them. I am of course aware that we are far away from being able to make sense of the physical world but I manage to make a room for it in the near or the far future. Because that's the true mission of science.
I was right, you are a postmodernist who lives in "interpretations", "narrativities" and "metaphors". What kind of effectivity could have a technology if we don't have the shadow of a clue of what things are... ? Magic, maybe ?

Well I have serious doubts that people who are working and thinking about that technology and don't subscribe to mwi don't have a serious clue.
Of which we have a good indication they are in the majority don't have the slightest clue. I believe according to Tegmark even in quantum computing they are in the majority, if you want to take the polls tegmark conduct, or cites *I don't know who conducts those polls he cites*, seriously, but let's just do for the sake of good faith. (David Raub is another case, because I think I refuted that poll successfully. Although you're entitled to have your own opinion about that).

The poll (talk about a vague poll):

An informal poll taken at a conference on quantum computation at the Isaac Newton Institute in Cambridge in July 1999 gave the following results:

Do you believe that new physics violating the Schro ̈dinger equation will make large quantum com- puters impossible? 1 yes, 71 no, 24 undecided
Do you believe that all isolated systems obey the Schro ̈dinger equation (evolve unitarily)? 59 yes, 6 no, 31 undecided
Which interpretation of quantum mechanics is clos- est to your own?
(a) Copenhagen or consistent histories (including postulate of explicit collapse): 4
(b) Modified dynamics (Schro ̈dinger equation modified to give explicit collapse): 4
(c) Many worlds/consistent histories (no col- lapse): 30
(d) Bohm (an ontological interpretation where an auxiliary “pilot wave” allows particles to have well-defined positions and velocities): 2
(e) None of the above/undecided: 50

But even if you do think that. It's still isn't an absurd conclusion that we have technology that we don't have the slightest clue how it works.
that doesn't have to involve magic. People have worked with technology that involved gravity for ages, while they hadn't (and some might say still don't) have the slightest clue how it works.
Also the 'technology' you seem to refer to is very controversial (there isn't a quantum computer that I know of yet, if you might want to imply that, but I don't know if you do since you don't really seem to make it clear what you mean).
sorry

 

[juanrga]

well that's a little bit strong (although I think I agree with you, it's a possibility that this statement causes a strong reaction of people who feel misjudged).
Maybe, to be a little arrogant, my poll is a better way to make a similar (tough a little less strong) point. Do I think it wouldn't be bad to read the website you mention.

Well in your poll in this same forum you add some of the responses that you received.

X1:

I think the many worlds interpretation is nonsense.

X3:

The many-worlds theory is a silly mistake

X5:

The theory is false because it is inconsistent.

I do not find too many difference with what I said:

Many worlds (MW) is a collection of nonsense as has been repeatedly showed in the literature.

But thanks by your post.

 

[eqblaauw2]

Well in your poll in this same forum you add some of the responses that you received.

X1:

X3:

X5:

I do not find too many difference with what I said:

But thanks by your post.

You make a good point.
And no thanks.

 

[juanrga]

Hi jtbell,

from: http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html

"Political scientist" L David Raub reports a poll of 72 of the "leading
cosmologists and other quantum field theorists" about the "Many-Worlds
Interpretation" and gives the following response breakdown [T].

1) "Yes, I think MWI is true" 58%
2) "No, I don't accept MWI" 18%
3) "Maybe it's true but I'm not yet convinced" 13%
4) "I have no opinion one way or the other" 11%

Amongst the "Yes, I think MWI is true" crowd listed are Stephen Hawking
and Nobel Laureates Murray Gell-Mann and Richard Feynman. Gell-Mann and
Hawking recorded reservations with the name "many-worlds", but not with
the theory's content. Nobel Laureate Steven Weinberg is also mentioned
as a many-worlder, although the suggestion is not when the poll was
conducted, presumably before 1988 (when Feynman died). The only "No,
I don't accept MWI" named is Penrose.

This is the 'highly unscientific' (Max Tegmark own words) poll taken at a 1997 quantum mechanics workshop, where Gell-Mann is listed as a believer in the interpretation, although he explicitly rejected the view, for instance.

 

[Ken G]

Your approach is not scientific, it is philosophical.

Not at all, what I am doing is separating the science from the philosophy. Often people get them all mixed up together.

The progress means the ability to meet and understand, even partially, the objects, not to make calculations about them.

What objects are you understanding?

I am of course aware that we are far away from being able to make sense of the physical world but I manage to make a room for it in the near or the far future. Because that's the true mission of science.

This is exactly the kind of "mixing up" philosophy and physics that I'm pointing out. We have no kind of basis to scientifically support these beliefs of yours, all we have any evidence of whatsoever is that we will continue to push new theories into domains where our predictions are currently suspect. That's it, that's what we can say. How do you know when you have made sense of the physical world? You expect a sign that reads "you have it correct-- you have reached your destination"? Every single scientific culture since Aristotle thought they were making room to make sense of the physical world in the near future! These are just the facts of the matter, as scientists, we should at least deal in facts.

I was right, you are a postmodernist who lives in "interpretations", "narrativities" and "metaphors".

Nah, I just know the difference between a scientifically demonstrable claim that is not liable to change in the future, and an interpretation that is.

What kind of effectivity could have a technology if we don't have the shadow of a clue of what things are... ? Magic, maybe ?

Let's examine your logic here. Your syllogism is apparently "we have effective technology, any effective technology must be based on understanding "what things are", ergo, we understand what things are." Does that really sound like a logically bulletproof argument to you? You can't think of any examples of technologies that worked fine being used by people who had no idea of why? Do we have any idea why two slits make a diffraction pattern, just because we can write an equation that predicts it? Why do you think we can build and fly airplanes without knowing any string theory?

 

[BruceW]

The standard interpretation is the Copenhagen one. Many worlds (MW) is a collection of nonsense as has been repeatedly showed in the literature. It is still maintained alive from people who do not understand QM.

Maybe you would take a look to Streater list of lost causes in physics, the section about MW: http://www.mth.kcl.ac.uk/~streater/lostcauses.html#XII

That website doesn't specifically rule out MWI, it just seems to say that MWI isn't useful. Also (sorry if I'm boring everyone with this point again), the 'no non-unitary collapse' version of MWI and the 'non-unitary collapse only happens for the end-user of the calculations' version of CI seem to be exactly the same thing (except the philosophical slant is different, but I don't really care about that either way).

 

[Ken G]

All interpretations of QM are the same except for the philosophical slant, so if you don't care about that, then what differences do you see in any of them? It's all the same theory, you realize!

 

[eqblaauw2]

This is the 'highly unscientific' (Max Tegmark own words) poll taken at a 1997 quantum mechanics workshop, where Gell-Mann is listed as a believer in the interpretation, although he explicitly rejected the view, for instance.

you seem to mix up two polls, the one cited by tegmark (which really says nothing very pro to mwi (in my opinion), and is in tegmark's own opinion highly unscientific, with people voting more then once, with 8 people voting for mwi, and in which copenhagen is still number one, if you don't count the instrumental version). And david raub's one, you're right when you say that 'Gell-Mann is listed as a believer in the interpretation, although he explicitly rejected the view, for instance' (unless you think consistent histories, that doesn't contain parallel universes and copies of everything on earth, is a version of mwi, which I think is kind of strange thing to argue for, since the many-worlds of the many-worlds interpretation aren't there in consistent histories).
just trying to get the fact straight, no real relevant criticism intended.

 

[juanrga]

That website doesn't specifically rule out MWI, it just seems to say that MWI isn't useful. Also (sorry if I'm boring everyone with this point again), the 'no non-unitary collapse' version of MWI and the 'non-unitary collapse only happens for the end-user of the calculations' version of CI seem to be exactly the same thing (except the philosophical slant is different, but I don't really care about that either way).

It says rather more than that. It says that the subject arose from a «misguided» point of view, remarks that «the idea of the wave-function of the universe is meaningless», that «there is nothing to the many-worlds theory», that is based in hopes «by its advocates», that they do not understand what they are trying («if this were possible, then we just arrive at quantum mechanics»)...

In short, it is a «lost cause» as the website title emphasizes.

 

[juanrga]

you seem to mix up two polls, the one conducted of david raub (which really says nothing very pro to mwi (in my opinion), and is in tegmark's opinion highly unscientific, with people voting more then once, with 8 people voting for mwi, and in which copenhagen is still number one, if you don't count the instrumental version). And david raub's one, where you're right when you say that Gell-Mann is listed as a believer in the interpretation, although he explicitly rejected the view, for instance.
just trying to get the fact straight, no real relevant criticism intended.

You are welcome

 

[eqblaauw2]

You are welcome

haha thanks I edited it (if that's what you tried to make me aware of)
greetings Edo