ThomasT said:
We've been repeatedly and sometimes painfully reminded that it's a mistake to take the proclamations of politicians as evidence of the truth.
Indeed! Clearly, the wiser course is to take the anonmyous musings of random personalities on an internet forum as truth.
Given the option of entertaining an endless parade of conspiracy theorists, each with their own opinion about "what's really going on" (and each absolutely convinced of their own topical omniscience), and the option of simply taking the intents and purposes of national governments at face value (whether we agree with them or not), I choose the latter.
The invasion of Iraq was a preemptive attack on a sovereign nation that posed no threat to the US. The Bush administration's desire to invade Iraq no matter what and the propaganda campaign leading up to the invasion have been well enough demonstated.
Laugh. Out. Loud. What, one wonders, is the point of this? The thread has long since derailed from a discussion of what the mission and capabilities of the Army ought to be, to the politics of war. I have zero interest in entering such a discussion, because is it
pointless - there are no right or wrong answers. You've got an opinion; that opinion is weak, in my
humble opinion, but I can't change it and you can't change mine. Moving on.
The position of the Bush administration and its entire national security and intelligence apparetus - with a combined budget of perhaps a trillion dollars per year, give or take - was that Iraq
was a threat, and that is government was in violation of the cease fire signed in '91 and ending hostilties; therefore it had to go to war. You might disagree, and you might somehow be more right than said $1T security and intelligence establishment, but I doubt it. Even if so, and the Iraq war was a waste of time and money,
what does this have to do with Gates' position?
Is it true that because the Iraq war wasn't necesarry, that all large scale ground warfare operations are unnecesarry (to put that another way, is it your opinion that because Iraq wasn't necesarry, there can't and won't ever be an Iraq-like war that
is necesarry)? If not, then is it true that a heavier Army - equipped and oriented for missions of invasion and occupation, as has classically been its mission - is better than a "lighter, smaller" Army with a focus on counter-insurgency, disaster reflief, and conflict intervention (the European model)? I'd say experience says "yes".
Fact: war's happen. Fact: those wars are of a scale and location generally unaticipatable and unchoosable by the participants. Given those facts, I think Gates' policy advice is reckless at best, dangerous at worst.
Didn't Iraq have these before the invasion?
What, exactly does the presence or absence of these characteristics in a country pre-occupation tell us about the relative success or failure
of that occupation? This is silly. An occupation whose stated goal was the establishment of a sovereign state with functional democratic institutions, and a capable national defense that was non-threatening to its neighbors and the interests of the United States has accomplished the same. By my understanding of the meaning of the word "success", if follows (war politics aside) that the Iraq reconstruction effort was successful on its own merits.
Cost/benefit analysis is an altogether different argument from success/failure, and one I also have no interest in having,
because none of us have anywhere near sufficient data or ability to accurately make that kind of assessment. You have no clue how to regress a reliable cost estimate for the Iraq war, and I have no clue how to regress a reliable benefit estimate. Frankly, its over our heads. You'd have to be able to value things like "regional stability", "national security", etcetera. I have no doubt that policy advisers exist who can create these kinds of metrics, but they aren't here, and there work wherever they are is ongoing - it is way to soon to really say what benefits the region and this country will derive from Saddam's ouster and the establishment of a moderate democracy (by Middle East standards) in Iraq.