Vitalist nonsense versus Science.

[Canute]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I think we'll just have to disagree on this one.

You're probably right - but I'll have another shot at it.

I don't think it's redefining terms. If what I am proposing as 'unconscious thought' really does serve the same general functional role in the brain as 'conscious thought,' then the only major difference between the two is whether or not they are represented in conscious experience...snip

You seem to be saying that a thought is just a function. In this case thoughts do not need explaining and computers can think. I didn't think that your position.

That's exactly what I think an 'unconscious thought' is: just a physical information processing mechanism in the brain. I do not think subjective experience can be coherently identified as literally 'being' a purely physical neural mechanism, for all the familiar reasons regarding the incommensurability between the ontologies of two. However, the philosophical problems of such an identity do not apply for cognitive processes that are not associated with subjective experience, because in this case there is nothing for the physical processes to be incommensurable with.

I agree. But on this view thoughts of which we are conscious are quite different things to thoughts of which we are not conscious. One type can be reduced to brain and one cannot. Doesn't this not suggest that they should have different definitions?

The functional role of thought, devoid of the experiential aspect, can be seen as a physical, algorithmic process without any inherent contradictions. (This is why eg the notion of a 'zombie' is not logically incoherent.)

Oh dear. It seems I disagree with you about zombies as well. Still I agree with the main point here. But you are talking about is the fundctional role of thought, not what a thought is. When you say 'it can be seen as' what that means is 'it can be defined as'. I agree that the functional role of thoughts 'can be seen' in this way, (although it is a conjecture), but I don't agree that thoughts can be seen this way. In any case surely there is a clear difference in causal effect, (aka function), between thoughts that are conscious and those that are not. Unconscious thoughts never cause us to write them down for instance. This is a function that unconscious thoughts cannot have.

Difficult to prove, yes, but there are good reasons for believing it nonetheless. The alternative is to suppose that the solution spontaneously occurs ex nihilo, and to me that is not a satisfying proposition.

Nor me. It's not what I was suggesting. I was suggesting that there may just be a 'timeout' in our reasoning when we are not consciously considering a problem, thus allowing ourselves to get out of the rut that has so far prevented us from finding a solution. IOW we may find sudden solutions simply because we stopped thinking about the problem for a while.

(Although I'm not disagreeing that unconscious brain processes occur, but just suggesting that these are not thoughts).

It is readily demonstrable that conscious thought involves the utilization of certain general but differentiated neural mechanisms, so I do not think it's a stretch to posit such mechanisms performing their functions as usual even though they happen in this instance to not be a content of consciousness.

I agree.

Numerous scientific studies involving phenomena such as unconscious priming, in addition to common sense concerns such as 'why do thoughts appear to bubble up randomly from nowhere?' all point to the general conclusion that it is very difficult, if not impossible or incoherent, to account for the performace of consciousness without taking into account brain activities which themselves are not all privilege to conscious access. [/B]

I agree with that also. I'm arguing only that those processes cannot be called thoughts unless you radically redefine 'thoughts'.

When you offer someone 'a penny for your thoughts' you do not expect them to say that they have no idea what they are.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Canute
I agree. But on this view thoughts of which we are conscious are quite different things to thoughts of which we are not conscious. One type can be reduced to brain and one cannot. Doesn't this not suggest that they should have different definitions?

I don't see conscious and unconscious thought as two different animals as much as I see them as the same kind of animal, just in different contexts. One context involves awareness and the other does not, and that awareness does not necessarily inhere to the processes of thoughts themselves.

Why do thoughts sometimes randomly pop into your head, with no prompting from conscious effort? It could be the case that the informational content of such thoughts was formed subconsciously, and that pre-existing information then made its way into conscious awareness (by whatever means are usually responsible for information in the brain being made accessible to consciousness). It just depends on if you want to define 'thought' as the informational process, or as the informational process in conjunction with awareness of it.

I should note that the same could be said for, say, color-- information in the brain that codes for light wavelengths can exist in some parts of the brain without being available to conscious access. I would, however, refuse to grant the notion of 'unconscious colors' on the same grounds that you refuse to grant the notion of 'unconscious thoughts.' I admit that this might be an inconsistency on my part. However, my reason for such discrimination is that, for me, the notion of 'color' is dominated by its experiential aspect (what it looks like) whereas the notion of thought is dominated by its informational/functional aspect (what it refers to/what it does). This said, I again emphasize that both have informational/functional aspects in brain processing that can exist independently of consciousness and both can have experiential aspects.

I don't think we fundamentally disagree on concepts so much as terminology. In any case, if you take the strict stance that thought must include an experiential component by definition, then of course I agree that 'unconscious thought' is a contradiction in terms.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Some neural activity that plays a similar functional role to what we think of as conscious thought, but which nonetheless occurs unconsciously.

For instance, there have been scientists/mathemeticians/thinkers who have unsuccessfully tried to solve difficult problems in their waking lives, only to have the solution spontaneously present itself to their conscious awareness in a dream. This suggests that their brains were processing information relevant to the problems while they slept (and perhaps subconsciously while they were awake), unbeknowst to them. Hence, they were having at least some 'unconscious thoughts'-- those thoughts that led to the solution.

This is one of the more striking examples of unconscious thought, although in reality we probably have such unconscious thoughts (judgments, reactions, deductions) all the time. There is much that goes on in the brain that does not reveal itself to consciousness, even when it comes to the higher cognitive functions.

And what exactly is the difference between a collection of "unconscious thoughts" and a conscious one?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I think the usual notion of 'thought' can embody two roles: the experiential role (how it feels) and the functional role (what it does).

I think this ad hoc distinction is at the heart of common misconceptions about consciousness...these misconceptions pile up and evolve into "the hard problem". Had you ever questioned whether such a distinction exists at all?

The same can be said for other 'higher' cognitive functions, such as memory. Thus there is a sense in which we can talk about thought and memory without referring to our conscious experiences of them at all. Obviously we do not take everything into account if we refer to conscious thought and conscious memory without referring to their experiential components; but it appears that we can still take into account their functional roles in the brain without explicitly referring to their experiential contents. That is to say, although it is obviously nonsensical to speak of the occurence of an experience in the absence of subjective experience of it, it is not necessarily nonsensical to speak of the occurence of a physical brain function in the absence of subjective experience of it, even if that physical function is sometimes subjectively experienced.

And what separates those that are subjectively experienced from those that aren't? Remember, if there is a dead-end in a line of reasoning, then you may have made a wrong turn somewhere down the line.

From a strictly functional point of view, there are certain cognitive functions in the brain that appear to perform very similar operations regardless of whether or not they are explicitly represented in consciousness. Thought is one such operation. If a thinker has a solution to a vexing problem suddenly presented to him in a dream, his brain must have been performing some kind of 'search' for a feasible solution to the problem during his unconscious sleep. Such an unconscious 'search' plays a similar functional role as what we think of as conscious thought, although there may be important differences (for instance, thought guided by conscious attention may use a method of search functionally distinct from subconscious thought in certain ways).

In what ways?

However, in both cases what we have are neural mechanisms that are dedicated to searching (using whatever methods) for an answer to a given problem. In this sense both neural mechanisms can be seen as fulfilling the general functional role of 'thought,' even though one is experienced consciously and one is not.

What if one simply doesn't remember that they consciously thought of it? What if some searches seem more successful than others to the "search mechanism" of the brain, and so the brain works on that possibility more, and that constant re-visiting is conscious thought?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
You seem to be saying that a thought is just a function. In this case thoughts do not need explaining and computers can think. I didn't think that your position.

But is there anything "wrong" with that position?

I agree. But on this view thoughts of which we are conscious are quite different things to thoughts of which we are not conscious. One type can be reduced to brain and one cannot. Doesn't this not suggest that they should have different definitions?

Unless they are one and the same, and the illusion of consciousness (as I've postulated in other threads) is, at it's heart, this very distinction. Then they could both be reduced to the brain.

Oh dear. It seems I disagree with you about zombies as well. Still I agree with the main point here. But you are talking about is the fundctional role of thought, not what a thought is. When you say 'it can be seen as' what that means is 'it can be defined as'. I agree that the functional role of thoughts 'can be seen' in this way, (although it is a conjecture), but I don't agree that thoughts can be seen this way. In any case surely there is a clear difference in causal effect, (aka function), between thoughts that are conscious and those that are not. Unconscious thoughts never cause us to write them down for instance. This is a function that unconscious thoughts cannot have.

Key point: Couldn't the impelling force to "write them down" or to re-stimulate our visual cortex so that we might "see" them again, or any other such desire to be sure that it's saved for later, be the only thing that differentiates "unconscious" and "conscious" thought? If so, it is merely a matter of "getting more attention" (in terms of more constant re-stimulation, for whatever reason), which Calvin has already accounted for in his Hexagon theory.[/color]

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
I think this ad hoc distinction is at the heart of common misconceptions about consciousness...these misconceptions pile up and evolve into "the hard problem". Had you ever questioned whether such a distinction exists at all?

The distinction is one of definitions. I know for a fact that I subjectively experience, axiomatically. I also know that the definition of computation has no compelling relation to subjective experience. We may redefine our notion of computation such that it can conceptually account for subjective experience, but then we are no longer in the realm of materialism.

We may not redefine subjective experience, since it is a brute fact and not some abstract concept that we arbitrarily create. It is a given, even more so than it is a given that (say) the moon objectively exists. It is the most fundamental given for human beings that there is. I can easily change my notion of computation to include some unseen properties, but I cannot change my notion of subjective experience such that it no longer has the properties I observe it to have. If I do this, I am no longer talking about subjective experience, for the same reason that if I redefine 'moon' to mean "a white circle" I am no longer talking about a massive rock that orbits the earth.

And what separates those that are subjectively experienced from those that aren't? Remember, if there is a dead-end in a line of reasoning, then you may have made a wrong turn somewhere down the line.

What separates them in the objective sense? I don't know, but then again no one knows right now. What separates them in the subjective sense? Well, one kind is subjectively experienced and one is not.

In what ways?

A thought guided by attention may have more of a propensity for, say, a depth first search as opposed to a breadth first search. (Just a random example-- don't take that literally.) Anyway, don't worry, because I realize that such a difference could be explained entirely in a reductive sense. Attention is not synonymous with experience and so can be subsumed under the easy problems.

What if one simply doesn't remember that they consciously thought of it?

Certainly a possibility. Seems to be a bit implausible in a normally functioning brain, but it is possible in principle.

What if some searches seem more successful than others to the "search mechanism" of the brain, and so the brain works on that possibility more, and that constant re-visiting is conscious thought?

No dice. Let's keep this one to M&E.

 

[Canute]

Hypnogogue

I agree that we are only arguing about terminology. But still I think it's important to do this. (I'm still annoyed with er, what's his name, for hijacking 'intentional' to mean something completely different to what everyone else has always meant for so long). There is a danger of embodying errors and contradictions in the definition of things when it comes to consciousness. In fact that seems to be half of the problem with it.

You obviously know this and your point about 'red' is a good one. As you guessed I do feel that it's inconsistent to treat 'red' as any different to something more obviously computational in origin. After all 'red' must be computational in origin even if it doesn't feel like we have to 'work out' the colour of things.

Mind you, if everybody in the trade suddenly decided to define thoughts as 'any mental process contributing to overall mental function' or something like that, then I'd have to go along with it. Then we would have to have two different words for conscious and unconscious thoughts, presumably 'C-thoughts' and 'U-thoughts'. But at the moment it seems to me that when people say thoughts they mean conscious ones.

I don't see conscious and unconscious thought as two different animals as much as I see them as the same kind of animal, just in different contexts. One context involves awareness and the other does not, and that awareness does not necessarily inhere to the processes of thoughts themselves.

Hmm. If thoughts are qualia then is it the 'absent qualia' problem in disguise that we are discussing?

Why do thoughts sometimes randomly pop into your head, with no prompting from conscious effort?

Don't know, and to be honest I'm not yet compeletely convinced that they do. But if we knew this then at least Buddhist meditation might become a lot easier to practice.

The key sticking point for me is that if thoughts can be unconscious brain processes then it seems to follow that computers can have thoughts and can think. There is a grave danger that a lot of issues will become muddled if we accept this terminology and it becomes commonplace for people to talk of unconscious machines having thoughts.

But I'm happy to agree to differ. As far as I know it's a priori impossible to prove that the definition of a term is incorrect.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Canute
Hmm. If thoughts are qualia then is it the 'absent qualia' problem in disguise that we are discussing?

No, I don't think so, because if we agree to define thought only in terms of a conscious though, our discussion basically disappears and we agree.

The key sticking point for me is that if thoughts can be unconscious brain processes then it seems to follow that computers can have thoughts and can think. There is a grave danger that a lot of issues will become muddled if we accept this terminology and it becomes commonplace for people to talk of unconscious machines having thoughts.

Completely agree. For this reason it is probably better to stick with your definition of thought.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
But is there anything "wrong" with that position?

If you don't mind redefining what 'thinking' is then no. However currently it is accepted that computers do not think, since thinking implies consciousness. If thinking is redefined so it does not imply consciousness then my pocket calculator can think, and an abacus can think with a bit of help.

Unless they are one and the same, and the illusion of consciousness (as I've postulated in other threads) is, at it's heart, this very distinction. Then they could both be reduced to the brain.

I think I've said all I can on this one. If consciousness was identical to brain states there'd be no explanation for why science is trying so hard to explain it.

Key point: Couldn't the impelling force to "write them down" or to re-stimulate our visual cortex so that we might "see" them again, or any other such desire to be sure that it's saved for later, be the only thing that differentiates "unconscious" and "conscious" thought? If so, it is merely a matter of "getting more attention" (in terms of more constant re-stimulation, for whatever reason), which Calvin has already accounted for in his Hexagon theory.[/color] [/B]

The very fact that you have to use the word 'illusion' shows that even you think conscious thoughts are different to unconscious processes. How do you explain this difference? The difference cannot be explained as an illusion. One cannot have an illusion of being conscious when in reality one is not.

Many people argue that our 'sense of self' and/or normal perception of reality is an illusion. But this is an illusion in the sense of a misperception or misinterpretation of the meaning of our experiences, not a suggestion that they don't exist. If they don't exist then they cannot be an illusion.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
The distinction is one of definitions. I know for a fact that I subjectively experience, axiomatically. I also know that the definition of computation has no compelling relation to subjective experience. We may redefine our notion of computation such that it can conceptually account for subjective experience, but then we are no longer in the realm of materialism.

We may not redefine subjective experience, since it is a brute fact and not some abstract concept that we arbitrarily create.

Fine, but you still haven't defined "subjective experience" in the first place...so how could you "re"-define it?

What separates them in the objective sense? I don't know, but then again no one knows right now. What separates them in the subjective sense? Well, one kind is subjectively experienced and one is not.

And what does it mean to experience a thought? What does it mean to have a thought without experiencing it? I can't understand the distinction because the terms being contrasted have not been properly defined.

A thought guided by attention may have more of a propensity for, say, a depth first search as opposed to a breadth first search. (Just a random example-- don't take that literally.) Anyway, don't worry, because I realize that such a difference could be explained entirely in a reductive sense. Attention is not synonymous with experience and so can be subsumed under the easy problems.

How do you know that? If the amount of attention your CPU pays to a particular spatial firing (or spatiotemporal one, for that matter) is what produces (in retrospect) the illusion that you "exerienced" that one any more than you "experienced" another one, then you still don't have an explanation for "experiencing one thought while not experiencing another", but you have made it a moot issue (btw, "experience" is always in scare-quotes because I still don't have a working definition of it from your side of the debate).

Certainly a possibility. Seems to be a bit implausible in a normally functioning brain, but it is possible in principle.

Is it not also possible in principle that one never experienced the thought, but remembers doing so? (Much like I remember flying over my town, but never really did so...it was a dream)

No dice. Let's keep this one to M&E.

Well, the afore-quoted was just a more blunt statement of the possibility that I'd been hinting at within the rest of the post (and some previous posts).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
If you don't mind redefining what 'thinking' is then no.

Why not? They don't seem to be getting anywhere with their current definition.

However currently it is accepted that computers do not think, since thinking implies consciousness. If thinking is redefined so it does not imply consciousness then my pocket calculator can think, and an abacus can think with a bit of help.

Wait a minute...since when is it a bad thing to assume a computer is conscious? We assume a dog is conscious, and a computer can process and interact better than a dog can, can't it?

I think I've said all I can on this one. If consciousness was identical to brain states there'd be no explanation for why science is trying so hard to explain it.

Sure there would: They're constantly met with philosophical opposition. The proclamation that "the hard problem still stands" is going to get in the way of even the most impressive of theories. William Calvin's theory would be an enormous step in the right direction, if people would just drop the "hard problem" (not off-hand, but after the realization that it (the hard problem) is based on false premises).

The very fact that you have to use the word 'illusion' shows that even you think conscious thoughts are different to unconscious processes. How do you explain this difference? The difference cannot be explained as an illusion. One cannot have an illusion of being conscious when in reality one is not.

Not of "being conscious", of having been conscious of one thought, while unconscious of another. You were processing both thoughts, there was simply more "attention" being paid to the one, instead of the other. All of this falls right back on the Darwinian process that I've described numerous times, since the variant patterns are competing for supremacy in a closed working space.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Sure there would: They're constantly met with philosophical opposition. The proclamation that "the hard problem still stands" is going to get in the way of even the most impressive of theories. William Calvin's theory would be an enormous step in the right direction, if people would just drop the "hard problem" (not off-hand, but after the realization that it (the hard problem) is based on false premises).

Without mentioning the validity of the hard problem in itself, I'd like to say that recognizing the hard problem will not 'get in the way' of any scientific theories of consciousness. At most the hard problem will call into question metaphysical assertions about consciousness which cannot really be conclusively supported or refuted by evidence anyway.

For instance, if Calvin's theory is fruitful, then no one who recognizes the hard problem will deny its fruitfulness-- they will just call into question its completeness. They will question if it really does explain everything that needs explaining, but that does not amount to refuting or standing in the way of the theory itself.

 

[Canute]

Mentat

I think we'll have to agree to differ. You seem to be saying that you don't know what subjective experiences are, and there's no way of defining them meaningfully to someone who doesn't know what they are like already.

I'm not sure where you get the idea that the 'hard' problem' is not a scientific one. It's certainly not a problem in many philosophies, and isn't really even a 'western' philosophical problem, since it is generally scientists who insist that consciousness arises from brain rather than philosophers, who in the main go for idealism.

Philosophers, people who think while trying not to make assumptions, merely point out that IF consciousness arises from brain then it is impossible for science to explain it. This is a scientific problem, not a philosophical one.

I'll leave you with Max Planck, who expressed the problem perfectly.

“Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery in nature. And it is because in the last analysis we ourselves are part of the mystery we try to solve.”

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Without mentioning the validity of the hard problem in itself, I'd like to say that recognizing the hard problem will not 'get in the way' of any scientific theories of consciousness. At most the hard problem will call into question metaphysical assertions about consciousness which cannot really be conclusively supported or refuted by evidence anyway.

For instance, if Calvin's theory is fruitful, then no one who recognizes the hard problem will deny its fruitfulness-- they will just call into question its completeness. They will question if it really does explain everything that needs explaining, but that does not amount to refuting or standing in the way of the theory itself.

I see what you mean.

But, then, couldn't a theory be complete by Science's standards, and still not satisfy the "hard problem" (which is, at its heart, a "why" question...or so it appears, anyway)?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Mentat

I think we'll have to agree to differ. You seem to be saying that you don't know what subjective experiences are, and there's no way of defining them meaningfully to someone who doesn't know what they are like already.

So there is no way to define them...since an a priori assumption that I'm just going to know what you are talking about is not just illogical but the true enemy of logic (if you'll forgive my false logical piety ).

I'm not sure where you get the idea that the 'hard' problem' is not a scientific one. It's certainly not a problem in many philosophies, and isn't really even a 'western' philosophical problem, since it is generally scientists who insist that consciousness arises from brain rather than philosophers, who in the main go for idealism.

The hard problem is a philosophical take-off of a scientific assumption. Scientists assume that the brain performs conscious functions, philosophers are the ones that add the question of "why" these two should be related (which is not a question that scientists are capable of asking let alone answering).

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
So there is no way to define them...since an a priori assumption that I'm just going to know what you are talking about is not just illogical but the true enemy of logic (if you'll forgive my false logical piety ).

It is not difficult to define 'experience'. It is just impossible to do it scientifically, for fairly obvious reasons.

Think of it this way. It is agreed by everyone who has ever considered the matter that idealism is unfalsifiable. If we could show that consciousness arose from brain then this would falsify idealism. Ergo we cann show that consciounsness arises from brain, and therefore quite obviously we cannot show how it happens.

Why this argument is so little used I don;t know. As far as I know it is unrefutable. I you're around Hypno what do you think?

The hard problem is a philosophical take-off of a scientific assumption.

I notice you use 'take off' to avoid using 'refutation'.

Scientists assume that the brain performs conscious functions, philosophers are the ones that add the question of "why" these two should be related (which is not a question that scientists are capable of asking let alone answering). [/B]

The view of some scientists is that brain gives rise to consciousness. In order to justify this assumption, and explain how it is plausible, they search for the corrleates of consciousness. This is what scientists are looking for, and that search is the scientific study of consciousness.

Philosophers do not invent problems, they point them out. You seem to think that there is some dividing line between philosophy and science. There isn't one.

I do not understand where you get your idea of the scientific view, it is nothing at all like yours. There is no 'scientific view' n the origins of consciousness, nor yet a proof of its existence.

Yet for some reason scientists conclude that consciousness needs an explanation. It is hard to say why this is so, but presumably it is because although there is no scientific evidence for conscousness scientists are conscious human beings, and find it hard to dismiss the fact.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Canute
Think of it this way. It is agreed by everyone who has ever considered the matter that idealism is unfalsifiable. If we could show that consciousness arose from brain then this would falsify idealism. Ergo we cann show that consciounsness arises from brain, and therefore quite obviously we cannot show how it happens.

Why this argument is so little used I don;t know. As far as I know it is unrefutable. I you're around Hypno what do you think?

I don't think showing brain activity to be the cause of consciousness would necessarily falsify idealism. An idealist could still hold that the brain itself is just an idea in the mind of God (or still has a fundamentally idea-like nature, or somesuch).

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I don't think showing brain activity to be the cause of consciousness would necessarily falsify idealism. An idealist could still hold that the brain itself is just an idea in the mind of God (or still has a fundamentally idea-like nature, or somesuch).

Good point. I forgot the mind of God. Still, isn't there something a bit odd about the idea that God created brains and brains created our consciousness? Also by most defintions 'God' is consciousness, independent of physical attributes. So even if God did create brains then it remains the case that consciousness gives rise to brains.

But I think you're right. It's not as simple as I suggested. I'll try try to refine it a bit.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
I notice you use 'take off' to avoid using 'refutation'.

No, I used "take-off" because it took off from a scientific assumption...it doesn't refute the assumption, it's a hybrid version of it.

The view of some scientists is that brain gives rise to consciousness. In order to justify this assumption, and explain how it is plausible, they search for the corrleates of consciousness. This is what scientists are looking for, and that search is the scientific study of consciousness.

I beg to differ. None of the scientific theories of consciousness I've ever read have been about the correlates of consciousness, but have been instead about what processes in the brain are consciousness. Indeed this distinction is often stated rather plainly in one way or another, at the beginning of the book.

Philosophers do not invent problems, they point them out. You seem to think that there is some dividing line between philosophy and science. There isn't one.

That may be bad wording, Canute. Science is a branch of Philosophy ("philosophy" being the "love and pursuit of wisdom/knowledge/understanding"), but, in being a "branch" it is subject to limitations that Philosophy as a whole is not subject to.

I do not understand where you get your idea of the scientific view, it is nothing at all like yours. There is no 'scientific view' n the origins of consciousness, nor yet a proof of its existence.

What?

Yet for some reason scientists conclude that consciousness needs an explanation. It is hard to say why this is so, but presumably it is because although there is no scientific evidence for conscousness scientists are conscious human beings, and find it hard to dismiss the fact.

Scientists conclude that consciousness needs an explanation because that is the entire purpose of science: to provide explanations for phenomena.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat

I beg to differ. None of the scientific theories of consciousness I've ever read have been about the correlates of consciousness, but have been instead about what processes in the brain are consciousness. Indeed this distinction is often stated rather plainly in one way or another, at the beginning of the book.

You have not read much then. The literature is awash with papers about NCC's.

What?

I thought I was clear. Science cannot prove that consciousness exists. Also, while there are many conjectures, there is no scientific view (i.e. view founded on scientific evidence) on the origins of consciousness. There will not be one until the hard problem is solved.

Scientists conclude that consciousness needs an explanation because that is the entire purpose of science: to provide explanations for phenomena. [/B]

The purpose of modern science is unclear to me, but I'll take your word for it. However do you not think it paradoxical that science is trying to explain something it cannot define and cannot show to exist?

 

[FZ+]

I think science has defined consciousness. The problem is that you don't like the definition.

 

[Dlanorrenrag]

Maybe Chalmers is recognizing and grappling with an innate, metaphysical, spiritual property of each particular vibrating string of matter that enables it to "stick-polarize-remember" fuzzy patterns in association with other levels of material organization within the whole. If such properties are tightly bound up with perception, then the focus of any sticky attempt to measure or perceive patterns of feelings of consciousness would seem likely to skew and render non-falsifiable the attempted observation. In other words, might understanding how basic particles of matter are able to polarize one another be requisite to reducing Chalmers' hard problem about consciousness? Sure glad I got that off my chest.

 

[Imparcticle]

However do you not think it paradoxical that science is trying to explain something it cannot define and cannot show to exist?

Or rather, we are having a hard time defining it ourselves. It obviously exists, does it not?

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by FZ+
I think science has defined consciousness. The problem is that you don't like the definition. [/B]

No, it hasn't been scientifically defined it yet. Individual scientists have individual definitions but they all disagree with each other. All widely agreed definitions are not scientific.

No scientific proof of its existence is available yet so you can't really say science has defined it. It's an odd situation.

 

[FZ+]

Individual scientists have individual definitions but they all disagree with each other.

Isn't that the whole point of science? Individual disagreement is what makes science work.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by FZ+
Isn't that the whole point of science? Individual disagreement is what makes science work.

I think so but this is pushing what Canute is saying a bit far I think. If I found a scientist who diagreed with evolutionary theory you'd probably be quick to say he wasn't a legitimate scientist. So disagreement only goes so far. There is generally agreement on a base level of established knowledge for the most part. I think when scientists disagree, they generally do it on the answer to a scientific question. But if they don't agree on the question itself, then it's hard to see how anything scientific can result.

 

[Canute]

Yes that's the point. And actually it's worse than that. There is no individual scientific definition of consciousness that works, never mind an orthodox one. Read any scientific paper or book on consciousness and the definition invariably leaves out the one thing philosophers (and common sense) say should left in, namely 'what it is like'.

This is the sort of crazy muddle (Chalmer's might say 'sleight of hand') that we get.

“…almost a decade ago, Crick wrote ‘Everyone has a rough idea of what is meant by consciousness. It is better to avoid a precise definition of consciousness because of the dangers of premature definition. Until the problem is understood much better, any attempt at a further definition is likely to be either misleading or overly-restrictive, or both’ (Crick, 1994). This seems to be as true now as it was then although the identification of different aspects of consciousness (P–consciousness. A-consciousness, self-consciousness, and monitoring consciousness) by Block (1995) has certainly brought a degree of clarification. On the other hand, there is little doubt that consciousness does seem to be something to do with the operation of a sophisticated control system (the human brain), and we can claim more familiarity with control systems than can most philosophers, so perhaps we can make up some ground there.” (Owen Holland and Rod Goodman)

 

[FZ+]

I found a scientist who diagreed with evolutionary theory you'd probably be quick to say he wasn't a legitimate scientist.

No I won't. It is a matter of attitude. If he had a credible reason, and a credible alternative, and positive evidence, then I wouldn't say that at all. Evolution theory has changed alot, due to people who disagreed.

But if they don't agree on the question itself, then it's hard to see how anything scientific can result.

Let's give an example, to disprove this.

Take one theory of everything. Scientists, legitimately practising the scientific method, have not only disagreed on candidates for this theory, but have also disagreed on what criteria it needs to fulfill. (Eg. marcus would tell you that a TOE needs to be conservative, not inventing new stuff. A string theorist may disagree.)

Read any scientific paper or book on consciousness and the definition invariably leaves out the one thing philosophers (and common sense) say should left in, namely 'what it is like'.

Common sense is a very bad word, as far as science is concerned. The fact remains that this is still a definition of consciousness, and the idea that experience sorts itself out is also legitimate. You may disagree with this definition, but that is your disagreement. Science has defined consciousness. Some people simply do not like it.

Speaking objectively, the way science can win this (if we see it as a competition), is to explain consciousness as far as its own definition. The rest, including the hard problem of experience, will probably prove intractable, and definitions requiring something more will probably fizzle out in time, simply by virtue of the fact it is a question made to be unanswerable, and eventually meaningless.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by FZ+
No I won't. It is a matter of attitude. If he had a credible reason, and a credible alternative, and positive evidence, then I wouldn't say that at all. Evolution theory has changed alot, due to people who disagreed.

This whole discussion is really about what we arbitrarily label as "scientific". Now that I read your statement, I can see that you can pretty much claim anything you want to be scientific and there's not much I or Canute can say or do to change that. It's just a silly word game. I just interpreted Canutes original point to be that there are some standards with which all scientists agree. The scientific method for one. Your statement implies that scientists can disagree on anything and everything. It is hard for me to see how scientists can accomplish anything and contribute to established knowledge if they can't even get past what is a philosophical issue of defining the problem. Whether you want to call such things scientific or not, is subjective. You and Canute just disagree about the label.

Let's give an example, to disprove this.

Take one theory of everything. Scientists, legitimately practising the scientific method, have not only disagreed on candidates for this theory, but have also disagreed on what criteria it needs to fulfill. (Eg. marcus would tell you that a TOE needs to be conservative, not inventing new stuff. A string theorist may disagree.)

The only way this proof works is if we assume that TOE has a scientific definition LOL. If this is true then Canute could argue that it does not. Again, this is subjective whether we label anything as scientiifc. But I still argue it would be hard to establish a pragmatic benefit from an area with so much semantic confusion.

Also, I'm not sure that the TOE is what you claim but I could be wrong. I was under the impression the objective of a theory of everything is to tie all the known forces together. That's what it is. If a scientist doesn't think this, then he's not on the same page with what the objective of a TOE is to begin with. And he's just using the wrong word or phrase. Just like scientists are likely using the wrong word when they say "consciousness" to describe whatever it is they define it to be.

Science has defined consciousness. Some people simply do not like it.

I didn't see you dispute the claim that there was disagreement on the definition. You simply claimed that disagreement was scientific. So how exactly can you say "science has defined it?" when there are so many definitions?

Speaking objectively, the way science can win this (if we see it as a competition), is to explain consciousness as far as its own definition. The rest, including the hard problem of experience, will probably prove intractable, and definitions requiring something more will probably fizzle out in time, simply by virtue of the fact it is a question made to be unanswerable, and eventually meaningless.

"Unanswerable" is a distinction that unbiased philosophy should discern.

The more I think about this topic, the more silly it seems. I can actually agree with you if we want to assume that a scientific definition is one that allows for scientific inquiry via the scientific method. This understanding allows 500 different scientific definitions. But I think Canutes point was that there is no single "established" definition, which is evidence that the philosophical issue of consciousness is likely not being addressed(or cannot be) by science. Certainly not in a way that can contribute anything to "established" knowledge. It is likely science is studying something that it labels "consciousness" but it doesn't represent what people mean when they speak of consciousness.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Fliption

But I think Canutes point was that there is no single "established" definition, which is evidence that the philosophical issue of consciousness is likely not being addressed(or cannot be) by science. Certainly not in a way that can contribute anything to "established" knowledge. It is likely science is studying something that it labels "consciousness" but it doesn't represent what people mean when they speak of consciousness. [/B]

Yep, this is the problem. Individual researchers have their own definitions and they are all different. Scientific defintions of consciousness do exist (I collect them for a hobby, the sophistry is fascinating) but it is quite easy to pick holes in all of them. The only definitions that are widely agreed are unscientific 'philosophical' or 'folk-psychological' ones ('what it is like' etc), and these do not provide a basis for scientific research or theorising.

The problem seems to be that consciousness is incompatible with physicalism. For a while this did not matter because 'Behaviourism' shielded science from the problem. However now that Behaviourism is discredited the problem is back.

Up until Behaviourism most philosophers and many natural scientists were idealists. But in the meantime physicalism has taken over. Now that consciousness has become a scientific issue again this creates a clash between the orthodox metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and the facts. Perhaps this will be resolved but it seems unlikely, and many including me say it's impossible in principle.

It's not a competition and I'm not knocking science exactly, just suggesting that science can only explain the physical in terms of the physical and therefore cannot explain consciousness. The definition problem is the same problem as the explanation problem, since a 'theory' is really just an elaborate definition.