kote said:
So to answer
why is anything measurable? I would refer to discussions of
why is there something rather than nothing? I really think they reduce to the same question of why observables exist, or rather, why anything is observable. There is a technical difference on the matter of unobservable properties, but unobservable properties aren't what anyone is asking about when they ask why there's something rather than nothing. That technicality isn't a concern for any of the arguments.
Unless, of course, your issue is with the holism of scientific theories and properties. Then see above

.
The issue at the heart of this is the difference between treating reality as a system and reality as a construction.
Yes, we can model reality as a construction - a bunch of small localised stuff (events, substance, atoms, information) glued together to create additive effects. That works. Although it then introduces paradoxes, such as how did that local stuff get created in the first place? And oh, we also seem to need a global spacetime, a void, a vacuum, a dimensionality, for the stuff to do its constructing in.
So the success of mechanical modelling - gluing together particles, or masses, or energies, or force vectors, or even microstates - is undeniable. But it leaves unanswered some basic metaphysical questions. Which is why it can be such a puzzle over, well, how can we have the measured without also having a measurer?
You will say, I want to be a good mechanist, a good reductionist, and do away with everything but the measured local stuff. Yet I cannot get away from the nagging realisation that a measurer, a global context that makes a measurement meaningful, is also always required.
The best recent philosopher on these issues I believe is CS Peirce. And his theory of semiosis is exactly about this issue. What gives meaning to a sign?
The radical step he made (or was trying to make) was to frame things so that he was talking simultaneously about epistemology and ontology.
Semiosis is how we (as reality modelling creatures) dichotomise the world into our formal models and the measurements they entail.
And then pan-semiosis would be saying well, the world has that logic itself. The world self-organises into a model (the classical, decohered, prevailing state of the universe) and its measurements (the acts of decoherence that create the events, or particles, or bits, or however you chose to think about the local stuff, out of which the whole is being created).
So if Conrad's question is why is anything measurable? The answer would be that systems are measuring devices. The local stuff out of which they are constructed is also the local stuff which they are creating (via the causality of downward "observational" constraint).
It is all about reality modeled as a self-organising system. And to do that properly, you require Peirce's firstness, secondness and thirdness. Or what I normally talk about as vagueness, dichotomies and hierarchies (as Peircean terminology is even more opaque, and I also prefer to connect to the larger bodies of thought on these matters).