Why something rather than nothing?

[vectorcube]

Weasel away. You either are talking about mere somethingness or you attempt some clear and honest definition of everythingness. This is not a race where you are allowed to back both horses.

Weasel away? How? What do you think the question that begins with "why something...?" mean? It means every single contingent concrete thing. Why is this so difficult to understand?

For example, the Parfit cite you supplied...

"Consider next the All Worlds Hypothesis, on which every
possible local world exists. Unlike the Null Possibility, this
may be how things are. And it may be the next least puzzling
possibility. This hypothesis is not the same as – though it
includes – the Many Worlds Hypothesis..."

So Parfit is rightly attempting to distinguish mere somethings from some true conception of everything..

"Merely something from some true conception of everything"? What the hell? Does this statement make any sense at all? What is "mere somethings" and "true conception of everything..."?

And your concrete contingent things would have to be a subset of even a many worlds view

Can you say this in a sentence? Are you saying the set of all concrete contingent things are a subset of the set of all possible universes in the many world view? If this is what you are saying then, then the answer is no.


Then...

This special feature need
not be that of being best. Thus, on the All Worlds Hypothesis,
reality is maximal, or as full as it could be. Similarly, if
nothing had ever existed, reality would have been minimal, or
as empty as it could be. If the possibility that obtained were
either maximal, or minimal, that fact, we might claim, would
be most unlikely to be a coincidence. And that might support
the further claim that this possibility’s having this feature
would be why it obtained."

So here Parfitt is treating everything and nothing as limit states of possibility. Then the actual, that which obtains, is taken as gaining support from being aligned with one limit rather than the other. The maximal is serving as fact C to favour A over B

Unlike you, i actually read the whole paper. What is "limit states of possibility" suppose to mean anyway? Parfit never at all say the "alll world hypothesis" is true, nor does he draw from it your conclusion.

"According to the Brute Fact View, reality merely
happens to be as it is. That, I have argued, may not be true,
since there may be some Selector which explains, or partly
explains, reality’s being as it is. There may also be some
higher Selector which explains there being this Selector. My
suggestion is only that, at the end of any such explanatory
chain, some highest Selector must merely happen to be the one
that rules. That is a different view."

Which is the Peircean approach I've argued but which you clearly don't get.

Give me references that shows this is what peirce say, ok?

So Parfit, as far as he goes, generally is following my path closely. But he does not continue on down the line to even deeper ideas about the true nature of "everythingness" - the better ontic possibility of vagueness. Nor does he have a story on the selector itself, which I argue is the dichotomy.

I don ` t believe you, but you can believe whatever you want. I suggest if you want to make this productive. You should list the properties of partfit` s selectors by yourself. Just a thought.

But that is by the by. My point here is you don't appear even to understand your own sources. Or maybe you filter out all the dangerous "new age" aspects of what appears in your course work.

Honestly, i know the source well, and you don` t know anything at all about what you are saying. You draw superficial similars, and think the author support your view. Sadly, i think you believe it.

 

[vectorcube]

Then what Nozick actually argues in the cite you pick...

"Nozick concludes by linking explanatory self-subsumption to reflexive self-reference, in order to explain why one version of LF holds rather than others that might hold. The apparent insufficiency of its holding in virtue of its holding, which would have been true of any of the others if they had held, marks the fundamental principle as reflexive: A reflexive fundamental principle will hold merely in virtue of holding, it holds true 'from the inside'."

Again, the only path is bootstrapping internalism. A teological approach where the ends explain the means.
.

This is funny. LF stands for limited fecundity. Refexive is a relation between explanations.

What the hell does this have to do with "bootstrapping internalism"( whatever this means)? teological approach? ?

Nothingness is considered and then rejected as some version of everythingness + selection must be the case. A case for fact C is at least roughed out in these two philosophers' view.

Nozick actually comes much closer to my arguments in Invariances p163. Treating everythingness as infinite dimensionality. Then extracting the actual world by some kind of averaging or a sum over histories.

Real new age stuff I guess

Honestly, you are not fooling me. Most of what you say here don` t even make sense.

 

[apeiron]

Weasel away? How? What do you think the question that begins with "why something...?" mean? It means every single contingent concrete thing. Why is this so difficult to understand?

Supply some reference that actually supports this ludicrous position.

Something simply is not somethingness in the limit. Nor did you specify that you were talking of something as "the set of contingent concrete things". Itself a limit on somethingness, as it would seem you want to exclude possibility, potential, form, process, purpose - other legitimate metaphysical categories.

Whether we choose to denote the idea of everything as a limit state (maximal) or a set, it is still more "things" than just what the limits or set contains.

The fact that everything is being denoted is an extra fact about the state of affairs. It is a fact that we have many things, and then a further fact that this is definitely "everything" - either via limits or set approaches.

Some things must exist in a global context. Everything would have to include even the global context.

This is not a terrifically exciting point, because as I say, everythingness is only a halt on the path to a deeper framing of the "why anything" question.

So the thinking should run, why not nothing (thesis)? Well, we know there is something, so perhaps then everything (anti-thesis)? And we can see naturally that [Everything [Something]].

But then why not the synthesis of Everything~Nothing? Which is the symmetry of vagueness. Anaximander's apeiron.

 

[vectorcube]

Supply some reference that actually supports this ludicrous position.

reference for what?

Something simply is not somethingness in the limit.

?

Nor did you specify that you were talking of something as "the set of contingent concrete things".

What do you think the original question "why something...?" mean? This something is the set of all contingent concrete things. Do you know what that means? i bet you don`t.

Itself a limit on somethingness, as it would seem you want to exclude possibility, potential, form, process, purpose - other legitimate metaphysical categories

When people ask "why something...?". They are puzzled by the existence of concrete contingent things. I highly doubt that they are thinking about abstract objects, santa claus, intensionality etc.

Whether we choose to denote the idea of everything as a limit state (maximal) or a set, it is still more "things" than just what the limits or set contains.

Sure, you can imagine anything you want that is not concrete objects, but the existence of those other things would not be in question here.

This is not a terrifically exciting point, because as I say, everythingness is only a halt on the path to a deeper framing of the "why anything" question.

?

So the thinking should run, why not nothing (thesis)? Well, we know there is something, so perhaps then everything (anti-thesis)? And we can see naturally that [Everything [Something]].

Realism about possible worlds is not a problem. If they do exist, then they would be part of the set of all contingent concrete objects.

then why not the synthesis of Everything~Nothing? Which is the symmetry of vagueness. Anaximander's apeiron.

The word "Nothing" means the same as "there is no state of affair". If all possible worlds exist, then this means " All state of affair that is logically possible, exist". You see the problem?

 

[qraal]

Only dogs bark at what they do not understand

---Heraclitus

 

[apeiron]

When people ask "why something...?". They are puzzled by the existence of concrete contingent things. I highly doubt that they are thinking about abstract objects, santa claus, intensionality etc.

These "people" would not include Parfit and Nozick. Because as you made clear with the references you yourself supplied, abstract objects did concern them.

You see the problem?

 

[qraal]

Realism about possible worlds is not a problem. If they do exist, then they would be part of the set of all contingent concrete objects.

A possible world is an object? "If they exist" is answered with "they could" which is why they're "possible" not "actual" worlds. Thus we have a non-binary option - if they're not existent and they're not non-existent, then they're 'possible'.

Still don't see how a 'world' can be an 'object' though.

 

[vectorcube]

Only dogs bark at what they do not understand

---Heraclitus

Don` t beat yourself up for it.

 

[vectorcube]

These "people" would not include Parfit and Nozick. Because as you made clear with the references you yourself supplied, abstract objects did concern them.

You see the problem?

No! Abstract objects is not in question at all. Their existence is "necessary". In the sense that they would be what they are even if there was no concrete things at all.

 

[vectorcube]

A possible world is an object? "If they exist" is answered with "they could" which is why they're "possible" not "actual" worlds. Thus we have a non-binary option - if they're not existent and they're not non-existent, then they're 'possible'.

Still don't see how a 'world' can be an 'object' though.

Does it matter in this case? If possible world is real, then they are all concrete worlds. This means each concrete worlds are made/composed of concrete things/objects. Thus, the set S of all concrete objects would include all concrete worlds for each such world are made of concrete objects. Obviously, if S includes all concretes, then it includes all the worlds. QDE

 

[apeiron]

Still don't see how a 'world' can be an 'object' though.

This is why vectorcube has been so entertaining. He reminds that philosophy departments still crank out people with a religious belief in this scholastic guff. Though vectorcube is a little fundamentalist even for an impressionable student.

Real philosophers like Nozick, Searle, and a few others I have time for, attempt to reason their way to strong conclusions using modal approaches. But there is common sense in the background usually guiding their efforts. With others like Lewis and David Chalmers, they build careers on taking logic to its illogical limits. And they certainly attract a certain kind of follower.

But the interesting question you raise is "what is a world"? Do you have a definition from your own readings?

I would take the systems approach and argue that a world is a system. It is not just a collection of objects (concrete, abstract, possible, necessary, or otherwise). It has to be always both its events and its contexts, its local and its global. So it is not even about "the largest scale". It is about how large and small are the system, the process~structure, about the relations from which everything forms.

The modal logic approach of talking about worlds as an atomistic collection - a collection of isolate objects - is clearly wrong on this view. If there were multiple worlds in any correct sense, it would have to then constitute the local elements in a global "world system". We would have to take the further step of spelling out how these separate worlds relate.

This becomes very clear in a process view. If worlds do not simply exist but must arise by some kind of development, some kind of shaping selection mechanism, then that process would have to be common across all worlds at some level.

Always if there is a figure, so must there be a ground. Even atoms require a void to express their relational properties such as shape, size, position. So if we do want to treat worlds as atomistic objects, we then just shift the discussion of the world context, the "void" which allows these multiple worlds to be distinguished, to a meta level.

 

[qsa]

existence is about facts. only numbers and relations between them give rise to reality. sit in a dark room and ask yourself what is the only thing that is real and has no choice but to exist and nothing else can.NUMBERS.

 

[apeiron]

existence is about facts. only numbers and relations between them give rise to reality. sit in a dark room and ask yourself what is the only thing that is real and has no choice but to exist and nothing else can.NUMBERS.

Or is it the NUMBER-LINE?

Then if that, the number-plane (complex number)?

And we can skip trionions because division algebras - arithmetic as we know and love it - breaks down in three dimensions. The concrete objects no longer relate in the abstract space with such neat geometrical resonance.

But then, what about QUARTERNIONS? Now we have 4D numbers and the relations they give rise to (but hey, what gave rise to the 4D realm in which they are embedded).

Then we continue onwards in search of the embedding context in which point-like numbers, simple integers, are only the most local possible seeming events. Do we stop at octonions, at exceptional lie algebras?

These are island of regularity for sure, but the very fact they are tracking some kind of emergent path proves there is also a larger multidimension realm from which they emerge. A space of infinite dimensional numbers if we take a max limit approach, the most natural philosophical presumption.

Then, extrapolating from what we can already observe, it would be arguable that infinite-D numbers would have no arithmetically regular relationships. Division would long have gone out the window. InfiniteD nine-ness would no longer divide by infiniteD three-ness. But perhaps - interesting question - even addition, subtraction and multiplication would no longer be possible relationships.

If so, once you have everything (in the limit), you would also be getting nothing (in the limit). Or more properly, we have arrived at vagueness again.

One of the tactical questions I'm considering is whether to use vagueness to prove the loss of arithmetic at infinity, or whether an argument can be worked the other way round.

But anyway, yes, the case of numbers has been carefully considered here. And it is 21st century mathematics. To update Kronecker in a post-category theory age, we would have to say god made the integers and the "infinite-ion" - the total system of an infinite dimensional algebraic space that could have its internal resonance-based features.

Baez offers a wonderful introduction to the basics of division algebras and their regularities for the intrigued...
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/octonions/

 

[qraal]

This is why vectorcube has been so entertaining. He reminds that philosophy departments still crank out people with a religious belief in this scholastic guff. Though vectorcube is a little fundamentalist even for an impressionable student.

I'm still not sure why vectorcube is so angry. S/He has a very angry writing style.

But the interesting question you raise is "what is a world"? Do you have a definition from your own readings?

A World has elements, a space, time and rules governing how it develops. A world is kind of like a cellular automaton at its simplest. But I think a world also needs an origin even if its future might be endless.

I would take the systems approach and argue that a world is a system. It is not just a collection of objects (concrete, abstract, possible, necessary, or otherwise). It has to be always both its events and its contexts, its local and its global. So it is not even about "the largest scale". It is about how large and small are the system, the process~structure, about the relations from which everything forms.

Yes. A world evolves, by my definition. States endlessly change, else the world halts/ends. We can't have a billiard ball universe if there's not some means for them to appear in the first place. Thus a flow from "simplest" to more complex

The modal logic approach of talking about worlds as an atomistic collection - a collection of isolate objects - is clearly wrong on this view. If there were multiple worlds in any correct sense, it would have to then constitute the local elements in a global "world system". We would have to take the further step of spelling out how these separate worlds relate.

Precisely. It's a bit like the argument over where the laws of physics came from. If they evolved, then what laws govern their evolution etc. One could chose an infinite regress, but that seems kind of like an endless tower of turtles... silly and pointless.

This becomes very clear in a process view. If worlds do not simply exist but must arise by some kind of development, some kind of shaping selection mechanism, then that process would have to be common across all worlds at some level.

Quite so. I think even our sparring partner would agree.

Always if there is a figure, so must there be a ground. Even atoms require a void to express their relational properties such as shape, size, position. So if we do want to treat worlds as atomistic objects, we then just shift the discussion of the world context, the "void" which allows these multiple worlds to be distinguished, to a meta level.

Regress is the preferred option (escape?) for some. They don't know how to handle space-time or the Void. I have an idea I'm working on which you might like, but need more information (ironically) before I can articulate it fully.

 

[apeiron]

Precisely. It's a bit like the argument over where the laws of physics came from. If they evolved, then what laws govern their evolution etc. One could chose an infinite regress, but that seems kind of like an endless tower of turtles... silly and pointless.

There would seem to be three general possible views here on how realities could be caused - could have a development.

1) fundamental smallness --------> led eventually to what is.

2) fundamental largeness --------> led eventually to what is.

3) Both these in interaction --------> led eventually to what is.

So either the small grew large (construction). Or the large became limited (constraint). Or both of these things happened synergistically.

The "from smallness" hypothesis is expressed in ideas like atoms, number, substance, information, fluctuations - the maximally specific and local.

The "from largeness" hypothesis is expressed as form, horizons, relations, voids, laws, selection, gods, meanings, purpose - the maximally general or universal.

The "both" hypothesis would seek to make use of both kinds of limit. And show how both emerge together out of something that is really fundamental - a purest possible symmetry.

A fourth approach is to claim reality just is what it is (no development, no causes) and so is eternal and unchanging.

4) what was -----------> is still the same as what is.

The thing to notice is how the search for the fundamental always reduces to the search for some fundamental scale. We exist either as a composition of smallest possible stuff or a subsumption of some meta-scale.

Except to combine both, we then have to find a direction that points somewhere else except to scale. Which taking scale to be about aysmmetry, broken symmetry, means towards foundational symmetry.

Is there any other ontic possibility that could intelligibly be added here?

 

[Galteeth]

I think this question reflects a fundamental limit of human understanding.

Let's go back to Descartes' famous Cogito.

It is certainly impossible to deny that one thinks. But contained in the structure of the cogito are other fudamental elements of human conscioussness that are intrinsic to experience. "I think therefore I am" or the more basic "It thinks" imply a linear structure to thought. In order to even form this basic undeniable thought there is an implicit linear order. Even without direct causality, the linear order remains. No matter how many times we reduce things to simpler components, there remains a follow up "well why that?" or a "what is before x?" even as we reach the limits of what is knowable.

Apply this to the big bang. There remains the question "why the big bang?" or "what came before?" There have been proposed speculative answers, but these have the same problem. This is a fundamental irresolvable paradox of human thinking. It seems to me the only conclusion one can reach at this present time is that human understanding of the nature of existence, being bound by thoughts requiring a linear structure, is inherently limited.

 

[vectorcube]

This is why vectorcube has been so entertaining. He reminds that philosophy departments still crank out people with a religious belief in this scholastic guff. Though vectorcube is a little fundamentalist even for an impressionable student.

<< personal insult deleted by Mentors >>

Real philosophers like Nozick, Searle, and a few others I have time for, attempt to reason their way to strong conclusions using modal approaches. But there is common sense in the background usually guiding their efforts. With others like Lewis and David Chalmers, they build careers on taking logic to its illogical limits. And they certainly attract a certain kind of follower.

Another impression. Great!

The modal logic approach of talking about worlds as an atomistic collection - a collection of isolate objects - is clearly wrong on this view. If there were multiple worlds in any correct sense, it would have to then constitute the local elements in a global "world system". We would have to take the further step of spelling out how these separate worlds relate.

Are you sure it is not the global world system that is an element in the set that constitute the local elements?

 

[vectorcube]

I'm still not sure why vectorcube is so angry. S/He has a very angry writing style.

I guess the word "ontological" is too big for me.

 

[vectorcube]

There would seem to be three general possible views here on how realities could be caused - could have a development.

1) fundamental smallness --------> led eventually to what is.

2) fundamental largeness --------> led eventually to what is.

3) Both these in interaction --------> led eventually to what is.

So either the small grew large (construction). Or the large became limited (constraint). Or both of these things happened synergistically.

The "from smallness" hypothesis is expressed in ideas like atoms, number, substance, information, fluctuations - the maximally specific and local.

The "from largeness" hypothesis is expressed as form, horizons, relations, voids, laws, selection, gods, meanings, purpose - the maximally general or universal.

The "both" hypothesis would seek to make use of both kinds of limit. And show how both emerge together out of something that is really fundamental - a purest possible symmetry.

A fourth approach is to claim reality just is what it is (no development, no causes) and so is eternal and unchanging.

4) what was -----------> is still the same as what is.

The thing to notice is how the search for the fundamental always reduces to the search for some fundamental scale. We exist either as a composition of smallest possible stuff or a subsumption of some meta-scale.

Except to combine both, we then have to find a direction that points somewhere else except to scale. Which taking scale to be about aysmmetry, broken symmetry, means towards foundational symmetry.

Is there any other ontic possibility that could intelligibly be added here?

Unrelated to the topic!

 

[apeiron]

Are you sure it is not the global world system that is an element in the set that constitute the local elements?

Yes. I already said that from a systems perspective, the local elements are what would contruct the global forms. And the global forms are what create the local elements by constraint. Then the two sources of action together are "the system".

 

[apeiron]

Unrelated to the topic!

I thought the topic was "why something?"

This is the way to unpack the question. You were trying to answer it purely in terms of option 1. So I am making clear the full range of options for you.

 

[apeiron]

"I think therefore I am" or the more basic "It thinks" imply a linear structure to thought. In order to even form this basic undeniable thought there is an implicit linear order. Even without direct causality, the linear order remains. No matter how many times we reduce things to simpler components, there remains a follow up "well why that?" or a "what is before x?" even as we reach the limits of what is knowable.

I agree with this epistemic position. We have no direct access, we only model.

But even here, you can see how you are thinking in terms of some preferred scale when you talk about "an implicit linear order". You are asserting there is some chain of causal actions all of the same scale.

But then you add that this linear path has a direction in scale. It reduces towards "simpler components". So this is adopting (1) fundamental smallness --------> led eventually to what is.

And I would agree that, being a limit, we can only approach fundamental smallness, not reach it. The trajectory would be asymptotic - infinite and yet also curving ever closer to a finite limit.

Now is it so unreasonable to think that the direction you need to take is in fact the opposite one - backwards towards ever greater generality? So instead of simpler components, we head towards simpler principles?

Then if both of these directions of reduction seem eminently reasonable, why not find a way to combine both directions in one larger ontic framework?

 

[Galteeth]

I agree with this epistemic position. We have no direct access, we only model.

But even here, you can see how you are thinking in terms of some preferred scale when you talk about "an implicit linear order". You are asserting there is some chain of causal actions all of the same scale.

But then you add that this linear path has a direction in scale. It reduces towards "simpler components". So this is adopting (1) fundamental smallness --------> led eventually to what is.

And I would agree that, being a limit, we can only approach fundamental smallness, not reach it. The trajectory would be asymptotic - infinite and yet also curving ever closer to a finite limit.

Now is it so unreasonable to think that the direction you need to take is in fact the opposite one - backwards towards ever greater generality? So instead of simpler components, we head towards simpler principles?

Then if both of these directions of reduction seem eminently reasonable, why not find a way to combine both directions in one larger ontic framework?

Do you mean both in regards to components and principles, or in regards to simplicity and generality?

 

[vectorcube]

Yes. I already said that from a systems perspective, the local elements are what would contruct the global forms. And the global forms are what create the local elements by constraint. Then the two sources of action together are "the system".

The statement you quoted on me does not even make sense. Thus, the irony.

 

[vectorcube]

I thought the topic was "why something?"

This is the way to unpack the question. You were trying to answer it purely in terms of option 1. So I am making clear the full range of options for you.

You are off topic, again.

 

[apeiron]

Do you mean both in regards to components and principles, or in regards to simplicity and generality?

The systems approach would require two axes to map everything here. So it does get complicated.

One axis would be that of developed scale. Worlds as they become. And that is realms where there are local components in interaction with global principles. Or equivalently, we could also use some other familiar dichotomies that mean the same thing. So substance~form, particulars~universals, atom~void, initial conditions~boundary conditions. You can see how all are ways of talking about something that is maximally located and component-like - stuff you can freely add together. Then matched with complementary things which are maximally global and act as general constraints.

Then having divided our description of how things end up, we need a second orthogonal axis to talk about the process or history of development itself. Which is the journey from the vaguely possible to the crisply produced. This could be called other things, like a developmental axis that runs from simplicity to complexity. But there are reasons why this is not very good.

So I was talking about the synchronic view - a slice across a system at a certain late stage of its development. That is when we will find that all things seem strongly divided towards local and global limits - what could be called the dichotomy of components~principles. Or better yet, substance~form. Or best of all, because now we are getting properly mathematical, local~global, a scale distinction.

And you would be right if you are pointing out that in separating off the description of development, I would be re-introducing a linear or time-like aspect of some sort. The path from the vague to the crisp, from potential to developed, would seem to be a one way trip. There would be an arrow of progression.

So yes, there is now a story of how we would step backwards. Except it would be stepping back towards something called vague potential rather than a journey in the usual notion of time.

Each step backwards would not take you towards either the fundamentally small, nor the fundamentally large. Rather, it would become increasingly difficult to distinguish these two possibilities.

 

[tauon]

@vectorcube...

you first stated the general case as "why A and not B?" where A,B=different states of affairs (as you put it).
but then you mentioned (somewhere in this thread) that nothing is not a state-of-affair (a something) -I am certain we can agree on this- so "why is there something rather than nothing?" is then not a particular instance of "why is there A and not B?"... this is the first error in your argument.

As for the supposed proposition that there is a C, and C leans the odds towards either A or B, you can just as easily ask "why is there a C instead of not being a C?" so your so called "general form" of the answer isn't that much of an answer either, furthermore this C-A,B system works only for "somethings"...something which you also noticed -albeit, from a different perspective- noticed (quote: "This is absurd, because C is part of something"), but the conclusion (evidently) does not follow:

that there is no way a C can support an A over B does not mean that "that there is no underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing. That the existence of something is a brute fact"- for one, the structure of the argument is inconsistent: nothing is not a B, a state-of-affair. saying "why is the A and not B?" is equivalent to saying "why is there this something and not that something?"... but nothing is not a something, so you're asking the wrong question (or rather, you're looking at the question from an erroneous point of view) and you're embarking on the wrong train...

 

[vectorcube]

you first stated the general case as "why A and not B?" where A,B=different states of affairs (as you put it).
but then you mentioned (somewhere in this thread) that nothing is not a state-of-affair (a something) -I am certain we can agree on this- so "why is there something rather than nothing?" is then not a particular instance of "why is there A and not B?"... this is the first error in your argument.

Why is it a contradition? If nothing means "there is no state of affair", and i am using it show that the original question is not applicable for the template question ( why A rather, than B?), then there either there is something wrong with the original template, or that there is something wrong with supposing that "nothing" is a state of affair.

Let me be more clear for you:

Suppose for a contradition that:

1. The template "why A rather than B?" is true, and that it applies to all A, B that are state of affairs.

2. The original question applies to form/template 1.

3. "nothing" is a state of affair( from 1& 2).

4. "Nothing" means "there is no state of affair".( definition).

Since, 3& 4 contradict one another, there there much be something wrong with the premises. We can:

a. reject 1.
b. reject 2.
c. reject 1 and 2.

Intuition tell us that we ought to opt for 2, and say the original question is not a valid question.

As for the supposed proposition that there is a C, and C leans the odds towards either A or B, you can just as easily ask "why is there a C instead of not being a C?"

Why is the shy blue instead of pink? Well, there is "the conditions in the atmosphere is just right. The properties of water molecules, and the properties of light. The laws of nature etc".( called this facts).

You can ask "why these facts?" You can ask this, but it would not be the same same form as "why A rather than B?". It would be "Why the facts C obtain obtain in the world, and why C has the properties that it does?".

that there is no way a C can support an A over B does not mean that "that there is no underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing. That the existence of something is a brute fact"- for one, the structure of the argument is inconsistent: nothing is not a B, a state-of-affair. saying "why is the A and not B?" is equivalent to saying "why is there this something and not that something?"... but nothing is not a something, so you're asking the wrong question (or rather, you're looking at the question from an erroneous point of view) and you're embarking on the wrong train...

No. To suppose that the original question applies to the template leads to the realization that nothing is both a state of affair, and not does not necessary imply that the reasoning fails if the intented purpose is only to show that assumption is false, and that the original question does not fit into the stardard template.

 

[qraal]

Why is it a contradition? If nothing means "there is no state of affair", and i am using it show that the original question is not applicable for the template question ( why A rather, than B?), then there either there is something wrong with the original template, or that there is something wrong with supposing that "nothing" is a state of affair.

If you can explain all this so eloquently and in good humour, why can't you get what apeiron is saying? You seem to be arguing past each other, yet what apeiron says isn't that weird, strange or opaque. It makes perfect sense when discussing existence as a whole, especially when determining what makes for "a whole" and the total system. The real problem with your little syllogism is you seem to take "something" to mean "any old thing" but in fact - in this type of question - it means "every damned thing" including the possible and the laws of logic themselves.

 

[tauon]

Why is it a contradition?

because "nothing" is not a "state of affair"... look:

If nothing means "there is no state of affair",

then

(1)"there is no state of affair"
(2)nothing is a state of affair

(2) implies not(1) (since there is at least 1 state of affair: "nothing", hence if there is nothing there is not-nothing=at least 1 something) q.e.d.

to make it more clear to you (even though, the contradiction is actually quite obvious), let's replace "state of affair" with "eagle" (you know, the bird :P):

(1)"there are no eagles"=nothing
(2)nothing is an eagle

so if there are no eagles than there is at least one eagle etc etc etc.
so yeah, there is indeed "something wrong with supposing that nothing is a state of affair"

You can ask this, but it would not be the same same form as "why A rather than B?".

no it would be EXACTLY like asking "why A rather than B?", since it's like asking "why C and not C' ?"

the original question does not fit into the stardard template.

well, yeah: that's what I said. thank you for repeating that for me. -_-

 

[vectorcube]

because "nothing" is not a "state of affair"... look:

(1)"there is no state of affair"
(2)nothing is a state of affair

nothing means 1, and 1&2 are contradictory.

(1)"there is no state of affair"
(2)nothing is a state of affair

(2) implies not(1) (since there is at least 1 state of affair: "nothing", hence if there is nothing there is not-nothing=at least 1 something) q.e.d.

No! the word "nothing" means 1, and that is what i am saying all along, 2 implies that there is at least one state of affair, namely nothing. That is the whole point in the argument when i use it to deny the assumption that the original question fits with the template. 2 is false, 1 and 2 contradict, and the original question is invalid.

no it would be EXACTLY like asking "why A rather than B?", since it's like asking "why C and not C' ?"

Then there is a fact D that makes C rather then C'. So your point being...?

well, yeah: that's what I said. thank you for repeating that for me. -_-

What you said was wrong, and obviously, you have zero to no experience with proves.

A true, but unjustified belief

 

[vectorcube]

If you can explain all this so eloquently and in good humour, why can't you get what apeiron is saying? You seem to be arguing past each other, yet what apeiron says isn't that weird, strange or opaque. It makes perfect sense when discussing existence as a whole, especially when determining what makes for "a whole" and the total system. The real problem with your little syllogism is you seem to take "something" to mean "any old thing" but in fact - in this type of question - it means "every damned thing" including the possible and the laws of logic themselves.

How many times do i have to say this? Everything here means " Every contingent concrete objects".

You seem to be arguing past each other, yet what apeiron says isn't that weird, strange or opaque.

Don` t worry. You are not too bad yourself.

 

[apeiron]

(1)"there is no state of affair"
(2)nothing is a state of affair

nothing means 1, and 1&2 are contradictory.

Which was the point. Modal approaches just don't give us the tools to do the job. It is a non-reflexive logic and therefore cannot be used to say anything true about reflexive questions.

But it is a little troll-like that you first persisted in defending the conclusion, we must accept "why something?" as brute fact, rather than just accept the logic itself has blue screened.

What was your reason for not coming clean sooner?

How many times do i have to say this? Everything here means " Every contingent concrete objects".

Again, you did not state this at the outset and only added this constraint belatedly. It is not as if we should take this to be part of the modal approach - something that does not even need stating explicitly.

Your own references for Nozick and Parfit demonstrated that they had to distinguish the contingent from the necessary, the concrete from the abstract.

 

[vectorcube]

Which was the point. Modal approaches just don't give us the tools to do the job. It is a non-reflexive logic and therefore cannot be used to say anything true about reflexive questions.

There is no modal logic here. Maybe a bit metaphysics about propositions and facts.

But it is a little troll-like that you first persisted in defending the conclusion, we must accept "why something?" as brute fact, rather than just accept the logic itself has blue screened.

I don ` t see how logic is wrong here. I am using logic to show certain conclusions right? Namely, the orignal question is invalid, or do you miss that entirely in your impression?


"What was your reason for not coming clean sooner?"


Coming clean? I am either clean, and not clearn, but not both. The logic is right. The question is wrong.

 

[tauon]

nothing means 1, and 1&2 are contradictory.

YES, that's what I said!

No! the word "nothing" means 1,

I never said otherwise thank you very much. All along I argued assuming 1 as a [quasi]definition of "nothing" (all at your little request in the OP).

and that is what i am saying all along, 2 implies that there is at least one state of affair, namely nothing. That is the whole point in the argument when i use it to deny the assumption that the original question fits with the template.

THAT'S WHAT I WAS SAYING!
what are you even arguing against here?

2 is false, 1 and 2 contradict, and the original question is invalid.

nope, the assumption 2 is false because 1 and 2 contradict. the original question P is independent of this.
furthermore, since 2 is false than you cannot push P into a "why A and not B?" A,B=state of affair system!

Then there is a fact D that makes C rather then C'. So your point being...?

why is there D rather than D' ?
INFINITE REGRESS!

What you said was wrong, and obviously, you have zero to no experience with proves.

A true, but unjustified believe.

what I said was trivially correct. the manner of your mistakes is incredibly naive. sometimes I wonder if you're even serious about the discussion...

 

[vectorcube]

Again, you did not state this at the outset and only added this constraint belatedly. It is not as if we should take this to be part of the modal approach - something that does not even need stating explicitly.


Your own references for Nozick and Parfit demonstrated that they had to distinguish the contingent from the necessary, the concrete from the abstract
.

Well, perhaps to the less than informed, but the original questions obvious talks about contingent concrete objects.

 

[vectorcube]

YES, that's what I said

You want a star?

I never said otherwise thank you very much. All along I argued assuming 1 as a [quasi]definition of "nothing" (all at your little request in the OP

Ok.

THAT'S WHAT I WAS SAYING!
what are you even arguing against here?

because you seem to not get the argument from the original post?

nope, the assumption 2 is false because 1 and 2 contradict. the original question P is independent of this.

indep?

furthermore, since 2 is false than you cannot push P into a "why A and not B?" A,B=state of affair system!

Which is why i have to repeat myself( so please don` t ask me why, again).

I first show that the assumption of P, and "P applies to template" implies a contradiction. I then turn back, and ask what was wrong with the premises, and i reject "P applies to template" is false. Which is my argument.

why is there D rather than D' ?
INFINITE REGRESS!

So? Perhaps you need to be reminded that i am not talking about the problem of regress( which i don` t really see as a problem). I ONLY point out that nothing is not a state of affair, here. Your only problem is that you don` t understand.

"The manner of your mistakes is incredibly naive. "

Suriously?

Where did i make a mistake? You misinterpret the original post, and i am being a good enough person to help you out with the details.

 

[tauon]

@vectorcube...

I don't get your argument?
isn't your argument that existence is merely a brute fact.

to quote you:

"It means that there is no underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing. That the existence of something is a brute fact."

what exactly about your argument do I fail to understand? please enlighten me... -_-

 

[apeiron]

When people ask "why something...?". They are puzzled by the existence of concrete contingent things. I highly doubt that they are thinking about abstract objects, santa claus, intensionality etc.

Again, who are these people?

What puzzles philosophers is thingness itself. Not particular things, or even particular worlds, but any thing in any sense. And that includes what you would call abstract objects. And I would call global constraints.

As you say, we know there is thingness so already we are reasonably disposed to the idea that nothingness - a true absence of thingness in all its senses - probably comes with a good reason why it is the case. We already have accepted there was a possible fork in the road between thingness and nothingness.

We also have a better working definition of no-thingness if it is the absence of both objects and categories, contents and containers. It is not just - in your parlance - an absence of concrete objects, but also abstract objects as well.

So we know that no-thingness in the full reflexive sense is not possible (that being the inverse of Descartes cogito).

So the natural next question to pose is to go in the other direction. Why not thingness rather than everythingness?

Of course, we could just chose to accept thingness and give up on questions about how it arose, how it could have developed. We seemed worried about it a moment ago when asking why something rather than nothing, but having disposed of that quickly because true nothingness is self-contradictory based on the dichotomisation that we know exists with thingness (the local~global division of the concrete~abstract as you call it) but now for some whimisical reason we have decided to just walk away from the question.

Or we can persevere and look at the inadequacies of everythingness as an alternative (as Parfit argues, it is "too much" and must get whittled down by a teleological selection mechanism).

Then once we get into issues of selection and self-organisation, we are into the territory of symmetry and symmetry-breaking. Which in metaphysics has its historic links with Anaximander's apeiron and Peirce's vagueness, to name two ways of talking about this kind of symmetry-breaking axis of development.

 

[apeiron]

to quote you:

"It means that there is no underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing. That the existence of something is a brute fact."

what exactly about your argument do I fail to understand? please enlighten me... -_-

Sounds like he is trying to say he knew this was the wrong answer all along and what he was in fact demonstrating was that this template argument cannot work on self-reflexive questions.

Which is obvious to everyone else, as all the responses show.

The interesting question then becomes, well what does work? Vectorcube is not going to help us here it seems.

 

[vectorcube]

@vectorcube...

I don't get your argument?
isn't your argument that existence is merely a brute fact.

to quote you:

"It means that there is no underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing. That the existence of something is a brute fact."

what exactly about your argument do I fail to understand? please enlighten me... -_-

It means that the original question do not following the usual template. The problem is with the inclusion of nothing as a state of affair.

The meaning is that nothing is not a state of affair, and the question should really be "Why something?", or "Why something exist?". Since there is no alternative of why there is something, because " nothing" is not a state of affair, thus not a possibility. The existence of something would be a brute fact.

 

[vectorcube]

Again, who are these people?

The majority of people( non-philosophers and philosophers) that ask the question.

 

[apeiron]

The majority of people( non-philosophers and philosophers) that ask the question.

But again, not the very philosophers you cited, so presumably not the academic community you had in mind whose views on these things could be taken as read.

Nor apparently the majority of those responding here on this forum. So that is a weak reply.

 

[tauon]

It means that the original question do not following the usual template. The problem is with the inclusion of nothing as a state of affair. The meaning is that nothing is not a state of affair,

and with this part, as I so many times now said: I AGREE. however-

and the question should really be "Why something?", or "Why something exist?". Since there is no alternative of why there is something, because " nothing" is not a state of affair, thus not a possibility. The existence of something would be a brute fact.

that is incorrect! whether existence is a brute fact or not, does not follow from this reasoning.

the question does not fit only in the "why A and not B?" where A and B were both the same type-states of affairs.
however, the question is perfectly valid in a context of "why Q and not P?" where Q and P are different types (not both states of affair) or "why Q and not not-Q ?".

 

[magpies]

What are is the probility that a universe doesn't exist aka nothingness... Would stay as nothingness from now till tomorrow and every tomorrows after that. Id say the chances of a universe that started as nothing and remained nothing would be zero.

The only problem with this idea is the religious dogma of science that says energy can't be created or destroyed. If you do away with that rule then a universe can come from nothing and at that point the question would be... Why/How does energy get made or unmade? Because I have a spiritual side I would answer that with this word... Choice.

 

[qraal]

Well, perhaps to the less than informed, but the original questions obvious talks about contingent concrete objects.

*head-desk*

 

[vectorcube]

But again, not the very philosophers you cited, so presumably not the academic community you had in mind whose views on these things could be taken as read.

Honestly, you don` t know what you saying here. Most philosophers that asked it had in mind contingent concrete objects. They include Parfit, and nozick. Are you honestly comparing yourself to me? You even misquote them! Seriously, all of you quotes from parfit, nozick are misinterpreted, and outright wrong.

 

[vectorcube]

however, the question is perfectly valid in a context of "why Q and not P?" where Q and P are different types (not both states of affair) or "why Q and not not-Q ?".

For the 100 times. NO!

nothing is not a state of affair, and so the scheme does not apply. What you have here does not make any sense.

 

[vectorcube]

*head-desk*

Is it too "ontological"?

 

[apeiron]

Honestly, you don` t know what you saying here. Most philosophers that asked it had in mind contingent concrete objects. They include Parfit, and nozick. Are you honestly comparing yourself to me?

Yes but you gave two references where both these philosophers explicitly included what you dub abstract objects as part of the general question of what exists. They also seem as concerned about necessary objects as contingent ones. So you're just being weird about this.

Just happened to be reading something that made me smile...

One famous quote attributed to Buddha states: “Unity can only be
manifested by the Binary. Unity itself and the idea of Unity are already two.”

To talk about worlds, we have to talk about both the contents and the container. You insist that only contents is a natural thing to be concerned with. But you can never escape the equally necessary idea of a container no matter how you wriggle.

A state of affairs is - quite plainly - both a state and the affairs we deem to constitute it. Even your own terminology has to smuggle in the notion of context to justify the notion of events.

Furthermore, on nothingness, I think we all agree that it cannot actually exist. Even if there is no affairs, there is still the state level description.

But is this then merely a trick of the modelling - our habit of talking in state-based, set theoretic, terms? Perhaps in reality we can define the null set in such a way there is both no contents and no bounding brackets (the denoter of global state)?

That's where the questioning here actually becomes interesting.

Then further, if we take a limits approach to these kinds of questions rather than a set theoretic one, could we treat [null] as being almost no container, almost no contents - so an asymptotic approach that is bounded by actual, but non-existent, nothingness?


So issue 1) Can we treat the "state of affairs" as a two part story? How does this actually divide our concept of nothingness (as into an absence of affairs vs an absence of state)?

And issue 2) If set theoretic approaches are not helpful, could we do better with a limits approach? What would it mean to be infinitesimally close to nothingness? For a start it would turn the question from one about existence or structure into one about development or process.