 Quote by kith
Do you agree that in a deterministic theory, the behaviour of a physical system is determined by its past or current state? Do you agree that in such a theory, the behaviour of the observer is determined by its past or current state if we treat him as a physical system?
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I agree with what DrChinese said. It's irrelevant.
 Quote by kith
Bell's theorem makes the assumption that the probability distributions for Alice and Bob are independent. If you don't make this assumption, you can't derive the inequality in the first place. So discussing this assumption seems relevant to me. Personally, I haven't completely wrapped my mind around superdeterminism and want to understand the arguments more deeply.
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I believe that superdeterminism is clutching at straws, and that it will not help us to understand the incompatibility between the lhv formalism and experiment. On the other hand, Bell's formulation of the independence assumption (his locality condition) is relevant, and some people (eg., Jarrett) think that a component of it (which, re Jarrett's analysis, doesn't necessarily inform regarding locality/nonocality in nature) might be the effective cause of BI violation.
Here's another way to approach the OP question. What is it about a basic Bell lhv model that produces a linear correlation (which is incompatible with the nonlinear one produced by qm and experiment) between θ and rate of coincidental detection?
 Quote by bohm2
Just to be clear, when you are using the term "anti-realism", do you mean: no pre-existing properties (non-counterfactuals). I'm asking because this stuff is a bit confusing as there are problems even with what is meant by "realism" also.
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I should have said that I think the answer has to do with some aspect of the realism of Bell's formulation, which includes the separable functions A and B (which describe individual detection) expressed in terms of λ, and the expression of the independence (locality) assumption in terms of the functions A and B -- with the result of the Bell lhv program being against realism or "anti-realism" in that only nonrealistic models of quantum entanglement, such as in standard qm or MWI, are allowed (unless you assume ftl or instantaneous action at a distance, such as in dBB).
 Quote by bohm2
But I always have trouble understanding this. If something is not pre-existing, would not the Wood and Spekkens argument above hold?
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I don't know. I don't understand the Wood and Spekkens article. Maybe you can explain it?
 Quote by Dan Fitzgibbon
Suppose there are two sorts of time, one in which the entangled particles in Aspect's experiment both change state at the same time and one (the usual one) in which their change of state should be separated by the amount of time it takes for the effect to travel between the two events at the speed of light, but is not observed to do so, hence our problem. Would that help?
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I don't see how it would. There's no particularly compelling reason to posit effects traveling between the two events. Paired detection events aren't correlated with each other except when the analyzer settings are aligned, in which case a local common cause explanation suffices.