Is Free Will Governed by Quantum Mechanics?

[christianjb]

This is false, existence of free will does not so "imply"--you confuse what are the "metaphysical given" (the physical laws of universe) and the "man-made" (free will). You freely make a mark in the sand, you do not make the sand. And, when was the last time your "imagination" caused the apple released from the tree (in reality) to fall up and not down ? But, of course you have a free will right not to "believe" in free will, just as I have a free will right to "know" free will. And please, do not ask me how "I" know what "I know" about free will--only "I know it".

I think I agree with this. I don't think it's philosophically untenable for free-will to be compatible with a universe governed by physical laws- even a deterministic universe.

People have trouble reconciling free-will with physics, but they also have trouble comprehending how consciousness could arise from atomic, molecular and electrical interactions. (Though- some die-hards even dispute that consciousness exists!)

And, as I've said before, it doesn't matter to me if you think that theory X disproves free-will. What matters is that we have at the very least a very strong illusion of free-will, which does all the things that 'real' free-will does anyway- or at least we feel it does.

Why has evolution given us the pain stimulus if there's no free will? If we can't choose to avoid putting our hand in the fire, then there's no point in feeling pain when we do so.

 

[Wizardsblade]

Free will, but not for inamanimate objects.

I am not a computer engineer, but I do not understand how a program can have “free will”. A simple test can prove this is not so. Take the program and load it onto 2 identical computers then run it, assuming all inputs are exactly the same will not both computers have the same outcome? If I had the time and information could I not follow the code of the program and tell you what the out come is? Even random generators in computers are not random (given no outside influences, in which in this case to prove free will all out side data would need to be identical and know to the code reader.)

Moving finger wrote,
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Easy answer :
First define the necessary & sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. For an entity to be morally responsible means it must meet these conditions. I suggest the conditions are :

We hold an agent to be “morally responsible” for an event X if:
Either : (1) Event X is causally related to the agent’s wilful prior actions
Or : (2) Event X is not causally related to the agent’s prior actions, but the agent could have acted to prevent X and wilfully chose not to do so
And : (3) The agent can be reasonably expected to be able to predict the possible consequences of acting or not acting in the above
(wilful = the agent’s actions are not externally forced or coerced against the agent’s will/wishes/intent)
I suggest that if either conditions (1) and (3) are true, or if conditions (2) and (3) are true, then we hold the agent to be morally responsible, and not otherwise.

(and no mention of libertarian free will)

Now, does a rock satisfy these conditions?
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
And,

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I contest that. Humans are electrons and rocks.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A rock hits a man in the head, did the rock do it?

1) No… but what is a willful action? “the agent’s actions are not externally forced `determination? ` or coerced against the agent’s will ‘ freewill?’ /wishes/intent)
2) Again no, a rock can’t choose to change direction.
3) No, a rock can not think. So this again does not apply.

So the rock is not morally responsible for hitting the man. But what about the man who held the rock before it was flying threw the air? It was stated that a man has no more free will then the rock so we must answer the question in the same way. Otherwise we are prejudice towards rocks (since neither can make a none externally forced decision). In this case only the determiner of the pre determination can be held accountable.

Or rock and humans have free will. But maybe the rock made the man throw it? This seems intuitively wrong because everything can be held accountable and we would be forced to hold everything responsible for any 1 action.

Obviously neither of these can be held to be true, but it seems that your definition test itself assumes freewill, as must all test that can logically assign responsibility.

Again your definition of willful grants that determinism is false “not externally forced” and that free will exist “agent’s will”. What kind of will is there besides free? If its not free then is it your will or is it something/ones else’s will or even not will at all?

 

[christianjb]

Wizardsblade:

It is conceptually very simple to think of a computer program that's impossible to predict. Have the computer hooked up to a web-cam such that it responds to the pattern of pixels. You could even use feedback effects with the webcam pointed at the computer-screen.

As soon as you couple a computer to the universe and spark off feedback mechanisms- the computer becomes part of the system and is as unpredictable as any other part of the system.

 

[Wizardsblade]

Christianjb,

I understand what you are saying but a program is still not having free will, rather just a program that interacts with an environment through well defined (determined) actions.. if this then that ect. So like I said its not free will because if I knew the code and I knew the enviromental inputs I could tell you what the out put will be. This is not so with free will.
Look at it this way: hook both of these identcal computers up to the same camara, will they both act identicaly? This is not free will, but determination. Albiet, this is a nice way to make a "random" generator, it is not a free will generator nor is it unpredictable.

 

[christianjb]

Christianjb,

I understand what you are saying but a program is still not having free will, rather just a program that interacts with an environment through well defined (determined) actions.. if this then that ect. So like I said its not free will because if I knew the code and I knew the enviromental inputs I could tell you what the out put will be. This is not so with free will.
Look at it this way: hook both of these identcal computers up to the same camara, will they both act identicaly? This is not free will, but determination. Albiet, this is a nice way to make a "random" generator, it is not a free will generator nor is it unpredictable.

But the environmental inputs could be as large as you like. Hook the computer up to the internet and the input is fantastically large.

It's true that two computers running the same code attached to the same webcam will give the same results. However, envision a feedback mechanism where the web-cam is pointed partially at the computer screen. Then things like specks of dirt on the screen can become important- and it's impossible to prepare the same system twice.

I think feedback is crucial to understanding consciousness and free-will. Without feedback between the 'machine' and the 'environment' nothing much of interest will ever be observed.

 

[Wizardsblade]

But the environmental inputs could be as large as you like. Hook the computer up to the internet and the input is fantastically large.

It's true that two computers running the same code attached to the same webcam will give the same results. However, envision a feedback mechanism where the web-cam is pointed partially at the computer screen. Then things like specks of dirt on the screen can become important- and it's impossible to prepare the same system twice.

Again this is not free will, because if I know the "fantastically large" input I can tell you the out come. This is determinism maybe call it environmental determinism. Any set of finite inputs will lead to a determined result in a computer. The idea of free will is you can take two identical humans with exactly the same experience and give them a choice (with out environmental factors) and they can make different decisions. I must exclude environmental factors because they will affect decision making, i.e. if I do not like coffee and I have a decision to drink coffee or not. My choice will be influenced by my dislike of coffee.

Put it this way if someone like drink A and drink B the same, i.e. their value is 3, and they are given the options of drinking one of them. This assumes the infinite choices they have are confined to 2 choices, but will work for this exercise. Someone with free will will choose one of the drinks, without external factors in this decision making process. There could be environmental factors that made the value of both drinks 3 but this will not affect the current decision. Now write a computer program that chooses a drink.
If x=3 then
If random > .5maxrandom then A
Else B
But this is deterministic because if I know the random function or inputs I can tell you the answer the program will pick.

Without feedback between the 'machine' and the 'environment' nothing much of interest will ever be observed.

When I read this it seems to state that or imply, freewill is random decisions and only with the feedback of environment will these decisions be structured into freewill. Or put another way, freewill is randomness structured by environment. Is this your view of free will?

 

[aspect]

I'm not sure why people have the need to salvage this somewhat contractictory notion of "free will". Isn't it enough to say we have causally efficacious will? This would imply determinism and at the same time, in my opinion, save the intuitions we hope to hold.

 

[Edgardo]

I am not a computer engineer, but I do not understand how a program can have “free will”. A simple test can prove this is not so. Take the program and load it onto 2 identical computers then run it, assuming all inputs are exactly the same will not both computers have the same outcome? If I had the time and information could I not follow the code of the program and tell you what the out come is? Even random generators in computers are not random (given no outside influences, in which in this case to prove free will all out side data would need to be identical and know to the code reader.)

I think it is possible to set up a computer program that reacts differently
on two different computers.

Build a computer with an integrated
quantum random number generator (QRNG) .
Imagine the computer has a webcam, and everytime I expose something red
to the webcam, the QNRG fires 16 photons to the beamsplitter.

On computer 1 the result may be 10110110 01001110 (Reaction by computer (voice)): "I like the color, bring me tea")
On computer 2 the result may be 01010101 11010011 (Reaction by computer (voice)): "I don't like the color, bring me coffee")

Note that the enviromental conditions were exactly the same for both computers.

Can we say that this computer has a free will?

 

[christianjb]

Wizardsblade: Positive feedback mechanisms introduce unpredictable randomness, which is enough to disprove the idea that you can run the same program twice and get the same answer. You'd have to run the same universe twice in order to be guaranteed of that.

I don't think true random number generators are sufficient or even necessary for free will to happen, but feedback is necessary- there has to be some interaction with the environment or else what's the point in making choices?

aspect: I agree. The powerful and overwhelming illusion of free will is good enough for me- especially if no-one can tell the difference between that and genuine free-will.

All: No-one has answered my question. What's the point in feeling physical pain if free will doesn't exist?

 

[aspect]

christianjb: What for you is genuine free will? because I have no idea what it would look like, or why it is necessary to posit such a thing.

 

[christianjb]

christianjb: What for you is genuine free will? because I have no idea what it would look like, or why it is necessary to posit such a thing.

Something like the ability to make conscious choices from a range of alternatives.

 

[aspect]

Something like the ability to make conscious choices from a range of alternatives.

I agree that's what the intuition is, but where does the "free" come into it? My point is, we can lose the free without sacrificing anything.

 

[christianjb]

I agree that's what the intuition is, but where does the "free" come into it? My point is, we can lose the free without sacrificing anything.

It would be slightly disconcerting to lose the 'free' part of 'free-will'. Imagine if science could predict that you were going to die in an auto accident on Tuesday at 7.34 and no matter how much free-will you thought you had- there was ultimately no way you could escape death.

A bit like the movie Minority Report in which psycogs can predict if a person will commit murder before the crime occurs. Should they still be arrested, even if the crime is prevented?

As long as no-one and nothing can predict your actions- it probably doesn't make much difference if theory X 'proves' you don't have free will- as long as you still have the overpowering sensation of having free will.

 

[aspect]

It would be slightly disconcerting to lose the 'free' part of 'free-will'. Imagine if science could predict that you were going to die in an auto accident on Tuesday at 7.34 and no matter how much free-will you thought you had- there was ultimately no way you could escape death.

A bit like the movie Minority Report in which psycogs can predict if a person will commit murder before the crime occurs. Should they still be arrested, even if the crime is prevented?

As long as no-one and nothing can predict your actions- it probably doesn't make much difference if theory X 'proves' you don't have free will- as long as you still have the overpowering sensation of having free will.

But you've strayed from the intuition you gave me. Now you think the agent in question should have causal powers in addition to those that describe the natural world (you inuit that the auto accident can somehow be avoided and if it can't then the decisions you make are not your own - this is a false dichotomy). As far as I can see the decisions will still be your own, so while the situation would be distressing, it is far from paradoxical.

 

[christianjb]

But you've strayed from the intuition you gave me. Now you think the agent in question should have causal powers in addition to those that describe the natural world (you inuit that the auto accident can somehow be avoided and if it can't then the decisions you make are not your own - this is a false dichotomy). As far as I can see the decisions will still be your own, so while the situation would be distressing, it is far from paradoxical.

Not sure I understand your point.
If you know ahead of time what your actions will be- and it's impossible to avoid making those actions- then you certainly won't feel like you have free-will.

The situation would give rise to all sorts of paradoxes by the way. How about you decided to commit suicide a few hours before by jumping off a tall building. If you agree with the premise that you must die in the auto-accident- then you can't possibly die in the suicide attempt no matter how hard you try.

Similar problems occur in time-travel stories.

Maybe it's a pointless hypothetical, because such predictions could never happen in real life. However, let's say genetics could establish you have a 90% probability of becoming an alcoholic- you might feel less inclined to believe that your will was free. I'd also be less inclined to place the blame on such a person if they did become an alchoholic.

 

[Wizardsblade]

I think it is possible to set up a computer program that reacts differently
on two different computers.

Build a computer with an integrated
quantum random number generator (QRNG) .

The only difference between using this and an camera is that the camera is out side the computer, a QRNG still uses out side input. So to show free will both computers would need to be hooked up to the same QRMG and still have different outcomes.

Fortunately / unfortunately I do not believe free will can even be proven or disproven, especially with QM in the picture. I see it like this: free is either our ability to choose which quantum path to take (this would probably require a soul/spirit/something beyond the physical), or its all just random statistical QM. If the latter is true then physics of the universe is going to be the next insanity plea in court. Because you can’t hold someone accountable for something they did not choose or where forced to do. I believe in the Bible so I'll go with soul, but either way I do not think it will be proven one way or the other. Like allot of things it comes down to faith one way or the other.

Btw someone asked about free will and western religions. Christians believe that free will does not end after judgment.

 

[christianjb]

The only difference between using this and an camera is that the camera is out side the computer, a QRNG still uses out side input. So to show free will both computers would need to be hooked up to the same QRMG and still have different outcomes.

Fortunately / unfortunately I do not believe free will can even be proven or disproven, especially with QM in the picture. I see it like this: free is either our ability to choose which quantum path to take (this would probably require a soul/spirit/something beyond the physical), or its all just random statistical QM. If the latter is true then physics of the universe is going to be the next insanity plea in court. Because you can’t hold someone accountable for something they did not choose or where forced to do. I believe in the Bible so I'll go with soul, but either way I do not think it will be proven one way or the other. Like allot of things it comes down to faith one way or the other.

Btw someone asked about free will and western religions. Christians believe that free will does not end after judgment.

Leave religion out of this. Well- I'm quite prepared to discuss religion after you prove that your God exists in a separate thread.

Personally, I'm of the opinion that every action we take is under the jurisdiction of Thor, the Norse god of thunder, but you don't see me using the Thorist answers in a physics forums.

It doesn't matter to me what you believe. It matters what you can add to the discussion, backed up by reason and evidence.

 

[aspect]

Not sure I understand your point.
If you know ahead of time what your actions will be- and it's impossible to avoid making those actions- then you certainly won't feel like you have free-will.

You'll still have 'will', and 'will' is enough. I still don't know what "free will" means or why we should have it.

The situation would give rise to all sorts of paradoxes by the way. How about you decided to commit suicide a few hours before by jumping off a tall building. If you agree with the premise that you must die in the auto-accident- then you can't possibly die in the suicide attempt no matter how hard you try.

But how is this a paradox? Obviously something will prevent you from dying long enough to be killed in the auto accident. The scientist predicted it so.

 

[christianjb]

You'll still have 'will', and 'will' is enough. I still don't know what "free will" means or why we should have it.



But how is this a paradox? Obviously something will prevent you from dying long enough to be killed in the auto accident. The scientist predicted it so.

1) For will to have meaning, the choices should be genuine and not forced choices. If I hold a gun to your head and ask you to hand over your wallet- you have the will to give me your money- but you don't have the freedom to disobey (not unless you're suicidal).

2) It's paradoxical, because normally you would die if you jumped off a tall building. Does the prediction stop you from dying- or does it stop you from even attempting suicide?

You could even rig up a suicide machine before-hand which would kill you before your predicted expected death date.

 

[aspect]

1) For will to have meaning, the choices should be genuine and not forced choices. If I hold a gun to your head and ask you to hand over your wallet- you have the will to give me your money- but you don't have the freedom to disobey (not unless you're suicidal).

2) It's paradoxical, because normally you would die if you jumped off a tall building. Does the prediction stop you from dying- or does it stop you from even attempting suicide?

You could even rig up a suicide machine before-hand which would kill you before your predicted expected death date.

1) The issue is not about how many actions are available or unavailable to me, but whether I am able to originate action (make a decision). In both the cases (I give you the money; I disobey) I originate the action, so I do not see what this example proves.

2) The prediction doesn't stop me from doing anything. I can try to circumvent the prediction if I wish. However the outcome as per the thought experiment will always be the same. The scientist would be able to predict everything that occurs, even that the suicide machine would fail to work on every occasion. It's improbable, but not paradoxical. David Lewis writes about this in his seminal paper "The paradoxes of time travel" (he argues that these are oddities, not impossibilities).

These oddities are peculiar, but I think it's more to do with the impossible nature of the thought experiment than anything else. This is good food for thought though and I thank you for it.

 

[christianjb]

1) The issue is not about how many actions are available or unavailable to me, but whether I am able to originate action (make a decision). In both the cases (I give you the money; I disobey) I originate the action, so I do not see what this example proves.

2) The prediction doesn't stop me from doing anything. I can try to circumvent the prediction if I wish. However the outcome as per the thought experiment will always be the same. The scientist would be able to predict everything that occurs, even that the suicide machine would fail to work on every occasion. It's improbable, but not paradoxical. David Lewis writes about this in his seminal paper "The paradoxes of time travel" (he argues that these are oddities, not impossibilities).

These oddities are peculiar, but I think it's more to do with the impossible nature of the thought experiment than anything else. This is good food for thought though and I thank you for it.

1) Read Kurt Vonnegut's 'Slaughterhouse 5' novel to see a cleverer exposition of a life without free will.

I still maintain that free-will implies the ability to make genuine choices- not just those forced upon you by circumstances. The question is, whether physical law forces us to make choices, that we post-priori rationalize as resulting from our free-will?

2) I agree it's an impossible thought experiment (see above). Part of the reason it's impossible is because we have the free-will to prevent such predictions from coming true.

Time travel is also probably impossible, at least for macroscopic objects. Whether this is due to just technical difficulties, or whether it's due to a deeper reason- the universe 'forbids' us from creating such paradoxes, is beyond my knowledge.

Even B-movie SciFi flicks show that there are at least apparent paradoxes when traveling back in time. 'Back to the future' and 'Terminator' spring to mind.

 

[Wizardsblade]

It doesn't matter to me what you believe. It matters what you can add to the discussion, backed up by reason and evidence.

If you read the post it does give you the three choices available from a QM perspective. Ill even add the third choice for completeness.

1) Determinism- QM's statically nature is, as random as it seems, is controlled by a hidden variable (something we can not discern at this time).

2) Randomness or pseudo freewill- QM's stastical nature is truly random and, therefore so are our choices.

3) Freewill- QM's statically nature is governed by something we control. Our will controls our decisions and therefore it will control which quantum paths to take. And as I said this would require something beyond the physical universe, call it what you will.

As I also said none of these can be proven, unless of course we can somehow solve the whys and hows of QM.
As another aside both 1 and 3 can have religious and secular interpretation.

 

[Edgardo]

@Wizardsblade
I think my computer with the quantum random number generator fulfills your situation where you described two identical people reacting differently on a situation (see your post #66

The idea of free will is you can take two identical humans with exactly the same experience and give them a choice (with out environmental factors) and they can make different decisions.

Also, you can't predict my computer's behaviour. There's no way to predict whether the photon is reflected or passes the beamsplitter.

Any set of finite inputs will lead to a determined result in a computer

But this is deterministic because if I know the random function or inputs I can tell you the answer the program will pick.

--------

The only difference between using this and an camera is that the camera is out side the computer, a QRNG still uses out side input. So to show free will both computers would need to be hooked up to the same QRMG and still have different outcomes.

It is clear that if you connect both computers to the same QRNG that the outcome is the same. But this is like considering one human being (with one brain) with two mouths.

1 QRNG and 2 computers <=> 1 brain and 2 mouths

But we want to consider the situation:
2 QRNG and 2 computers <=> 2 brains and 2 mouths.

 

[Wizardsblade]

I think my computer with the quantum random number generator fulfills your situation where you described two identical people reacting differently on a situation

It is clear that if you connect both computers to the same QRNG that the outcome is the same. But this is like considering one human being (with one brain) with two mouths.

1 QRNG and 2 computers <=> 1 brain and 2 mouths

But we want to consider the situation:
2 QRNG and 2 computers <=> 2 brains and 2 mouths.

I guess the question comes down to do humans have an organic QRNG? I say no. With out an organic QRNG a human with freewill can choose a different choice when reliving the same moment. This is where I attained the idea of 2 identical computers. I also mentioned no outside inputs which I consider a QRNG an outside input (because it is not a part of the programing but rather the program calling for something <information, data, a random numder, ect.> outside itself). But here lays a debatable issue, do humans have organic QRNGs or not? But beyond that debate in accordance of my previous statement:

1) Determinism- QM's statically nature is, as random as it seems, is controlled by a hidden variable (something we can not discern at this time).

2) Randomness or pseudo freewill- QM's stastical nature is truly random and, therefore so are our choices.

3) Freewill- QM's statically nature is governed by something we control. Our will controls our decisions and therefore it will control which quantum paths to take. And as I said this would require something beyond the physical universe, call it what you will.

Both humans and computers with QRNGs would not possesses freewill but rather pseudo freewill.

So do humans have an organic QRNG?
Are my definitions suitable for this discussion? (If not please help redefine them)
Can an experiment (real or thought) be devised to test these definitions?