Is Free Will Governed by Quantum Mechanics?

[Your.Master]

I'm not exactly sure why people try to use mathematics and physics to try to prove free will...

Human beings obey different laws than math and science. One of the very first posts on this thread talked about humans not having free will because we can not choose to disobey the laws of gravity.

That is precisely why one might make the attempt to use mathematics and physics to prove free will (or rather, to disprove free will -- it seems to me probably significantly harder to prove such a thing if it is true than to disprove it if it's false -- but that's just my impression). Whatever higher level arguments we have, we are ultimately subject to reality. To physics. If one can utterly prove that physics affirms or denies free will, then all else is irrelevant. If one cannot, we must move to higher-level argumentation (or abandon the issue).

One of the first things you learn in any philosophy class is that the scientific laws are based on precedence only. Just because the pencil fell to the floor when you dropped it the first thousand times you let it fall out of your hand, doesn't mean that it won't fly towards the ceiling the thousand and first time you "drop" it.

Right. The assumption that the past is in some way like the future (and that some recording of the past, at least in memory, is reliable enough). There is also the assumption that standard logic is in some way truth-preserving. To abandon these assumptions would mean that the above logical and physical proofs are not valid, or at least, valid but insufficient. However, this puts aside a certain practicality, and also makes it quite impossible to ever evaluate your claims on any objective basis. Which, of course, is okay. But we are on the physics forums ;).

Also, there was mention of computers being able to make decisions...I'm an electrical engineering student and I spend most of my time writing code for computers to follow.

I'm an engineering scientist who began specializing in physics and ended specializing in computers and am receiving my graduate degree within a month ;).

Whenever you see a computer doing something "clever", it's because a clever programmer told it to do that.

Not necessarily. Evolutionary algorithms, neural networks, dynamical systems, and hell, even buggy software (especially buggy distributed software) all violate your principle. You are correct that most software used today does do this. But we have had practical results out of all of those other cases I mentioned, so they aren't merely academic.

When a human makes a decision, there's an infinite amount influences to take into consideration. A computer would have to be obeying an infinite number of conditional structures, which is impossible because it would have to actively generate it's own programming.

You're equivocating here. Humans have an extremely large but finite amount of influences, although a lot of them counteract and a lot of them fade away completely. Furthermore, an influence does not necessarily equate to a conditional strictly. It could relate to a variable assignment, especially to a variable that is never again used in the program.

You can't describe a decision making process as deterministic because if it's deterministic, there can't be any decision...your course of action has already been "determined" for you.

I disagree. Determinism merely suggests that you will definitely make the decision that is determined. But the decision is still made.

In the second Matrix movie, Neo knows he has to make a certain decision. The oracle tells him that he's already made that decision, he just has to understand it.

Argument by the Matrix.

...

I like your style ;).

If there is a God that is all knowing, and He does know what's going to happen...so what? That doesn't affect your position at all...because you still don't know what you're going do. God's not making the decision, you're still the one who does that.

Good. Now, can I further propose that God may not be sentient at all? Is there anything stopping us from labelling something else, even something with no understanding whatsoever, God?

Can we say that, in the context of this paragraph, God is determinism (I'm not trying to open up a religious debate, just draw an analogy)? Or, perhaps, that God is the laws of physics, not as man currently knows them, but as actually occur? Thus, does this not mean that determinism and free will can coexist, after a certain definition for free will and determinism?

Back to my opening line...what electrons and rocks do is irrelevant because you aren't an electron or a rock. To prove that humans have free will or whether their actions are determined, look are what humans do.

I contest that. Humans are electrons and rocks. They are also other things.

That Conway paper shows that if logic holds, then humans have free will (under *his* definition) if and only if electrons have, in some sense, free will. Thus it is not irrelevant unless we strike down logic. At which point, argumentation becomes irrelevant unless we can agree on some other model to replace logic. Which I'm not sure is possible.

 

[Mahler765]

That is precisely why one might make the attempt to use mathematics and physics to prove free will (or rather, to disprove free will -- it seems to me probably significantly harder to prove such a thing if it is true than to disprove it if it's false -- but that's just my impression). Whatever higher level arguments we have, we are ultimately subject to reality. To physics. If one can utterly prove that physics affirms or denies free will, then all else is irrelevant. If one cannot, we must move to higher-level argumentation (or abandon the issue).

I suppose I never considered free will being defined as the ability to do whatever you want - including defying your reality. If being able to overcome the laws of physics is a requirement for free will, and let's suppose that you can...then you encounter that higher-level of argumentation. And then you say "Well, if free will does actually exist, then we should be able to disobey these laws just as we disobeyed the laws of physics" and then you proceed to the next set of laws. If you use these criteria for proving or disproving free will, then you'll either end up disproving it(because we can't disobey the laws of physics) or you'll end up disobey each set of laws in turn until human beings must be all powerful in order for free will to exist...so the test of free will is doomed to fail before it even begins since it's obvious that human beings aren't all powerful.

And I'd just like to point out that you could argue that physics and mathematics are no better at describing reality than psychology, history, or just sitting on a park bench and watching the way people interact with each other...

Most of the time, the discoveries in science raise more questions than they answer...so science simply shows us what we don't understand about reality rather than giving us dominion over it.

Right. The assumption that the past is in some way like the future (and that some recording of the past, at least in memory, is reliable enough). There is also the assumption that standard logic is in some way truth-preserving. To abandon these assumptions would mean that the above logical and physical proofs are not valid, or at least, valid but insufficient. However, this puts aside a certain practicality, and also makes it quite impossible to ever evaluate your claims on any objective basis. Which, of course, is okay. But we are on the physics forums ;).

I agree that the validity of logic and mathematics is one huge assumption...the assumption that most people are sane and rational. But that still doesn't mean that one day, all our logic systems and equations can't come crashing down around us. And do see your point that logic is really the only tool we have to test such things, no matter how flimsy it might be...



I'm an engineering scientist who began specializing in physics and ended specializing in computers and am receiving my graduate degree within a month ;).

Not necessarily. Evolutionary algorithms, neural networks, dynamical systems, and hell, even buggy software (especially buggy distributed software) all violate your principle. You are correct that most software used today does do this. But we have had practical results out of all of those other cases I mentioned, so they aren't merely academic.

Even if some computers do seem "think" creatively, wouldn't the intelligence of the computer always be limited by the intelligence of it's programmer?

You're equivocating here. Humans have an extremely large but finite amount of influences, although a lot of them counteract and a lot of them fade away completely. Furthermore, an influence does not necessarily equate to a conditional strictly. It could relate to a variable assignment, especially to a variable that is never again used in the program.

If the number of influences is limited, the number of alternatives can still be unlimited. In addition to all the logic choice you might make, you could consider all the illogical ones as well...

I disagree. Determinism merely suggests that you will definitely make the decision that is determined. But the decision is still made.

I would define free will as the ability to choose between options in making a decision...if determinism limits you to one option...there can't be a choice. In a decision, I would assume that you have to "decide" something. Usually, you decide between two or more options. If you only have one option, you aren't really given a decision to make.

Good. Now, can I further propose that God may not be sentient at all? Is there anything stopping us from labelling something else, even something with no understanding whatsoever, God?

No, if you define God as something that has no understanding. In that particular scenario, God would be an entity that allows the exercise of free will.

Can we say that, in the context of this paragraph, God is determinism (I'm not trying to open up a religious debate, just draw an analogy)? Or, perhaps, that God is the laws of physics, not as man currently knows them, but as actually occur? Thus, does this not mean that determinism and free will can coexist, after a certain definition for free will and determinism?

I don't think you could argue that God is determinism is because God is not the one determining your actions(in this scenario). If you were going to make any kind of statement like that, you would have to say that the individual determines his actions, which is the same as free will.

If you say that God is not the laws of physics, then He automatically loses his status as a God, by most definitions of a deity. I used to argue that free will and determinism coexist, but I came to think that if determinism does it exist, then you're the one who creates it...determining yourself.

I contest that. Humans are electrons and rocks. They are also other things.

The very first assignment that I had in my high school philosophy class was to take a rock in my hand and answer a series of questions about it. One of the questions was "What would it take to hold the rock morally responsible?"

I'm willing to go so far as to say it's impossible to hold a rock morally responsible without giving it human characteristics and qualities. If humans are rocks, then humans can't be held morally responsible either.

 

[moving finger]

When a human makes a decision, there's an infinite amount influences to take into consideration. A computer would have to be obeying an infinite number of conditional structures, which is impossible because it would have to actively generate it's own programming.

Why would it be impossible for a machine to actively generate it's own programming?

You can't describe a decision making process as deterministic because if it's deterministic, there can't be any decision...your course of action has already been "determined" for you.

Can you describe the alternative? What you seem to wish for is the incoherent concept of libertarian free will, the notion that we can somehow act as free agents with ultimate responsibility for our decisions and actions - that our actions may be neither determined nor random but "something else" and still controlled by us - but unfortunately such a notion is incoherent - it effectively means the "self" must be the cause of the "self". See http://www.moving-finger.com/papers/Swamp.pdf for a detailed explanation of the incoherency of ultimate responsibility.

If there is a God that is all knowing, and He does know what's going to happen...so what? That doesn't affect your position at all...because you still don't know what you're going do. God's not making the decision, you're still the one who does that.

It doesn't follow from this that we have free will in the libertarian sense.

If Bob knows that you're going to choose blueberry pie for dessert, but you still haven't made up your mind yet, what Bob knows is irrelevant because Bob's not making the decision.

Logically incorrect. What Bob knows is very relevant, because by definition knowledge entails truth, therefore if Bob knows that you are going to choose blueberry pie, it follows that you are going to choose blueberry pie. If you do not choose blueberry pie, it follows that Bob did NOT know that you are going to choose blueberry pie (which contradicts the premise).

To prove that humans have free will or whether their actions are determined, look are what humans do.

What actions of humans in particular lead you to the safe conclusion that humans have (libertarian) free will, and how do you arrive at this conclusion?

 

[moving finger]

That Conway paper shows that if logic holds, then humans have free will (under *his* definition) if and only if electrons have, in some sense, free will. Thus it is not irrelevant unless we strike down logic. At which point, argumentation becomes irrelevant unless we can agree on some other model to replace logic. Which I'm not sure is possible.

"that Conway paper" (http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0604079v1) is inconclusive and irrelevant to the question of whether humans have free will or not - simply because the authors admit in the paper that they find themselves unable to give an operational definition of "free"! (section 11.2 of the paper). If one cannot define one's terms, what is the point of arguing whether an electron has this undefined "thing" or not?

I might as well claim that all electrons, and hence all humans, possesses a property called "grungethump", but so long as I am unable to provide an operational definition of "grungethump", what's the point?

 

[moving finger]

I would define free will as the ability to choose between options in making a decision...if determinism limits you to one option...there can't be a choice. In a decision, I would assume that you have to "decide" something. Usually, you decide between two or more options. If you only have one option, you aren't really given a decision to make.

How do you make your choice, assuming your choice is neither determined nor random? (Indeed if its neither determined nor random, what is it?). If you could reset the physical world back to EXACTLY the way it was before you made your choice, would your choice be the same again? If no, why not? (If yes - then that's determinism pure & simple).

The very first assignment that I had in my high school philosophy class was to take a rock in my hand and answer a series of questions about it. One of the questions was "What would it take to hold the rock morally responsible?"

Easy answer :
First define the necessary & sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. For an entity to be morally responsible means it must meet these conditions. I suggest the conditions are :

We hold an agent to be “morally responsible” for an event X if:
Either : (1) Event X is causally related to the agent’s wilful prior actions
Or : (2) Event X is not causally related to the agent’s prior actions, but the agent could have acted to prevent X and wilfully chose not to do so
And : (3) The agent can be reasonably expected to be able to predict the possible consequences of acting or not acting in the above
(wilful = the agent’s actions are not externally forced or coerced against the agent’s will/wishes/intent)
I suggest that if either conditions (1) and (3) are true, or if conditions (2) and (3) are true, then we hold the agent to be morally responsible, and not otherwise.

(and no mention of libertarian free will)

Now, does a rock satisfy these conditions?

 

[<daleader>]

How must we overcome the laws of physics as independent actors? Can there be a science that explains this personal divergence from mechanical description? Is free will the rule of the universe rather than the exception?

In order for us to be able to answer these question carfully we most first understand the creation of God and evil. That is the problem of evil. God and therefore there been an evil. That is if you are a theist.

Reading suggestion: Plato's Euthyphro.

After reading this we see the problem is that what is value? And after that we can see why determining value is an issues. Than after this another problem can be raised which is the existence of evil. Which if why do we have evil in a world where the omipetent, omniscient and omnibelvelont allow such evil which than can be link to the idea of 'free will'.

What I think of free will, WELL i think IT IS JUST RUBBISH! We are never free on the decision that we make since all our idea are some how link for some prior experience/ ideas/feeling that we had in our life. WE can never wake up and say I do this today without knowing why! that is there is always a reason for doing, you may not know it but it doesn't mean there is NON!

 

[Rade]

I do not believe there is a free will. Free will implies that the universe is not completely governed by physical laws but also up to a certain extend by the imagination of the mind.

This is false, existence of free will does not so "imply"--you confuse what are the "metaphysical given" (the physical laws of universe) and the "man-made" (free will). You freely make a mark in the sand, you do not make the sand. And, when was the last time your "imagination" caused the apple released from the tree (in reality) to fall up and not down ? But, of course you have a free will right not to "believe" in free will, just as I have a free will right to "know" free will. And please, do not ask me how "I" know what "I know" about free will--only "I know it".

 

[Rade]

In order for us to be able to answer these question carfully we most first understand the creation of God and evil.

Read the bible (old part not new), god informs that god created evil.

 

[<daleader>]

Read the bible (old part not new), god informs that god created evil.

What if you don't believein bible. My point is that God isn't only in churchs...or its holy places. In a way god is in you and all around you. a complex issue!

 

[christianjb]

What if you don't believein bible. My point is that God isn't only in churchs...or its holy places. In a way god is in you and all around you. a complex issue!

That's not really getting us anywhere. It's like claiming that Thor is all around us, which may or may not be true- but it doesn't progress this thread much.

 

[christianjb]

This is false, existence of free will does not so "imply"--you confuse what are the "metaphysical given" (the physical laws of universe) and the "man-made" (free will). You freely make a mark in the sand, you do not make the sand. And, when was the last time your "imagination" caused the apple released from the tree (in reality) to fall up and not down ? But, of course you have a free will right not to "believe" in free will, just as I have a free will right to "know" free will. And please, do not ask me how "I" know what "I know" about free will--only "I know it".

I think I agree with this. I don't think it's philosophically untenable for free-will to be compatible with a universe governed by physical laws- even a deterministic universe.

People have trouble reconciling free-will with physics, but they also have trouble comprehending how consciousness could arise from atomic, molecular and electrical interactions. (Though- some die-hards even dispute that consciousness exists!)

And, as I've said before, it doesn't matter to me if you think that theory X disproves free-will. What matters is that we have at the very least a very strong illusion of free-will, which does all the things that 'real' free-will does anyway- or at least we feel it does.

Why has evolution given us the pain stimulus if there's no free will? If we can't choose to avoid putting our hand in the fire, then there's no point in feeling pain when we do so.

 

[Wizardsblade]

Free will, but not for inamanimate objects.

I am not a computer engineer, but I do not understand how a program can have “free will”. A simple test can prove this is not so. Take the program and load it onto 2 identical computers then run it, assuming all inputs are exactly the same will not both computers have the same outcome? If I had the time and information could I not follow the code of the program and tell you what the out come is? Even random generators in computers are not random (given no outside influences, in which in this case to prove free will all out side data would need to be identical and know to the code reader.)

Moving finger wrote,
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Easy answer :
First define the necessary & sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. For an entity to be morally responsible means it must meet these conditions. I suggest the conditions are :

We hold an agent to be “morally responsible” for an event X if:
Either : (1) Event X is causally related to the agent’s wilful prior actions
Or : (2) Event X is not causally related to the agent’s prior actions, but the agent could have acted to prevent X and wilfully chose not to do so
And : (3) The agent can be reasonably expected to be able to predict the possible consequences of acting or not acting in the above
(wilful = the agent’s actions are not externally forced or coerced against the agent’s will/wishes/intent)
I suggest that if either conditions (1) and (3) are true, or if conditions (2) and (3) are true, then we hold the agent to be morally responsible, and not otherwise.

(and no mention of libertarian free will)

Now, does a rock satisfy these conditions?
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
And,

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I contest that. Humans are electrons and rocks.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A rock hits a man in the head, did the rock do it?

1) No… but what is a willful action? “the agent’s actions are not externally forced `determination? ` or coerced against the agent’s will ‘ freewill?’ /wishes/intent)
2) Again no, a rock can’t choose to change direction.
3) No, a rock can not think. So this again does not apply.

So the rock is not morally responsible for hitting the man. But what about the man who held the rock before it was flying threw the air? It was stated that a man has no more free will then the rock so we must answer the question in the same way. Otherwise we are prejudice towards rocks (since neither can make a none externally forced decision). In this case only the determiner of the pre determination can be held accountable.

Or rock and humans have free will. But maybe the rock made the man throw it? This seems intuitively wrong because everything can be held accountable and we would be forced to hold everything responsible for any 1 action.

Obviously neither of these can be held to be true, but it seems that your definition test itself assumes freewill, as must all test that can logically assign responsibility.

Again your definition of willful grants that determinism is false “not externally forced” and that free will exist “agent’s will”. What kind of will is there besides free? If its not free then is it your will or is it something/ones else’s will or even not will at all?

 

[christianjb]

Wizardsblade:

It is conceptually very simple to think of a computer program that's impossible to predict. Have the computer hooked up to a web-cam such that it responds to the pattern of pixels. You could even use feedback effects with the webcam pointed at the computer-screen.

As soon as you couple a computer to the universe and spark off feedback mechanisms- the computer becomes part of the system and is as unpredictable as any other part of the system.

 

[Wizardsblade]

Christianjb,

I understand what you are saying but a program is still not having free will, rather just a program that interacts with an environment through well defined (determined) actions.. if this then that ect. So like I said its not free will because if I knew the code and I knew the enviromental inputs I could tell you what the out put will be. This is not so with free will.
Look at it this way: hook both of these identcal computers up to the same camara, will they both act identicaly? This is not free will, but determination. Albiet, this is a nice way to make a "random" generator, it is not a free will generator nor is it unpredictable.

 

[christianjb]

Christianjb,

I understand what you are saying but a program is still not having free will, rather just a program that interacts with an environment through well defined (determined) actions.. if this then that ect. So like I said its not free will because if I knew the code and I knew the enviromental inputs I could tell you what the out put will be. This is not so with free will.
Look at it this way: hook both of these identcal computers up to the same camara, will they both act identicaly? This is not free will, but determination. Albiet, this is a nice way to make a "random" generator, it is not a free will generator nor is it unpredictable.

But the environmental inputs could be as large as you like. Hook the computer up to the internet and the input is fantastically large.

It's true that two computers running the same code attached to the same webcam will give the same results. However, envision a feedback mechanism where the web-cam is pointed partially at the computer screen. Then things like specks of dirt on the screen can become important- and it's impossible to prepare the same system twice.

I think feedback is crucial to understanding consciousness and free-will. Without feedback between the 'machine' and the 'environment' nothing much of interest will ever be observed.

 

[Wizardsblade]

But the environmental inputs could be as large as you like. Hook the computer up to the internet and the input is fantastically large.

It's true that two computers running the same code attached to the same webcam will give the same results. However, envision a feedback mechanism where the web-cam is pointed partially at the computer screen. Then things like specks of dirt on the screen can become important- and it's impossible to prepare the same system twice.

Again this is not free will, because if I know the "fantastically large" input I can tell you the out come. This is determinism maybe call it environmental determinism. Any set of finite inputs will lead to a determined result in a computer. The idea of free will is you can take two identical humans with exactly the same experience and give them a choice (with out environmental factors) and they can make different decisions. I must exclude environmental factors because they will affect decision making, i.e. if I do not like coffee and I have a decision to drink coffee or not. My choice will be influenced by my dislike of coffee.

Put it this way if someone like drink A and drink B the same, i.e. their value is 3, and they are given the options of drinking one of them. This assumes the infinite choices they have are confined to 2 choices, but will work for this exercise. Someone with free will will choose one of the drinks, without external factors in this decision making process. There could be environmental factors that made the value of both drinks 3 but this will not affect the current decision. Now write a computer program that chooses a drink.
If x=3 then
If random > .5maxrandom then A
Else B
But this is deterministic because if I know the random function or inputs I can tell you the answer the program will pick.

Without feedback between the 'machine' and the 'environment' nothing much of interest will ever be observed.

When I read this it seems to state that or imply, freewill is random decisions and only with the feedback of environment will these decisions be structured into freewill. Or put another way, freewill is randomness structured by environment. Is this your view of free will?

 

[aspect]

I'm not sure why people have the need to salvage this somewhat contractictory notion of "free will". Isn't it enough to say we have causally efficacious will? This would imply determinism and at the same time, in my opinion, save the intuitions we hope to hold.

 

[Edgardo]

I am not a computer engineer, but I do not understand how a program can have “free will”. A simple test can prove this is not so. Take the program and load it onto 2 identical computers then run it, assuming all inputs are exactly the same will not both computers have the same outcome? If I had the time and information could I not follow the code of the program and tell you what the out come is? Even random generators in computers are not random (given no outside influences, in which in this case to prove free will all out side data would need to be identical and know to the code reader.)

I think it is possible to set up a computer program that reacts differently
on two different computers.

Build a computer with an integrated
quantum random number generator (QRNG) .
Imagine the computer has a webcam, and everytime I expose something red
to the webcam, the QNRG fires 16 photons to the beamsplitter.

On computer 1 the result may be 10110110 01001110 (Reaction by computer (voice)): "I like the color, bring me tea")
On computer 2 the result may be 01010101 11010011 (Reaction by computer (voice)): "I don't like the color, bring me coffee")

Note that the enviromental conditions were exactly the same for both computers.

Can we say that this computer has a free will?

 

[christianjb]

Wizardsblade: Positive feedback mechanisms introduce unpredictable randomness, which is enough to disprove the idea that you can run the same program twice and get the same answer. You'd have to run the same universe twice in order to be guaranteed of that.

I don't think true random number generators are sufficient or even necessary for free will to happen, but feedback is necessary- there has to be some interaction with the environment or else what's the point in making choices?

aspect: I agree. The powerful and overwhelming illusion of free will is good enough for me- especially if no-one can tell the difference between that and genuine free-will.

All: No-one has answered my question. What's the point in feeling physical pain if free will doesn't exist?

 

[aspect]

christianjb: What for you is genuine free will? because I have no idea what it would look like, or why it is necessary to posit such a thing.

 

[christianjb]

christianjb: What for you is genuine free will? because I have no idea what it would look like, or why it is necessary to posit such a thing.

Something like the ability to make conscious choices from a range of alternatives.

 

[aspect]

Something like the ability to make conscious choices from a range of alternatives.

I agree that's what the intuition is, but where does the "free" come into it? My point is, we can lose the free without sacrificing anything.

 

[christianjb]

I agree that's what the intuition is, but where does the "free" come into it? My point is, we can lose the free without sacrificing anything.

It would be slightly disconcerting to lose the 'free' part of 'free-will'. Imagine if science could predict that you were going to die in an auto accident on Tuesday at 7.34 and no matter how much free-will you thought you had- there was ultimately no way you could escape death.

A bit like the movie Minority Report in which psycogs can predict if a person will commit murder before the crime occurs. Should they still be arrested, even if the crime is prevented?

As long as no-one and nothing can predict your actions- it probably doesn't make much difference if theory X 'proves' you don't have free will- as long as you still have the overpowering sensation of having free will.

 

[aspect]

It would be slightly disconcerting to lose the 'free' part of 'free-will'. Imagine if science could predict that you were going to die in an auto accident on Tuesday at 7.34 and no matter how much free-will you thought you had- there was ultimately no way you could escape death.

A bit like the movie Minority Report in which psycogs can predict if a person will commit murder before the crime occurs. Should they still be arrested, even if the crime is prevented?

As long as no-one and nothing can predict your actions- it probably doesn't make much difference if theory X 'proves' you don't have free will- as long as you still have the overpowering sensation of having free will.

But you've strayed from the intuition you gave me. Now you think the agent in question should have causal powers in addition to those that describe the natural world (you inuit that the auto accident can somehow be avoided and if it can't then the decisions you make are not your own - this is a false dichotomy). As far as I can see the decisions will still be your own, so while the situation would be distressing, it is far from paradoxical.

 

[christianjb]

But you've strayed from the intuition you gave me. Now you think the agent in question should have causal powers in addition to those that describe the natural world (you inuit that the auto accident can somehow be avoided and if it can't then the decisions you make are not your own - this is a false dichotomy). As far as I can see the decisions will still be your own, so while the situation would be distressing, it is far from paradoxical.

Not sure I understand your point.
If you know ahead of time what your actions will be- and it's impossible to avoid making those actions- then you certainly won't feel like you have free-will.

The situation would give rise to all sorts of paradoxes by the way. How about you decided to commit suicide a few hours before by jumping off a tall building. If you agree with the premise that you must die in the auto-accident- then you can't possibly die in the suicide attempt no matter how hard you try.

Similar problems occur in time-travel stories.

Maybe it's a pointless hypothetical, because such predictions could never happen in real life. However, let's say genetics could establish you have a 90% probability of becoming an alcoholic- you might feel less inclined to believe that your will was free. I'd also be less inclined to place the blame on such a person if they did become an alchoholic.

 

[Wizardsblade]

I think it is possible to set up a computer program that reacts differently
on two different computers.

Build a computer with an integrated
quantum random number generator (QRNG) .

The only difference between using this and an camera is that the camera is out side the computer, a QRNG still uses out side input. So to show free will both computers would need to be hooked up to the same QRMG and still have different outcomes.

Fortunately / unfortunately I do not believe free will can even be proven or disproven, especially with QM in the picture. I see it like this: free is either our ability to choose which quantum path to take (this would probably require a soul/spirit/something beyond the physical), or its all just random statistical QM. If the latter is true then physics of the universe is going to be the next insanity plea in court. Because you can’t hold someone accountable for something they did not choose or where forced to do. I believe in the Bible so I'll go with soul, but either way I do not think it will be proven one way or the other. Like allot of things it comes down to faith one way or the other.

Btw someone asked about free will and western religions. Christians believe that free will does not end after judgment.

 

[christianjb]

The only difference between using this and an camera is that the camera is out side the computer, a QRNG still uses out side input. So to show free will both computers would need to be hooked up to the same QRMG and still have different outcomes.

Fortunately / unfortunately I do not believe free will can even be proven or disproven, especially with QM in the picture. I see it like this: free is either our ability to choose which quantum path to take (this would probably require a soul/spirit/something beyond the physical), or its all just random statistical QM. If the latter is true then physics of the universe is going to be the next insanity plea in court. Because you can’t hold someone accountable for something they did not choose or where forced to do. I believe in the Bible so I'll go with soul, but either way I do not think it will be proven one way or the other. Like allot of things it comes down to faith one way or the other.

Btw someone asked about free will and western religions. Christians believe that free will does not end after judgment.

Leave religion out of this. Well- I'm quite prepared to discuss religion after you prove that your God exists in a separate thread.

Personally, I'm of the opinion that every action we take is under the jurisdiction of Thor, the Norse god of thunder, but you don't see me using the Thorist answers in a physics forums.

It doesn't matter to me what you believe. It matters what you can add to the discussion, backed up by reason and evidence.

 

[aspect]

Not sure I understand your point.
If you know ahead of time what your actions will be- and it's impossible to avoid making those actions- then you certainly won't feel like you have free-will.

You'll still have 'will', and 'will' is enough. I still don't know what "free will" means or why we should have it.

The situation would give rise to all sorts of paradoxes by the way. How about you decided to commit suicide a few hours before by jumping off a tall building. If you agree with the premise that you must die in the auto-accident- then you can't possibly die in the suicide attempt no matter how hard you try.

But how is this a paradox? Obviously something will prevent you from dying long enough to be killed in the auto accident. The scientist predicted it so.

 

[christianjb]

You'll still have 'will', and 'will' is enough. I still don't know what "free will" means or why we should have it.



But how is this a paradox? Obviously something will prevent you from dying long enough to be killed in the auto accident. The scientist predicted it so.

1) For will to have meaning, the choices should be genuine and not forced choices. If I hold a gun to your head and ask you to hand over your wallet- you have the will to give me your money- but you don't have the freedom to disobey (not unless you're suicidal).

2) It's paradoxical, because normally you would die if you jumped off a tall building. Does the prediction stop you from dying- or does it stop you from even attempting suicide?

You could even rig up a suicide machine before-hand which would kill you before your predicted expected death date.

 

[aspect]

1) For will to have meaning, the choices should be genuine and not forced choices. If I hold a gun to your head and ask you to hand over your wallet- you have the will to give me your money- but you don't have the freedom to disobey (not unless you're suicidal).

2) It's paradoxical, because normally you would die if you jumped off a tall building. Does the prediction stop you from dying- or does it stop you from even attempting suicide?

You could even rig up a suicide machine before-hand which would kill you before your predicted expected death date.

1) The issue is not about how many actions are available or unavailable to me, but whether I am able to originate action (make a decision). In both the cases (I give you the money; I disobey) I originate the action, so I do not see what this example proves.

2) The prediction doesn't stop me from doing anything. I can try to circumvent the prediction if I wish. However the outcome as per the thought experiment will always be the same. The scientist would be able to predict everything that occurs, even that the suicide machine would fail to work on every occasion. It's improbable, but not paradoxical. David Lewis writes about this in his seminal paper "The paradoxes of time travel" (he argues that these are oddities, not impossibilities).

These oddities are peculiar, but I think it's more to do with the impossible nature of the thought experiment than anything else. This is good food for thought though and I thank you for it.

 

[christianjb]

1) The issue is not about how many actions are available or unavailable to me, but whether I am able to originate action (make a decision). In both the cases (I give you the money; I disobey) I originate the action, so I do not see what this example proves.

2) The prediction doesn't stop me from doing anything. I can try to circumvent the prediction if I wish. However the outcome as per the thought experiment will always be the same. The scientist would be able to predict everything that occurs, even that the suicide machine would fail to work on every occasion. It's improbable, but not paradoxical. David Lewis writes about this in his seminal paper "The paradoxes of time travel" (he argues that these are oddities, not impossibilities).

These oddities are peculiar, but I think it's more to do with the impossible nature of the thought experiment than anything else. This is good food for thought though and I thank you for it.

1) Read Kurt Vonnegut's 'Slaughterhouse 5' novel to see a cleverer exposition of a life without free will.

I still maintain that free-will implies the ability to make genuine choices- not just those forced upon you by circumstances. The question is, whether physical law forces us to make choices, that we post-priori rationalize as resulting from our free-will?

2) I agree it's an impossible thought experiment (see above). Part of the reason it's impossible is because we have the free-will to prevent such predictions from coming true.

Time travel is also probably impossible, at least for macroscopic objects. Whether this is due to just technical difficulties, or whether it's due to a deeper reason- the universe 'forbids' us from creating such paradoxes, is beyond my knowledge.

Even B-movie SciFi flicks show that there are at least apparent paradoxes when traveling back in time. 'Back to the future' and 'Terminator' spring to mind.

 

[Wizardsblade]

It doesn't matter to me what you believe. It matters what you can add to the discussion, backed up by reason and evidence.

If you read the post it does give you the three choices available from a QM perspective. Ill even add the third choice for completeness.

1) Determinism- QM's statically nature is, as random as it seems, is controlled by a hidden variable (something we can not discern at this time).

2) Randomness or pseudo freewill- QM's stastical nature is truly random and, therefore so are our choices.

3) Freewill- QM's statically nature is governed by something we control. Our will controls our decisions and therefore it will control which quantum paths to take. And as I said this would require something beyond the physical universe, call it what you will.

As I also said none of these can be proven, unless of course we can somehow solve the whys and hows of QM.
As another aside both 1 and 3 can have religious and secular interpretation.

 

[Edgardo]

@Wizardsblade
I think my computer with the quantum random number generator fulfills your situation where you described two identical people reacting differently on a situation (see your post #66

The idea of free will is you can take two identical humans with exactly the same experience and give them a choice (with out environmental factors) and they can make different decisions.

Also, you can't predict my computer's behaviour. There's no way to predict whether the photon is reflected or passes the beamsplitter.

Any set of finite inputs will lead to a determined result in a computer

But this is deterministic because if I know the random function or inputs I can tell you the answer the program will pick.

--------

The only difference between using this and an camera is that the camera is out side the computer, a QRNG still uses out side input. So to show free will both computers would need to be hooked up to the same QRMG and still have different outcomes.

It is clear that if you connect both computers to the same QRNG that the outcome is the same. But this is like considering one human being (with one brain) with two mouths.

1 QRNG and 2 computers <=> 1 brain and 2 mouths

But we want to consider the situation:
2 QRNG and 2 computers <=> 2 brains and 2 mouths.

 

[Wizardsblade]

I think my computer with the quantum random number generator fulfills your situation where you described two identical people reacting differently on a situation

It is clear that if you connect both computers to the same QRNG that the outcome is the same. But this is like considering one human being (with one brain) with two mouths.

1 QRNG and 2 computers <=> 1 brain and 2 mouths

But we want to consider the situation:
2 QRNG and 2 computers <=> 2 brains and 2 mouths.

I guess the question comes down to do humans have an organic QRNG? I say no. With out an organic QRNG a human with freewill can choose a different choice when reliving the same moment. This is where I attained the idea of 2 identical computers. I also mentioned no outside inputs which I consider a QRNG an outside input (because it is not a part of the programing but rather the program calling for something <information, data, a random numder, ect.> outside itself). But here lays a debatable issue, do humans have organic QRNGs or not? But beyond that debate in accordance of my previous statement:

1) Determinism- QM's statically nature is, as random as it seems, is controlled by a hidden variable (something we can not discern at this time).

2) Randomness or pseudo freewill- QM's stastical nature is truly random and, therefore so are our choices.

3) Freewill- QM's statically nature is governed by something we control. Our will controls our decisions and therefore it will control which quantum paths to take. And as I said this would require something beyond the physical universe, call it what you will.

Both humans and computers with QRNGs would not possesses freewill but rather pseudo freewill.

So do humans have an organic QRNG?
Are my definitions suitable for this discussion? (If not please help redefine them)
Can an experiment (real or thought) be devised to test these definitions?