Rosenberg on Edelman's Theory of Consciousness

[selfAdjoint]

Via Wikipedia I discovered that well-known neuroscientist Gerald Edelman has a materialism-based theory of consciousness in which he explicitly accepts qualia. I got his book The Remembered Present out of the library and am currently reading it. So far his account of the first person experiences he calls qualia sound very much like the qualia I have seen in the discussion on Resenberg's book. So I wonder if anyone could tell me if Rosenberg discusses Edelman's construction, and if so, what his opinion is of it? Thank you.

 

[hypnagogue]

Edelman has two entries in the references section of Rosenberg's book ("Neural Darwinism: Population Thinking and Higher Brain Function" and The Remembered Present). Unfortunately, Edelman is not listed in the index, and I cannot recall offhand where or in what context Edelman is mentioned. I'll keep an eye out in future readings, though.

Just curious, what about Edelman's ideas reminds you of Rosenberg?

 

[selfAdjoint]

Just curious, what about Edelman's ideas reminds you of Rosenberg?

Oh he doesn't in general. Rosenberg is high philosophy, trying to establish a new ontology, and Edelman is speculating within the scientific materialist tradition. Both very smart guys (Ashkenazi overclocking?). But here is Edelman's description of qualia in Remembered Present:

In the present theory, in addition to making the physics and the evolutionary assumptions, we will assume that phenomenal states or qualia (sensations, raw feels, and the like, constituting collectively "what it feels like to be an X") all exist in conscious humans, whether considered as scientific observers or as subjects.

 

[ghrosenb@hotmail.com]

Ironically...

Via Wikipedia I discovered that well-known neuroscientist Gerald Edelman has a materialism-based theory of consciousness in which he explicitly accepts qualia. I got his book The Remembered Present out of the library and am currently reading it. So far his account of the first person experiences he calls qualia sound very much like the qualia I have seen in the discussion on Resenberg's book. So I wonder if anyone could tell me if Rosenberg discusses Edelman's construction, and if so, what his opinion is of it? Thank you.

Just this weekend I was reviewing the latest on Edelman and his colleague's work and was very thrilled. They've applied information theoretic analyses to neuronal group theory and the characteristics of the NG's in the thalamo-cortical system they've identified match nicely the predictions one would make by applying the Theory of Natural Individuals. For example, each NG that is part of the proposed consciousness system is part of a larger thalamo-cortical system in which each group has a state almost wholly dependent on the state of each other member of the group, and which the entire set of NG's interact as a whole with other brain systems; they hypothesize a massively asymmetric dependence between NG's in the group relative to any NG outside of the group, measurable by the extent to which any particular NG's entropy can be predicted by measuring the entropy of any other NG in the group; the state of each NG is a function of the state of the entire thalamo-cortical group of which it is a part; information that enters anyone NG is shared by all others in the group; the contribution of qualitative character from a group is hypothesized to be its constraint contribution on the joint state of the thalamo-cortical system as a whole, and so forth. It matches the characteristics of a symmetric natural individual very closely. It was a very thrilling read for me, and I'm very much excited by Edelman's work.

--Gregg

 

[selfAdjoint]

This is wonderful news, Is any of this research surveyable online? We have here users like hypnagogue who have read your book deeply, and others like Monica who are capable of following the brain research with deep insight. And I can sort of limp along behind in both areas. This "consilience" (forgive me) of fields would be a fine thing to review on these boards.

 

[ghrosenb@hotmail.com]

Edelman review

This is wonderful news, Is any of this research surveyable online? We have here users like hypnagogue who have read your book deeply, and others like Monica who are capable of following the brain research with deep insight. And I can sort of limp along behind in both areas. This "consilience" (forgive me) of fields would be a fine thing to review on these boards.

Bernie Baars has written a very helpful review of Edelman's recent work:

http://www.nsi.edu/users/seth/Papers/accs03abs.pdf

Irrespective of its (I think obvious) consonance with the theory of natural individuals, Edelman's work and Baars review are wonderful in their own right.

--Gregg

 

[antfm]

I hope you be understanding and don't consider this too much boldness on my behalf. I'm just reading Rosenberg's book, and much of it with the help of Hypnagogue and all other members of PF in the book discussion group. So I'm but a simple aficionado, and ,might be very wrong in my interpretations or Rosenberg's theory. Anyway, I think you are nice, understanding guys here in PF, and forgive my mistakes.

Just to point that though, as Rosenberg himself has commented in this same thread, Edelman's ideas could very well match Rosenberg's theory of 'natural individuals', I think that there might remain certain divergence referring to the concept of qualia (once again the old qualia...).
I quote form Seth and Baars, "Neural Darwinism (ND) and Consciousness", Consciousness and Cognition, 14, 2005.
www.nsi.edu/users/seth/Papers/SethBaars.pdf[/URL]

"The qualitative feel of conscious events is less easily explained. Why should sensation accompany the complex discriminations enacted by a dynamic core, but not the discrimination of light from dark by a photodiode? Edelman and Tononi suggest that the answer lies in the complexity (in the technical sense) of the discrimination. A sensation of redness does not correspond to a discrimination among a small number of colors; rather, it is entailed by the state of the entire dynamic core. The qualitative feel of a conscious event is a consequence of the vast amount of information disclosed by the core by being in one state out of very many possible states.
The relationship of 'entailment' appears to be critical to the conception of qualia in ND. For Edelman (2003, 2004), qualia are high-dimensional discriminations that are entailed by neural activity in the core. They differ because their underlying neural systems differ. Qualia are entailed by this distinctive form of neural activity in the same way that the structure of hemoglobin entails a certain spectroscopic response: One is not caused by the other, rather, one is an inevitable property of the other. This concept implies that neural systems underlying consciousness were selected in evolution to carry out discriminations in a high dimensional space of possible inputs, yielding adaptive advantage."

I understand that for Edelman it is that 'high-dimensional discrimination' what constitutes 'qualia', and that it is 'entailed' by neural activity in the dynamic core. But it seems to me that, for Rosenberg, subjective experience cannot be entailed just by the physical. Of course, we could think that neural activity is not just plainly physical activity, but I don't think this aspect is adressed by Edelman's proposal. Am I too wrong? Perhaps you have some other understanding.

 

[selfAdjoint]

antfm, it seems to me you are correct. Seth and Baars dismiss the hard problem as like expecting a description of tornados to be windy. That may be crass of them to a philosopher, but I think it captures the position Edelman holds, as well.

 

[Tournesol]

The point about qualia is that they are not conveyed by 3rd peson descriptions.
To object that this is equivalent to saying that a description of a quale
does not make you actually have a quale, is to assume that the only
way a quale can be known is by subjective experience. But this intrinsically
subject aspect of qualia *is* the Hard Problem. The "hurricane" objection does not
dissolve the HP, it relies on it !

 

[selfAdjoint]

The fact that you can't give a third person description of a private first person experience is only a problem for those who feel science is incomplete if it can't do this. I don't find it a problem at all, hard or otherwise, and apparently neither do the people who work with Edelman.

 

[Vast]

The fact that you can't give a third person description of a private first person experience is only a problem for those who feel science is incomplete if it can't do this. I don't find it a problem at all, hard or otherwise, and apparently neither do the people who work with Edelman.

Have you seen The Final Cut? I know it’s only a movie, but if the technology depicted here is possible, or any other future technology that would be able to give a first person experience, then science can indeed do this!

 

[Tournesol]

The fact that you can't give a third person description of a private first person experience is only a problem for those who feel science is incomplete if it can't do this. I don't find it a problem at all, hard or otherwise, and apparently neither do the people who work with Edelman.

It what sense could science possible be said to be complete in spite
of not being able to do this ? As far as I can see it boils down the circular proposition that science can solve all the problems which were suitably scientific in the first place. Which is OK if you regard science as one of
a number of approaches to understanding reality, but very much not OK
if you are going metaphysical conclusions from the successes or failures of science. To say that qualia don't exist because they cannot be explained
scientifically is completely cart-before-the-horse. It is the existence of unexplained
phenomena which is the criterion of the success of science; science is not
the criterion for whether phenomena exist in the first place.

 

[Les Sleeth]

It what sense could science possible be said to be complete in spite
of not being able to do this ? As far as I can see it boils down the circular proposition that science can solve all the problems which were suitably scientific in the first place. Which is OK if you regard science as one of
a number of approaches to understanding reality, but very much not OK
if you are going metaphysical conclusions from the successes or failures of science. To say that qualia don't exist because they cannot be explained
scientifically is completely cart-before-the-horse. It is the existence of unexplained
phenomena which is the criterion of the success of science; science is not
the criterion for whether phenomena exist in the first place.

I'm suitably shocked that we might actually agree on something.

My regular complaint since I've been here is the tendency of __________ (fill in the blank with the philosophical belief of your choosing) to "dismiss" anything as unsubstantial, nonexistent, irrelevant, contraindicated, etc., that someone's favorite epistomological method can't account for.

In the past, Metacristi has argued that empiricism deserves "epistomological privilege." In terms of investigating physical reality, I think he's correct. But the fact that empiricism reveals nothing but physicalness can't be fairly interpreted to mean there is nothing but physicalness!

The only possible, logical, honest, unbiased interpretation is . . . empiricism is only capable of revealing the physical aspects of reality. A dispassionate opinion must admit that empiricism's results may demonstrate both its strengths and its limitations.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Well folks, Tournesol and Les, can philosophy actually exhibit a first person quale? Rosenberg's or anybody else's? If so where can I experience it? If I read Rosenberg or Searle or Chalmers will I experience a quale not my own? But if not, then isn't it just the pot calling the kettle incomplete?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Well folks, Tournesol and Les, can philosophy actually exhibit a first person quale?

"Exhibit" is an empirical standard, one based on externalization and sense observation. You are demanding something that is based on what you already believe is the only way to "know" something (i.e. empircally).

If so where can I experience it? If I read Rosenberg or Searle or Chalmers will I experience a quale not my own? But if not, then isn't it just the pot calling the kettle incomplete?

You can experience it. Do your senses relate information to you about the size, weight, colors, etc. of your granddaughter? But beyond the data your senses feed you, is there some other "quality" you feel about your granddaughter?

As long as you've lived SA, I really can't understand why you would doubt the quality of appreciation (which is what I boil qualia down to . . . who cares what we call it). Appreciation is the difference between a dead life (or a computer) and an alive life for consciousness. No matter what info the senses send us, without the ability to appreciate the info's quality we are not conscious.

 

[selfAdjoint]

"Exhibit" is an empirical standard, one based on externalization and sense observation. You are demanding something that is based on what you already believe is the only way to "know" something (i.e. empircally).




You can experience it. Do your senses relate information to you about the size, weight, colors, etc. of your granddaughter? But beyond the data your senses feed you, is there some other "quality" you feel about your granddaughter?

As long as you've lived SA, I really can't understand why you would doubt the quality of appreciation (which is what I boil qualia down to . . . who cares what we call it). Appreciation is the difference between a dead life (or a computer) and an alive life for consciousness. No matter what info the senses send us, without the ability to appreciate the info's quality we are not conscious.

Les, you seem to think that I deny qualia. I don't. The question before the house is whether science is incomplete because it can't demonstrate or exhibit qualia, beyond just describing them. See the parable about the color blind expert on color. And my point is that talking about ontology doesn't display qualia either. That neither the study of how things work, nor the study of What It All Means has anything to contribute to exhibiting qualia that are NOT internally generated to the public. Maybe techology will someday do this, but if it does, you can bet there will be plenty of people ready to call the qualia reporting robot a lying zombie.

 

[Tournesol]

Well folks, Tournesol and Les, can philosophy actually exhibit a first person quale? Rosenberg's or anybody else's? If so where can I experience it? If I read Rosenberg or Searle or Chalmers will I experience a quale not my own? But if not, then isn't it just the pot calling the kettle incomplete?

Nothing I said implies that any other approach is more complete. However, it could be argued that conveying other people's qualia is the basic job of art
(which would make it clear why they are such a problem for science).

 

[Les Sleeth]

The question before the house is whether science is incomplete because it can't demonstrate or exhibit qualia, beyond just describing them. . . . Maybe techology will someday do this, but if it does, you can bet there will be plenty of people ready to call the qualia reporting robot a lying zombie.

The question seems a little ambiguous though. Is a hammer "incomplete" because you can't unscrew a 1/2 inch nut with it? If you take the hammer to a job that only requires 1/2 inch nuts to be unscrewed, then one would say it's the wrong tool for the job, not that the hammer is incomplete. Science is a tool, so I think the question should be stated as: "can science reveal all that's knowable?" Or, alternatively, "Are there other means of knowing than what empiricism relies on?"

I'd have to admit that if a machine could exhibit qualia, then there must either be something physical about, or some physical counterpart to, qualia. But in the absence of exhibiting or physically accounting for qualia, I also don't see why anyone should have total faith that machinery or empiricism is going to do it. As you likely know, I believe the proper stance is neutrality about the question, and that the only reason some people insist qualia are physical is because they are already committed to the physicalist position.

And my point is that talking about ontology doesn't display qualia either. That neither the study of how things work, nor the study of What It All Means has anything to contribute to exhibiting qualia that are NOT internally generated to the public.

I believe you are correct about that. I don't believe the rationalistic approach some here favor is ever going to exhihit qualia. It just might be that neither science nor the rationalists are never going to explain qualia (well, they might "explain" it but without being able demonstrate it's true).

One thing I love about empiricism is the search to experience what has been hypothesized to be true. The rationalists don't seem to bother; they are light years ahead in theory of what anyone has experienced. We know confirmation by experience produces knowledge, but we don't know rationalism achieves much.

Along those lines, I say that only if we discover a reliable way to directly experience qualia can we ever get anywhere. But in terms of knowledge, must the object of experience be externalizable (as science requires) in order to qualify as having epistomological value?

If qualia are strictly internal, and if only each individual human being has access to his own qualia, then does that render the inner, non-externalizable experience of qualia useless to knowing? It means science isn't going to reveal them is all. The only reason I can see that's a problem, as I suggested above, is if someone is determined to explain everything empirically, and then if they can't they want to "dismiss" whatever is slipping through the science cracks.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Okay, but just one other thought. Suppose Edelman or somebody is able to really pin down the mechanisms of what he calls higher consciousness (his "primary consciousness" is what some animals may have, and is mostly "unconcious" to our own awareness). Suppose this is so convincing that almost everybody accepts it; he can show exactly what goes on when we perceive exactly this shade of red, and all the other scientists agree, the super MRI-Xray-CT-EEG scans show that he's right, the phenomena he predicts when this shade of red is viewed are what the machines measure, every time.

Now are you going to be in the equivalent of the creationist-ID camp, fighting the rear guard action just because you don't like mechanical explanations? Or in general is there ANY evidence for a mechanical explanation of consciousness and qualia that you would accept?

 

[Tournesol]

I have never claimed that qualia are beyond the reach of any future science. However, there seems to be a specific problem with mathematical/structural/functional accounts being particularly inapt for conveying qualia -- and how can you explain them without conveying them ?

 

[selfAdjoint]

I have never claimed that qualia are beyond the reach of any future science. However, there seems to be a specific problem with mathematical/structural/functional accounts being particularly inapt for conveying qualia -- and how can you explain them without conveying them ?

What do you mean by conveying?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Okay, but just one other thought. Suppose Edelman or somebody is able to really pin down the mechanisms of what he calls higher consciousness (his "primary consciousness" is what some animals may have, and is mostly "unconcious" to our own awareness). Suppose this is so convincing that almost everybody accepts it; he can show exactly what goes on when we perceive exactly this shade of red, and all the other scientists agree, the super MRI-Xray-CT-EEG scans show that he's right, the phenomena he predicts when this shade of red is viewed are what the machines measure, every time.

Now are you going to be in the equivalent of the creationist-ID camp, fighting the rear guard action just because you don't like mechanical explanations? Or in general is there ANY evidence for a mechanical explanation of consciousness and qualia that you would accept?

I had to think about this a few days to see if I might answer it differently than I usually do, but I can’t figure out anything but to repeat what I think is wrong with your logic, and why I think there is something more to consciousness than mechanisms.

First the logic. Your phrase “suppose . . . somebody is able to really pin down the mechanisms” reveals what you are looking at, and how you are looking at it. The analogy I’ve used before is you, the empiricist, attempting to 100% account for, say, Monet's painting Beach at Sainte Adresse. When we receive your report, we find for each point on the painting you’ve listed every wavelength of color, paint chemistry, canvas materials, paint thickness, geometric shapes, pressure used by the brush, and so on.

Once you are done, you claim you’ve explained all that needs explaining because the “exhibited” physical painting is 100% accounted for. But that’s because the only thing you are looking at are the physical aspects, the only thing that interests you are the physical aspects, and the research method you used to study the painting (empiricism) only reveals physical factors.

But I, as an art lover, see and especially feel “something more.” To make your analysis as a scientist you don’t need to feel something more, but to appreciate the work of art, you do. Art is a good example to use because there is no doubt that an artist must work through some sort of physical medium. But the physical medium hasn’t shaped itself into art; neither did the hands alone do it, nor the intellect alone figuring out how to work with various colors do it . . . there was “something more,” a qualitative appreciation of something the artist was trying to reflect in his work. That, SA, is what I don’t think your example of “pinning down mechanisms” would necessarily account for.

My other reason for not finding your claim that pinning down mechanisms would explain it all is due to my own personal experience with my own personal consciousness. As I’ve said many times, I see an additional component to consciousness when the mind becomes perfectly still. The “activity” of all your mechanisms doesn’t explain how stillness is even possible (when I know it is), and it certainly doesn’t explain why one perceives a sort of larger “background” field of consciousness each individual consciousness seems within. You can claim what I experience inwardly an illusion, but you don’t actually know since you’ve not undertaken to investigate consciousness in the subjective manner I’ve described.

My view, on the other hand, has been reinforced by 30+ years of experiencing that background thing, and I can’t just pretend I don’t know about that when the empiricists or the rationalists start proposing consciousness models which don’t include it. From my perspective and experience, what it looks like is that consciousness is entwined in the physical setting, separated from the larger background thing by the CSN, individualized within the far more “general” background thing by the CSN . . . all of which makes consciousness temporarily concurrent with and dependent on physicalness to achieve anything. And that’s why it APPEARS consciousness is being “caused” by mechanisms, when in reality it has it’s own prior existential qualities, qualities which one will never know unless learns how to experience them directly (as any good researcher knows).

So it isn’t automatically the case that the reason one might reject a wholly mechanistic explanation is because of one’s own creationist/ID-like a priori beliefs. Although there may be a great many people who believe from ignorance, it doesn't seem a fair judgement to suggest anyone who disagrees with what appeals to your mechanistic predilections has arrived at their point of view merely from stubborn conviction. In the case of exchanging opinions about the nature of subjectivity, it just might be they have subjective evidence you aren’t privy to.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Once you are done, you claim you’ve explained all that needs explaining because the “exhibited” physical painting is 100% accounted for. But that’s because the only thing you are looking at are the physical aspects, the only thing that interests you are the physical aspects, and the research method you used to study the painting (empiricism) only reveals physical factors.

This is a breathtakingly crude caricature of scientific explanation. Do you think scientists IGNORE the subjective? Certainly Edelman does not; read his books. Science advances not merely by simple empiricsm but by a complex social process that includes theorizing and recategorization. Indeed, the progress of science has a strong resemblance to the complex adaptive Theory of Neural Group Selection (TNGS) that is Edelman's principal contribution.

But let me interpret your post charitably: I believe you regard science as incomplete if, after analyzing the painting, it cannot predict YOUR reaction to it. But this is ridiculous! Surely you can see that no prediction of your reaction can take place without a measurement and analysis of your state of mind! Given that much of that state of mind is not consciously expressible, there would be a considerable uncertainty in such an analysis AT PRESENT, no denying it! But objective methods of tracking mental operations via such tools as fMRI continue to progress without any signs of stopping, and already more has been done toward objectivation of states of mind than would have been believed possible ten years ago, or than many in the philosophical community are ready to admit to even now.

"Consciouness of the gaps" is in trouble. The gaps are getting smaller and amaller.

 

[Fliption]

But let me interpret your post charitably: I believe you regard science as incomplete if,

No I think Les was saying that to claim science is incomplete would be the same thing as saying a hammer is incomplete because it could not unscrew screws.

But objective methods of tracking mental operations via such tools as fMRI continue to progress without any signs of stopping, and already more has been done toward objectivation of states of mind than would have been believed possible ten years ago, or than many in the philosophical community are ready to admit to even now.

"Consciouness of the gaps" is in trouble. The gaps are getting smaller and amaller.

And when you're all done, you'll have the entire meaning of the painting all represented in numbers and chemical states, which will render it meaningless and explain nothing. Sorry but that doesn't bridge any gaps. It seems to me that we don't lack information, as you seem to suggest by mentioning fMRI etc. We seem to lack concepts. I can't even imagine how one can objectively explain subjectivity. It seems impossible by definition does it not? The gap needs to be bridged with some conceptual understanding. Just claiming that we need more studies does not do the trick at this point.

 

[Les Sleeth]

This is a breathtakingly crude caricature of scientific explanation.

Crude? OMG, I am known far and wide for my suave sophistication. I'm sorry my opinion took your breath away . . . should I call 911? (Just kidding SA, I was not trying to insult. But I don't think you quite get my objection either.)

Do you think scientists IGNORE the subjective? Certainly Edelman does not; read his books.

I don't have time to read Edelman right now (but he's on my list). So nothing I say is meant to challenge or refute him. I am only responding to your points.

I don't believe scientists ignore the subjective, but I also don't believe they study what the best subjective "experts" have achieved either. That means they are basically ignorant of just what can be realized subjectively. And after all, subjectivity (as in inner experience) is not their priority is it? Isn't objectivity (as in externals/externalization) the priority?

Science advances not merely by simple empiricsm but by a complex social process that includes theorizing and recategorization. Indeed, the progress of science has a strong resemblance to the complex adaptive Theory of Neural Group Selection (TNGS) that is Edelman's principal contribution.

Here's where I don't think you grasp where I'm coming from. The processes involved with theorizing, categorization, complexity . . . those are techniques designed to understand "objects" external to you. I am trying to suggest that the core of you cannot be known that way.

But let me interpret your post charitably

I hope you do because that's how I feel about perspetives in dispute as long as both parties are sincerely trying to understand each other.

I believe you regard science as incomplete if, after analyzing the painting, it cannot predict YOUR reaction to it.

No SA, that isn't what I am saying (and I am not trying to be contrary). As Fliption suggests, I don't think science is the slightest bit incomplete. I just think there are areas of reality science isn't designed to investigate or reveal. But so what? It does an impressive job of helping us learn about physical reality. No matter what science "can't" do diminishes its awesome accomplishments with what it can do.

But this is ridiculous! Surely you can see that no prediction of your reaction can take place without a measurement and analysis of your state of mind!

This is, once again, an objective, externalizing standard. You are trying to set things up so that consciousness can be studied empirically. But I've been maintaining it might be that consciousness can't be externalized for empirical study. That means consciousness must be studied by each individual alone, studying his own consciousness. And if that is what I were doing (which is), I couldn't possibly care less if anyone could predict, measure or analyze my state of mind.

"Consciouness of the gaps" is in trouble. The gaps are getting smaller and smaller.

. . . unless "gaps" can be infinitely small, and then there isn't the slightest sign of being in trouble.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Here's where I don't think you grasp where I'm coming from. The processes involved with theorizing, categorization, complexity . . . those are techniques designed to understand "objects" external to you. I am trying to suggest that the core of you cannot be known that way.

I don't think this is so. Edelman, for example emphasizes that individuals have imperfectly reportable first person experiences "both as scientific investigator and as subject". And even Dennett has his heterophenomenology, a method of investigating first person experiences scientifically. And a great deal has been done with objective measurements keyed to simultaneous first person experiences - this goes back to EEGs in the 50's. And as I keep saying current correlation of subtle "qualia" eperiences with fMRI records is closing in on the ineffable.

This is just to address your point that science is only keyed to things. That isn't even true of physics!

 

[Tournesol]

So science is succeeding in explaining qualia. Weren't you saying earlier that it shouldn't even be trying ?

 

[Les Sleeth]

I don't think this is so. Edelman, for example emphasizes that individuals have imperfectly reportable first person experiences "both as scientific investigator and as subject". And even Dennett has his heterophenomenology, a method of investigating first person experiences scientifically. And a great deal has been done with objective measurements keyed to simultaneous first person experiences - this goes back to EEGs in the 50's. And as I keep saying current correlation of subtle "qualia" eperiences with fMRI records is closing in on the ineffable.

Well, I do see why you are hopeful technology is "closing in on the ineffable." But I must fall back to the reason I've stated (and which you may see as the source of my stubbornness) . . . and that is my repeated, daily experience attained in "union" meditation which makes me aware of two things.

One is of my own personal conscious "background," which is sort of like a homogeneous field I am aware of virtually all the time now (before practicing union I was not aware of it except when affected by peyote). The other is the experience of momentarily joining with (i.e., during successful meditation) a much larger conscious "background" which seems homgeneous, steady, and omnipresent. Also, I should add that because the temporary joining with that background consciousness during union seems like a "return," my impression is that the body is what creates my sense of separation from it.

As I've said, I cannot disregard my 30+ year history with this experience when I hear others model an individual human consciousness without it. Yet you cannot model with it because you don't believe/know it exists. So I'm not being stubborn and neither are you. I just interpret all the successes you are so encouraged by differently that you because of my personal experiences.

See, all that which is being revealed by, say, fMRI I interpret as manifestations of something more basic which is "one." That is, it's out of that singular background thing which all the observable stuff is arising. You think all those little "parts" are going to add up to the whole. But to me, that is impossible, just like counting all the waves on the surface of a body of water won't reveal the entire ocean. All it does is give a count of aspects which have, temporarily, differentiated from the quality of wholeness. Not only will those waves return, while they are differentiated (as waves) the ocean's quality of oneness is not diminished.

This is just to address your point that science is only keyed to things. That isn't even true of physics!

Well, there are effects, such as gravity, and circumstances, such as uncertainty. Nonetheless, they are observable apart from you, and that is something subjectivity can never be (I say).

 

[selfAdjoint]

Les, the heterophenomonolgy principle leads me to take your report of your experiences utterly seriously as representing your beliefs, but not to sign on to those beliefs myself without more evidence than your statement. And that's where I think we have to leave it.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Les, the heterophenomonolgy principle leads me to take your report of your experiences utterly seriously as representing your beliefs, but not to sign on to those beliefs myself without more evidence than your statement. And that's where I think we have to leave it.

Of course. I hope nobody thinks I expect them to "believe" my interpretations. I think you have to trust your own experiences, not mine. What I am doing is making a report, and giving you my impressions. It might interest you to check it out for yourself, or it might not.

But to be perfectly honest, I don't "believe" very much in a final sense. I know for a fact I can experience something I label "union" in meditation. I know that I interpret part of the experience as a "background" thing as I described. The background is always there for me, and I know others who practice who report the same thing. But I don't know what it is beyond that. So my resistance to your "parts" model is simply because it doesn't explain that constant background.

Ontologically speaking . . . I am just hypothesizing. I don't actually "know" a damn thing about the ultimate nature of reality.

 

[fuzzyfelt]

Would you mind at all telling me your opinion of external things, in that they may (art)offer "something else" that moves toward union, and yet also contribute (the body) to separation?

 

[Paul Martin]

Ontologically speaking . . . I am just hypothesizing. I don't actually "know" a damn thing about the ultimate nature of reality.

Think about this hypothesis: The ultimate nature of reality is simply the ability to know.

This hypothesis does not have the problem of infinity that your field does. The explanation of subjective experience comes for free with this hypothesis. The hypothesis also leads to a plausible explanation for the construction and existence of the physical universe. A sketch for this explanation would be knowing --> discriminating --> imagining --> remembering --> logical inference --> calculation --> experimentation --> selection. All of these are what we might call "thoughts" or "thought processes", but regardless of how they are "really" constituted, they seem to be exactly the ingredients that physical theories need as a substrate for the existence of physical reality.

Paul

 

[Les Sleeth]

Would you mind at all telling me your opinion of external things, in that they may (art)offer "something else" that moves toward union, and yet also contribute (the body) to separation?

I do think "externals" like art, or the beauty of creation, or a child, or anything deeply appreciated can move us in the direction of "something more."

But I want to distinguish between being moved by appreciating certain externals, and moving oneself by way of a dedicated internal practice of union.

In some ways I think it might be compared to the people who participate here. There are those of us who are moved by the wonders of physics, and there are those who actually undertake the study of physics. In terms of acquiring skill in physics, who do you think is going to get the furthest?

In the same way, it is a good thing to be sensitive and open enough to be moved by art (or whatever external one prefers), and through that keep your faith in "something more" intact. But it is also possible to go beyond faith to actual first hand, direct experience. And that is what a dedicated inner union practice can give one.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Ontologically speaking . . . I am just hypothesizing. I don't actually "know" a damn thing about the ultimate nature of reality.

Think about this hypothesis: The ultimate nature of reality is simply the ability to know.

Okay, but keep in mind my statement was about what I "know," not about what interesting hypotheses I might imagine. I said I don't know the ultimate ontology because I can't see enough of it from my little perspective. I know what I personally experience, that's it.

This hypothesis does not have the problem of infinity that your field does.

I don't understand why you say that. I didn't say the field was infinite (in fact, I don't think it is). You might have misinterpreted my use of omnipresence, which I just meant as: all around wherever I go. I have no way of knowing what is beyond where I can go. But so far, every place I sit and experience union, there is that greater background.

Therefore, my statement is not a hypothesis; the background field isn't at issue for me. I know I experience something like that. I am not hypothesizing, I am giving a first-hand report as a witness.

A sketch for this explanation would be knowing --> discriminating --> imagining --> remembering --> logical inference --> calculation --> experimentation --> selection. All of these are what we might call "thoughts" or "thought processes", but regardless of how they are "really" constituted, they seem to be exactly the ingredients that physical theories need as a substrate for the existence of physical reality.

Okay, now I'll hypothesize. I appreciate your efforts, but I just don't see it. How does your path of knowing through selection account for all the properties of physicalness, for instance? If you say every physical property is a thought, then explain how the thinker of the thought came be. If you say the thinker has always been, then it seems the thinker, being omniscient, should be able think a perfect creation; yet creation is far from perfect.

If the thinker is not infinitely knowledgeable, then it means he/she/it learns, but that implies the thinker had a beginning. What could have begun the thinker? Also, what is the thinker made out of?

I don't see how it helps to say the ultimate reality is knowing because as a modeling tool it doesn't explain some very important things (like the essence of itself, and either its origin or how it can be omniscient and still create imperfectly). True, your theory can't be disproven, but none of it can be proven either. That's always been the objection to idealism. We are left with nothing but speculation.

 

[Paul Martin]

I don't understand why you say that. I didn't say the field was infinite (in fact, I don't think it is).

Sorry. My mistake. I don't remember where I got that impression.

I appreciate your efforts, but I just don't see it. How does your path of knowing through selection account for all the properties of physicalness, for instance?

The short answer is Ed Witten's (I think) "It from bit". It seems that whatever the TOE will turn out to be, it will be a set of mathematical equations that will describe the behavior of a set of mathematical entities. Those mathematical equations and entities are nothing more than ideas that could have been developed strictly via the path of knowing through selection. The initial conditions and the set of subsequent states could likewise be nothing more than ideas of that knower.

If you say every physical property is a thought, then explain how the thinker of the thought came be.

I'm puzzled as to why you framed that as an if...then request. If I didn't say that every physical property is a thought, then would I be off the hook in explaining how the thinker came to be? It seems to me that the question of how any thinker came to be is still unanswered, no matter what explanations there are for physicality. But since I do think everything physical is nothing but thought, I guess I'm on the hook.

Actually, I think I have a lot of company. I think that no matter what explanation of anything anyone offers, you can quickly ask a series of questions leading to an ultimate one about how the fundamental entity involved in the explanation came to be. And, it seems that we must choose that either something-or-other always existed, or that the something-or-other came to be out of nothing. I don't see that my hypothesis suffers from this problem any more than each and every other hypothesis does.

If you say the thinker has always been, then it seems the thinker, being omniscient, should be able think a perfect creation; yet creation is far from perfect.

I agree. I don't think the thinker is omniscient.

If the thinker is not infinitely knowledgeable, then it means he/she/it learns,

I agree, and I think so.

but that implies the thinker had a beginning.

Not necessarily. The thinker might have always existed but only began thinking at a point in time. (That way we have both intractable problems at once!)

What could have begun the thinker?

Good question. What could have begun anything that might be at the root of reality?

Also, what is the thinker made out of?

Another good question. What is anything that is ontologically fundamental made out of? I'd say it is made out of pure ability to know.

I don't see how it helps to say the ultimate reality is knowing because as a modeling tool it doesn't explain some very important things (like the essence of itself, and either its origin

I think it helps because it gives a plausible chain of cause and effect that leads from the hypothesis to everything we know exists. As for its own essence and origin, every theory has this very same stumbling block. I'd suggest we just get over the stumbling block and try to make sense of eveything else.

or how it can be omniscient and still create imperfectly).

I agree with you that it can't. In fact, I don't think there is anything in reality that is omnipotent, omniscient, perfect, infinite, complete, or immutable. I do agree with you, however, on omnipresence.

True, your theory can't be disproven, but none of it can be proven either. That's always been the objection to idealism. We are left with nothing but speculation.

I agree. But I think the same objection applies to physicalism as well.

Thanks for your thoughts, Les.

Paul

 

[fuzzyfelt]

Thank you Les Sleeth, that has been my understanding too, although, yes, I think you did guess that I was momentarily toying with the idea that there may be an even deeper, essential, relationship between physicality and union.

 

[Canute]

I think that no matter what explanation of anything anyone offers, you can quickly ask a series of questions leading to an ultimate one about how the fundamental entity involved in the explanation came to be. And, it seems that we must choose that either something-or-other always existed, or that the something-or-other came to be out of nothing. I don't see that my hypothesis suffers from this problem any more than each and every other hypothesis does.

Hi Paul - I feel you're right that this is the problem, but wrong in saying that we must make this either/or choice and that this is a problem in all cosmologies. The cosmology of Buddhism, Sufism, Taoism, the Upanishads etc. - does not suffer from this problem. In this cosmology the tertium non datur rule is modified, just as it has to be in QM and M-theory, and so the problem disappears. The avoidance of this false distinction, ("either that something-or-other always existed, or that the something-or-other came to be out of nothing") is one of the many meanings of the term 'nonduality' in these doctrines. Clearly neither choice makes sense so there must be this third option. (Consider the 'hypothesis of duality' in M-theory, or the concept of complementarity in QM).

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi Paul - I feel you're right that this is the problem, but wrong in saying that we must make this either/or choice and that this is a problem in all cosmologies. The cosmology of Buddhism, Sufism, Taoism, the Upanishads etc. - does not suffer from this problem. In this cosmology the tertium non datur rule is modified, just as it has to be in QM and M-theory, and so the problem disappears. The avoidance of this false distinction, ("either that something-or-other always existed, or that the something-or-other came to be out of nothing") is one of the many meanings of the term 'nonduality' in these doctrines. Clearly neither choice makes sense so there must be this third option. (Consider the 'hypothesis of duality' in M-theory, or the concept of complementarity in QM).

Hi Canute,

Yes, 'must' is too strong of a word. There are many alternative ways of dealing with this issue. I think my suggestion of just stepping over this stumbling block is essentially the same as the approach of the eastern cosmologies and of QM: avoid the problem by not talking about it and move on to something you can talk about. At least that's the way those other approaches sound to me.

Paul

 

[Canute]

Yes QM avoids the problem in this way, but 'Eastern' cosmologies do not avoid the problem at all, they address it head on and thus solve it. There is no unspoken of mystery in these cosmologies, no unanswerable metaphysical questions or other barriers to knowledge. But this nonduality of reality, at an absolute level, has to be understood on a personal basis, through experience, as Les keeps saying, not by third-person theorising or hypothesising, which, as we can easily see from the current state of the naturalised sciences and of analytical or 'western' philosophy (and the discussions on this forum) gets one absolutely nowhere.

 

[Paul Martin]

Yes QM avoids the problem in this way, but 'Eastern' cosmologies do not avoid the problem at all, they address it head on and thus solve it. There is no unspoken of mystery in these cosmologies, no unanswerable metaphysical questions or other barriers to knowledge. But this nonduality of reality, at an absolute level, has to be understood on a personal basis, through experience, as Les keeps saying, not by third-person theorising or hypothesising, which, as we can easily see from the current state of the naturalised sciences and of analytical or 'western' philosophy (and the discussions on this forum) gets one absolutely nowhere.

Hi Canute,

"Those who know don't tell; those who tell don't know."

I have heard that quote a few times over the years but I don't know if it has any official standing in any philosophy or religion. But it gets me to wondering just the same. I am quite convinced that some people have had personal experiences by which they came to know something, in the strongest sense of knowing, which they cannot express in language. So,... they not only don't tell anyone else, they can't tell anyone else.

I am also pretty well convinced that several times throughout history, someone has had such an experience, has attempted to explain it in language, and has convinced a number of followers that he was really on to something. What happens then is that the followers get it all messed up and come up with some doctrine that is very different from the knowledge attained by person who had the experience. And, thus, a religion or a sect is started. I think it is interesting that Parmenides, Socrates, Jesus, and Gautama didn't leave any personal written account. What we have are interpretations by their followers.

That preamble was to set the stage for a question to you, Canute: What do you mean by "solve a problem"? You said that there is no unspoken of mystery in the Eastern cosmologies.

If you mean that in Eastern cosmologies the problem is solved in the mind of an individual then that is one thing, and not too useful to others. But if you mean that a solution is available to be spoken, or otherwise expressed in language, then 1) it means that the impression I expressed in my preamble is wrong and I need to be corrected, and 2) for Heaven's sake, What is the solution? How can something exist without either starting or always existing?

Paul

 

[Canute]

Paul

My answers to such questions tend to come out horribly garbled but I'll have a shot at it.

I agree with what you say on how religions get started. It seems obvious from the evidence that our major religions are founded on misreadings of the prophets. This complaint is regularly made of Christianity, Islam and Hinduism. The problem does not really crop up in the mystical religions because these are religions in a different sense of the word, and in these one is not expected to believe the words of any prophet or master but rather to is expected to follow in their footsteps and thus attain their knowledge for oneself. Thus the criticism of Christianity, Islam and Hinduism, as these doctrines are so often taught, is, ironically, most often and most vociferously made by Christian mystics, Sufis and Advaita Vedantists. (This is the whole argument about the non-canonical gospels, for example, for in these Jesus gives the mystical view of cosmology, not a theist view).

The question "How can something exist without either starting or always existing?" can be addressed by asking what the words mean. For most people 'something' will mean a thing that exists in space and time. If it means this then the answer to the question is 'It cannot'. If something exists in time and space then it has a beginning and an end. (I know Hawking argues that time might have a beginning but not an end, but he hasn't yet shown that this idea is not absurd).

The same argument applies to the term 'exists' - what most people mean by 'exists', certainly what most scientists mean, is 'exists in space and time'. Given this meaning then anything that exists must have a beginning, and again the answer would be 'It cannot'.

But the question can be interpreted differently. In the nondual cosmology what is fundamental, the ultimate phenomenon, transcends the distinction between existing and not-existing and between some-thing and no-thing. In fact it transcends all such 'dual' distinctions so, for instance, this 'thing' has no properties and all properties, is both extended and not extended, is differentiated and undifferentiated, both a void and a plenum and so on ad infinitum. (cf Spencer Brown's mathematical model of cosmogenesis, in which forms arise in the void by the reification of these false distinctions).

This seems a strange idea but if it were true it would very straighforwardly explain why metaphysical question are undecidable, and no other explanation has yet been proposed.

The easiest way to conceive of the nonduality of the ultimate phenomenon, it seems to me, is in terms of superposition and complementarity. But this is just a helpful device, and there is complete agreement among mystics and meditators that in fact it is impossible to conceive of it.

All those who propound this view assert that this strange property or state of ultimate reality cannot be understood except by direct experience. However, now that physics has progressed sufficiently the assertions that space and time are not fundamental, and that something can be in many states at the same time and so on, begin to seem less odd than they used to, and we can speculate that this 'something' is inconceivable for the same reason that wavicles are inconceivable, which is that according to reason a thing must be either a particle or a wave, must be local or non-local, must exist against a spacetime background or not and so forth.

In the mystical view what is fundamental to existence is not a corporeal or mental phenomenon. It does not exist in the way that other phenomena exist, and it is in a sense beyond spacetime, beyond temporality and extension. The Nibbana of Buddhism, for example, is, metaphorically at least, rather like another dimension, in contact with every point in the physical universe but itself unextended, like a curled-up or compacted fifth dimension in M-theory, or like the hyperspace of science fiction. This is reminiscent of Neo's Matrix-world, in which spatial extension is an illusion, since all points in Neo's universe are the same point, the point at which his self-consciousness exists, in a brain in a vat in a machine somewhere entirely outside of his phenomenal universe. Non-locality would be easy to explain in the Matrix, where naive realism is about as wrong as it could be.

This problem with how to define 'something' and 'exist' in your question is avoided by various methods in mystical writings. In Taoist philosophy, for instance, the ultimate is often referred to as 'something', the scare quotes signifying that it should not be thought of as a thing or object. Likewise, it is said that the Tao (Allah, Nibbana, Unicity etc) is, not that it exists, because the term 'exists' implies the notion of spacetime, and this 'something' is beyond spacetime.

Actually what I've said here is not quite right. One reason for this, in addition to my ignorance, is that it's very difficult to talk about this 'something' in everyday terms for the same reason it is very difficult to talk about wavicles in mathematical terms. One must take a wavicle to be a wave or a particle in mathematics, while in fact it not a wave, not a particle, not neither a wave nor a particle and not both a wave and a particle. I'm not suggesting that Nibbana, the Tao etc. is a wavicle, (although to me this would make scientific sense) but rather that some of the concepts that have had to be developed in QM are useful when thinking about the idea of 'nonduality', and that the dual nature of its explandum causes the same epistemilogical and linguistic problems in Taoism as it does in QM and quantum cosmology.

It is important to say that this 'nondual' cosmological view is not speculative, but based on 'knowledge by identity', on first-person empirical evidence. It can be argued that it is built on a delusion, or a series of self-delusions, but this can only be decided by first-person research.

Does that make any sense at all? I doubt it. If not I'll post a couple of links to much better answers.

Canute

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi Canute,

What an excellent response! It made a lot of sense to me and I think I understand what you are saying. I think it helps, though, that I am currently about half-way through a course in Buddhism that I am taking (yes, I decided to take it because of your suggestions. Thank you for that.). For example, I learned that 'Nibbana' is the Pali word for the Sanskrit 'Nirvana'.

Another thing I learned is that you should probably include Buddhism in your list of religions in which the prophets have been misread. Such misreadings, IMHO, lead to the diffusion of the Dharma and the resulting schools of The Nyingma, The Sakya School, The Kagyu School, and the Geluk School.

It was great for me to learn about the philosophy of each of these schools because each time, I thought I knew what they were talking about and each time I identified it with my own philosophical beliefs. Then when I learned about the next one, I realized that it was really a refinement or an improvement on the prior one. The net of it is, at least in my opinion, each one is correct but none of them can be expressed in a precise way. It's the same old story of the necessity of parable, poetry, and allegory in describing religious doctrine of any kind. As soon as you try to be specific and linguistically accurate, you head right into error.

Thanks for your post. Gotta go.

Paul

 

[Canute]

Yeah, there have been disagreements over some of the deeper aspects of reality between different schools of Buddhism. I suspect that these have all but disappeared today, but you probably know more about this than I do. For me most of the disagreements were more apparent than real, more about what should be taught and how rather than about what is true, since no school of Buddhhism argues that the Buddha was incorrect in anything he said, but I haven't really looked into the details.

It's great to hear that you're looking into all this though. I'll be genuinely interested to know what you make of it. In case you've got the time can I recommend a book? You may find the Penguin edition of the Bhagavad Gita well worth a read. The main text is worth reading in itself of course. But the edition also includes two introductions, a brilliant one by Juan Mascaro, the translator, and a more general but even more brilliant one by Simon Broderick. The writers of the Gita expounded the same doctrine as the Buddha, albeit they presented it very differently. Because of this the two introductions to the text of the Gita are also explanations of Buddhist doctrine, and they are both exceptionally good in my opinion. Just a thought.

Canute