One of those consciousness threads

[moving finger]

Hi Paul

I am interested in what "the rational explanation" is.

An explanation along the lines of Metzinger’s paper. I'm not suggesting this is the "only" rational explanation, but explanations along these lines are the only rational ones that I have seen so far.

I'm guessing you buy into Metzinger's or Dennett's explanation, neither of which I accept. We can discuss my reasons further if you like.

Yup. I would be interested to know your reasons for rejecting Metzinger’s explanation.

I take it that by 'magical' you mean 'irrational'.

To me, an explanation is magical if it purports to explain some observed phenomenon on the basis of some other totally new and (directly) unobserved concept X, when the same concept X is itself neither a part of accepted explanations of other existing phenomena nor is itself explained by our other concepts. In other words, suggesting that "X gives rise to Y" is not very useful if (a) it leaves unanswered the question of what gives rise to X, and (b) X is not needed to explain anything else.

For example, the medieval idea that wandering stars (planets) are pushed around the sky by angels may not have seemed magical at the time (because a more rational explanation was not available), but we can see now (with the benefit of a more rational explanation based on mechanics) that this angel idea is a "magical" concept.

The current idea that our feeling of free will is explained by the fact that we are genuinely free agents (in the libertarian sense) is also what I would call a magical explanation, because the mechanism of libertarian free will is itself unexplained (in fact I believe unexplainable), positing libertarian free will does not actually explain anything that we observe empirically apart from our subjective feeling of free will, and there is a perfectly rational alternative explanation for the subjective feeling of free will based on a purely deterministic model which does not need the magical premise of libertarian free will.

We need parsimony in our fundamental concepts, we need to resist the desire to multiply fundamental concepts needlessly.

you are saying that if we consider consciousness to be analogous to a running program, then consciousness cannot exist without a physical body, just as a running program cannot exist without a computer. Agreed.

Good.

Are you a Platonist who believes in the real existence of Plato's world of forms?

It depends what you mean by “real existence”. I believe in Plato’s world of forms only in the sense of an idealistic representation. In the “universal set of ideas” there is the idea of a perfect circle. This does not mean that the universal set of ideas has any kind of material, physical existence. Similarly, in the “universal set of mathematical equations” there is every conceivable mathematical function, but this does not mean the universe of mathematical equations has any kind of material, physical existence. It’s an ideal, not a reality. Similary, there is a “universal set of computer programs”.

the "idea of the program" really does exist independently of the computer both as a purely mental idea and also as a symbolic representation of those ideas in some physical medium.

In the same way the “idea of the perfect circle” really does exist (in the real world) in the form of a mathematical equation describing that circle, independently of any real circles ever created in the physical world.

I do believe that mathematicians discover mathematical truths and proofs rather than invent them, but this belief does not entail that these truths have any "material existence" prior to their discovery (although of course it all comes down to how one defines "existence").

But such “idea” of program is totally ineffectual (in our world) in absence of any physical substrate.

I agree with this. But if the "idea" exists (which you seem to agree "can exist as an idea") and then the physical substrate somehow shows up, the "idea" can be loaded into the substrate whereupon it can become effectual (in the world of the substrate).

Agreed.

I claimed that "no software exists that did not have its ultimate origin in a conscious mind" and you asked me to clarify my definition of "software" before you would comment. By 'software' I simply mean any and all computer programs. The kicker here is its "ultimate origin". Certainly there are programs that have been generated by other running programs. But the ultimate origin is not the generating program, but instead it is the programmer who designed the generating program. It is this fact that does not seem to have an analog in the consciousness/brain system if consciousness is nothing more than a brain process.

It is correct that all instances of computer programs presently known to homo sapiens are ultimately descended from programs that were originally created by homo sapiens. But what does this prove? It is also true (if one believes in evolutionary theory) that all homo sapiens are descended from non-conscious organisms. There are only certain ways in which extremely complex systems can arise in nature, and evolution and design are two of these ways. Are you perhaps suggesting that consciousness can arise only by “pure evolution in absence of any design” and not by “evolution initiated by design”? If you are suggesting this, why do you think this is the case?

In my view, the analogy works because I don't think consciousness originates in the brain, just as the ideas which lead to the existence of programs don't originate in computers.

Understood. But if your explanation for how consciousness arises in individuals is based on something that is in turn equally unexplained, then that’s what I would call magical.

It doesn't seem to me that the analogy works for you even if you equate consciousness with a running instance of a program and not with the set of symbols representing the program.

I don’t understand what you mean here, sorry.

It seems to me that my interpretation is more rational.

To me, the more rational explanation is the one with the greater explanatory power, ie the one that accurately explains the phenomenon in question whilst relying in turn on the minimum of new unexplained concepts for that explanation. We should adhere to parsimony in concepts, only inventing new concepts if the existing ones have been demonstrated to be inadequate. Simply explaining one unexplained concept by replacing it with an additional, new and equally unexplained concept is not, to me, a rational explanation.

Best Regards

MF

 

[octelcogopod]

First I must apologize, you said "accept the rational explanation" not "truth."
Sorry.
Anyway

moving-finger, so you do agree that qualia exists, but you do not have an explanatin for consciousness?
I'm a little confused by your post at this point.

You say that conscious experience and detection are not the same.
Then you explain how the brain sees red in the consciousness, but we are no closer to knowing what consciousness IS.
What IS conscious experience?

It's quite a baffling post you made though, I never thought about it like this before.
I think your point is that a quale and conscious experience are not the same things.

Would you care to elaborate a little bit or should I go read metzingers writings?

 

[Lars Laborious]

Moving finger, a concept like “inside” or “outside” a box is a mental idea. And a mental idea consists of sensations that are processed in the right way so that the idea (the concept) is presented to itself (or for those who believe in dualism, to homunculus). Either way, a concept is secondary, whilst the nature of sensations itself is the unexplained substance we seek to understand when we (at least some of us) speek of qualia.

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

I would be interested to know your reasons for rejecting Metzinger’s explanation.

See post #3 at https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=119221

To me, an explanation is magical if it purports to explain some observed phenomenon on the basis of some other totally new and (directly) unobserved concept X, when the same concept X is itself neither a part of accepted explanations of other existing phenomena nor is itself explained by our other concepts. In other words, suggesting that "X gives rise to Y" is not very useful if (a) it leaves unanswered the question of what gives rise to X, and (b) X is not needed to explain anything else.

Thank you for this explanation. Not that it is important to define or use the term 'magical', but that it helps me understand where our differences are and maybe how to address them.

It seems to me that our difference can be summarized as follows: My view is that consciousness gives rise to physicality, while your view is that physicality gives rise to consciousness. We have reversed roles for X and Y in the proposition "X gives rise to Y".

Now, let's examine the "usefulness" of our respective positions using your criteria (a) and (b) above. I'll start with mine, where X = consciousness, and Y = physicality.

(a) Since I consider X to be primordial and ontologically fundamental, the question of what gives rise to X either does not arise or it is unanswerable. (In any system of ontology, something must be primordial and ontologically fundamental. Either the question of what gives rise to it does not arise, or the question is unanswerable in principle.) So it is a matter of opinion as to whether criterion (a) is met or not.

(b) X is needed to explain consciousness as experienced in at least one human, so criterion (b) is met.

Next, we'll consider yours, where X = physicality and Y = Consciousness.

(a) In order for X to exist, something -- call it X' -- must be primordial and ontologically fundamental in order to account for the existence of X. (I don't know what you might consider X' to be, but regardless of whether it is a false vacuum, a "true" vacuum, a Higg's Field, a set of laws, a set of principles, an endless stack of turtles, or what, it doesn't matter for the purposes of this argument.) Since X' is primordial and ontologically fundamental, the question of what gives rise to X' either does not arise or it is unanswerable. So, just as in my case, it is a matter of opinion as to whether criterion (a) is met or not.

(b) X' is needed to explain the existence of the world, so criterion (b) is met.

Our views seem to be equally magical (or rational) by these criteria.

To me, an explanation is magical if it purports to explain some observed phenomenon on the basis of some other totally new and (directly) unobserved concept X,...

My X is an observed phenomenon, not new at all (we each experience consciousness beginning in childhood), and it is as directly observed as anything can be -- more directly, in fact, than anything physical can be observed. Your X', on the other hand, is to date not only an unobserved phenomenon, but as yet has not even been identified. When it is finally identified, it may not be "totally new", but in all likelihood it will be a directly unobserved concept.

My view seems much less magical than yours on this score.

...when the same concept X is itself neither a part of accepted explanations of other existing phenomena nor is itself explained by our other concepts.

My X is an integral part of at least my explanation of human conscious experience, which is the most in-your-face existing phenomenon there is. It is, however, not explained by our other concepts. Your X', when identified, will no doubt be a part of explanations for other existing phenomena, but it too, will not likely be explained by other concepts.

Our views seem to be about equal on this score.

We need parsimony in our fundamental concepts, we need to resist the desire to multiply fundamental concepts needlessly.

Agreed. I think my view is more parsimonious than yours since I posit nothing new; we know consciousness exists and we are pretty sure physicality exists. Those are all I ask. Yours still needs the elusive X' and it brings along The Hard Problem of how consciousness can arise from physicality.

Gotta run. Good talking with you MF,

Paul

 

[octelcogopod]

Paul I really like your post, but it leaves me with an unfulfilled feeling nonetheless.

I like both your arguments really, but I still feel a piece is missing in both.

for MF I have one question; what are your proposed ways of solving the hard problem?

For Paul I have another; Do you feel it is satisfying to know that consciousness can never be "solved?"
It seems as if you're saying that we shouldn't dig into the physicality to develop our understanding of conscious experience, but rather just say "consciousness is fundamental, so where it arises from is not a question."

However, if you are saying that yes, physicality is 100% responsible for conscious experience, but we can't answer the hard problem from within our conscious "sphere" of experience, then yes, I agree.

Do you also feel that qualia / consciousness exists seperately from the physical world? Or is this simply a subjective viewpoint / excercise in logic?

 

[selfAdjoint]

. I think my view is more parsimonious than yours since I posit nothing new; we know consciousness exists and we are pretty sure physicality exists

I do NOT know that consciousness exists. I know that I am conscious, which is not the same thing at all. I also know that I am tall, old, and digesting lunch, but that doesn't mean that tallness' oldness, and lunch digestion exist as primordial ontological substances. You are multiplying entities without sufficient reason.

 

[Doctordick]

If one is to explain anything from an absolutely rational base, intuition must be dropped. One must fall back to the only thing which can be consciously followed: the logical chain of reasoning. Think about it, the only rational position which stands on its own is, we are trying to describe the universe under the constraint that, "the only thing we know for sure, is that we know nothing for sure"[/color]. Can any of you give me a starting point consistent with that perspective? My statement is that I can and have done so. Please note, as an aside, that I take mathematics as a unique mode of communication and not as a self evident truth. Mathematics is unique because statements in mathematics (and logic) enjoy an almost perfect definition of terms and misinterpretation is next to impossible; a quality not shared by any other human language.

I take the definition of "an explanation" as the basic starting point as understanding becomes a meaningless concept in the total absense of explanation. It is impossible for anyone to understand what I am talking about without understanding my paper, http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm . If you want to understand anything at all, it is absolutely necessary that you understand exactly why the equation I develop in that paper needs to apply directly to the fundamental elements of any explanation of anything. From that fact, it follows that any internally logical development of what one is talking about requires that one define the fundamental elements of their explanation in terms of solutions of that equation. This is a complete and total reverse of the ordinary approach and makes no resort to presumed knowledge (which every other attack on the problem of understanding anything intimately relies).

I read Dr. Metzinger's paper with interest (it is not easy reading) and I found him pointing out some aspects of the constraint on what we know which are very important to my thoughts. In particular, what he refers to as "transparency" is a particularly significant issue. As I understand it, in lay terms, he is expressing the kind of transparency seen in common communication systems: i.e., the information obtained can not be used to discover the actual function of the communication system (in his case that would be the subconscious mind). One can say the communication system is a transparent window into the actual information being presented.

It is an excellent presentation; however, he misses a very important issue (I admit it is an issue of little concern to him). That would be another idea fundamentally embedded in the word "transparency". The word "transparency" implies what is seen is what is out there; however, with human communication devices (TV signals, radio, the internet, hearing aids, audio systems, etc.) there exist other ways of obtaining the same information whereas, when it comes to the conscious mind, the only source of any information arises from the subconscious itself and the word "transparency" sort of includes an assumption that what you see is correct. That Metzinger himself has made that assumption is evident in his clear presumption that the scientific conclusions concerning reality are correct. Again, I will excuse him because that issue is really not a concern of his; however, it is a very strong concern of mine.

My point in all of this is that, if one is to explain "conscious awareness", that explanation must be based on fundamental elements obeying my equation: i.e., on some complex conglomerate consequences of entities which themselves are built of solutions to that equation. Since it is easy to show that all of known physics arises from fundamental entities which can be defined as primary solutions to that equation, I would have to come down on Metzinger's side: that the self arises from the same source.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi octelcogopod,

Do you feel it is satisfying to know that consciousness can never be "solved?"

No. On the other hand, I don't claim to know that consciousness can never be solved. I am interested in a vigorous pursuit of a complete understanding not only of consciousness, but also all aspects of physical phenomena. I am delighted that some smart people are finally looking into the question of consciousness after ignoring it for so long.

It seems as if you're saying that we shouldn't dig into the physicality to develop our understanding of conscious experience

Not at all. I think we should keep digging into physicality in order to understand its role in the conscious experience.

...but rather just say "consciousness is fundamental, so where it arises from is not a question."

Not quite. I do claim that consciousness is fundamental, but I suspect that the primordial consciousness was significantly more primitive than the consciousness we experience as humans. For one thing, there was not the rich set of physical objects in existence which provide things to be conscious of. I also suspect that information stored in physical substrates enhances conscious experience to a considerable degree.

As I see it, a primordial consciousness started out with extremely limited knowledge and experience and evolved to produce what we experience now. That includes physicality along with who knows what else. So maybe where the primordial consciousness arises from is a question we can't ever grapple with. But related questions, such as what was that limited form of primordial consciousness like, and what were the stages of evolution that led from that primordial state to what we have now, may be questions we might be able to answer some day.

However, if you are saying that yes, physicality is 100% responsible for conscious experience, but we can't answer the hard problem from within our conscious "sphere" of experience, then yes, I agree.

That is not what I am saying. I say that consciousness is 100% responsible for physicality. The Hard Problem is solved by physical structures being constructed in such a way as to provide a communication path between consciousness and physical bodies, just as a two-way radio connection allows a JPL scientist to drive a Mars rover and perceive aspects of the rover's experience on Mars. The body is the rover and the JPL scientist is the consciousness. The remote control nature of the setup gives consciousness the illusion that it is resident in the brain.

Do you also feel that qualia / consciousness exists seperately from the physical world? Or is this simply a subjective viewpoint / excercise in logic?

Now that's a good question. I don't think there is anything simple about it at all. I have some vague hunches about the question, but nothing I would be able to defend very well. In short, I think there are physical processes (in the brain) which transform certain physical stimuli in complex ways prior to transmission to consciousness, rather than the raw stimuli themselves being transmitted.

Let me try to describe what I mean by using the example of sound. We have the quale of a musical tone. We consciously experience the sound of a tone as a musical note being played. We know intellectually that this tone is made of a rather complex set of vibrations. If the pitch of the tone is low enough, we may even be able to detect and hear the vibrations in addition to hearing the tone. Think of a low note on a tuba or a bassoon.

Or, using the same example, think of a cogwheel turning slowly and each cog hitting something rather stiff as it passes. We hear the sound of those strikes as individual clicks or thumps if the frequency is less than 10 hz or so. But if the wheel turns faster, at about 15 hz we begin to hear a tone in addition to the individual vibrations. Above some other frequency, maybe 30 hz or so, we can no longer detect the individual vibrations but only hear the tone. I think that the brain constructs information that we have a repeated set of vibrations at a particular frequency (or pattern of frequencies) and transmits this information, as a quale, to consciousness, rather than transmitting information representing the actual vibrations. This is all very speculative and I can't defend it very well, but you asked so I answered.

Thanks for your thoughts,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi selfAdjoint,

I know that I am conscious

And I am skeptical. In order for you to know that, you must know what you mean by the term 'I', by the term 'am', and by the term 'conscious'. My skepticism comes from your use of the term 'I' without defining it. The term 'am' is a form of the verb 'to be' which is a synonym of the word 'exist'. So "to be conscious" IMHO means the same thing as "consciousness exists". Yet you say that

I do NOT know that consciousness exists

You seem to be inconsistent whether or not you can satisfactorily define the word 'I'.

I also know that I am tall, old, and digesting lunch, but that doesn't mean that tallness' oldness, and lunch digestion exist as primordial ontological substances.

Agreed.

You are multiplying entities without sufficient reason.

I don't understand what you mean by "multiplying entities". What entities have I multiplied? In my opinion I have drastically reduced entities. In your scheme, there are some six billion conscious entities plus maybe even more if some animals are conscious, each of which demands an accounting of how it came to be. In my scheme, there is only one conscious entity which needs to be explained.

Rather than "multiplying entities without sufficient reason" I have taken the entities which appear to exist and simply made a choice as to which of them to posit as a fundamental entity. My claim is that by making this choice, which incidentally is arbitrary, it is easier to explain everything else.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi Dick,

Think about it, the only rational position which stands on its own is, we are trying to describe the universe under the constraint that, "the only thing we know for sure, is that we know nothing for sure". Can any of you give me a starting point consistent with that perspective?

Let me propose a starting point that is close. We can know some things for sure, but we can't explain them. Here I have separated knowing from explaining. My hunch is that the ability to know is ontologically fundamental. I also suspect that nothing can be completely explained. The reason is that we can't define all the terms we use without being circular.

I take the definition of "an explanation" as the basic starting point as understanding becomes a meaningless concept in the total absense of explanation.

So I think my starting point is slightly ahead of yours. I start with knowing without being able to explain. You start with explanation and go on to derive its limitations.

There seems to be an intermediate position between knowing and explaining, and that is what MF calls "believing". I sometimes call it "thinking", as in "I think I know something but I can't necessarily explain it". If "believing" or "thinking" is not intermediate between knowing and explaining, it is at least another entity besides "knowing" which we might like to explain. That is, in addition to wanting to be able to explain what we know, we would also like to be able to explain what we believe.

Next, you mentioned 'understanding' and 'meaning'. It seems to me that you might agree that an acceptable definition of 'understanding' would be the ability to produce an explanation (of either a known fact or a belief). And, taking a cue from Wittgenstein, 'meaning' would be defined as the explanation that is commonly understood by the majority of communicants.

...I take mathematics as a unique mode of communication and not as a self evident truth. Mathematics is unique because statements in mathematics (and logic) enjoy an almost perfect definition of terms and misinterpretation is next to impossible; a quality not shared by any other human language.

Yes. And this, I think is where and why a lot of people misunderstand what you have discovered. It also is one of the sources of irritation for people like Les Sleeth. But let me give you my perspective on Mathematics and your work.

You have without a doubt based your work on traditional, standard mathematics. That is why I insist on labeling your result as a theorem. But what you have glossed over are the foundations of mathematics. I think Foundations play heavily in what we are discussing.

Mathematics has the same difficulty of circular definitions as any other language. So, in mathematics, certain terms are taken as primitive, i.e. without definition. It is a mistake to think that the primitive terms "mean something". They do not. They are only a starting point and provide an initial set of symbols which can be manipulated.

Now when you take as your starting point, a set of numbers, you have assumed the mathematical "meaning" of the term 'set' and the term 'number'. The term 'number' is rigorously defined in mathematics but the term 'set' is not (typically).

Going back to my starting point, can we say that we know what a set is even though we can't explain it? Well, yes. That's sort of the tacit position of mathematics. And that becomes the tacit position of the basis of your work, Dick.

Or, if that's unacceptable, can we say that we think we know what a set is? Or that we believe that we know what a set is? If we can just say this much, it seems that it provides enough on which all the rest of mathematics can be built. I think that's the case.

If you agree with me so far, then it seems clear that "we" must know or believe something "we" can't necessarily explain in order to have mathematics at all. But then, who exactly is this "we"? It seems to me that the existence of some kind of entity which has the ability to know, to believe, and to think, is absolutely necessary in order to have mathematics. And if mathematics is somehow involved in, or a prerequisite for, the instantiation and operation of physicality, as it sure seems to be, then it seems inescapable that consciousness must precede physicality in the development of reality.

Starting with consciousness, you can get mathematics. And with mathematics, you can get Dick's theorem. And with Dick's theorem you can get the laws of physics. And with the laws of physics, some initial numbers, and some sort of processor (like a conscious mind) you can get phenomena that appear every bit as real as the rock Boswell kicked trying to refute Berkeley. It all seems to hang together and make sense to me.

My point in all of this is that, if one is to explain "conscious awareness", that explanation must be based on fundamental elements obeying my equation: i.e., on some complex conglomerate consequences of entities which themselves are built of solutions to that equation.

For conscious awareness appearing in humans I would agree. But for that consciousness which is necessary in order to have the mathematics necessary for your starting point, it does not logically follow.

Since it is easy to show that all of known physics arises from fundamental entities which can be defined as primary solutions to that equation...

Yes but be careful. Conscious experience has not been explained by known physics and quite possibly could exist outside of physical reality. (Of course you know that I think it does.)

I would have to come down on Metzinger's side: that the self arises from the same source.

If the self you are talking about is one claimed to be inside and part of a human body, I suppose you and Metzinger could be right. But if the Buddhists are right, and there is no self in that body, then my view of reality makes more sense and is more complete. Just my humble opinions.

It's fun talking with you, Dick,

Paul

 

[eggman]

Hello

I used to be deep into this consciousness stuff some time

ago...so I wish to add 2 cents.

1)The 'I' is generally First Person Singular Pronoun..

a verbal 'center' in which the swirl of speech revolves around.
(a talking organic computer)

2)'I' have no way to separate myself from consciousness to find out what it is...if 'it' were anything at all.

3)If I recall Knowledge is the Experience...one creates the other..
they are infinitely self referential..aka they go back and forth forever..
Consciousness like most words is a reference...it has no meaning in itself.

3a)If it did mean anything it would appear to be that 'Knowledge' and Consciousness are one and the same.

4)I did read about awareness once but it too seems to be 'knowledge' and logic simply in some sort of self-checking mode of mind...
Knowledge is aware of itself as it runs through the human brain.

5)If Consciousness were to be a 'thing' it like most things would have to be Organic therefore temporary

Thats all I have for now...just 2 cents

 

[selfAdjoint]

And I am skeptical. In order for you to know that, you must know what you mean by the term 'I', by the term 'am', and by the term 'conscious'. My skepticism comes from your use of the term 'I' without defining it. The term 'am' is a form of the verb 'to be' which is a synonym of the word 'exist'. So "to be conscious" IMHO means the same thing as "consciousness exists".

No I don't need to do all that. I know that I am conscious better than I know grammar or logic or mathematics, and have done since I was two. If you want to say awareness of being conscious is prior to all those things, which are prior to the definition game you want to play, feel free.

I am directly aware that I am conscious, but you I only have reports about.


And as for multiplying entities, AFICS you have no warrant for treating "consciousness" as a thing, so to assert that it exists is multiplying entities.

 

[octelcogopod]

Hi Dick,
If you agree with me so far, then it seems clear that "we" must know or believe something "we" can't necessarily explain in order to have mathematics at all. But then, who exactly is this "we"? It seems to me that the existence of some kind of entity which has the ability to know, to believe, and to think, is absolutely necessary in order to have mathematics. And if mathematics is somehow involved in, or a prerequisite for, the instantiation and operation of physicality, as it sure seems to be, then it seems inescapable that consciousness must precede physicality in the development of reality.

Starting with consciousness, you can get mathematics. And with mathematics, you can get Dick's theorem. And with Dick's theorem you can get the laws of physics. And with the laws of physics, some initial numbers, and some sort of processor (like a conscious mind) you can get phenomena that appear every bit as real as the rock Boswell kicked trying to refute Berkeley. It all seems to hang together and make sense to me.
For conscious awareness appearing in humans I would agree. But for that consciousness which is necessary in order to have the mathematics necessary for your starting point, it does not logically follow.
Yes but be careful. Conscious experience has not been explained by known physics and quite possibly could exist outside of physical reality. (Of course you know that I think it does.)
If the self you are talking about is one claimed to be inside and part of a human body, I suppose you and Metzinger could be right. But if the Buddhists are right, and there is no self in that body, then my view of reality makes more sense and is more complete. Just my humble opinions.

It's fun talking with you, Dick,

Paul

Thanks for a very detailed post.
I'm still a bit blurry on some issues though.
It seems to me that you are taking the easy way out, I mean, your theory doesn't bring us any closer to knowing what consciousness is.
You have explained the how but not the what, so to speak.

For instance you say consciousness is a separate thing outside of physical reality. Well jeez, I can't argue with that.
Your post makes perfect logical sense, but it doesn't really go into the specifics on how for instance the consciousness interacts with physical reality.
If something interacts with physical reality, it is automatically a part of physical reality, it's just a fundamental truth.
You can't just do a "guest visit" and then erase all traces, your presence will create "ripples in the ocean" that will spread to the far ends of the galaxy.

Also, an entity such as consciousness, for it to be "external" to physical reality, it would still need its own logical reality, for it to function in.
Anything that has any kind of form, shape, movement or change MUST have some kind of rule to how it works, and when something has a rule it is automatically defined and finite.

So imo saying that you start with consciousness still ends in infinite regress.
Where does consciousness come from?
How does consciousness work?
Why does it exist?
How could it exist?

And I don't think a satisfactory answer would be that it is fundamental and therefore those questions don't arise.

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi octelcogopod,

It seems to me that you are taking the easy way out, I mean, your theory doesn't bring us any closer to knowing what consciousness is.
You have explained the how but not the what, so to speak.

It might seem easy, but there are a lot of people who seem to be having a hard time accepting it. I think that once people start accepting the possibility, then some reasonable theories might start coming out.

As for what consciousness is, I think it is fundamentally the ability to know. This, to me, is the same sort of idea that energy is the ability to do work. Now energy comes in many different forms that at first seem to be quite different things. But science has now demonstrated that electric energy, gravitational potential energy, heat energy, nuclear energy, and even matter itself are all forms of energy, and they are comfortable in considering, quantifying, and measuring energy as it transforms from one form to another.

I think the same sort of thing might be worked out for the ability to know. We may know that something exists, how something happens, how to do some act, why some things occur, what something is, where something is, when something happened, what something is like, etc. These are all forms of knowing, and I would say that together they make up consciousness just as all the forms of energy make up the total energy.

It seems to me that knowing is the acquisition of information by consciousness. And I suspect that there might be some sort of conservation law or an extension to the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics that says something like knowledge never decreases. Since the law of conservation of mass had to be extended to become the conservation of energy, which included all forms of energy including mass, it seems to me like we might need to extend it once again to include information and knowledge. Those are only idle speculations, but they suggest that a theory of consciousness might bring us closer to an understanding of the deeper mysteries of the physical world. Who knows?

Your post makes perfect logical sense, but it doesn't really go into the specifics on how for instance the consciousness interacts with physical reality.

I have speculated on these specifics in other posts (and gotten into a little trouble for it). Basically I think consciousness interacts with physical reality in both directions.

In the direction of perception, where information from physical reality becomes known to consciousness, I say that the biological nervous system receives information from sense organs and then transmits it to consciousness somehow. Since consciousness is outside the physical universe, this transmission method must either be something we don't yet know about, or it is something we do know about but which also produces effects in the other "world" which can carry the information.

In the other direction, that of causing willful action in the physical world, I think the information triggering or directing the action presents itself in the physical world as quantum effects that are below the threshold of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. From the standpoint of our measurements, these effects look like they are random. But in a carefully constructed apparatus, like the setup for the Schroedinger's Cat experiment, or like a living brain, quantum effects that are below the HUP radar can be amplified to the point where they can cause intended macro effects. I think neurons with their microtubules can receive and amplify these signals and cause a cascade of physical effects eventually resulting in muscle action which in turn can result in bulldozer action which in turn can cause significant changes in the world.

Also, an entity such as consciousness, for it to be "external" to physical reality, it would still need its own logical reality, for it to function in.
Anything that has any kind of form, shape, movement or change MUST have some kind of rule to how it works, and when something has a rule it is automatically defined and finite.

I agree. I especially agree that consciousness, along with everything else in reality, is finite. Moreover, the rule you say MUST exist has been deduced by Dr. Dick. The rule says that any consistent explanation of what consciousness or reality might be doing must obey the laws of physics. That is its logical reality.

So imo saying that you start with consciousness still ends in infinite regress.

How so? I don't agree with that at all. If you start with a primordial consciousness which is extremely limited, maybe only knowing a single bit, and then that primordial consciousness evolves by imagining, experimenting, and learning, building virtual physical realities as it goes, it will at all times remain finite. There is no more infinite regress in that kind of development than there is in the evolutionary development of biological organisms here on earth. What infinite regress do you see?

Where does consciousness come from?

The rich consciousness that we experience as humans came from a long long evolutionary path beginning with the primordial consciousness long before the Big Bang, and culminating with what there is "now", whatever all that includes. But where did that primordial consciousness come from? That part of it remains a mystery and probably always will.

How does consciousness work?

I think it works within a structure described by Gregg Rosenberg in his "A Place for Consciousness". This is a hierarchical structure of what he calls "natural individuals". The characteristic of a natural individual is that it has at once a receptive principle and an effective principle. To me the receptive principle is the ability to know and the effective principle is the ability to cause effects. These are communication actions that flow among natural individuals both across the hierarchy and up and down the hierarchy. I think human (and other animal) brains are elements of the lowest level of this hierarchy of natural individuals. Unlike Rosenberg, however, I claim that no natural individual experiences consciousness except the one at the very top of the hierarchy. Each of the others presents an illusion to the one at the top making it seem that while the lower individual is active, it seems that consciousness inheres in it, when in fact it is only vicarious. If that's not clear, I apologize. It's the best I could do in one paragraph.

Why does it exist?

In the sense of "how come?" it is because it has always existed. In the sense of "what for?" it is to discover novel things to know and novel ways of knowing. Those are just my guesses.

How could it exist?

Good question. We only know that it does exist so there must be a way. Chris Langan has done a lot of thinking about how it could exist. You might want to check with him at http://ctmu.org/

And I don't think a satisfactory answer would be that it is fundamental and therefore those questions don't arise.

Me either.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

No I don't need to do all that. I know that I am conscious better than I know grammar or logic or mathematics, and have done since I was two. If you want to say awareness of being conscious is prior to all those things, which are prior to the definition game you want to play, feel free.

I am directly aware that I am conscious, but you I only have reports about.


And as for multiplying entities, AFICS you have no warrant for treating "consciousness" as a thing, so to assert that it exists is multiplying entities.

So you know you are conscious yet you say consciousness doesn't exist. Is there no such thing as consciousness? Should we expunge the word from our language? Would you agree to define 'consciousness' as the thing --- whoops! I mean that which you experience when you know you are conscious?

What is 'AFICS' and what is your definition of 'thing'?

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[moving finger]

First I must apologize, you said "accept the rational explanation" not "truth."

(I guessed that was the case, but didn’t want to presume, so asked the question)

so you do agree that qualia exists, but you do not have an explanatin for consciousness?

I believe qualia are “virtual” entities, just like the conscious self is a virtual entity. Neither qualia nor the conscious self “exist’ in the sense of having any kind of existence outside of the conscious processing which is creating these virtual entities.

There is in fact a very credible explanation for consciousness – consciousness is simply a particular form of information processing (by an agent) which produces (as part of that processing) the entities of virtual “qualia” and virtual “self”. This (imho) is all that consciousness is, and thus is an explanation for consciousness. The details are in Metzinger’s paper.

You say that conscious experience and detection are not the same.

Can you remind me where I say that?

Then you explain how the brain sees red in the consciousness, but we are no closer to knowing what consciousness IS.
What IS conscious experience?

Consciousness is simply a particular form of information processing (by an agent) which produces (as part of that processing) the entities of virtual “qualia” (the experience) and virtual “self” (the experiencer). This (imho) is all that consciousness is, and thus is an explanation for consciousness. The details are in Metzinger’s paper. What more is there to know?

It's quite a baffling post you made though, I never thought about it like this before.
I think your point is that a quale and conscious experience are not the same things.

I agree the notion I am trying to put forward may seem baffling at first, because it goes against deep-seated intuitions of “how the world works”. But human intuitions evolved to help humans survive in the macroscopic everyday world, they did not evolve to give humans accurate insights into the microscopic world, or the world inside the mind.

A “quale” is supposed to be an element of conscious experience – assuming that we can “reduce” consciousness and dissect it up. In the same way, the “self” is supposed to be the thing doing the experiencing.

The issue here is that one cannot have “an experience” in the absence of “something doing the experiencing”, and one cannot have “something experiencing” in the absence of “an experience”. The notion that we can dissect consciousness down and isolate the “quale” and the “self’ as separate entities is nonsensical, irrational. The reason why people (like Chalmers) try to do this separation is because we have a deep-seated intuition that all subjects and objects can be both logically and physically separated from each other (this is what we do all the time in everyday life for example). But this naïve intuition does not hold when we apply it to consciousness. The “conscious experience” is a whole, an irreducible entity, a unity, which cannot be physically separated into subject and object parts.

Would you care to elaborate a little bit or should I go read metzingers writings?

Reading Metzinger would give you some more insight.

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

Moving finger, a concept like “inside” or “outside” a box is a mental idea.

I agree it's an "idea". I'm not sure why you say it is necessarily a mental idea.

And a mental idea consists of sensations that are processed in the right way so that the idea (the concept) is presented to itself (or for those who believe in dualism, to homunculus). Either way, a concept is secondary, whilst the nature of sensations itself is the unexplained substance we seek to understand when we (at least some of us) speek of qualia.

I genuinely don't understand what it is that you think is left unexplained.

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

Our views seem to be equally magical (or rational) by these criteria.

The fundamental problem with your suggested solution is that, if you are suggesting that “consciousness gives rise to physicality”, you need to derive the exact reverse of Metzinger’s paper. Instead of constructing a plausible and rational mechanism which shows how we can start with the physical world and this gives rise to and explains everything we know empirically about consciousness, you instead need to construct a plausible and rational mechanism which shows how consciousness gives rise to and explains everything we know empirically about the physical world. Can you do this? If not, your notion is explanatorily very weak.

My X is an observed phenomenon, not new at all (we each experience consciousness beginning in childhood), and it is as directly observed as anything can be -- more directly, in fact, than anything physical can be observed.

I disagree. Your X is not observed in the scientific sense of objectively observed. Your X is “subjectively experienced”. A subjective experience for which we have a very rational objective physical explanation.

How does your assumption that the “subjective experience of consciousness is fundamental, and is the explanation for the physical world” actually explain the physical world? Where is the model?

My X is an integral part of at least my explanation of human conscious experience, which is the most in-your-face existing phenomenon there is.

It’s a purely subjective phenomenon.

I think my view is more parsimonious than yours since I posit nothing new; we know consciousness exists and we are pretty sure physicality exists.

You need to provide a coherent and rational model for how your subjective consciousness generates everything we know about the physical world. Without this model your notion is not an explanation.

Yours still needs the elusive X' and it brings along The Hard Problem of how consciousness can arise from physicality.

There is no Hard Problem – read Metzinger again.

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

for MF I have one question; what are your proposed ways of solving the hard problem?

I am often asked this, and my reply is always the same: What Hard Problem? The ideas elaborated by Metzinger explain how information processing gives rise to a virtual self as well as to virtual qualia. I don't see any problem unanswered. Perhaps you could explain just what you think the Hard Problem is?

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

Hi Paul

Your ideas are interesting, but for the most part (as you admit yourself) mainly speculative.

With respect, I think you should not be surprised that few people take your ideas seriously, unless and until such time as you can work out a rational, coherent and “explanatorily adequate” model based on these ideas. It seems that you’re a long way from this.

As for what consciousness is, I think it is fundamentally the ability to know.

If one accepts the definition that knowledge is “justified true belief”, then any agent with an ability to form beliefs about the world has an ability to possesses knowledge. This has nothing necessarily to do with consciousness (I can envisage a complex information processing machine which could form beliefs, ie speculative propositions which it deems to be true, about the world but without that machine necessarily possessing consciousness).

This, to me, is the same sort of idea that energy is the ability to do work. Now energy comes in many different forms that at first seem to be quite different things. But science has now demonstrated that electric energy, gravitational potential energy, heat energy, nuclear energy, and even matter itself are all forms of energy, and they are comfortable in considering, quantifying, and measuring energy as it transforms from one form to another.

Energy is simply a property of the physical world, just as mass and lengths are a proprties of the physical world. It does not exist in its own right (one cannot isolate a kilogram of pure energy). The intuition that “energy transforms from one form to another” is a misleading way to think of it – it’s like saying that “lengths transform from one form to another” when a piece of paper is folded up. All we do when we are measuring “energy” is we are measuring certain properties of the physical world.

I think the same sort of thing might be worked out for the ability to know. We may know that something exists, how something happens, how to do some act, why some things occur, what something is, where something is, when something happened, what something is like, etc. These are all forms of knowing, and I would say that together they make up consciousness just as all the forms of energy make up the total energy.

As pointed out above, a sufficiently complex non-conscious machine could claim to possesses this kind of knowledge. The conflation of knowledge with consciousness may seem naively intuitively correct (after all, I am conscious, and I know things – therefore the two must be intimately related, no?), but consciousness and knowledge are strictly (both scientifically and philosophically) quite different things. Intuitions are often misleading.

It seems to me that knowing is the acquisition of information by consciousness.

How do you arrive at this conclusion? Simply because you are conscious and you acquire knowledge? Are you saying therefore that a non-conscious agent cannot possesses knowledge?

And I suspect that there might be some sort of conservation law or an extension to the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics that says something like knowledge never decreases.

What possible empirical evidence or theoretical justification would one have for such an outrageous and irrational assertion (apart from mystical wishful thinking)? If one accepts the JTB definition of knowledge, then knowledge is in direct proportion to the number of agents with justified true beliefs. If the planet Earth were to be destroyed in a holocaust tomorrow, there would be a sudden drop in knowledge (at least in this part of the universe). The 2nd Law is based on sound, rational argument using both the theory of statistical mechanics and the obsservations of countless experiments. Please don’t sully the name of the 2nd Law by trying to associate it with some fantasy guesswork about the possible metaphysical properties of knowledge.

Those are only idle speculations, but they suggest that a theory of consciousness might bring us closer to an understanding of the deeper mysteries of the physical world.

I’m glad you say these are “idle speculations”. Don’t fool yourself into thinking that you have a coherent and rational theory which would rival the physicalist account unless and until you work these things out rigorously.

There is nothing wrong with idle speculation. Mankind has speculated idly, and wildly, about many things, such as angels pushing the planets around, but it is important not to confuse such idle speculation with rational, coherent models of how the world works. We can all make idle speculations, but (with all due respect) nobody intelligent should consider an idle speculation, unsupported by any proper coherent rational theory or empirical data, to be a serious rival for well-established models which are based on and supported by mountains of theory and data.

Since consciousness is outside the physical universe, this transmission method must either be something we don't yet know about, or it is something we do know about but which also produces effects in the other "world" which can carry the information.

More idle speculation? What evidence do you have for your assertion that “consciousness is outside the physical universe”? Your model offers no explanation for how this information is transmitted, it simply seems “magical”, please don’t try to suggest this is a rival for a physicalist account.

In the other direction, that of causing willful action in the physical world, I think the information triggering or directing the action presents itself in the physical world as quantum effects that are below the threshold of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. From the standpoint of our measurements, these effects look like they are random.

Quantum behaviour is in fact not random, it is (epistemically) stochastic. Are you suggesting that consciousness can directly interfere with or control this stochastic behaviour? In which case, in well controlled experiments, we should be able to observe this “conscious influence” on quantum behaviour? What mechanism do you propose for this mysterious influence, or perhaps it is magical again?

I think neurons with their microtubules can receive and amplify these signals and cause a cascade of physical effects eventually resulting in muscle action which in turn can result in bulldozer action which in turn can cause significant changes in the world.

You’ve been reading that misguided mathematician called Roger Penrose haven’t you
Let’s explore this speculation. In this magical influence upon the quantum realm, is your consciousness itself operating deterministically? In other words how does it decide what it wants to do – does it (a) choose quantum results quite randomly with no regard for “what it wants to happen”, or does it (b) make targetted and intentioned deterministic choices based on “what it wants to happen”? Which way would you prefer to jump, (a) or (b)?

Anything that has any kind of form, shape, movement or change MUST have some kind of rule to how it works, and when something has a rule it is automatically defined and finite.

I agree. I especially agree that consciousness, along with everything else in reality, is finite. Moreover, the rule you say MUST exist has been deduced by Dr. Dick. The rule says that any consistent explanation of what consciousness or reality might be doing must obey the laws of physics.

What comes first, the rule or the behaviour? Rules may be descriptive rather than prescriptive. By your own account, consciousness it seems can magically interfere with quantum stochastic behaviour, which would mean that the “rules” would in fact be made up as we go along? Or are you suggesting that consciousness follows rules as well?

If you start with a primordial consciousness which is extremely limited, maybe only knowing a single bit, and then that primordial consciousness evolves by imagining, experimenting, and learning, building virtual physical realities as it goes, it will at all times remain finite.

“Evolves”? How does it evolve, what is the mechanism for this evolution? Evolution by natural selection is based upon competition for finite resources which eliminates weaker or less competitive genes. What mechanism would you propsoe for your evolution of primordial consciousness?

The rich consciousness that we experience as humans came from a long long evolutionary path beginning with the primordial consciousness long before the Big Bang, and culminating with what there is "now", whatever all that includes.

So this “primordial consciousness” was around for 13 billion years before conscious human beings came on the scene? It also existed before the Big Bang?

In the sense of "what for?" it is to discover novel things to know and novel ways of knowing.

Are you suggesting a teleological reason for consciousness? That there is an ultimate “purpose” which this consciousness is working towards?

Best Regards

MF

 

[octelcogopod]

It was extremely insightful to say the least, and actually changed some of my fundamental thinking on the issue.

I just have one more question..
I will read metzingers paper after I have posted this question, so if I come back with my question answered I will edit my post.

So on to the question;
You use the words "virtual qualia" and "virtual self", so I'm interested in what exactly this virtual "thing" is..
The brain "engine" gives arise to the virtual self and qualia, right?
So how do we define this virtual qualia, how can we make a model for it, explain it, understand it, within the limits of the physical world?

Or can't we? (Within the limits of the physical world I mean)

I mean surely, if the universe is just one big amazing "blob" of energy, then where in this energy can we explore this virtual qualia?
Can we only explore it from within the virtual self?

 

[Doctordick]

Hi Paul,

I enjoy talking to you too. However, we do have some differences. The first seems to be the idea that "the only thing we know for sure, is that we know nothing for sure". Against this you make the comment, "We can know some things for sure, but we can't explain them." Actually, I don't think we are that far apart. Please note that the opening of my paper, http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm , I define C as, "What is known about A: i.e., our given known information." So I also begin with the assumption that something is "known" although, if you follow the deduction, you will discover that the results deduced are still valid even when C vanishes. But that is really immaterial here; I think the real issue is the definition of "knowing".

Moving finger has defined knowledge as “justified true belief” and I think I can live with that definition; however, even using that definition, there exist some issues which I don't think anyone here has approached. There are several things which can be done with a "justified true belief". First, one can attach a name to a "justified true belief". Does that imply it is not a "justified true belief" before the name was attached? Secondly, a "justified true belief" can be interpreted. Does that imply it is not a "justified true belief" before it has been interpreted? Or one could say, a "justified true belief" can be understood. Does that imply it is not a "justified true belief" before it has been understood? Moving finger, perhaps you can understand where I am going with this since a lot of your comments seem to show an interest in exact meaning. From my perspective, the only "justified true beliefs" consist of the fundamental data which needs to be explained. Without an explanation, the information, data or knowledge is completely meaningless! That is exactly why I treat it as an unknown and deal with it via the simple reference C. As soon as you presume you know something about it, you are lying to yourself.

Paul, you say you "start with knowing without being able to explain". Don't you think that the first step here is to decide what an explanation is going to be?

If you agree with me so far, then it seems clear that "we" must know or believe something "we" can't necessarily explain in order to have mathematics at all.

Yes, I agree with you one hundred percent; but you are mixing up a central issue here. All of us operate daily on millions upon millions of presumed facts that are, in fact, the tools of our thoughts. Out of these facts we build mental structures intended to explain our experiences. In particular, I have done so: i.e., "established a mental structure which explains our experiences". English (or any other human language) is a rather vague and sloppy structure when it comes to exact expression of ideas as there never has been any great effort to remove the interpretive inconsistencies from common language expressions. Mathematics, on the other hand, is a language developed by those who are intently interested in removing possibility of misinterpretation.

Saviormachine and I had somewhat of an extended discussion of why it is advantageous for human languages to be vague and imprecise. Some of you might find my opening post to saviormachine worth reading. It certainly bears on the value of expressing ideas in mathematics. Paul, what I am getting at here is the fact that you should criticize my approach for its dependence on mathematics is rather unjustified in view of the almost totally vague and imprecise representation of concepts in English. As I said, I am using it to communicate concepts and relationships from the perspective that I can depend upon misunderstanding (by a decent mathematician) to be almost nonexistent.

For conscious awareness appearing in humans I would agree. But for that consciousness which is necessary in order to have the mathematics necessary for your starting point, it does not logically follow.

Ah, but it does. A can be absolutely anything as no constraints whatsoever were placed on A, the elements of which provide the information which is known: i.e., C.

But what you have glossed over are the foundations of mathematics. I think Foundations play heavily in what we are discussing.

And you think the foundations of English are better understood than the foundations of mathematics? Besides, I am using it as a means of communication of relationships. I start with a single concept: the concept of an explanation. From there I show in detail how to deduce a universal constraint on any explanation. You keep calling it a proof; if that is the position you wish to take then you must understand that it is a proof that my fundamental equation is contained in the definition of an explanation. I agree with Feynman that mathematics is the distilled essence of logic and, if you want to throw out logic as a basis for these discussions, then we really have nothing to discuss.

Conscious experience has not been explained by known physics and quite possibly could exist outside of physical reality. (Of course you know that I think it does.)

So what? If it can be explained, that explanation can be interpreted in such a way that the fundamental elements of the explanation obey my equation. Since I have already shown that these fundamental elements obey the rules of "physical reality", it follows that the fundamental elements of your explanation obey the rules of "physical reality". "Quod erat demonstrandum!"

But if the Buddhists are right, and there is no self in that body, then my view of reality makes more sense and is more complete. Just my humble opinions.

The Buddhists seem incapable of explaining much; rather they seem to throw doubt on explanation itself. So I would not hold my breath waiting for the Buddhists to acquire dominance in the academies of rational thought. I note further that moving finger appears to ask for an explanation as the primary element of any proposition.

With respect, I think you should not be surprised that few people take your ideas seriously, unless and until such time as you can work out a rational, coherent and “explanatorily adequate” model based on these ideas. It seems that you’re a long way from this.

With regard to awareness and consciousness, there was an http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7567 published in "Science News" which talked about a rather strange phenomena observed in brain activity. What they discovered was that a picture of some recognized actress apparently caused a single cell in the brain to activate. The picture did not need be the same picture at all but the results rather seemed to indicate that it was the recognition of a particular person which was causing the activity. Perhaps there is a single cell up there which becomes active whenever you are conscious to let you know that whatever you are doing is a conscious activity. Could it be that simple?

Have fun – Dick

 

[Rade]

"the only thing we know for sure, is that we know nothing for sure"[/color][/b]. Can any of you give me a starting point consistent with that perspective?

Why ? It is a gibberish pronouncement--no need to give a starting point to gibberish since it has no point. The second part of the statement contradicts the first. If you know "no-thing", then it is impossible to "know one thing". Now, it seems you have provided a logical falsification of your "equation", since above you claim that your "equation" provides a starting point for this gibberish pronouncement, that is, your equation was derived to provide an explanation of gibberish. Not trying to be critical, just logical.

 

[octelcogopod]

Rade I think he meant that we can't know anything 100%, not that we can't know anything at all.

 

[moving finger]

You use the words "virtual qualia" and "virtual self", so I'm interested in what exactly this virtual "thing" is.

What is any “virtual” thing? A virtual entity is information only, it is not a physical object, but it may be interpreted from one perspective (from within the system that is creating the virtual object) as representing an object. But to the external world, it is information pure and simple.

The brain "engine" gives arise to the virtual self and qualia, right?

Correct. In the same way that a program running on a computer can generate virtual worlds populated by virtual objects within itself.

So how do we define this virtual qualia, how can we make a model for it, explain it, understand it, within the limits of the physical world?

Or can't we? (Within the limits of the physical world I mean)

I mean surely, if the universe is just one big amazing "blob" of energy, then where in this energy can we explore this virtual qualia?
Can we only explore it from within the virtual self?

If you mean "how can we explain or model qualia based on physical objects?" - in general we cannot, for the simple reason that qualia are virtual objects existing within an information processing system, they are not physical objects. The only direct access we have to them as "qualia" is from "within the system", because from outside of the system they don't look like anything at all (they look just like information).

Imagine we create a robot with visual colour receptors, linked to an image processing unit, a memory where it can store information about images it has previously processed, a developed sense of “conscious self” within it’s processing routines (so that it thinks it is an agent which is actually “looking” at images via it’s visual colour receptors), an ability to form subjective impressions based on the quality of images, and the ability to interpret and report on the images that it is processing. All of this is purely physical.

Now we ask the robot : “Please describe what your subjective perception of seeing the colour red “feels like” to you, please describe to us how we can explain or model these subjective perceptions of yours, using terms that we can relate to in the physical world.”

What do you think it would say?

Why should its answers be any different to a human answering the same questions?

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

Moving finger has defined knowledge as “justified true belief” and I think I can live with that definition; however, even using that definition, there exist some issues which I don't think anyone here has approached. There are several things which can be done with a "justified true belief". First, one can attach a name to a "justified true belief". Does that imply it is not a "justified true belief" before the name was attached? Secondly, a "justified true belief" can be interpreted. Does that imply it is not a "justified true belief" before it has been interpreted? Or one could say, a "justified true belief" can be understood. Does that imply it is not a "justified true belief" before it has been understood? Moving finger, perhaps you can understand where I am going with this since a lot of your comments seem to show an interest in exact meaning. From my perspective, the only "justified true beliefs" consist of the fundamental data which needs to be explained. Without an explanation, the information, data or knowledge is completely meaningless! That is exactly why I treat it as an unknown and deal with it via the simple reference C. As soon as you presume you know something about it, you are lying to yourself.

Interesting.

I think the argument hinges on propositions which may be interpreted as justified true beliefs (JTBs), whether this property “JTB” of the proposition is ontic or epistemic.

An expression or a proposition may be advanced, which one claims to be an example of a “justified true belief” (JTB). Whether we agree it is a JTB or not requires some prior interpretation and understanding of that proposition, before we can agree whether it is a JTB or not. After the interpretation and understanding, we may come to agree that it is a JTB. But if we agree that it is a JTB, then I would suggest that the proposition did not suddenly “become a JTB” at the moment of our individual interpretation or understanding, it was a JTB even prior to the interpretation we placed upon it or the understanding we made of it, in other words we discovered that it was a JTB rather than we created a JTB at the moment of our interpretation.

What, then, is it which creates a JTB? The background syntax/semantic system of language. A proposition cannot exist in absence of a language. Once that language exists, propositions can exist, and such propositions then either represent or do not represent JTB propositions according to the accepted rules of that language. An agent may not recognise a given proposition as a JTB until that agent has interpreted or understood that proposition from it’s own perspective, but the mere fact that an agent has not recognised that a particular proposition is a JTB does not imply that it is not a JTB.

Paul, you say you "start with knowing without being able to explain". Don't you think that the first step here is to decide what an explanation is going to be?

I think it depends on what one means here by “being able to explain”.
If we accept the JTB definition, it is not enough to simply believe something in order to claim knowledge, one must also have a justifiable belief. In other words, there need to be rational reasons to support that belief. I agree it need not be a fully-fledged explanation in terms of detailing all the underlying mechanisms etc, but it does need to be some kind of explanatory justification for holding the belief.

Conscious experience has not been explained by known physics

I do not agree with this. I think Metzinger’s paper is a very good explanation for conscious experience. What is it exactly that you think Metzinger’s approach leaves out?.

and quite possibly could exist outside of physical reality.

It is also quite possible that the planets are pushed around the sky by angels (nobody can prove this is not the case), but there is a perfectly rational alternative mechanistic explanation which makes the “angels” theory redundant. My point here is that if we have a mechanistic explanation which fits the facts, why posit additional unnecessary metaphysical entities or possibilities?

With regard to awareness and consciousness, there was an interesting article published in "Science News" which talked about a rather strange phenomena observed in brain activity. What they discovered was that a picture of some recognized actress apparently caused a single cell in the brain to activate. The picture did not need be the same picture at all but the results rather seemed to indicate that it was the recognition of a particular person which was causing the activity. Perhaps there is a single cell up there which becomes active whenever you are conscious to let you know that whatever you are doing is a conscious activity. Could it be that simple?

Descartes also postulated that there was a “centre of consciousness” in the brain, but I doubt that this would be evolutionarily advantageous. Nature seems to build in redundancy wherever it can, especially in the brain. Severe brain damage may impair many functions of the brain, but does not always result in loss of consciousness. If there were a single cell upon which all consciousness depended then it should be possible to destroy consciousness by destroying that one cell, leaving the rest of the brain intact. I’m not saying such a thing is impossible, I just think it unlikely in the extreme.

My money is on the idea that consciousness is a highly diffuse, distributed process which takes place over large regions of the brain simultaneously. This would fit with the observation that large parts of the brain can be lesioned but leave the individual still able to regain consciousness.

But the hypothesis that one single cell is responsible should be easily testable.

Best Regards

 

[Rade]

Originally Posted by Doctordick--"the only thing we know for sure, is that we know nothing for sure". Can any of you give me a starting point consistent with that perspective?

Rade I think he meant that we can't know anything 100%, not that we can't know anything at all.

OK, then the first part of the statement is a contradiction, for if we know "for sure" (e.g., 100 %) any "thing", then it is illogical to conclude that we know no "thing" for sure, since for sure a thing is known. Either way, the statement is gibberish, IMO.

 

[octelcogopod]

lol, yep, pretty much.

This statement is better imo:

The only thing we do not know for certain, is if we know anything for certain.

 

[Doctordick]

Why ? It is a gibberish pronouncement--no need to give a starting point to gibberish since it has no point. The second part of the statement contradicts the first. If you know "no-thing", then it is impossible to "know one thing".

You are missing the point that to "know" is a somewhat vague English term.

Or one could say, a "justified true belief" can be understood. Does that imply it is not a "justified true belief" before it has been understood?

Before it is understood it is gibberish isn't it? So it indeed does follow that my equation provides a starting point to explain gibberish doesn't it? If you hold one cannot start from gibberish, how did we get where we are? I know, God delivered the answer in the beginning; but, gee, how did god manage to understand what he was doing?

An expression or a proposition may be advanced, which one claims to be an example of a “justified true belief” (JTB). Whether we agree it is a JTB or not requires some prior interpretation and understanding of that proposition, before we can agree whether it is a JTB or not.

That is exactly why I treat it as an unknown. By handling (it in my logic) as an unknown, I place no constraints on it and thus avoid that very critical issue of agreement which is clearly impossible anyway. That is to say, actual specific agreement as to what is and what is not a JBT is not required to insure that my equation is valid. You might think about the equation for black body radiation as an example of how one can obtain constraints on relationships without actually knowing the details of the relationships. Internal consistency is a very unforgiving taskmaster.

What, then, is it which creates a JTB? The background syntax/semantic system of language. A proposition cannot exist in absence of a language.

As Rade pointed out above, the JTB is gibberish until it is understood so we had better figure out how to deal with it without knowing what it is.

Once that language exists, propositions can exist, and such propositions then either represent or do not represent JTB propositions according to the accepted rules of that language. An agent may not recognize a given proposition as a JTB until that agent has interpreted or understood that proposition from it’s own perspective, but the mere fact that an agent has not recognized that a particular proposition is a JTB does not imply that it is not a JTB.

Exactly! In the final analysis, nothing can be proved to be a JTB. That is exactly why my equation is the only way to attack the problem; the actual JTB (represented by my unknown set C) need never be recognized for my equation to be valid.

I think it depends on what one means here by “being able to explain”.
If we accept the JTB definition, it is not enough to simply believe something in order to claim knowledge, one must also have a justifiable belief. In other words, there need to be rational reasons to support that belief. I agree it need not be a fully-fledged explanation in terms of detailing all the underlying mechanisms etc, but it does need to be some kind of explanatory justification for holding the belief.

I think your attention is being deflected from the central point by an issue which simply cannot be solved as stated. You need, instead, to look directly at the "rational reasons to support that belief" and that is exactly what I lay out in my definition of "an explanation": the past events (as seen from the perspective of your explanation) must be consistent with what that explanation yielded as your expectations. If that constraint is satisfied, then you have rational reasons to support the belief that your explanation is correct[/color]: i.e., there are utterly no conflicts with what you think you know and you can do no better than that. That does not mean you won't change your mind in the future but it certainly supports your current beliefs.

I think Metzinger’s paper is a very good explanation for conscious experience.

I agree with moving finger; Metzinger's paper is the best analysis of the situation I have seen and it makes a lot of sense to me.

It is also quite possible that the planets are pushed around the sky by angels (nobody can prove this is not the case), but there is a perfectly rational alternative mechanistic explanation which makes the “angels” theory redundant. My point here is that if we have a mechanistic explanation which fits the facts, why posit additional unnecessary metaphysical entities or possibilities?

I think there is a bit more to be said here having to do with how one choses the best explanation. With which explanation are past events more consistent with what the explanations yield as your expectations? If "planets are pushed around the sky by angels" doesn't that yield some expectations we have never seen? Why couldn't the angels take a day off now and then? Essentially, you still have to explain why the angels choose the paths they do. It's essentially a pretty rotten and useless explanation.

I’m not saying such a thing is impossible, I just think it unlikely in the extreme.

Now you know I am not going to disagree with that (by the way, I have read a lot of your posts and find almost nothing to disagree with); however, I need to point out something which I noticed many many years ago. Control of the body seems to be very much organized around implementing body reactions originally designed (by evolution) for other purposes. For example control of voluntary muscles is not accomplished by direct signaling of the muscle cells themselves by the brain but is rather accomplished by signaling a small set whose contractions set up stresses in the main muscle which the muscle itself tries to eliminate. Looked at closer, these signals do not seem to arise directly in the brain but are instead reactive signals arising in the spine. The brain seems to trigger reactive effects normally dedicated to normal reflexes. What I am getting at is that the whole system seems to be one which essentially operates on it's own and is only tickled into doing what we want by otherwise meaningless signals. What I am getting at is the idea that conscious itself, the central node of conscious behavior, might be no more than a single cell reacting to the distributed memories and senses available in the brain.

This would fit with the observation that large parts of the brain can be lesioned but leave the individual still able to regain consciousness.

Isn't "regain" the critical issue there? Is it not possible for a second cell to take over the duties of the original "consciousness cell" with loss of the original? Why is it that, though our ability to think and reason often takes time when recovering from loss of consciousness, the actual feeling of being conscious or aware is always quite a definite abrupt occurrence with no seeming time lag.

But the hypothesis that one single cell is responsible should be easily testable.

Now that I don't see at all. It would involve finding the cell and talk about a needle in a hay stack! By the way, you ought to read an interesting article on the necessity of a brain.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[moving finger]

Is it not possible for a second cell to take over the duties of the original "consciousness cell" with loss of the original?

What “duties” are you suggesting here?
Are you suggesting that a single cell somehow contains something like the consciousness-equivalent of “élan vital”, such that the rest of the brain is just slavishly following instructions that are dreamed up and issued centrally by this single cell?

Why should it be necessary to have a single cell which is the ultimate origin of consciousness, if at the same time you are suggesting that this cell could easily be replaced by some other cell in the event that it is destroyed?

If consciousness is basically just a form of information processing, then such information processing will be distributed across large numbers of cells (you cannot process information with one single cell), and given this then I see no logical reason, either from an empirical or theoretical perspective, why we need posit that there is some central cell “in charge”.

It just doesn’t make sense to me, sorry.

Why is it that, though our ability to think and reason often takes time when recovering from loss of consciousness, the actual feeling of being conscious or aware is always quite a definite abrupt occurrence with no seeming time lag.

Is it? I’m not so sure.
There are times when I am just drifting off to sleep, or when I have a restless night (not too often fortunately) when I seem to slowly “drift in and out” of consciousness, when my awareness of my surroundings seems to be incomplete or patchy. Consciousness does not always (at least not with me) instantly switch on and off. The same is true for patients recovering from anesthesia, it can take some time before they are fully in grasp of their surroundings and faculties, before they are fully aware.

Explaining why our conscious reasoning faculties sometimes take longer to “get up to speed” than does consciousness is fairly easy. Conscious reasoning is a higher level function of brain activity than is consciousness; conscious reasoning is not possible in absence of consciousness but consciousness does not entail reasoning.

The “creation” of consciousness within the brain is an automatic, unconscious activity, consciousness is kick-started by the unconscious. But conscious reasoning is a consciously-driven activity which can be thought of as an emergent property of the conscious mind. Conscious reasoning is a particular form of directed consciousness; the process of conscious reasoning is a “meta-level” information process which overlays the more basic information processing of consciousness. The brain needs to get “consciousness” in place first before it can start on the more complex task of getting conscious reasoning working.

In addition, there may be very few “levels of consciousness” (either one is conscious or one is not, there is not much room for an “in-between” state), whereas the same is probably not true of conscious reasoning. Complex conscious reasoning can take place on many levels, the brain may be able to initiate very simple conscious reasoning processes fairly quickly on regaining consciousness, and it then builds up the channels of conscious reasoning to higher and higher levels of complexity over a period of tme. Thus conscious reasoning may be possible in “many shades of grey”, whereas consciousness is almost (but not quite) “black and white”.

Best Regards