Altriusm, a nice way to express your selfishness?

[JoeDawg]

We observed the act of self-sacrificing in many animals because the person or animal doing the self-sacrficing values the cause that institigated the self-sacrificing more so than they value their own life.

The act of putting the lives of others first, is altruism.

That person doing the self-sacrificing wants to see some sort of legacy

This is patently false you can observe inter-species acts of altruism even amongst lower forms of life that have no concept of 'legacy'. In fact you can observe acts of altruism directed towards nonliving things. Altruism is an instinct. Its not logical or rational.

You're committed to defending your selfishness at any cost... that's clear. And boring.

 

[JoeDawg]

Appeal to authority?

Yup.

That being that one person forces themselves upon another against their will. If you can find me a definition of rape that does not involve the intent of one individual to overwhelm the intent of another then do so.

Its called statutory rape. I mentioned this already.

And I am saying that you have not properly demonstrated the qualification of this definition which you assert.

And I'm saying that you are evading the whole issue by appealing to definitions which don't address what I have actually said.

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

Yup.

Its called statutory rape. I mentioned this already.

And I'm saying that you are evading the whole issue by appealing to definitions which don't address what I have actually said.

I suppose I forgot that I had used the qualifier "statutory" in my scenario instead of just plain "rape" and that I must have missed the part of the thread where you demonstrated that your definition resolved these issues of intent which I have been bringing up rather than simply dismissing them.

Good show man.

 

[JoeDawg]

I suppose I forgot that I had used the qualifier "statutory" in my scenario instead of just plain "rape"

The problem with your scenario is that it introduces problems... like legal definitions... which have nothing to do with the question at hand.

and that I must have missed the part of the thread where you demonstrated that your definition resolved these issues of intent

I've never resolved anything about intent. I said intent was not part of a basic understanding of altruism, and therefore it only complicates the issue.

Good show man.

Wish I could say the same, man.

 

[magpies]

Some times the thing that you think is just a complication of the equation is actually a vital part of it. :)

 

[noblegas]

The act of putting the lives of others first, is altruism.

If it is motivated by a self-interest that you value more than your life , that's up for debate . Certainly, you are not always in situations of seemingly acts of altruism when you self-sacrifice yourself while inadvertently or intentionally sacrificing the lives of others around you to carry out your cause. Self-sacrifice is not synonymous with altruism.

This is patently false you can observe inter-species acts of altruism even amongst lower forms of life that have no concept of 'legacy'. In fact you can observe acts of altruism directed towards nonliving things. Altruism is an instinct. Its not logical or rational.

If they absolutely have no concept of 'legacy' you would see mother wolves sacrificing themselves for baby chicks rather than their own pups , and vice versa. If they did not have any concept of legacy, then you would not see only observed this consistent pattern in nature where wolves are sacrificing themselves for their young rather than other non-related animals. The legacy doesn't have to be genetic, for you see soldiers dying for their country's government to see that the country's goals get accomplished ; Otherwise , there would be no reason for them to die if their country did not want them to fight for them.

 

[DanP]

A quick google search says different, man:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1999/02/99/e-cyclopedia/437789.stm

"The implication of the rule is that anyone who has sex with a girl under 13 is committing what is termed "statutory rape". There is no defence to this charge - even if a boy says the girl was willing or that he thought she was older than she was, it would not matter."

It doesn't say different. I think you are not understanding what the word "intention" mean. Everything you wrote here in this message has no link whatsoever with the concept of intention. Because you are linking an article which doesn't really discusses this concept, and you pretend it does.

Show me where that article discusses the concept of intention. Please do it.

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

The problem with your scenario is that it introduces problems... like legal definitions... which have nothing to do with the question at hand.

I think that it poses problems with your argument and so you wish to dismiss it. Legal definitions need not apply. Rape is not merely an act defined by its legality. Your objection is a strawman.

I've never resolved anything about intent. I said intent was not part of a basic understanding of altruism, and therefore it only complicates the issue.

The "basic understanding of altruism", which you can find in any dictionary, includes intent. Your version of altruism does not. You have yet to demonstrate that your definition eliminates the complications which you so disdain in any other way than by simply defining them out of the equation. Your definition is jargon particular to a field of science dealing with issues at a genomic scale where intent is not considered and you are applying it to a discussion of psychological and sociological issues where intent is a major concern. It is incumbent upon you to illustrate its virtue in resolving the conflicts that are at the root of discussion. Your argument thus far to any attempt at having you oblige us has been on par with placing your hands over your ears and shouting "LALALALA" or rather "ITS IRRELEVANT BECAUSE MY DEFINITION SAYS SO".

Wish I could say the same, man.

Yes, I am becoming a bit embarrassed that I keep responding to posts by someone who seems nothing more than a baiting troll.

 

[DaveC426913]

Yes, I am becoming a bit embarrassed that I keep responding to posts by someone who seems nothing more than a baiting troll.

Don't make that mistake. JoeDawg is a shrewd debater, blunt as he may sometimes be.

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

Don't make that mistake. JoeDawg is a shrewd debater, blunt as he may sometimes be.

Then he should be better than strawmen and flat dismissal of complications.

 

[apeiron]

.This is patently false you can observe inter-species acts of altruism even amongst lower forms of life that have no concept of 'legacy'.

What examples did you have in mind here?

 

[ThomasEdison]

I've been reluctant to include a scenario that am reminded of about intent and altruism because it mentioned two different religions so I didn't know if it would be blocked.

My wife used to work with a very strict Pakistani Muslim named M. Khan.
Khan once had this story about begging.

Khan and his coworker were walking to the entrance of a factory located in India. There were two beggars outside. Khan gave money to one beggar but not the other.
Khan's coworker said "Why did you give money to the Hindu but not the Muslim?"
Khan "Because I know these two. If I give money to a beggar then I own them. I would never do that to a fellow Muslim."

Was Khan being altruistic?

 

[kote]

This is an old debate in ethics. Selfishness is known as egoism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical_egoism). Many people have argued that altruism is an expression of egoism. Over 2300 years ago Plato (Socrates?) addressed this exact issue with Gyges' Ring. Socrates concludes that it is always in one's self-interest to behave justly (altruistically), despite the social consequences.

More recently, Nagel's "The Possibility of Altruism" influentially argues that altruism is egoistic.

Despite thousands of years of explicit academic debate, this one still doesn't have a general solution. Moral theory is tough like that.

 

[ThomasEdison]

I should read Nagel's paper.

Including animals really muddies up the debate for me.

On one hand I will defend earnestly that humans are animals, I never want to be in the camp that says humans are not animals; on the other hand I know there are some huge differences between humans and other animal species.

This murkiness is that I have not been reasonably convinced of how that difference is defined. I could say "humans are different because they know better" but I can't imagine trying to prove that.


So I will admit that mentioning spiders dieing for their babies backs me into a corner and perhaps I should have read closer into the OP about evolutionary altruism.

I hate to single humans out as being unique above other animals; I can't completely accept that they are the same either. I am unresolved so I don't have the strongest perch with which to enter this conversation. I could claim that animal morality derails the thread; but evolutionary altruism is the crux of the argument because it was mentioned in the OP.

I ignored the evolutionary altruism part and dove into this debate for what it appears that Kote said above:the argument that altruism is egoistic. On that debate alone then I take the side that it is egoistic... in people.

Bringing animals into this confuses me.

 

[kote]

One bit of warning about Nagel is that he did change his views since writing that in 1970 .

Including animals definitely stretches the debate to include aspects of free will and psychology. Ethics is tough because of the is-ought problem. No amount of psychology, biology, evolution etc can tell us anything about how we ought to behave. They only describe how we do behave.

I've given up on studying ethics for now because it is so shaky epistemologically. Maybe once I figure out free will I can feel confident getting back into ethics .

 

[apeiron]

Ethics is tough because of the is-ought problem. No amount of psychology, biology, evolution etc can tell us anything about how we ought to behave. They only describe how we do behave.

I would argue that science can tell us what is natural and therefore what a natural ethics would look like.

For example, if you felt that evolution is summed up as survival of the fittest, then that becomes your ground for judging.

And if you felt Darwinian selection is only a small part of the actual story of biology, and that also adaptedness is an equilibrium balance rather than a naked competition, you would come up with a different set of ethical outcomes.

Either way, views on what is natural - taken from science - would seem a proper grounding for ethical thinking. And then you just have to find a broad enough scientific view to be credible.

Perhaps I say this because I do see teleology and purpose in nature - the "ought", as well as the is.

The second law of thermodynamics would seem to be the great ought of nature - the prevailing "purpose".

Interestingly, taking the second law as the ground for ethics leads to a surprising result perhaps. The heat death of the universe seems its natural goal.

Life and mind certainly exist in the first place because they accelerate that death. The order of dissipative structure can arise because overall it produces more entropy or disorder faster than would otherwise happen.

So human wastefulness would be highly ethical - as altruistic as it is egotistical - in this light.

Anyway, so long as you agree that ethics ought to be based on natural systems rather than unnatural, or otherwise arbitrary or localised choices, then science should in principle offer a grounding for ethical philosophy.

 

[kote]

Perhaps I say this because I do see teleology and purpose in nature - the "ought", as well as the is.

...

Anyway, so long as you agree that ethics ought to be based on natural systems rather than unnatural, or otherwise arbitrary or localised choices, then science should in principle offer a grounding for ethical philosophy.

But is this viewpoint a scientific one? What evidence do we have that what nature appears to have as its purpose is what it should have as its purpose? I still see a required, unscientific, "leap of faith" here to bridge the is-ought gap.

As far as I can tell, ethics necessarily depends on a leap of faith. You can't get get from descriptive science to meaning and purpose without unscientific assumptions. I'm perfectly okay making a leap of faith, since it is necessary for our actions to have meaning or purpose. I do think that it makes ethics very difficult though.

I'm not a fan of completely naturalized or descriptive ethics, because without a conception of what should be that is separate from what is, there is no room for purpose, meaning, good or evil, etc. Unless all of my actions are completely meaningless and arbitrary, which may be the case, naturalized ethics doesn't cut it for me.

 

[apeiron]

But is this viewpoint a scientific one? What evidence do we have that what nature appears to have as its purpose is what it should have as its purpose? I still see a required, unscientific, "leap of faith" here to bridge the is-ought gap.

Fair point. But doesn't that become like cartesean doubt. Whatever scientific model seemed sufficiently final could still in principle be doubted as "not the whole story".

I think in practice it would be enough to show that it makes sense to speak about nature as having an "ought". The fact that it might concievably have other oughts could be a debate that followed.

The idea that nature even has an ought, rather than merely just is, would be contentious enough of course. But I think that argument can be made from a self-organising systems perspective where from many initial conditions, the same self-organised outcome is inevitable (the argument based on attractors and chaos theory).

I'm not a fan of completely naturalized or descriptive ethics, because without a conception of what should be that is separate from what is, there is no room for purpose, meaning, good or evil, etc.

Again, it is true that meaning has been removed from scientific descriptions by reductionist modelling approaches. Which is why I like Peircean-base semiotics approaches that are all about modelling the meaning within systems.

Yes, it could be said the modelling is still rudimentary. But if nothing else, considering the ethics of self-organised systems, or autopoietic systems, would give that branch of philosophy something new to talk about after all these years?

Actually, thinking about it, almost every systems scientist has tried to draw some kind of moral conclusion from their systems approach. Mostly of the save the planet, anti-technology, variety.

Check Erich Jantsch, Conrad Waddington, Gregory Bateson, Fritjof Capra...

Koestler too. And spiral dynamics, a trademarked approach to ethics!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spiral_dynamics

It is interesting that the dichotomy here is in the form of is~ought. Substance and form - the materials and the organisation - as usual. Or information (the local constructive stuff) vs meaning (the globally constraining context).

Information just is and meanings is about ought. The systems view is about how the materials and the organisations are actually not separated. Even if they are distinct as levels in the hierarchy, the system arises via their interaction.

Unless all of my actions are completely meaningless and arbitrary, which may be the case, naturalized ethics doesn't cut it for me.

I would argue that the problem lies with reductionist science which is based on excluding meaning from its discourse, leaving just the information. This was a powerful simplification tactic but left the job of modelling reality half complete.

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

I should read Nagel's paper.

Including animals really muddies up the debate for me.

On one hand I will defend earnestly that humans are animals, I never want to be in the camp that says humans are not animals; on the other hand I know there are some huge differences between humans and other animal species.

This murkiness is that I have not been reasonably convinced of how that difference is defined. I could say "humans are different because they know better" but I can't imagine trying to prove that.


So I will admit that mentioning spiders dieing for their babies backs me into a corner and perhaps I should have read closer into the OP about evolutionary altruism.

I hate to single humans out as being unique above other animals; I can't completely accept that they are the same either. I am unresolved so I don't have the strongest perch with which to enter this conversation. I could claim that animal morality derails the thread; but evolutionary altruism is the crux of the argument because it was mentioned in the OP.

I ignored the evolutionary altruism part and dove into this debate for what it appears that Kote said above:the argument that altruism is egoistic. On that debate alone then I take the side that it is egoistic... in people.

Bringing animals into this confuses me.

I think that the issues come in when we are muddying the waters with other than the standard definitions to which we are accustomed without any qualification of their aptness for the discussion and making assumptions about the capacities of animals.

It has been asserted that animals do not possesses the capacity for intent, that we can see altruism in animals and so intent is irrelevant to the issue of altruism.

At its base intentionality seems to be purposeful action. I believe that we can observe purposeful action among animals. The issue with intent among animals seems to arrive due to the human habit of rationalizing and justifying actions. We seem to connect intent with rationalization when we do not necessarily have any reason to. Without an observed capacity among most animals for rational contextualizing of its actions we rob it of simple intent. This does not seem to me a justifiable conclusion.

We can perhaps consider the existence of a simple intent among animals (and even among humans at times) devoid of rational contextualization. An intent without appeal to rationalization, justification, or contextualization that is simply action with purpose. This is only problematic if we believe that purpose is an illusion or product of rationalization, again something I think is not necessarily a justifiable conclusion.

Aside from intent the other issue I see is the perceived self. Most animals do not appear to be possessed of a perceived self and seeing as how we are discussing selfishness vs selflessness it would seem to be a primary issue of concern for the discussion of altruism perceived in animals. Without a perceived self the actions of animals would appear to be selfless by definition.

As Joedawg points out the issue of intent complicates things. Tying in rationalized context complicates things even further for rationalization influences intent and the whole issue snowballs. To me the notion of self appears to be the lynch pin in the tangled mess.

These are my opinions. I do not believe they are necessarily, or even likely, correct. And I am willing to discuss any reasonably argued complications or dissent regarding them.

 

[DanP]

Use the definitions I provided in a post above for the two kinds of evolutionary altruism, and you are out of trouble. Those are used in mainstream evolutionary psychology.

 

[JoeDawg]

If they absolutely have no concept of 'legacy' you would see mother wolves sacrificing themselves for baby chicks rather than their own pups , and vice versa.

That is your claim.
However, inter-species adoption does occur.
And it occurs because parental behavior is instinctive and instinct is not rational.

And other forms of altruistic behavior between species can also be observed:

http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKWEL1524120080313

If they did not have any concept of legacy

Animals sometimes eat their young, or let them die, for no apparent reason.
You are anthropomorphising.

 

[JoeDawg]

Show me where that article discusses the concept of intention. Please do it.

The article makes it clear, that it doesn't matter whether the male intended to sleep with "an underage female", even if he was unaware of her age, he is guilty of statutory rape. His intention doesn't matter, with regards to guilt.

The law is complicated, and the definition of 'rape' is both complicated and varies from place to place and time to time. One could write books on the subject. Introducing 'rape' into the discussion only confuses the issue.

But maybe that was your intention.

 

[JoeDawg]

Rape is not merely an act defined by its legality.

True, it can also be a metaphor... its still a bad example.

Your definition is jargon particular to a field of science dealing with issues at a genomic scale where intent is not considered and you are applying it to a discussion of psychological and sociological issues where intent is a major concern.

I don't see it that way. I see no problem with eliminating intent from the equation.
Maybe you can explain why its such a big problem?

"ITS IRRELEVANT BECAUSE MY DEFINITION SAYS SO".

Actually, I've explained that intention is not relevant, because altruism exists without it, on all levels of life. Its a survival mechanism, an instinct. Since intention is not a issue on this level, we can therefore talk about altruism, without talking about intention. YOU may also want to discuss what might be called 'altruistic intention', but I don't see value in it.

Yes, I am becoming a bit embarrassed that I keep responding to posts by someone who seems nothing more than a baiting troll.

That would be embarrassing.

 

[JoeDawg]

What examples did you have in mind here?

Interspecies adoption is the obvious one.

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

The article makes it clear, that it doesn't matter whether the male intended to sleep with "an underage female", even if he was unaware of her age, he is guilty of statutory rape. His intention doesn't matter, with regards to guilt.

The law is complicated, and the definition of 'rape' is both complicated and varies from place to place and time to time. One could write books on the subject. Introducing 'rape' into the discussion only confuses the issue.

But maybe that was your intention.

I introduced it to the discussion since it appears to me to be a thing most people will consider other than altruistic and which I believe is an action which involves intent as a part of its defining characteristics.

Rape is a word which we use to describe an event. The fact that definitions of the word have changed over time is irrelevant. Currently it serves to communicate a particular set of circumstances which is the point of the argument I was making. Concerns over legal definitions and previous definitions are a strawman, these are not things which we are discussing. If you sincerely believe that "rape" is a social construct without any relevant meaning to the discussion then you are shying from saying so and explaining why.

 

[JoeDawg]

Anyway, so long as you agree that ethics ought to be based on natural systems rather than unnatural, or otherwise arbitrary or localised choices, then science should in principle offer a grounding for ethical philosophy.

You can't derive an ought from an is...

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

Actually, I've explained that intention is not relevant, because altruism exists without it, on all levels of life. Its a survival mechanism, an instinct. Since intention is not a issue on this level, we can therefore talk about altruism, without talking about intention. YOU may also want to discuss what might be called 'altruistic intention', but I don't see value in it.

I have pointed out where I believe intention is relevant even to animals and where I think you are making an assumption that is not necessarily the case. You have not seen fit to address my arguments other than to dismiss them per your definition.

 

[JoeDawg]

Rape is a word which we use to describe an event.

But it really doesn't. Rape describes an assessement of an event. Rape is both a legally and an ethically loaded term.

Concerns over legal definitions and previous definitions are a strawman, these are not things which we are discussing.

What constitutes rape varies quite widely. My objection to it as an example is perfectly reasonable.

If you sincerely believe that "rape" is a social construct without any relevant meaning to the discussion then you are shying from saying so and explaining why.

I never said anything like that. But thanks for putting words in my mouth.
Strawmen, indeed.

 

[DanP]

The article makes it clear, that it doesn't matter whether the male intended to sleep with "an underage female", even if he was unaware of her age, he is guilty of statutory rape. His intention doesn't matter, with regards to guilt.

The crime punished by statutory rape laws is "having sexual contact with a underage minor".
How could you sleep with somebody and have no intention to sleep with that particular somebody at the same time?
You can argue that you didn't had the intention to *rape*. This doesn't matter, because it;s not rape which is punished by statutory rape laws. It's having sexual relations with a person under the age of consent.

 

[noblegas]

What constitutes rape varies quite widely. My objection to it as an example is perfectly reasonable.

saying what constitutes as rape varies from society to society is just like saying that what constitute as murder varies from society to society. There may be societies that don't see it as a major social consequence, but the act is essentially the same in all cultures, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable or not socially acceptable or socially permissible .

 

[JoeDawg]

The crime punished by statutory rape laws is "having sexual contact with a underage minor".
How could you sleep with somebody and have no intention to sleep with somebody at the same time?

You can argue that you didn't had the intention to *rape*. This doesn't matter, because it;s not rape which is punished by statutory rape laws. It's having sexual relations with a person under the age of consent.

So statutory rape isn't rape?
If you say so.

Which is why using rape as an example is a bad idea. Thanks.

 

[JoeDawg]

saying what constitutes as rape varies from society to society is just like saying that what constitute as murder varies from society to society. There may be societies that don't see it as a major social consequence, but the act is essentially the same in all cultures, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable or not socially acceptable or socially permissible .

And 'murder' would be another bad example to use.

Murder doesn't describe an act, it describes the valuation of an act.

That is why its a problem.

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

But it really doesn't. Rape describes an assessement of an event. Rape is both a legally and an ethically loaded term.

I have not made any appeals to legal definitions, you have. Ethically I see where it can be construed as an appeal to emotion but I have yet to attack your argument based on any sort of ethical disgust and you have no reason to believe that I will. Other than that I see no reason for your objection.

What constitutes rape varies quite widely. My objection to it as an example is perfectly reasonable.

I am fairly certain that you and I can likely come to an understanding of the common definition in the modern western world. Based on this there does not seem to be any reasonable objection.

I never said anything like that. But thanks for putting words in my mouth.
Strawmen, indeed.

And I never said you did. I am only guessing at your objections since you have done little other than throw up strawmen.

 

[DanP]

So statutory rape isn't rape?
If you say so.

Which is why using rape as an example is a bad idea. Thanks.

Look in your criminal code. See if the definitions of statutory rape and rape are identical.

My question for you would be if you still maintain that you can be guilty of statutory rape and lack intent to sleep with a underage minor. Or for that matter, if you can still sleep with anyone and lack intent to doit.

 

[JoeDawg]

Look in your criminal code.

See... I saw this one coming a mile away... as soon as 'rape' was brought up as an example...this was inevitable.

What were we talking about again?

 

[DanP]

What were we talking about again?

I was asking you if you think you can sleep with somebody and have no intent to sleep with that particular somebody at the same time.

 

[JoeDawg]

I was asking you if you think you can sleep with somebody and have no intent to sleep with that particular somebody at the same time.

Ask a stupid question...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sexomnia

 

[DanP]

Ask a stupid question...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sexomnia

After how many stupid answers you gave, a stupid question won't hurt :P

You do realize that assaulting an underage in such a situation constitutes rape and not statuary rape.

You also do realize that using a defense based on psychopathology , if successful, waves you of responsibility, and one of the basis for this is because mens rea is not present ?

 

[apeiron]

Interspecies adoption is the obvious one.

What, like cuckoos you mean? The examples you are thinking of would be mistaken behaviours and not altruistic in the biological sense. And where interspecies adoption is a persistent behaviour, as with cuckoos, it is called parasitism not altruism for obvious reasons.

And if you really think that good Moko "led" the whales to safety, then perhaps you also think bad Moko trapped a female swimmer off shore so she was in danger of drowning.

Not much "obvious" in these examples.

 

[JoeDawg]

You do realize that assaulting an underage in such a situation constitutes rape and not statuary rape.

I'm sure a legal case could be made for it being both, but that wasn't your question.

You also do realize that using a defense based on psychopathology , if successful, waves you of responsibility, and one of the basis for this is because mens rea is not present ?

It might, depending on the system of law where you live. But so what?

 

[JoeDawg]

What, like cuckoos you mean?

I'm not going to resort to namecalling, but I'm sure you might have a pet.

How bout http://psychology.uga.edu/primate/pub/Izar%20et%20al%20adoption%20AJP%2068,%20692%20-%20700%202006.pdf"

The examples you are thinking of would be mistaken behaviours

Not cuckoo then, but psychic.

And if you really think that good Moko "led" the whales to safety, then perhaps you also think bad Moko trapped a female swimmer off shore so she was in danger of drowning.

I'm not even sure what you mean by this.

 

[apeiron]

You can't derive an ought from an is...

Why not? Of course I know the old Humean arguments. But I was arguing a not uncommon counterview.

A self-organising system would indeed be prescriptive at the level of global constraint - even if dichotomistically, it was descriptive at the level of local constructive action, or material stuff.

Reductionist think everything just "is". There is no meaning in reality. A systems thinker would expect things to be the way they are because that was the way they had to be for some reason, some purpose.

Of course you need other bits of the systems toolkit to get how this works, like vagueness.

 

[JoeDawg]

Reductionist think everything just "is". There is no meaning in reality. A systems thinker would expect things to be the way they are because that was the way they had to be for some reason, some purpose.

If that is true, then everything that 'is', has a purpose.
Which means if it exists, it should exist.

Serial killers, mass murderers, pedophiles, rapists, and people who kick puppies all exist as part of the system for a purpose.

And yeah, Hume.

 

[apeiron]

I'm not going to resort to namecalling, but I'm sure you might have a pet.

Er, I'm human and having pets is hardly an act of altruism. So not seeing how this is relevant.

How bout http://psychology.uga.edu/primate/pub/Izar%20et%20al%20adoption%20AJP%2068,%20692%20-%20700%202006.pdf"

But this is still a biological case of mistaken identity. You could call it altruistic, but from a science point of view, it would be a contentless statement. It would no explain why it happened. Whereas a misdirected maternal instinct explains it very well.

And why would I favour an unhelpful useage over a helpful one?

Not cuckoo then, but psychic.

Meaning?

I'm not even sure what you mean by this.

Perhaps you don't know of the incident? I'm simply suggesting that if you impute disinterested concern in the one case, then it would seem you would have to impute selfish malice to the other.

 

[apeiron]

If that is true, then everything that 'is', has a purpose.
Which means if it exists, it should exist.

Serial killers, mass murderers, pedophiles, rapists, and people who kick puppies all exist as part of the system for a purpose.

And yeah, Hume.

All these examples are local particulars - they indeed would exist at the level of "is". The ought would lie in the global constraints. It is trying to collapse the two scales implied by a dichotomy that is the reductionist fallacy. And you continue to commit it.

Referring back to my earlier posts in this thread, the local level would be "competition" and the global level would be "co-operation". All the examples you cite above would be local pathologies - out of equilbrium reactions. Insufficiently constrained - for the purposes of the greater system. Which is why there are laws and prisons.

Everything that is, ought to be in harmony with the purpose enshrined in the whole.

 

[JoeDawg]

The ought would lie in the global constraints.

Yeah, just about everyone has some claim to knowing what those are.
I'm thinking one has to know the purpose of the system as a whole, first, though.
And just so, even a cancer cell has its own purpose, and its own part to play.

Referring back to my earlier posts in this thread, the local level would be "competition" and the global level would be "co-operation".

Eastern philosophy tends to view those two things as indistingishable, mainly because the balance of nature is maintained by competing forces. Of course that assumes an eternally static universe, which we don't appear to have, and life itself is a bit of an aberration.

I don't buy the teleology, I don't think you can translate the 'global contraints' of the universe into human everyday life. Its like saying that certain atoms should act a certain way, because they belong to a baseball. Equilibrium includes a wide range of atomic level behaviors.

Which is why there are laws and prisons.

Nature required no such thing for millions of years. If anything, we are an aberration, within an aberration. A system where the law of the jungle is the global constraint, within a system where inanimate matter and empty space are the universal contraint.

Civilization is out of harmony with the jungle, but its where I prefer to live.

 

[apeiron]

Yeah, just about everyone has some claim to knowing what those are.
I'm thinking one has to know the purpose of the system as a whole, first, though.
And just so, even a cancer cell has its own purpose, and its own part to play.

Eastern philosophy tends to view those two things as indistingishable, mainly because the balance of nature is maintained by competing forces. Of course that assumes an eternally static universe, which we don't appear to have, and life itself is a bit of an aberration.

I don't buy the teleology, I don't think you can translate the 'global contraints' of the universe into human everyday life. Its like saying that certain atoms should act a certain way, because they belong to a baseball. Equilibrium includes a wide range of atomic level behaviors.

Nature required no such thing for millions of years. If anything, we are an aberration, within an aberration. A system where the law of the jungle is the global constraint, within a system where inanimate matter and empty space are the universal contraint.

Civilization is out of harmony with the jungle, but its where I prefer to live.

This is such a mish mash of statements it is not worth trying to disentangle them.

But anyway, cancer cells are another of your examples of local out-of-equilbrium behaviour which prove my general point (and I refer youback to apoptosis).

Dichotomies are defined by their absolute differentiation.

Equilbrium is a dynamic concept and does not presume a static universe.

The system view of particles would indeed see them as local features like solitons.

And I think you are being rather hard on yourself if you believe are an aberration. But it was indeed my earlier suggestion that the heat death as the purpose of the second law is indeed (arguably) the broadest sense of what we would deem to be ethically natural.

 

[JoeDawg]

This is such a mish mash of statements it is not worth trying to disentangle them.

Thank you.

But anyway, cancer cells are another of your examples of local out-of-equilbrium behaviour which prove my general point (and I refer youback to apoptosis).

Well yes, I realize that, but at the other end, it all depends on what you define the system as... the scope of your field of view:

Cancer is the bigbang in a multiverse, so the entire visible universe is 'out of equilibrium'.
And I don't make this up, symmetry breaking is a recognized part of our universe: matter/anti-matter etc..

We aren't the cancer, the universe is. Maybe?

Or, imagine the universe as a fractal system with bends within bends, and curves within curves, the shape dependent only on field of view and magnification.

Who knows.

Dichotomies are defined by their absolute differentiation.

Yeah, but absolutes are rubbish.

Is the universe static?
Well, if we think of time as a dimension, then the arrow of time is an illusion, and nothing really 'changes'. The universe doesn't 'begin' and 'end', so much as it has a front and back.

Is the universe dynamic?
The past is gone, and the future doesn't exist yet.
Time is change.

Or, maybe, static and dynamic are just two different ways of looking at the same universe, it is neither, and it is both. Dichotomies are merely artificial frames of reference.

Equilbrium is a dynamic concept and does not presume a static universe.

One could have equilibrium in a static universe. A static universe is just one that is not expanding or contracting. And if a multiverse exists... then it essentially is the 'real' universe.

The system view of particles would indeed see them as local features like solitons.

That at least is interesting. Have to look into that.

And I think you are being rather hard on yourself if you believe are an aberration. But it was indeed my earlier suggestion that the heat death as the purpose of the second law is indeed (arguably) the broadest sense of what we would deem to be ethically natural.

Hard on myself? Not at all. I rather like the idea.
Our very existense defiles the universe.

Of course, if the universe is indeed a cancer, then we are doomed to defeat, by an unstoppable evil... but is there not some nobility in that?
Think happy thoughts.

 

[JoeDawg]

I have not made any appeals to legal definitions

I don't see it as avoidable.

I am fairly certain that you and I can likely come to an understanding of the common definition in the modern western world.

'Rape' is not an action, per se. It already has a value attached to it.
If we are going to talk about the nature of an action, this is a bad place to start.

And I never said you did. I am only guessing at your objections since you have done little other than throw up strawmen.

Another bad place to start.

 

[apeiron]

so the entire visible universe is 'out of equilibrium'.
And I don't make this up, symmetry breaking is a recognized part of our universe: matter/anti-matter etc..

Yes, the universe arises out of symmetry breaking, but if its local and global sources of action are integrating evenly (even as they also differentiate) then is is an equilibrium state that is being achieved.

The difference between the two states is easy to recognise. A symmetry breaking which maintains an equilbrium rate of development shows powerlaw behaviour - log/log, as both its aspects show geometric growth, giving it overall a geometric mean.

Out of equilbrium in your example of cancer is where one aspect grows too fast, exponentially - log/normal.

Yeah, but absolutes are rubbish.

As an absolutist statement, this is indeed rubbish.

I've explained this before, you will recall. Models are crisp formal statements - absolutes. But reality develops out of vague potential towards these absolutes without ever actually achieving them. The boundary states - like perfect continuity, or perfect discreteness - are good descriptors but not actual achieved states of reality. As we know from QM.

Or, maybe, static and dynamic are just two different ways of looking at the same universe, it is neither, and it is both. Dichotomies are merely artificial frames of reference.

Correct, dichotomies are the general modelling concept in metaphysics. All philosophy's concepts arose as dichotomies. But they arose because they do seem to say true things about the limits that shape reality.

Stasis~flux is one of those classic dichotomies. And the modern idea of a thermodynamic equilbrium - where change is also no change - is a way of resolving the ancient dilemma over which category is primary.

One could have equilibrium in a static universe. A static universe is just one that is not expanding or contracting. And if a multiverse exists... then it essentially is the 'real' universe.

No, a purely static universe seems impossible from the laws of physics. And by extrapolation, it seems safe to argue a multiverse would also have to be a stasis~flux equlibrium structure. But that would be OK if the multiverse is really just our universe at a vaguer state of development.

Hard on myself? Not at all. I rather like the idea.
Our very existense defiles the universe.

Of course, if the universe is indeed a cancer, then we are doomed to defeat, by an unstoppable evil... but is there not some nobility in that?
Think happy thoughts.

Good and evil - the subtext of this thread - do not make a good dichotomy. This is why there is so much confusion around them. A good dichotomy makes the necessary local~global division in scale visible.

There are two kinds of symmetry breaking - the same scale kind of left/right, for example. But the natural one, the developmental one, is the scale invariant kind. Fractals for example. Static and dynamic in equal measure because it exists everywhere and never ends.