ParticleGrl said:
How do you define efficiency of healthcare delivery? I would argue that in the context we are discussing, the administrative costs are a good measure.
Even if I took that argument as given (which I don't, for obvious reasons administrative costs are a poor measure of efficiency of anything other than
administration, including by definition efficiency of healthcare delivery), it is not true that administrative costs are lower in Medicare than in the private sector. Quite the opposite; they are substantially higher.
For the case of medicare, the remaining money is spent mostly on medical bills, obviously. For private insurance, the rest of the money won't be spent on medical bills, some of it is profit. It is obviously unfair to count profit as inefficiency.
This is silly. Forget for a moment than profit margins for private health insurance companies are tiny; what, pray tell, do you imagine profit is? It seems to me that the uneducated imagine "profit" to be some sort of wasteful, unnecesarry corporate overhead largesse thrown fruitlessly at fat cats, and that in its absence everybody could work much more efficiently.
Of course, in real life, profit is nothing more than
payment for capital. Do even the tiniest bit of reasoning, and you'll realize that non-profits (charities and government offices) have capital costs that must be paid. Yes, they don't attract capital by investment; in the case of Medicare, it is borrowed or seized. In either case, there are costs. If seized by tax, we can look at the opportunity costs of the foregone alternatives. But the far more interesting case, in this context, is what happens when the government borrows.
In the private sector, we call debt servicing a capital cost, and build it into the health insurance industries administrative costs. Medicare does not internalize payments on government debt when accounting for its own costs, however. According to one source I found, if it did, administrative costs immediately rise 7 points to 10% of total cost:
First, Medicare's "capital costs" are not included in government estimates of Medicare spending. Here is a simplistic, but revealing example: federal net interest payments to the public -- the government's overall capital cost -- totaled $160 billion in fiscal year 2004. In that year, Medicare benefits (net of premiums collected from beneficiaries) comprised about 12 percent of federal non-interest spending. Therefore, Medicare's share of the government's debt-service costs could be estimated at about $19 billion in 2004. Adding these payments alone would boost Medicare's administrative cost rate by almost 7 percentage points, to just under 10 percent.
http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/Administrative_Costs_030705.pdf
Note also that profits are usually internalized as well in studies of industry costs, such that the data usually reads "Administrative costs and profits".
Per patient administrative costs is obviously not a good metric. If I insure a pool of 22 year olds who makes no claims in an average year, my administrative cost can approach 0. The per CLAIM administrative cost would be a better number, but we can't get it from the CBO data above.
No, they can't, as explained above. A significant portion of overall administrative costs are consumed by activities other than paying claims.
BUT, what we can do is directly compare medicare advantage plans (through private companies) to the similar pool of medicare. Now we have the same demographics, I hope you would agree? What do we find- between 3 and 4% administrative costs for medicare, and about 11% for the private medicare advantage plans. Comparing these similar demographics, we find private companies spend more in administration per patient of the same demographic.
No, we don't. Normalize the comparison by excluding costs incurred only by the private sector, and incurring public sector capital costs, and you'll find the Medicare is significantly more expensive than private plans, assuming your initial numbers are accurate.
Of course the perfectly inelastic case doesn't exist. Generally, anything between 0 and -1 is considered inelastic. I would say -0.2 is extremely inelastic.
Er, no, it is not. It is considered
relatively inelastic, as in,
relative to everything greater than 1. Independently, you can't make any kind of value judgments - you can only say that it is
elastic by definition.
Yes, eggs are famously inelastic. Largely because they are among the cheapest proteins, so there are no close substitutes, to follow the econ 101 logic (although I don't know an actual study of their inelasticity, could you provide one?) . Of course, if the price of eggs jumped above the price of chicken or beef, elasticity would set in. With health care, what do you think can explain the inelasticity? Is there a price where health care becomes more elastic? Given that it is obviously a necessity, with no substitutes, might the relative elasticity be due to people who are priced out of the market all together?
Eggs are a famous case, but there are innumerable goods and services with transaction point price elasticities between 0 and 0.2, approaching infinity. It is impossible and pointless to try and track them all; it varies by consumer, market, good, time, etcetera.
Eggs are famous only because they are useful to make a point - point price elasticity tells us very little about aggregate behavior over significant terms, does not imply that prices can or will rise to infinity, does not imply any kind of market failure or necesitate corrective action, and that there is no "magic number" at which we have acceptable and unacceptable price response behaviors.
Yes, all rational participants in the health care market invest the resources to get the MD required to understand the best course of action, and successfully negotiate with their provider and insurance company.
Is this serious, or satire? Is it really your claim that I need an advanced degree in architecture before I can choose a home? Real estate before I can buy it? Agriculture before I can shop for produce? Engineering before I can buy a car? Automotive mechanics before I can hire someone to repair it? Law before I can pick an attorney or make informed legal decisions?
Should I continue?
Right, but the routing is done by the ambulance, not the patient, on the basis of medical reasoning, not patient choice. If you call 911, you are going to where the ambulance takes you, whether or not they are in your provider network, or take whatever payment you have on you, etc. The choice is whether or not to call 911.
That's not the point; choices are made at some point by consumers to effectively maximize their utility. In a strategic game (defined as a game with more than one player - in this case, patients and ambulance drivers) it is elementary that the players' welfare can be increased by restricting their decisions. We call this the value of commitment.
In this case, patients choose to limit their choice of destination in an emergency ahead of time, and to let ambulance drivers know. This informs the decisions of ambulance drivers, and increases the payoff at the end of the game for everyone.
But this is all distraction: the point is, there exists strategic decision making, or "choices".