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I guess that, in a nutshell, is the measurement problem.Stephen Tashi said:If that is the case then how is it that natural processes cause wave function collapses?
I guess that, in a nutshell, is the measurement problem.Stephen Tashi said:If that is the case then how is it that natural processes cause wave function collapses?
Stephen Tashi said:On the one hand, the argument has been made that consciousness is not necessary for causing wave function collapse because natural processes not involving conscious beings cause collapses.
On the other hand you seem to say that a natural process cannot be simulated as a sequence of wave function collapses.
Being mathematically inclined, I'm curious about how such a claim ("cannot be simulated" - in any manner whatsoever) would be stated as a theorem.PeterDonis said:No. Only some natural processes--the ones that do not involve decoherence--cannot be simulated as a sequence of wave function collapses.
The orbit of the Moon is a natural process, and can be simulated just fine with a classical model, which is equivalent to a continuous infinity of wave function collapses.
Stephen Tashi said:I'm curious about how such a claim ("cannot be simulated" - in any manner whatsoever) would be stated as a theorem.
Stephen Tashi said:Is there no way to simulate non-decoherent processes as stochastic realization of a continuous infinity of wave function collapses?
Stephen Tashi said:For example Brownian motion is such a model.
rasp said:Summary:: I am reading a book which quotes from Wigner “Remarks on the Mind-Body Question”. Would appreciate someone’s comment on them.
Reading book, “God? Very Probable”. The author quotes Wigners comments in his book, “Remarks on the Mind- Body Question” 169, 171, 173. “The very study of the external world led to the conclusion that the content of consciousness is an ultimate reality. Given the ultimate priority of consciousness, the quantum physics understanding of reality leads to an intellectual outcome where “solipsism may be logically consistent” with the current state of scientific thinking in physics but it is beyond doubt that “monism in the sense of scientific materialism is not” compatible with contemporary physics.
The author, Robert Nelson, then goes on to quote a similar conclusion from Wheeler in “At Home in the Universe” , 181.
I ask, how do these ideas stand in today’s Theories of quantum mechanics?
PeterDonis said:I don't think you can get the prediction that the Moon behaves classically without applying the "collapse" postulate of QM to the Moon even when no one is looking at it.
For example: "The mental Universe" by Richard Conn Henry, Nature, volume 436, 29 (2005)rasp said:Summary:: I am reading a book which quotes from Wigner “Remarks on the Mind-Body Question”. Would appreciate someone’s comment on them.
I ask, how do these ideas stand in today’s Theories of quantum mechanics?
atyy said:is the difference in our views that I wouldn't mind using "measurement", "observer", "conscious observer" in a related way with regards to the quantum formalism, but you would?
The Founders of QM saw a connection to consciousness.
@f95tolif95toli said:It is important to realize that what the founder thought about QM is -quite generally- essentially irrelevant.
allisrelative said:The Founders of QM saw a connection to consciousness.
edmund cavendish said:Extract from the above
edmund cavendish said:In the early stages of this discussion Sir Roger Penrose's name was mentioned. Given his views on the relationship between QM and the origins of consciousness it seemed that they deserved a bit more of an airing hence the link and extract from the article below. I personally feel that a lot of the language about the "observer" is also tied up with issues around Free will and Determinism, explaining why some are uneasy with the idea of a universal system observation as distinct from a chosen act..to open the lid of the box or not. Penrose also writes/talks extensively about the non computability of consciousness, referencing Godel and it seems likely that the AI debate may also add to this current discussion, which I have enjoyed reading.
http://nautil.us/issue/47/consciousness/roger-penrose-on-why-consciousness-does-not-computeExtract from the above.
"Penrose’s theory promises a deeper level of explanation. He starts with the premise that consciousness is not computational, and it’s beyond anything that neuroscience, biology, or physics can now explain. “We need a major revolution in our understanding of the physical world in order to accommodate consciousness,” Penrose told me in a recent interview. “The most likely place, if we’re not going to go outside physics altogether, is in this big unknown—namely, making sense of quantum mechanics.”
He draws on the basic properties of quantum computing, in which bits (qubits) of information can be in multiple states—for instance, in the “on” or “off” position—at the same time. These quantum states exist simultaneously—the “superposition”—before coalescing into a single, almost instantaneous, calculation. Quantum coherence occurs when a huge number of things—say, a whole system of electrons—act together in one quantum state."
In a previous paper (gr-qc/9907063) we described the early inflationary universe in terms of quantum information. In this paper, we analize those results in more detail, and we stress the fact that, during inflation, the universe can be described as a superposed state of quantum registers. The self-reduction of the superposed quantum state is consistent with the Penrose's Objective Reduction (OR) model. The quantum gravity threshold is reached at the end of inflation, and corresponds to a superposed state of 10^9 quantum registers. This is also the number of superposed tubulins-qubits in our brain, which undergo the Penrose-Hameroff's Orchestrated Objective Reduction, (Orch OR), leading to a conscious event. Then, an analogy naturally arises between the very early quantum computing universe,and our mind.
Abstract
The nature of consciousness, the mechanism by which it occurs in the brain, and its ultimate place in the universe are unknown. We proposed in the mid 1990's that consciousness depends on biologically ‘orchestrated’ coherent quantum processes in collections of microtubules within brain neurons, that these quantum processes correlate with, and regulate, neuronal synaptic and membrane activity, and that the continuous Schrödinger evolution of each such process terminates in accordance with the specific Diósi–Penrose (DP) scheme of ‘objective reduction’ (‘OR’) of the quantum state. This orchestrated OR activity (‘Orch OR’) is taken to result in moments of conscious awareness and/or choice. The DP form of OR is related to the fundamentals of quantum mechanics and space–time geometry, so Orch OR suggests that there is a connection between the brain's biomolecular processes and the basic structure of the universe. Here we review Orch OR in light of criticisms and developments in quantum biology, neuroscience, physics and cosmology. We also introduce a novel suggestion of ‘beat frequencies’ of faster microtubule vibrations as a possible source of the observed electro-encephalographic (‘EEG’) correlates of consciousness. We conclude that consciousness plays an intrinsic role in the universe.
Lord Jestocost said:Not only some founders of QM were pondering. For example, David Bohm and Basil J. Hiley in “The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory (Routledge 1993)”:
"Several physicists have already suggested that quantum mechanics and consciousness are closely related and that the understanding of the quantum formalism requires that ultimately we bring in consciousness in some role or other (e.g. Wigner [17], Everett [18] and Squires [19]). Throughout this book it has been our position that the quantum theory itself can be understood without bringing in consciousness and that as far as research in physics is concerned, at least in the present general period, this is probably the best approach. However, the intuition that consciousness and quantum theory are in some sense related seems to be a good one, and for this reason we feel that it is appropriate to include in this book a discussion of what this relationship might be."
allisrelative said:What M.W.I. and some Decoherence interpretations say is the observer is basically meaningless and this global physical wave function splits or decohere's when the system interacts with it's environment. If this is the case Wigner shouldn't be able to measure interference.
allisrelative said:Their predictions were corroborated by Anirban Bandyopadhyay a Senior Scientist at the National Institute for Material Science when he found quantum vibrations in microtubules.
allisrelative said:Michio Kaku calls himself a String Theorist and Sean Carroll is a proponent of many worlds. Both of these things have features that aren't scientific and can't be tested.
PeterDonis said:I think this is an important point. My impression from previous discussions on PF of Wigner's Friend type expeirments is that the people who claim Wigner can measure interference want to have it both ways: they want to call the friend's observation an actual outcome, while at the same time they want Wigner to be able to measure interference between multiple "outcomes" for his friend. The latter would require Wigner to be able to do unitary operations on his friend that are equivalent to quantum erasure of the friend's memory. But those kinds of operations are incompatible with decoherence, and therefore with actual outcomes.
In other words, if Wigner can actually keep the friend and his entire lab and experimental apparatus in a state of sufficient quantum coherence to be able to measure interference, then the friend will never have actually observed anything, because no decoherence will ever have occurred.
In the last few years the general notion of decoherence in quantum mechanics has become increasingly common among physicists, philosophers of physics and quantum information scientists. And rightly so, because it represents both a further application of the predictive and explicative power of quantum theory, and an attempt to break the stalemate situation with respect to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Powerful as it might be, however, the decoherence programme has not solved the measurement problem yet. Specifically, and contrary to some claims, it has not solved the definite outcomes problem, better known as the problem of the wave function collapse. Due to the wide scope of the decoherence programme, which could be summarized as the attempt to recover the classical phenomena from quantum physics, the problem of definite outcomes happens to be often confused with other, loosely related, issues. Such a confusion is the main motivation of this study.
It has been already stressed that the appearance of definite outcomes in single measurements does not follow from the decoherence mechanism, but, in light of the many contradictory or misleading statements present in the relevant literature, the author feels that such a point is never highlighted enough. In fact, up until the first half of the 2000’s, it was not uncommon to find such statements as: “...In particular ‘reduction of the wave packet’, postulated by Von Neumann to explain definiteness of an outcome of an individual observation, can be explained when a realistic model of an apparatus is adopted” [57]; or “...the word ‘decoherence’ which describes the process that used to be called ‘collapse of the wave function’...” [66].
Some of the authors, expressing the view that the decoherence programme has somehow solved the definite outcomes problem, actually base their position on sophisticated assumptions which, unfortunately, they often fail to expound. Some others, such as for example W. Zurek, later on acknowledged the incorrectness of their statement and clarified which particular interpretation they were adopting, even proposing new solutions [31].
PeterDonis said:While such vibrations have been observed, that is still far short of corroborating Penrose's larger model; we have no real evidence about the role, if any, that such vibrations play in consciousness. I absolutely think such research should be continued, but it's way too early to say that it has confirmed Penrose's overall model.
PeterDonis said:My impression from previous discussions on PF of Wigner's Friend type expeirments is that the people who claim Wigner can measure interference want to have it both ways: they want to call the friend's observation an actual outcome, while at the same time they want Wigner to be able to measure interference between multiple "outcomes" for his friend.
allisrelative said:How do you define an actual outcome?
allisrelative said:How are you defining decoherence?
Stephen Tashi said:Does a "Wigner's friend experiment" imply repetitions of some experiment - call it "the basic experiment" - so that statistics from the basic experiment can be used to demonstrate interference?
PeterDonis said:An outcome that cannot be reversed.
Loss of quantum coherence due to entanglement spreading out among a large number of untrackable degrees of freedom.
You are correct that a single definite outcome, by itself, does not follow from decoherence alone. All decoherence ensures is that the outcomes are definite, i.e., there is no interference between them and each one is irreversible. But decoherence by itself does not rule out interpretations like the MWI where all possible outcomes actually occur, not just one of them. It just says that, even in interpretations like the MWI, the outcomes are irreversible and don't interfere. So if Wigner's friend undergoes decoherence, Wigner can't observe interference between different outcomes for his friend.
allisrelative said:Undergoes decoherence?
allisrelative said:The wave function has not collapsed so why shouldn't Wigner(O') be able to measure interference of the S+O system
allisrelative said:I think confusion comes into play because you're equating loss of intereference with collapse of the wave function.
allisrelative said:I think confusion comes into play because you're equating loss of intereference with collapse of the wave function.
PeterDonis said:Perhaps it's worth elaborating on my "no" response to this a little more.
In a no collapse interpretation, such as the MWI, decoherence still occurs--more precisely, decoherence is still required for "splitting" into multiple "branches" to occur. If interference between different alternatives is still possible, decoherence has not occurred, and those alternatives are not separate "worlds" or "branches" according to the MWI.
So in a Wigner's friend experiment where we stipulate by fiat (however unrealistically) that Wigner can detect interference, the MWI will agree with interpretations that do have collapse, because both kinds of interpretations will say that no measurement by the friend occurred at all--the friend, once again, is no different from an electron that has gone through a SG magnet but has not yet hit any detector screen.
We investigate whether quantum theory can be understood as the continuum limit of a mechanical theory, in which there is a huge, but finite, number of classical “worlds,” and quantum effects arise solely from a universal interaction between these worlds, without reference to any wave function. Here, a “world” means an entire universe with well-defined properties, determined by the classical configuration of its particles and fields. In our approach, each world evolves deterministically, probabilities arise due to ignorance as to which world a given observer occupies, and we argue that in the limit of infinitely many worlds the wave function can be recovered (as a secondary object) from the motion of these worlds. We introduce a simple model of such a “many interacting worlds” approach and show that it can reproduce some generic quantum phenomena—such as Ehrenfest’s theorem, wave packet spreading, barrier tunneling, and zero-point energy—as a direct consequence of mutual repulsion between worlds. Finally, we perform numerical simulations using our approach. We demonstrate, first, that it can be used to calculate quantum ground states, and second, that it is capable of reproducing, at least qualitatively, the double-slit interference phenomenon.
allisrelative said:Decoherence is still required for splitting into multiple branches?
allisrelative said:Where's the scientific evidence for this?
allisrelative said:Which speculative theory do you want me to go by?
allisrelative said:Wigner can measure interference. That was the whole point of the published paper.
You can certainly stipulate that Wigner can measure interference in a particular thought experiment. What you can't do is stipulate that and then make use of intuitive arguments that assume that Wigner's friend has made an actual observation, the same way that we would make an actual observation in ordinary life.
A fundamental scientific assumption called local realism conflicts with certain predictions of quantum mechanics. Those predictions have now been verified, with none of the loopholes that have compromised earlier tests.
allisrelative said:it wasn't just a thought experiment it was an actual experiment.
allisrelative said:quantum theory does not distinguish between information recorded in a microscopic system (such as our photonic memory) and in a macroscopic system as long as the system remains isolated and quantum coherence is maintained.
PeterDonis said:There have not been any actual Wigner's friend experiments involving people. There have been "Wigner's friend" experiments involving qubits. Qubits have only one degree of freedom. People have something like ##10^{25}##. Big difference.
allisrelative said:You're not debating science, you're speculating.
allisrelative said:Let me quote from the published paper again