Evaluating Scientific Experiments: Has the Standard of Proof Shifted?

[JoeDawg]

Again, to remind you, the definition of "arbitrary" is: determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and not by necessity, reason, or principle.

How nice of you to state the obvious.

So you really want to say that abstractions are a matter of chance, whim or impulse?

I have never said that. I have said that choosing the abstractions one uses is arbitrary, UNLESS one uses experience as a foundation. You seem to be able to quote dictionaries ok, but your reading comprehension needs work.

But hopefully it is a reasoned and principled choice.

Which would be a choice based on experience.

But the idea that the choices of axioms and dichotomies have ever been arbitrary in human history

People choose premises based on whim and impulse all the time. In fact, it is quite common. It is where things like astrology, religion, and even pop-psychology come from. You are either naive or have led a sheltered life.

Perhaps you are misunderstanding the definiton of abstraction too? It comes from the Latin for to draw off. So you question has to be from what? From what else apart from subjective experience? And you can tell this is thought to be a purposeful action. Not an arbitrary matter.

So dichotomies are abstractions, and abstractions are 'draw[n] off' subjective experience.
So subjective experience is fundamental, not dichotomies. Thank you, I agree.

Of course dichotomies are constructs.

And therefore not fundamental.

This returns us to the importance of Descartes Cogito Ergo Sum. When discussing epistemology what is fundamental is subjective experience. Subjective experience, in Descartes case, doubting or thinking, is undeniable, since if you can doubt, then you know at the very least that doubting exists.

Consciousness, as yet undefined, is what is essential, fundamental, or foundational to epistemology. Abstractions are what the mind draws off from these, and they are therefore not fundamental.

And out of curiosity, why do you never cite any references germane to your arguments?

I have used references in this forum many times. I do so when I feel it relevant. I don't put much stock in arguments from authority. But since you seem to need this sort of thing, I base my position largely on Empirical philosophy, people like John Locke, David Hume but also, and more recently Ludwig Wittgenstein and Henri Poincare.

I am not a disciple of any of these people. I disagree with things they have said, and I make my own judgements, casual and layman as they may be.

 

[apeiron]

Consciousness, as yet undefined, is what is essential, fundamental, or foundational to epistemology. Abstractions are what the mind draws off from these, and they are therefore not fundamental.

Err, yes, but abstracting is in fact believed to be fundamental to mental experience. That was why I was citing all that modern stuff about anticipation and neural nets and habits and generalisation, etc.

Remember? Consciousness is actually impressions~ideas. "Consciousness" is just a vague non-technical term that refers to somehow "being aware". But discovering the dichotomies that lurks has been the way to recent models of the mind like Grossberg's ART neural nets.

Hume and Locke are fine as part of the grounding for discussions of epistemology. But if you want to be taken seriously, you also need to be up to date with what we actually now know about minds, and relational systems generally. You can't base epistemology on a 17th century state of knowledge about the mind, can you?

And I note you still don't seem brave enough to address a dichotomy like stasis~flux directly.

Again, check out Grossberg's many papers on ART (the American Scientist one is a good review).

You will find that Grossberg dubs it the stability~plasticity dilemma. A basic problem in designing artificial minds too!

 

[JoeDawg]

Err, yes, but abstracting is in fact believed to be fundamental to mental experience.

You're confusing neuroscientific explanation with epistemology. You can't even do neuroscience without first having a theory of knowledge. The latter comes first.

Consciousness is fundamental to epistemology, the study of knowledge, because knowledge doesn't exist without it.
Neuroscience details the 'ontological' explanation or 'source of knowledge', not knowledge itself.

And I note you still don't seem brave enough to address a dichotomy like stasis~flux directly.

I don't see anything needs addressing. Its a dichotomy, as you have admitted, it is constructed, derived from, generalized from, experience. And therefore not fundamental. Experience is fundamental to epistemology.

The fact that we use, and find useful, dichotomies that describe experience doesn't mean they are fundamental to anything, it just means they are useful descriptions. And unlike definitions, descriptions are 'by definition' incomplete.

 

[apeiron]

You're confusing neuroscientific explanation with epistemology. You can't even do neuroscience without first having a theory of knowledge. The latter comes first.

No confusion. Just up to date epistemology. The science informs the philosophy just as the philosophy informs the science. There is no chicken and egg problem here once you understand that knowleged develops from vaguer states to crisper states.

I don't see anything needs addressing. Its a dichotomy, as you have admitted, it is constructed, derived from, generalized from, experience. And therefore not fundamental. Experience is fundamental to epistemology.

The claim is precisely that it is "fundamental", to the extent ideas can be fundamental. As discussed, dichotomies are not all equal. Some seem to be maximally general. If you dispute this, you have to show this not to be true of philosophy's foundational dichotomies. Such as stasis~flux. Or any of the other dozen I can supply you with.

It is not I that invented them. They long pre-date 17th C philosophy which seems to be your favoured era. If you feel the history of philosophy is in some kind of deep error, along with modern figures like Bohr, then let's hear your specific argument.

 

[JoeDawg]

No confusion. Just up to date epistemology.

Of course its an update, its a modification, which has nothing to do with fundamentals. If you can modify it, its not fundamental. A fundamental is where you start, where you must, by necessity, start. And human philosophy always starts with experience, not abstraction.

You said it yourself abstractions are drawn from experience. Experience is fundamental.

There is no chicken and egg problem here once you understand that knowleged develops from vaguer states to crisper states.

Dichotomies can be useful, but you've reduced them to dogmatic oversimplification.

It is not I that invented them. They long pre-date 17th C philosophy which seems to be your favoured era.

Really? Wittgenstein and Poincare are 17th century, uhm... you might want to recheck that.

First you argue my ideas are not up to date, now you argue they are not old enough. You will argue anything to protect your dogmatic assumptions.

If you feel the history of philosophy is in some kind of deep error, along with modern figures like Bohr, then let's hear your specific argument.

LOL

You equate your opinion with the history of philosophy?
What specific argument of Bohr's are you even talking about?
Or is this another argument from authority?
Your read that Bohr said this or that, and if he said it, well then, it must be god's own truth.

You are the one making the deep error.

 

[apeiron]

First you argue my ideas are not up to date, now you argue they are not old enough. You will argue anything to protect your dogmatic assumptions.

So still not confident enough to address a dichotomy like stasis~flux directly?

Bring what Wittgenstein and Poincare had to say about this specific matter to the table by all means.

 

[JoeDawg]

So still not confident enough to address a dichotomy like stasis~flux directly?

Address what? Yes this is an example of a dichotomy.
Your claim, which the onus is on you to support, was that dichotomies are fundamental to epistemology. Feel free to support that claim. So far, you haven't.

And I've told you...

Dichotomies are abstractions, and abstractions are derived from experience, therefore dichotomies are not fundamental. Experience is.

Please show how experience is not fundamental. Supplying a quote from your favorite philosopher, can be helpful, but mostly it just shows you can do a google search.

Bring what Wittgenstein and Poincare had to say about this specific matter to the table by all means.

Give me a reason to, and I will. So far, you haven't supplied much in the way of argument. Claiming over and over that dichotomies are fundamental, is not the type of thing that inclines me to look up references. Maybe you have time to reread and look for quotes but unless you provide something more interesting, I feel no need.
Good luck.

 

[apeiron]

Address what? Yes this is an example of a dichotomy.
Your claim, which the onus is on you to support, was that dichotomies are fundamental to epistemology. Feel free to support that claim. So far, you haven't.

No, the actual claim again is that some dichotomies that early philosophy derived from experience are maximally general. Stasis~flux is an example.

Other dichotomies like true~ugly lack this maximal generality which would make them a candidate for what is fundamental. You will remember how the argument went there.

Still other dichotomies are just trivial unrelated pairings lacking dichotomistic content, meaningless like liquid helium~Paris Hilton. You will remember how the argument went there.

So we have a claim. We have examples of tests of what qualify a dichotomy as maximally general. We have the fact that these maximally general dichotomies are basic to philosophical and scientific concepts.

I don't know if I can break it down any further into baby steps for you.

So take stasis~flux and apply the tests I suggest. Can you imagine it not meeting the A~notA criteria?

 

[JoeDawg]

No, the actual claim again is that some dichotomies that early philosophy derived from experience are maximally general. Stasis~flux is an example.

Something can be 'maximally general' with regards to a certain data set.
Please supply the data set you are using.

Other dichotomies like true~ugly lack this maximal generality which would make them a candidate for what is fundamental.

That is a false dichotomy.

Still other dichotomies are just trivial unrelated pairings lacking dichotomistic content, meaningless like liquid helium~Paris Hilton.

Again, false dichotomy, and not even abstract, Paris Hilton and Helium are concrete things, which involves description, not definition, so your argument fails. Are you making this up as you go?

So we have a claim. We have examples of tests of what qualify a dichotomy as maximally general.

No we don't, we have more of your claims... and no data set.

We have the fact that these maximally general dichotomies are basic to philosophical and scientific concepts.

No, that is your claim. What is basic to epistemology is experience... ie the data set.

Can you imagine it not meeting the A~notA criteria?

All you have supplied is a definition, nothing more.

 

[apeiron]

Something can be 'maximally general' with regards to a certain data set.
Please supply the data set you are using.

The data set is the totality of experienced reality as already stated.

So please, quit scrabbling for excuses. Take stasis~flux and tell me in what way it is not a fundamental dichotomy. Where is the free choice, the arbitrariness?

And here are yet another couple of reference that might help ground your response.

http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/lane/prilan.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectical_monism

 

[JoeDawg]

The data set is the totality of experienced reality as already stated.

Exactly, so the data is fundamental. The abstract dichotomy is derived from the data, the data is experience.

Experience is therefore fundamental to epistemology.
As I have said repeatedly.

Take stasis~flux and tell me in what way it is not a fundamental dichotomy.

Its a useful dichotomy, its not 'fundamental to epistemology'. Epistemology is about knowledge, and knowledge comes from experience...

Dichotomies are arbitrary... UNLESS... they are based on experience.
Experience gives us patterns that we can generalize.
Experience is fundamental to knowledge.

Where is the free choice, the arbitrariness?

Ok, I've repeated this many times, so either you aren't reading my posts, you have poor reading comprehension skills, or you're just a cranky old man with tunnel vision.

Dichotomies are arbitrary... UNLESS... they are based on experience.

I have never said your precious little stasis/flux dichotomy is arbitrary.
Please feel free to quote where you claim I said this.

When it comes to abstract systems, we CAN CHOOSE axioms at random.
We generally don't, of course, we choose the ones that represent patterns in experience.

Dichotomies are arbitrary... UNLESS... they are based on experience.

 

[apeiron]

Ok, I've repeated this many times, so either you aren't reading my posts, you have poor reading comprehension skills, or you're just a cranky old man with tunnel vision.

You really need to focus on the issues as they have been raised, not continually responding to your own mis-readings.

The summary of what I said is 1) all metaphysics is based on dichotomies and 2) all knowledge is derived by a process of dichotomisation.

The scientific method inherited both some foundational dichotomies from metaphysics and is also an uber-example of the dichotomising mind. Modelling and measurement made formal.

Given that we sort reality via dichotomisation, and that reality appears to sort itself by dichotomisation, it is worth then having a really good theory about exactly how dichotomisation operates.

This is where we should pay attention to scholars from Anaximander, to Hegel, to Peirce.

Dichotomies are arbitrary... UNLESS... they are based on experience.

So it is the other way round. Experience is based on dichotomisation. And experience that is not the result of dichotomisation would be what was arbitrary.

If you could take the time to study the neuroscience of attention, or Gestalt psychology, this would become very obvious to you. Figure~ground, focus~fringe, etc.

Indeed, take the time to study the brain. Consider how it is architecturally divided into attention~habits, sensory cortex~motor cortex, object processing~relationship processing, etc.

You make the basic mistake of treating "consciousness" and "experience" as simple states with no structure. And a lot of your errors follow from that fundamental misunderstanding.

Mental experience has a structure that reflects the neural structure. And that structure is dichotomous and dichotomising.

Science is a way of taking this basic structure of knowing and making it less subjective, more objective.

 

[JoeDawg]

The summary of what I said is 1) all metaphysics is based on dichotomies and 2) all knowledge is derived by a process of dichotomisation.

Yes, I know, which is why no matter what question anyone posts to this forum, you always bring up dichotomies, like some platonicly inspired energizer bunny... still going.

Given that we sort reality via dichotomisation, and that reality appears to sort itself by dichotomisation

Reality does no such thing, experience is filled with shades of grey, you simply choose to reduce everything to binaries. Black and white thinking is simpleminded.

So it is the other way round. Experience is based on dichotomisation.

Dichotomies are abstractions, abstractions are 'drawn' from experience. You said it yourself, you can't have an abstraction... unless it comes from somewhere. Experience is fundamental.

If you could take the time to study the neuroscience

I'm actually a big fan of neuroscience and science in general. But science is ontology, not epistemology. Neuroscience can inform our understanding of the source of knowledge, it can provide explanation, but you need a theory of knowledge before you can do any science. This is what Descartes was after with Cogito Ergo Sum. A certainty, a foundation. And experience, in this case 'mental experience' is that foundation.

You make the basic mistake of treating "consciousness" and "experience" as simple states with no structure.

Not at all. I simply don't equate the abstract constructions of the mind to the actual patterns that exist in experience. We may be able to define dichotomies that are useful in dealing with experience, but that doesn't mean they are not our invention.
That is the same mistake Plato made with his forms.

Mental experience has a structure that reflects the neural structure.

You are confusing epistemology with ontology.


"Geometry is not true, it is advantageous."
- Henri Poincare

 

[apeiron]

Yes, I know, which is why no matter what question anyone posts to this forum, you always bring up dichotomies, like some platonicly inspired energizer bunny... still going.

...and hierarchies and vagueness too of course. These comprise the Peircean triad of analytic levels that define the systems science and semiotics approach.

And because this is a process metaphysics, thermodynamics and complexity theory are focal when modelling material systems.

So yes, there is indeed a paradigm involved here.

The standard anglo-saxon modelling paradigm involves reductionism, mechanicalism, atomism, monadism, determinism and locality. Although though you might not be able to articulate it, this is the way your own mental processes will have been institutionalised.

Yet still, that does not justify your continuing displays of intellectual xenophobia.

Reality does no such thing, experience is filled with shades of grey, you simply choose to reduce everything to binaries. Black and white thinking is simpleminded.

I realize you will probably never get it. Your thought habits are very inflexible. But I have explained how dichotomies are about separation and mixing, or differentiation~integration (as modeled by the I Ching for example).

So separation creates light and dark, or black and white. Then the mixing of what has been made distinct allows all the shades of grey inbetween. That is how you get distinct shades of grey, by being able to mix pure white and pure black.

I'm actually a big fan of neuroscience and science in general. But science is ontology, not epistemology. Neuroscience can inform our understanding of the source of knowledge, it can provide explanation, but you need a theory of knowledge before you can do any science. This is what Descartes was after with Cogito Ergo Sum. A certainty, a foundation. And experience, in this case 'mental experience' is that foundation.

Again, I am talking about modern day epistemology. Philosophy updated by science. Model and measurement is an interactive process of development. We can't pretend we are still operating with Descartes' level of ignorance.

Not at all. I simply don't equate the abstract constructions of the mind to the actual patterns that exist in experience. We may be able to define dichotomies that are useful in dealing with experience, but that doesn't mean they are not our invention.
That is the same mistake Plato made with his forms.

I am explicitly not a platonist. That is dualism - a broken apart binary - and dichotomies are interacting levels of the same stuff (the same possibility separated to create an asymmetry).

Our concepts are of course our inventions. But they are subject to the same self-consistency requirement that appears to be true of reality also. So they are hardly arbitrary.

You are confusing epistemology with ontology.

Hardly. I'm introducing you to what the modern world has to say on these issues.

 

[Pythagorean]

Reality does no such thing, experience is filled with shades of grey, you simply choose to reduce everything to binaries. Black and white thinking is simpleminded.

This can be a matter of resolution: we only observe gray because we can't see the mixture of tiny black and white pixels, for instance.

Also, while he does use a lot of binary examples, the concepts he's operating under are not restricted to a base 2 system. Just a base n system.

He's brought up ternary systems before, too. Another resolution example is three base colors making up a wide range of different colors to make images on your screen.

This is not so simpleminded once you get into more complex systems.

 

[apeiron]

This can be a matter of resolution: we only observe gray because we can't see the mixture of tiny black and white pixels, for instance.

Black and white are not a perfect analogy of what I mean as they are treated here as essentially a symmetry and antisymmetry, not a symmetry and a broken symmetry, or asymmetry.

So again, the + and - of electric charge are a binary that is symmetrical. Each side is the same scale. Black and white, treated as the on/off of a pixel is also a binary of this kind. We know then the difficulty of getting real black on an LED screen. The global viewing conditions become important.

If you go into the eye's processing habits, you will see that in fact our nervous system relies on local~global asymmetry to create our experience of degrees of illumination (shades of grey). And this fact is necessary to understanding visual illusions like neon colour spreading.

http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/col_neon/index.html (a really good site this)

Also, while he does use a lot of binary examples, the concepts he's operating under are not restricted to a base 2 system. Just a base n system.

But it is also a significant fact that all numbering systems are reducible to binary notation. It is in fact fundamental (you can go no lower). And this is why we are such believers in information theory and the power of the digital approach.

You cannot get simpler that 1,0. The plus and minus of a symmetric binary.

However, applying the dichotomistic lens to this, I would return to Shannon's original signal~noise dichotomy. That was the original systems view. That was how the whole information theoretic, digital, bandwagon arose.

And signal~noise follows the local~global template of an asymmetric dichotomy. You locate the signal and, in so doing, discard a global context of noise.

Thus the 1 and the 0 are not actually the same scale. The 1 is as small as possible, the 0 as large as possible. The O stands for everything excluded as noise and so you would want this "everything" to be as large as possible, in fact infinitely large if you want to be certain about the 1 which is the crisp signal dragged out of the vague fog of your initial uncertainty.

Joedawg complains I see dichotomies everywhere. No, I just point out how all good ideas in science arise because some clever person saw through to the dichotomy inherent in nature.

Bohr did it with particle~wave (though he improved on that kinematic~dynamic, or stasis~flux as it was called in Heraclitus's day). Shannon did it with signal~noise.

Yes, technology arose by simplifying the dichotomy further. Once you find your essential asymmetry in nature, you can make life easier by throwing away one half of the dichotomy (the global or holistic half) and just using the local or atomistic half. You do this by creating a symmetric binary relation (the global scale can then be constructed by gluing together digital bits in clumps - though this is patently artificial as natural systems are defined by the fact that they self-assemble).

Anyway, again we can pick any major advance of science at random, I suggest, and find that the breakthrough thought was the asymmetry of dichotomy. Which may have later been reduced to the simplicity of a dualistic binary perhaps.

 

[JoeDawg]

This can be a matter of resolution: we only observe gray because we can't see the mixture of tiny black and white pixels, for instance.

It can be, or it might be. But that doesn't really address the problem of what is fundamental.

All you have really done is compare experiences, which runs full force into the problem of induction.

And that also assumes anyone physical pixel can convey 'pure' black or 'pure' white. If black and white are simply ideals, then everything is a shade of grey. Talking about wavelengths doesn't solve this problem either.

Which brings us back to Descartes, who was looking for a basis of knowledge that was 'certain', not just a matter of resolution or sampling.

 

[Pythagorean]

But that's not the subject, you're just interpreting it that way. We're actually discussing the fundamental structure of the universe. Whether it is continuous or quantized.

The point is that it could very well be of a quantized nature and that continuity is just an illusion based on the inherent resolution of observation.

Depending on your philosophy (whether you think science actually describes reality to a T or whether it just describes a set of interaction with reality), the matter of resolution and sampling become very important to our understanding of reality.

We're not talking about simple technological sampling or resolution (like oh, I bought the cheaper sensor, so my resolution sucks). No, not that.

We're actually talking about our inherit limitations in observation. In quantum mechanics, for instance, we have the uncertainty principle. Does the uncertainty principle say that we can't know a particles position and velocity with precision or does it say the particle doesn't have position or velocity in the way we think of position and velocity?

 

[JoeDawg]

But that's not the subject, you're just interpreting it that way. We're actually discussing the fundamental structure of the universe. Whether it is continuous or quantized.

Then that is not epistemology, that is an ontological question.

The point is that it could very well be of a quantized nature and that continuity is just an illusion based on the inherent resolution of observation.

Well sure, it could be.

If one uses the stasis/flux concept, one could say the universe is either static, ie time is an illusion and the entire universe just is what it is, or that time actually flows and is therefore in flux. It's either/or, but so what? We don't know. The epistemological question would be, can we know, and more in line with the classical understanding of knowledge, can we 'know for certain'? If we can't know for certain, then knowledge becomes indistingishable from belief, which is a central problem in epistemology.

We're actually talking about our inherit limitations in observation.

Again, not epistemology, now you are discussing phenomenology/ontology.

In quantum mechanics, for instance, we have the uncertainty principle.

This is a very narrow band of epistemology, ie what can we know with certainty about the interactions of quantum particles within the scope of physics. The uncertainty principle may be fundamental to physics, but it is not fundamental to knowledge generally.

Does the uncertainty principle say that we can't know a particles position and velocity with precision or does it say the particle doesn't have position or velocity in the way we think of position and velocity?

That would be a question that is fundamental to physics, not to knowledge itself. Its a question of measurement, not knowledge per se.

 

[Pythagorean]

I'm not part of the epistemology vs. ontological argument. I'm not familiar with the terms

The epistemological question would be, can we know, and more in line with the classical understanding of knowledge, can we 'know for certain'?

I don't see how questioning an idea like inherent resolution is removed from this...

That would be a question that is fundamental to physics, not to knowledge itself. Its a question of measurement, not knowledge per se.

But that's the question I'm asking. Is it a limit of our ability to know, or is it simply the case physically. I don't think the two are necessarily mutually exclusive. There could very well be a physical explanation for why we we can or can't know things, such as:

"Does the uncertainty principle say that we can't know a particles position and velocity with precision or does it say the particle doesn't have position or velocity in the way we think of position and velocity?"

 

[WaveJumper]

But that's the question I'm asking. Is it a limit of our ability to know, or is it simply the case physically. I don't think the two are necessarily mutually exclusive. There could very well be a physical explanation for why we we can or can't know things, such as:

"Does the uncertainty principle say that we can't know a particles position and velocity with precision or does it say the particle doesn't have position or velocity in the way we think of position and velocity?"

Would you rather believe that as you were typing that post, there existed another you that would later fall asleep on the computer, plus another you whose computer would catch fire fire, plus another you who would make 23 typos in the above post, plus another you who would type some stupidity and get banned, etc. etc...? If you insist on realism, this is what you get(electrons spinning left and right at the same time, dead and alive cats, etc.). Then you have to make clear what happened with the 'you' who got banned, who fell asleep, etc.
Or perhaps, another assumption of ours is wrong - that our reasoning can describe reality. I cannot prove that we are not reaching the limit of our abilities to imagine(to get the 'picture' behind the event, as Einstein liked to say; maybe there is simply no picture). It's no coincidence philosophers are being invited on physics gatherings discussing similar foundational issues.

 

[JoeDawg]

I'm not part of the epistemology vs. ontological argument. I'm not familiar with the terms.

Ontology is the study of what exists and how it exists.
What is gravity?

When Newton described gravity with an equation, he simply formulated a description of what gravity does. Einstein went further, beyond a simple formula description, and defined it as the 'curvature of space'. The former is an ontological description of gravity, the latter is an ontological explanation of gravity.
Scientists often prefer to stick with description and data, because 'explanation' is equated with interpretation which can be very subjective. Interpretations can be useful too though.

I don't see how questioning an idea like inherent resolution is removed from this...

I guess it depends what you mean by inherent, its a loaded word. If its a property of an external thing, part of the object, like what atomic number describes, rather than color, then you are talking about ontology. Color would be an example of phenomenology, or 'perception of the world'.

Epistemology, is the study of knowledge, or what is True.
In classical times, True, with emphasis on the capital T was about what was absolutely True, as in the god-defined essense of something. But since we don't usually get access to gods, finding out what was True had to be done another way. The ancients believed that geometry and logic could show us Truth. Math was regular, precise, and predictable, while real life was chaotic. So they used the best tool they had.

Science makes no such claims to Truth in the absolute sense. Its about belief founded on evidence (inductive logic). So science deals with truth of a sort, but its not absolute or certain, it is probable.

Descartes was looking for certainty, something deductive, to refute the skeptics who doubted everything. Cogito Ergo Sum was that logical solution. The more modern way of looking for truth is using inductive and deductive logic, science and math together.

Certainty, can be attained through logical/mathematical proof, but deductive logic is limited by its premises. And deductive logic is derived from human understanding of causation.

This becomes problematic on the quantum level, because causation appears to work differently there, as in non-locality. A different kind of logic must be invented to deal with it.

But that's the question I'm asking. Is it a limit of our ability to know, or is it simply the case physically. I don't think the two are necessarily mutually exclusive. There could very well be a physical explanation for why we we can or can't know things, such as:

That's really a different usage of the word 'know'. Are we capable of knowing the position and velocity of a particle. In terms of scientific epistemology both are 'knowable' as an approximation, but not absolutely. The problem is we can't measure one without affecting the other.

"Does the uncertainty principle say that we can't know a particles position and velocity with precision or does it say the particle doesn't have position or velocity in the way we think of position and velocity?"

This is not a question of knowledge, its a question of how particles exist. Replace 'know' with 'measure' and I think it removes the confusion.

A question about knowledge would be: Does measuring a particle's velocity tell us something true about the particle?

 

[Pythagorean]

I guess it depends what you mean by inherent, its a loaded word. If its a property of an external thing, part of the object, like what atomic number describes, rather than color, then you are talking about ontology. Color would be an example of phenomenology, or 'perception of the world'.

Inherent, as in, there's no way around it. I assume our a model of physical reality is a result of our interactions with what is "True". Because we interact with this base reality (even when we observe) there is a limit to what we can ever possibly know because we always somehow "disturb the experiment" when we make observations. To me, the epistemological question is answered with the help of ontology. I don't see how they're mutually exclusive.

That's really a different usage of the word 'know'. Are we capable of knowing the position and velocity of a particle. In terms of scientific epistemology both are 'knowable' as an approximation, but not absolutely. The problem is we can't measure one without affecting the other.

I don't know of any observation we can make without affecting the experiment. We may not affect it significantly for our ontological question in every case (where we can approximate) but we seem to be effecting it significantly for the epistemological question, since (it seems) approximations won't do. (Note: this is not the case with the uncertainty principle. The uncertainty principle affects both the ontological and epistemological question imo).

A question about knowledge would be: Does measuring a particle's velocity tell us something true about the particle?

That question can be answered by the answer to my question. But I'm not sure of your definition of true. I've presented mine as the thing we interact with that leads us to our physical observations. I usually call it reality. And I think we have a very skewed perception of it: we are limited to knowing only how it interacts with us, which we discover in an ontological way).

 

[apeiron]

To me, the epistemological question is answered with the help of ontology. I don't see how they're mutually exclusive.

Of course, they are not. Which is why we are pragmatic scientists rather than rationalist philosophers at the end of the day. Best knowledge in each should inform the other. Which is why modern epistemology has to be up to date with modern mind science. Among other things, like QM and systems theory.

Ultimately, I think the goal ought to be to reduce epistemology to ontology. So the way humans know worlds ought to be generalised to observers and the observed generally.

Which is what Peircean semiotics, Rosen's modelling relations and Pattee's epistemic cut are all about, for instance.

 

[apeiron]

for example...

For Peirce, perceptual facts at their very primordial core emerge neither from mind alone nor from the dynamic reality of the universe alone, but rather from the interaction of the two which constitutes experience.

http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/perros.htm

 

[JoeDawg]

Inherent, as in, there's no way around it. I assume our a model of physical reality is a result of our interactions with what is "True".

Truth describes what exists. A scientific 'theory of knowledge' goes something like this...

There exists a world external to me, and through my interactions with it, I can create a model that accurately describes it.

But what if that 'assumption' is wrong. What if everything I experience is a virtual reality that is a complete lie, perpetrated on me by some evil intelligence? Now, that is somewhat paranoid, but if it is the case, everything I think I know about the 'external world' is a lie. So that model I have created is based on a world that does not exist. So how could that model tell me anything that is true?

You are correct, if the world exists, and if I can interact with it in a way that allows me to model it, then I can call what I learn about it... approximately true. But if the world is a lie, and/or I don't have the ability to model it, then science is a waste of time, it won't tell me anything that is even close to true.

So, before you can start talking about what exists, you have to have a theory of how you can know anything.

That question can be answered by the answer to my question. But I'm not sure of your definition of true. I've presented mine as the thing we interact with that leads us to our physical observations.

Truth is descriptive. Its a value judgement, it is part of epistemology.
What you describe as true is what Kant called the 'thinginitself', or what exists.
It would be the 'source of truth'.

I usually call it reality.

That can get confusing. Many philosophers refer to 'reality' as what is 'experienced', as opposed to what exists.

we are limited to knowing only how it interacts with us, which we discover in an ontological way.

Yes, once you assume you can gain knowledge of what exists by interaction with existense, then you can modify, or enhance, your theory of knowledge accordingly. But first you must have a theory of knowledge that includes the idea that you can gain knowledge in this way.

Modern science is based on a combination of rational (knowledge gained through logic) and empirical(knowledge gained through observation) 'theories of knowledge' (epistemologies.)

 

[Pythagorean]

But what if that 'assumption' is wrong. What if everything I experience is a virtual reality that is a complete lie, perpetrated on me by some evil intelligence?

But "everything you experience", "virtual reality", "complete lie", and "perpetrated on you by some evil intelligence" are all things that you learned from your allegedly fake experience. If your "experience" is a "complete lie" those terms wouldn't have meaning either. What would your lie be modeled off of?

 

[JoeDawg]

What would your lie be modeled off of?

The whim or plan of a evil demon...

You have to understand, I'm not claiming this is true. The universe seems nominally consistent, but faulty premises lead to faulty results. Its a thought experiment designed to define the 'starting point', the foundation for all knowledge.

Knowledge has a very different meaning in science, than it does both generally, and historically, so its a non-trivial question. Its fine to say that a naturalistic view of the world is useful, but one can have a theory that is useful in a given situation, but not actually accurately descriptive of that situation.

So ideally, with regards to knowledge, one starts with what one is most certain of... and builds from there.