How Do Mind and Body Interact in Dualism?

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Just to play some devil's advocate (assuming 'conceptual' as used here refers to the ontological nature of 'consciousness'): the conceptual is that which you experience firsthand, and it is the medium through which you observe 'the world' and infer the existence of the physical. So
1) our notions of the physical are entirely contingent on our experience of the conceptual;
2) the conceptual has an axiomatic claim to existence, whereas the physical has only an assumed/inferred one.

I conclude that if any of these two notions is to be discarded, it should be the physical.

It's funny that you mention that, since I'd just been considering it. However, I think this reasoning is wrong. Introspection comes quite a bit after perception of objectivity, in the development of an infant, doesn't it?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
What does it mean to be conscious of a phenomenon if it is not like something to experience that phenomenon? There is perhaps a sense in which a thermometer is 'aware' of the phenomenon of temperature, but this is clearly (I hope) not what we mean by 'consciousness.'

What of the consciousness of a dog, that he has been approached? It can be said that it isn't really like anything to be a dog, since the dog never conducts introspection (note: I chose "dog" randomly, I could have used any non-sentient (not even semi-sentient) mammal), and yet he is conscious of objective phenomena, right?

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
It's funny that you mention that, since I'd just been considering it. However, I think this reasoning is wrong. Introspection comes quite a bit after perception of objectivity, in the development of an infant, doesn't it?

Perception is a subjective experience, and so still belongs under the 'conceptual' category (again-- assuming by 'conceptual' we refer to the ontological nature of consciousness rather than the more literal definition).

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
What of the consciousness of a dog, that he has been approached? It can be said that it isn't really like anything to be a dog, since the dog never conducts introspection (note: I chose "dog" randomly, I could have used any non-sentient (not even semi-sentient) mammal), and yet he is conscious of objective phenomena, right?

I don't think we know enough about the mental activity of dogs to say that they don't conduct some sort of introspection. Regardless of this, your argument relies on the notion that it can only be like something to be a certain creature if that creature introspects, which can't be taken as a given.

In what sense can a dog be said to be conscious of phenomena if it is not like something for that dog to experience those phenemona? If it is not like something to be this dog, it follows that the dog has no subjective experience; if the dog has no subjective experience, it follows that it is not conscious.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
I know what you mean about relying on third-person evidence. But if you think about it consiousness is completely invisible to third-persons, and in fact we rely entirely on first person evidence. What we see from a third-person perspective is behaviour, not consciousness. Alos, however much science we do we will never prove that emotions exist in a scientific sense. How is physics going to explain something it can't prove exists?

Actually, Psychology is considered a science (I think), and rightly so. It may only be able to interpret "behavior", but that just means that a full understanding of emotion will not come until a physical link to each instance of this "behavior" is found. Right?

Ah, but you agree with him.

Because I haven't noticed any of these faults that you point out. My "agreement" is different than most, in that it is merely a current assumption that I cannot yet disprove.

He did a pretty good job as well, but dualism lives to fight again. His book had little impact on the debate as far as I can tell from what emerges in the literature.

You are correct. That is sad, in my own opinion, since the new scientific theories of consciousness do seem to follow very near to exactly the model that he predicted.

He showed some forms of dualism to be illogical, but failed (imo) to deal with the more logical forms of it. (I also think that (ultimately) dualism is false, but only at the limit).

What "more logical forms of it" are you referring to? Examples?

Are you saying that consciousness depends on language? You wouldn't be alone in that (Wittgenstein agreed I think) but it's speculation with little evidence to support it, and plenty against.

Well, I say that the propogation of memes in complicated social structure is indeed dependent on language, and that the passing and personal propogation of memes is very important to consciousness...what's wrong with that?

Do you think that consciousness (our ability to know we are experiencing) is causal? It's not the scientific view. According to science consciousness had (and has) no effect on our technological progress.

Hmm...but no non-sentient being could ever invent the tools that primitive man must have used to outwit his predators and his prey (since we're not much, physically, compared to some of the beasts that existed 2 million years ago).

If you KNOW that subjective experience exists, but science cannot observe subjective experience, then how can subjective experience be the the same thing as a brain state. How do you know subjective experiences exist?

I told you, I know that they exist because I've experience them. You have too, otherwise you wouldn't have experienced whatever emotion it is you are experiencing at the time of reading this (hopefully only good thoughts ).

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Canute
That's not what I meant. I was saying that phenomenal consciousness is 'intentional', it is consciousness of something. 'What it is like to be' is a more fundamental definition, and a more fundamental state.

It's very hard to argue that phenomenal consciousness is not physically caused (the momentary nature of it anyway), but that isn;t the case for 'what it is like'.

I agree. If that is how you're defining phenomenal consciousness, then the problem of phenomenal conscious is just the 'easy' problem of consciousness-- it can be explained entirely by recourse to functional analysis of cognitive capacities.

However, the reason there is so much debate about consciousness is because there is a 'hard' problem of consciousness-- explaining how it can be that it can be 'like something' to be a certain physical system, just as you stated. I believe what we are interested with here is the 'hard' problem of consciousness. To try to solve the hard problem with recourse to solutions to the easy problem, as is sometimes a tactic for the materialist, is at bottom just a straw man argument.

It's very difficult to see how the correlation can hold if there is not interaction between brain and experience. Leibnitz argues God maintains the link, but the idea never caught on. How do you think they are correlated if they don't interact? (Btw I'm not assuming anything about which direction the causation works).

As I said, I do believe the most reasonable assumption to make is that there is a causal interaction underlying the correlation. I just wanted to point out that this is still an assumption and could be a potential flaw in our understanding (I doubt it-- but it could be the case).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Perception is a subjective experience, and so still belongs under the 'conceptual' category (again-- assuming by 'conceptual' we refer to the ontological nature of consciousness rather than the more literal definition).

Perception is indeed a subjective experience, but the perception of this fact is an introspective one, is it not?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I don't think we know enough about the mental activity of dogs to say that they don't conduct some sort of introspection. Regardless of this, your argument relies on the notion that it can only be like something to be a certain creature if that creature introspects, which can't be taken as a given.

Why not? If it is like something to be me, then it stands to reason that I know what it is like, since I am me. And if I know what it is like, then I have conducted introspection. Right?

In what sense can a dog be said to be conscious of phenomena if it is not like something for that dog to experience those phenemona?

Simple, the dog becomes aware of the phenomenon, but never aware of what it is like to be aware of the phenomenon. Seriously, if a dog runs into a tree, and then feels pain, the dog is probably conscious of the pain, but not that this is what it is like to hit a tree, nor that this pain is different from that which is felt when running into any other hard surface.

If it is not like something to be this dog, it follows that the dog has no subjective experience;

No, it follows that the dog doesn't know it has subjective experience. Knowing about subjective experience just isn't one of its subjective experiences.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Perception is indeed a subjective experience, but the perception of this fact is an introspective one, is it not?

You don't need to perceive that you perceive in order to be conscious. This is almost akin to the homunculan problem-- why should we stop at perception of perception? Why shouldn't we have to perceive that we perceive that we perceive in order to be conscious? Alternatively, why should perception of perception entail consciousness (subjective experience), but not perception alone?

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Why not? If it is like something to be me, then it stands to reason that I know what it is like, since I am me. And if I know what it is like, then I have conducted introspection. Right?

Define introspection.

Simple, the dog becomes aware of the phenomenon, but never aware of what it is like to be aware of the phenomenon. Seriously, if a dog runs into a tree, and then feels pain, the dog is probably conscious of the pain, but not that this is what it is like to hit a tree, nor that this pain is different from that which is felt when running into any other hard surface.

If the dog feels pain, then there is something it is like for this dog to feel this pain. Otherwise, the dog cannot be said to feel pain in the first place.

No, it follows that the dog doesn't know it has subjective experience. Knowing about subjective experience just isn't one of its subjective experiences.

If the dog does not experience its own subjective experience, then by definition there is no subjective experience to speak of.

It is logically inconsistent to hold that the dog is conscious of (say) pain and also that there is nothing it is like to be the dog. If the dog has subjective experience of pain, it must follow that this pain feels like something to the dog; therefore it is 'like something' to be this dog.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
You don't need to perceive that you perceive in order to be conscious.

I know. That's not what I said. You need to perceive that you perceive in order for it to be "like something" to be you. You can be conscious without this introspection.

This is almost akin to the homunculan problem-- why should we stop at perception of perception? Why shouldn't we have to perceive that we perceive that we perceive in order to be conscious? Alternatively, why should perception of perception entail consciousness (subjective experience), but not perception alone?

Again (just to make sure I'm clear), it is not necessary for consciousness, but for it to be "like something" to be you.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Define introspection.

Perceiving that you perceive (and any conclusions drawn from this perception).

If the dog feels pain, then there is something it is like for this dog to feel this pain. Otherwise, the dog cannot be said to feel pain in the first place.

Yes, it is like something to feel pain, for a dog. What I said is that it is not like something to be a dog, since the dog doesn't even know it's a dog.

If the dog does not experience its own subjective experience, then by definition there is no subjective experience to speak of.

But the dog does experience its experience. It just doesn't know that it's doing that.

It is logically inconsistent to hold that the dog is conscious of (say) pain and also that there is nothing it is like to be the dog. If the dog has subjective experience of pain, it must follow that this pain feels like something to the dog; therefore it is 'like something' to be this dog. [

No, therefore it is like something for this dog to feel pain.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
I know. That's not what I said. You need to perceive that you perceive in order for it to be "like something" to be you.

Again (just to make sure I'm clear), it is not necessary for consciousness, but for it to be "like something" to be you. [/B]

It is consistently agreed by philosophers that consciousness is 'something that it is like'. This is how it is usually defined. What you say here is therefore self-contradictory.

There is no a priori reason why 'perceiving that we percieve' is necessary to consciousness, and Buddhists would strongly disgree with the idea.

However perceiver and perceived are both probably necessary to 'phenomenal consciousness', i.e. consciousness of phenomena, since these phenomena are contents of consciousness, and therefore require the existence of something that contains them.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
No, therefore it is like something for this dog to feel pain.

I think you have been making the assumption that "it is like something to be creature X" means that it is like something to experience creature X's sense of self. From this it would follow that if creature X has no sense of self, there is nothing it is like to be creature X.

However, this is not how the terminology in general is used. When we say "it is like something to be creature X," we mean that, if you put yourself in creature X's shoes (so to speak), you would have some sort of subjective experience. From your own admission that it is like something for a dog to feel pain, it follows that "if we 'put ourselves in a dog's shoes,' it would be like something for us to feel this dog's pain." This argument works just as well if we substitute any arbitrary conscious perception in for 'pain.' So, as long as the dog is conscious of something, we say it is like something to be this dog.

 

[Canute]

Oh yes, that's a much better way of explaining it.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
It is consistently agreed by philosophers that consciousness is 'something that it is like'. This is how it is usually defined. What you say here is therefore self-contradictory.

Oh. Consciousness was defined rather differently in the books I've read...but, I could be completely wrong (as usual ).

There is no a priori reason why 'perceiving that we percieve' is necessary to consciousness, and Buddhists would strongly disgree with the idea.

But I didn't say it was necessary to consciousness, I said it was necessary to knowing what it is like to be you...and knowing what it is like to be you is necessary for it to be "like something" to be you, since if you don't know what it's like to be you, who does?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I think you have been making the assumption that "it is like something to be creature X" means that it is like something to experience creature X's sense of self. From this it would follow that if creature X has no sense of self, there is nothing it is like to be creature X.

However, this is not how the terminology in general is used.

Then I apologize for my misconception. You are exactly right as to how I was taking that term.

When we say "it is like something to be creature X," we mean that, if you put yourself in creature X's shoes (so to speak), you would have some sort of subjective experience. From your own admission that it is like something for a dog to feel pain, it follows that "if we 'put ourselves in a dog's shoes,' it would be like something for us to feel this dog's pain." This argument works just as well if we substitute any arbitrary conscious perception in for 'pain.' So, as long as the dog is conscious of something, we say it is like something to be this dog.

But (and please forgive me if this is a stupid question) doesn't this just prove that it is like something for a dog to do X? I've never disputed this, it's whether it's like something for the dog to just be a dog that I've disputed. I don't quite see how you can separate having conscious self-perception from it being "like something" to be you.

A little more help please .

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
But (and please forgive me if this is a stupid question) doesn't this just prove that it is like something for a dog to do X? I've never disputed this, it's whether it's like something for the dog to just be a dog that I've disputed. I don't quite see how you can separate having conscious self-perception from it being "like something" to be you.

A little more help please .

You could indeed equally well phrase it, "it is like something for a dog to do X," eg "it is like something for a dog to smell a tree." The phrasing "it is like something to be a dog" just highlights the first-person view of this 'like-ness.' That is, when we say "it is like something to be a dog," we mean something roughly like

1) A dog has a conscious perception associated with e.g. its behavior of smelling a tree-- it is 'like something' for the dog to smell the tree.
2) The dog's experience of smelling the tree is only accessible to the dog itself.
3) Therefore, if you were the dog, it would be like something for you to smell the tree.
4) Therefore, it is like something to be the dog (eg to be the dog smelling the tree, or to be the dog experiencing any other arbitrary conscious perception).

I think you get the substance of the idea; it's just a matter of phrasing.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
Oh. Consciousness was defined rather differently in the books I've read...but, I could be completely wrong (as usual ).

You're not exactly wrong. Scentists usually argue that we cannot define consciousness, and then proceed to define it as they see fit. So lots of definitions turn up. However philosophers, with less at stake, usually define it as 'what it is like'. This comes from Nagel, who in a famous paper wondered what it is like to be a bat.

But I didn't say it was necessary to consciousness, I said it was necessary to knowing what it is like to be you...and knowing what it is like to be you is necessary for it to be "like something" to be you, since if you don't know what it's like to be you, who does? [/B]

Ok. But the word 'know' can be tricky here. It implies an experience and also a self-aware 'experiencer' who is separate to the experience. This leads to complications. Consciousness, at the limit, may not need a 'self'. Theoretically it can be just the experience. (It's hard to get your head around that but that's the thinking). Philosophers tend to play safe on this and stick to the simplest definition, the very minimum required for consciousness.

 

[Sikz]

seeker, your problem started when you differentiated "mental" from "physical". If mental events are not physical, then they cannot interact with the physical body (which they obviously do); therefore they must be physical.QUOTE]

What about the uncertainty principle? Couldn't the "mind" or "soul" or whatever you want to call it interact with the universe that way? Einstein is quoted as saying "I cannot believe that God plays dice!" but who says GOD is playing dice? What if the randomness of quantum physics provides a way for the non-physical to affect the physical?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
You could indeed equally well phrase it, "it is like something for a dog to do X," eg "it is like something for a dog to smell a tree." The phrasing "it is like something to be a dog" just highlights the first-person view of this 'like-ness.' That is, when we say "it is like something to be a dog," we mean something roughly like

1) A dog has a conscious perception associated with e.g. its behavior of smelling a tree-- it is 'like something' for the dog to smell the tree.
2) The dog's experience of smelling the tree is only accessible to the dog itself.
3) Therefore, if you were the dog, it would be like something for you to smell the tree.
4) Therefore, it is like something to be the dog (eg to be the dog smelling the tree, or to be the dog experiencing any other arbitrary conscious perception).

I think you get the substance of the idea; it's just a matter of phrasing.

I'm sorry, but I still don't like it.

If it is like something to do a particular thing as a dog does that thing, then that dog has subjective experience, and I never denied this. However, if it is like something to be a dog, then doesn't that refer (as you mentioned) to the first-person perspective of being a dog...but the dog doesn't know it's a dog, and so this couldn't take place, could it?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Sikz
What about the uncertainty principle? Couldn't the "mind" or "soul" or whatever you want to call it interact with the universe that way? Einstein is quoted as saying "I cannot believe that God plays dice!" but who says GOD is playing dice? What if the randomness of quantum physics provides a way for the non-physical to affect the physical?

How? The Uncertainty principle refers to a physical phenomenon. Remember my deduction of why a physical entity can never interact with a non-physical one?

 

[Sikz]

What I was saying about the Uncertainty Principle is that it leaves some things random, multiple possible outcomes with nothing to decide which occurs, one simply happens. No way to decide which PHYSICLY, but one of them obviously occurs (assuming we observe it... now we could go into all that oddness but it's really irrelevant to my point). Therefore since the outcome is physical but not determined by a physical thing, it must be determined by some non-physical thing. So either the non-physical thing is just something called "random" or it is something else, possibly even something intelligent. You see what I'm saying?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Sikz
What I was saying about the Uncertainty Principle is that it leaves some things random, multiple possible outcomes with nothing to decide which occurs, one simply happens. No way to decide which PHYSICLY, but one of them obviously occurs (assuming we observe it... now we could go into all that oddness but it's really irrelevant to my point). Therefore since the outcome is physical but not determined by a physical thing, it must be determined by some non-physical thing. So either the non-physical thing is just something called "random" or it is something else, possibly even something intelligent. You see what I'm saying?

Yes, but I think you're wrong. No offense, but there needn't be anything "determining" the result, since the "probability" is the result, and thus determination would be out of place, wouldn't it?

 

[Sikz]

And as for your explanation of why physical and aphysical cannot interact (which I just reread)... You are thinking of a direct interaction (the way physical reacts with physical or aphysical reacts with aphsyical, a homotypic reactio). But the type of reaction I am talking about already occurs everyday- a good example is the moon. The moon reacts with the Earth to orbit it, however there is a third element involved. The element is movement itself, the concept. Earth/gravity induces movement[moon]. Movement is a physical object in a certain STATE- a state is nonphysical. An aphysical object, however, can also be in a state, so it is in the aphysical category (since aphysical is anything besides physical) but it actually is more like this:

Aphysical States Physical

Random is a state that manifests itself as a physical occurence. It is possible that the state is caused (or rather, influenced) by something aphysical- rather hard to explain, but I'm sure you understand what I'm getting at.

Edit: And you are correct, there needn't be anything determining the result, and depending on your definition of a "thing" you might could say there isn't. I am only stating the possibility that an aphysical thing COULD determine/influence the result, and so achieve communication with the physical.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
I'm sorry, but I still don't like it.

If it is like something to do a particular thing as a dog does that thing, then that dog has subjective experience, and I never denied this. However, if it is like something to be a dog, then doesn't that refer (as you mentioned) to the first-person perspective of being a dog...but the dog doesn't know it's a dog, and so this couldn't take place, could it?

The dog has never heard of dogs. But the dog experiences being whatever it is. In other words it is like something to be a dog. If you were a dog you would experience smells and sounds and pains and so on, assuming dogs are conscious.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Sikz
And as for your explanation of why physical and aphysical cannot interact (which I just reread)...

Just a quick point, I appreciate your open-mindedness in having re-read my deduction on the matter, instead of just disagreeing outright. Thank you for that.

You are thinking of a direct interaction (the way physical reacts with physical or aphysical reacts with aphsyical, a homotypic reactio). But the type of reaction I am talking about already occurs everyday- a good example is the moon. The moon reacts with the Earth to orbit it, however there is a third element involved. The element is movement itself, the concept. Earth/gravity induces movement[moon]. Movement is a physical object in a certain STATE- a state is nonphysical.

A state of a physical object is a description of that object's position and the derivatives therefrom. Motion is just a first-order derivative; the change in position on the part of the object in question. There is nothing non-physical here.

An aphysical object, however, can also be in a state, so it is in the aphysical category (since aphysical is anything besides physical) but it actually is more like this:

Aphysical States Physical

Look, even if states were non-physical (which I still don't think they are, but if they were) they would then fall under the category of "intermediaries" (as per my aforementioned deduction) and would be completely useless, since the aphysical object wishing to interact was aphysical in the first place - so what use would it have for another aphysical extension?

Random is a state that manifests itself as a physical occurence. It is possible that the state is caused (or rather, influenced) by something aphysical- rather hard to explain, but I'm sure you understand what I'm getting at.

It is indeed possible, but not necessary and thus an extra assumption.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
The dog has never heard of dogs. But the dog experiences being whatever it is. In other words it is like something to be a dog. If you were a dog you would experience smells and sounds and pains and so on, assuming dogs are conscious.

If I were a dog, I would indeed experience all of these external phenomena, but introspection would be lacking. Thus, I wouldn't know what it was like to be a dog, but would know what it was like to catch a ball or chase a burglar, etc. And, if I don't know what it is like to be "me" then it isn't like anything to be me, since no one can tell what it's like to be me better than I can, right?

It still seems like introspection is necessary for it to be "like something" to be a dog...while consciousness is still present, self-consciousness is not.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
If I were a dog, I would indeed experience all of these external phenomena, but introspection would be lacking. Thus, I wouldn't know what it was like to be a dog, but would know what it was like to catch a ball or chase a burglar, etc. And, if I don't know what it is like to be "me" then it isn't like anything to be me, since no one can tell what it's like to be me better than I can, right?

That seems completely self-contradictory to me. Perhaps I'm misreading it. How can you have an experience that is not experienced, not like anything to have? What do you call an 'experience'?

It still seems like introspection is necessary for it to be "like something" to be a dog...while consciousness is still present, self-consciousness is not. [/B]

This is sort of true and sort of false imho. Selfless experiences are the stuff of Buddhism, and that's a big topic. However we needn't get into that. There is no evidence that dogs are are not aware of experiencing existence even when they're not catching balls or chasing burglars.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
That seems completely self-contradictory to me. Perhaps I'm misreading it. How can you have an experience that is not experienced, not like anything to have? What do you call an 'experience'?

No, that's the point, the dog does experience all of these things, except that s/he never experiences that s/he is a dog. That requires introspection.

This is sort of true and sort of false imho. Selfless experiences are the stuff of Buddhism, and that's a big topic. However we needn't get into that. There is no evidence that dogs are are not aware of experiencing existence even when they're not catching balls or chasing burglars.

They experience their existence, but they do not perceive that they are doing that (since they don't introspect) and thus don't know what it's like to be (I keep emphasizing this word for a reason) a dog.