How Do Mind and Body Interact in Dualism?

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The discussion centers on dualism, particularly the interaction between the mind and body. Participants explore concepts like epiphenomenalism, which suggests that the mind is a byproduct of physical processes, akin to noise from a machine. This raises questions about how mental and physical states can interact if they are fundamentally different. Some argue that consciousness may have evolved as a beneficial trait, while others contend that consciousness cannot be a product of evolution if it lacks causal power. The conversation also touches on the nature of consciousness, with debates on whether it is purely physical or if it exists as a separate entity. The role of cells and their intelligence in bodily functions is discussed, with some suggesting that consciousness could be a process of matter rather than a distinct phenomenon. Overall, the thread highlights the complexity of understanding consciousness and the ongoing philosophical challenges posed by dualism and materialism.
  • #61
Originally posted by Mentat
If I were a dog, I would indeed experience all of these external phenomena, but introspection would be lacking. Thus, I wouldn't know what it was like to be a dog, but would know what it was like to catch a ball or chase a burglar, etc. And, if I don't know what it is like to be "me" then it isn't like anything to be me, since no one can tell what it's like to be me better than I can, right?

There is no absolute thing it is like to catch a ball. The experience of catching a ball is contingent upon the cognitive system that is doing the catching. Take 3 examples: a normal human H, a human on psychoactive drugs P, and a dog D. We know that the experience of catching a ball will be different for P and H, and we have good reason to think that it will be even more different for D.

A rough analogy for this phenomenon is to say that P, H, and D all view the world through different lenses. "What it is like to be X" then amounts to "what it is like to see the world through the lens of X." If some particular creature cannot see itself through its lens, but can see at least some things nonetheless, then it is still like something to see the world through its lens. Likewise, if some particular creature has no sense of self, but has some consciousness of at least some things nonetheless, then it is still like something to be that creature.
 
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  • #62
Originally posted by Mentat
No, that's the point, the dog does experience all of these things, except that s/he never experiences that s/he is a dog. That requires introspection.

You cannot have an experience unless you are experiencing having it by defintion. There is always 'something that it is like' to have an experience. If there isn't then it isn't an experience. Either there is 'something that it is like' to be a dog or dogs do not have experiences. It's either/or, it can't be a bit of both.

You can prove this for yourself. Have you ever had an experience which wasn't like something to have?
 
  • #63
Originally posted by hypnagogue
There is no absolute thing it is like to catch a ball. The experience of catching a ball is contingent upon the cognitive system that is doing the catching. Take 3 examples: a normal human H, a human on psychoactive drugs P, and a dog D. We know that the experience of catching a ball will be different for P and H, and we have good reason to think that it will be even more different for D.

A rough analogy for this phenomenon is to say that P, H, and D all view the world through different lenses. "What it is like to be X" then amounts to "what it is like to see the world through the lens of X." If some particular creature cannot see itself through its lens, but can see at least some things nonetheless, then it is still like something to see the world through its lens. Likewise, if some particular creature has no sense of self, but has some consciousness of at least some things nonetheless, then it is still like something to be that creature.

I see what you mean. I guess my point was resting on the idea that for it to be "like something" to be X doing Y is not significant, but to just be X...well, that would require introspection. Now that I come to think about it, it really isn't possible to "just be X", since you are always doing something, and it wouldn't be "like anything" to be you, since you wouldn't "be". In that case, it makes me wonder if it's "like something" to "be" anything! I mean, it's like something to be X doing Y, but is it like something to just be X?

Anyway, I can see that it's like something for the dog to see the world through the "eyes" of a dog, and it is thus "like something" to be the dog.
 
  • #64
Originally posted by Canute
You cannot have an experience unless you are experiencing having it by defintion. There is always 'something that it is like' to have an experience. If there isn't then it isn't an experience. Either there is 'something that it is like' to be a dog or dogs do not have experiences. It's either/or, it can't be a bit of both.

You can prove this for yourself. Have you ever had an experience which wasn't like something to have?

No, I had already said that it is always "like something" to experience something, but was wondering of it was always "like something" to be a certain conscious creature. I guess I was wrong on this point as well, though...not completely convinced, but leaning toward that conclusion .
 
  • #65
Mentat

I don't think you're completely wrong. (I'm not sure it's possible to ever be completely wrong).

'Being' is normally associated with knowing that one exists. This doesn't require anything but having an experience of existing. In that sense you are wrong about 'doing', having to catch balls or chase burglars or whatever in order to be conscious.

But at the limit, in a state of what some people would call 'selfless' being, there is a question about whether that constitues consciousnes or not. Without a 'self' can one be conscious? At first glance the answer seems to be no.

But Buddhists say yes and no, and that being and non-being are one at the limit. There are two ways of looking at it. They suggest that the we should look at it both ways, since the duality of being and non-being is an illusion, the wrong way of thinking about it (or experiencing it).

(They also say that the only way to test this assertion is to find out for yourself).
 
  • #66
Originally posted by Canute
Mentat

I don't think you're completely wrong. (I'm not sure it's possible to ever be completely wrong).

'Being' is normally associated with knowing that one exists. This doesn't require anything but having an experience of existing. In that sense you are wrong about 'doing', having to catch balls or chase burglars or whatever in order to be conscious.

But at the limit, in a state of what some people would call 'selfless' being, there is a question about whether that constitues consciousnes or not. Without a 'self' can one be conscious? At first glance the answer seems to be no.

But Buddhists say yes and no, and that being and non-being are one at the limit. There are two ways of looking at it. They suggest that the we should look at it both ways, since the duality of being and non-being is an illusion, the wrong way of thinking about it (or experiencing it).

(They also say that the only way to test this assertion is to find out for yourself).

Hmm...didn't David Hume once write something about whether there was a self aside from his experiences? Something about how, if you were to strip away all of his experiences and knowledge and genes (though I don't think he actually mentioned genes) there would be no "self" left behind, and thus the self must be the collection of these things.
 
  • #67
Yeah, I think just about everyone, whatever their metaphysical beliefs, agrees that the 'self' is an illusion, a personal construct.
 
  • #68
Originally posted by Canute
Yeah, I think just about everyone, whatever their metaphysical beliefs, agrees that the 'self' is an illusion, a personal construct.

If only this were true! There are so many people who subscribe to a kind of Dualism, wherein the "mindful self" can remain a separate entity from the body and the experiences...that's part of the reason for my contempt for Dualism: Most of its forms are merely there for the benefit of people who can't accept what science and philosophy have shown time and time again.

However, hypnagogue has propose a very different dualism, and I'm not completely sure that he's wrong.
 
  • #69
Originally posted by Mentat
If only this were true! There are so many people who subscribe to a kind of Dualism, wherein the "mindful self" can remain a separate entity from the body and the experiences...that's part of the reason for my contempt for Dualism: Most of its forms are merely there for the benefit of people who can't accept what science and philosophy have shown time and time again.

However, hypnagogue has propose a very different dualism, and I'm not completely sure that he's wrong.
I didn't say that people thought that consciousness was an illusion! I said 'self'. Very few people think that consciousness is an illusion, if any.
 
  • #70
Originally posted by Canute
I didn't say that people thought that consciousness was an illusion! I said 'self'.

Indeed. Dualism usually has to do with the "self", not just consciousness.
 
  • #71
Originally posted by Mentat
Indeed. Dualism usually has to do with the "self", not just consciousness.
It is sometimes, I agree. This is because some people think that consciousness is no more than 'self'. Not many, but there are some. Is this relevant?
 

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