Is 'I Think, Therefore I Am' a Valid and Obvious Philosophy?

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In summary, Descarte's famous saying "I think, therefore, I am" comes from an argument in which an Evil Demon tried to convince a man that everything he believed was false, but could not prove that the man himself did not exist. The saying highlights the fact that thinking is proof of one's existence. However, others believe that attentiveness to one's being or experiencing can also lead to the awareness of existence. Some suggest a slight modification to the saying, such as "I think therefore I know" or "I think therefore I am aware". Ultimately, the saying is just a conclusion of an argument and should not be taken too literally.

Was Descartes right?

  • Yes

    Votes: 25 75.8%
  • No

    Votes: 8 24.2%

  • Total voters
    33
  • #71
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
Either you are still missing the point, or I am. You still keep implying that I'm saying "there need be an I to [bleep]". I am not saying that. I am saying that there need be an "I" for "I" to [bleep].
No, no, no! I'm not implying anything. Only if you got the catch of that proof! Suppose there are two independent statements, one is Descartes' statement and the other is my P([beep]). We want to see if Descartes' statement is true or not, but before we do this I ask of you of the state you associate with P([beep]). See, P([beep]) is just a helper. Then you say that P([beep]) is true or false. The true/false state of P([beep]) has nothing to do with Descartes' statement. After you've given P([beep]) its state, we come to study Descartes' statement. Then I turn to you and show that Descartes' statement will lead to undesirable situations, "with regard to P([beep])." And I show that this happens for all states P([beep]) can assume.

This means there's an incompatibility between all the states P([beep]) may assume and Descartes' statement. Now, with asking for P([beep]) state and assigning a state to it, I haven't done anything illogical and I've also let you choose its state as you wish. There must be something wrong with the view point from which the problem is viewed. Simply put, Descartes' statement is incompatible with this viewpoint.
Which is why the "P[bleep]" reasoning doesn't apply to Descartes' philosophy. You must substitute an entity for "P" in order for it to be at all relevant to Descartes' philosophy.
I designed the proof and then you tell me what to do? I wanted to design it the way it is. P is a function, can you understand this? It has an input and an output, nothing more. P isn't part of the statement, it's the function that maps [beep] into the statement I wanted.

Let me see, do you know what f(x) means in Mathematics?
Then how can it possibly be relevant to this discussion?
I told you many times before. P is a helper device. In that proof P isn't being studied, P is "being used." P "is used" to study Descartes' statement. A tin-opener is not a can but it's used to open a can. When you open cans, you don't say "how can a tin-opener be relevant here?" The tin-opener and the can are different but they're both involved in the mutual task of opening a can.
But you haven't showed that. You have showed that all statements of the form "P[bleep]" (the function notation) lead to undesirable results. And yet, you yourself have said that this reasoning (P[bleep] reasoning) is irrelevant to Descartes' philosophy.
I've shown, you didn't get it. P([beep]) leads to undesirable results, that's right but how then? In association with Descartes' statement.

I didn't say P([beep]) reasoning is irrelevant to Descartes' statement, I said P([beep]) is distinct and irrelevant to that statement. A tin-opener's action isn't irrelevant to the can being opened but the tin-opener itself is irrelevant to and distinct from the can.
Is it really a "helper device" if it is entirely separate from and irrelevant to Descartes' type of reasoning (as shown above)?
Yes! You see how it works if you understand what is going on in that proof.
Which should lead you to discard Uncertainty. If Uncertainty plagues itself (because of it's paradoxical and self-contradictory nature), then it isn't useful, it's plagued. Why would you stay with something that was plagued, when you could continue with non-paradoxical studies, such as Science/Philosophy?
Once again, this isn't the way I've chosen. This is the way it is. Science is a disguise and Philosophy is not what you call Philosophy.
It is not inevitable. It is a choice, that you already seem certain of.
It is inevitable for it is the most general. How can you avoid the most general while you're concerned with its particulars?
If one is Uncertain about all things, then there can be no boundary. However, this creates a paradox similar to that of the paradox of limitlessness, which I have discussed on numerous threads. This means that Uncertainty itself, when applied to all things, is paradoxical. Not just plagued/dirty/difficult, but paradoxical, and paradox is the dead-end of progressive knowledge, as I see it.
How did you conclude that? That I'm uncertain of everything (you're right, I can't be but I pretend to) doesn't have any implication but that I'm uncertain of everything. It won't give me power over something so it won't break any hard boundaries. Broken are the boundaries of my mind, those chains that needn't be there.

And I have no problem with paradoxes and paradoxical speech. Your paradoxes are merely lexical ambiguities but those paradoxes I'm concerned with are those relying not on ambiguity in literary expressions but on the nature of human knowledge.
Well, sure, I should be able to see other options. But, in doing so, I have to be able to look beyond Uncertainty itself. The only thing other than Uncertainty is Certainty, and since there isn't supposed to be anything certain, I shouldn't be able to look beyond Uncertainty. Thus, Uncertainty is a dead-end, isn't it?
Yes, you have to look beyond Uncertainty, too. That's when that residual understanding I wrote of comes in.

Suppose Uncertainty is a dead-end, what then? Just tell me what then? Suppose you (and all humanity) have tried to sincerely study human knowledge or human being and you've encountered a dead-end. Wouldn't that be much more honorable than making an excuse, named Certainty, to intoxicate your mind and shield it against what is forthcoming? Certainty is a narcotic, I told you before. Narcotics aren't all bad, you need them sometimes to relieve but take it too much and you'll never get out of it.
I do question that which is apparent. However, I do so through the use of logic and progressive knowledge. I build off of foundations, instead of reinventing the wheel at every point. I will question the foundation later, but if you question everything at once, you start all over again, every time.
One such apparent thing would be "the use of logic and progressive knowledge." Don't you mind questioning this one?

Those foundations you're talking of are for others. They had their own and you should have your own, if you're really interested in having them. I told you before, this isn't re-inventing the same wheel all the time, it's inventing your "own" "all-new" wheel which's "unlike" any wheel that's come before and that'll come after.
Irrationality is mere "mishmash". That's the point of the irrational. If you say that there is something rational about irrationality, then you have another paradox on your hands. How many paradoxes must one run into, before abandoning a certain line of reasoning?
Irrationality has its own rationale like I said. That "rationale" is an extended version of the "rationale" you understand.

You think of irrationality and imagine picturesque scenes of humans fighting to death for nothing. That's one sort of irrationality. There are other kinds of it. Think of so many hermits with all sorts of odd faith, and even no faith, who've lived peaceful lives without your rationality. They had their own way of ordering things and that was their rationale. The order of things was different for them but it wasn't mishmash. Think of all peoples of ancient times who've lived their lives in so many ways that would seem absurd to the people of these days. Yet they were righteous over what they did.


Once again, if you insist that's a paradox, well, that's a paradox, what then?
And thus, you use Uncertainty to get certainty. And yet, Uncertainty dictates that there are no certainties. How can a line of reasoning lead to something, when it (the line of reasoning) is based on teh premise that that "something" doesn't exist?
I don't use Uncertainty to "get" Certainty. I use it to "approach" Certainty. That's the twist. A Physicist will never be certain of the physical Universe but she/he will, led by the Uncertainty drive, approach Certainty day by day step by step.
A foundation, from which to question that which I am not certain about. There's not enough time in life to question everything. I'm only 14 and I know that.
You can take any foundation you like but I think, being uncertain is much more honorable that being certain of something that holds no certainty.

I understand what you mean. The life is short, you're right and I agree with you but then couldn't we be wrong? Couldn't we be dying for we think we must die someday? This isn't ridicule, think about it.
Well, it's my outlook on life. How is "nothing is certain" better than "progressive knowledge is necessary"?
Now that's a brilliant question. My answer is "noway." Suppositions of any sort are equally creditable but they can be more or less general. "Nothing is certain" leaves a way open for any new idea to come in while "progressive knowledge is necessary" is like condemning a whole bunch of new ideas that have equal creditability to those ideas enhanced and promoted by the supposition, "progressive knowledge is necessary."

"Nothing is uncertain" is so general that it can incorporate the other supposition but the other supposition isn't that general.

You may ask why I prefer more general suppositions. I'd say that's a matter of taste. If you agree to Uncertainty, everything and every choice will become a matter of taste. I don't know if you like this.
 
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  • #72
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

No, no, no! I'm not implying anything. Only if you got the catch of that proof! Suppose there are two independent statements, one is Descartes' statement and the other is my P([beep]). We want to see if Descartes' statement is true or not, but before we do this I ask of you of the state you associate with P([beep]). See, P([beep]) is just a helper. Then you say that P([beep]) is true or false. The true/false state of P([beep]) has nothing to do with Descartes' statement. After you've given P([beep]) its state, we come to study Descartes' statement. Then I turn to you and show that Descartes' statement will lead to undesirable situations, "with regard to P([beep])." And I show that this happens for all states P([beep]) can assume.

This means there's an incompatibility between all the states P([beep]) may assume and Descartes' statement. Now, with asking for P([beep]) state and assigning a state to it, I haven't done anything illogical and I've also let you choose its state as you wish. There must be something wrong with the view point from which the problem is viewed. Simply put, Descartes' statement is incompatible with this viewpoint.


But, Descartes' statement is not of the form "P([bleep])". That's what I've been trying to say. I understand functions in Algebra, but I don't think that Descartes' statement is using "I" as a function. Hence, I don't think that any reasoning on the problems of statements of the form "P([bleep])" is relevant to Descartes' philosophy.

I designed the proof and then you tell me what to do? I wanted to design it the way it is. P is a function, can you understand this? It has an input and an output, nothing more. P isn't part of the statement, it's the function that maps [beep] into the statement I wanted.

Yes, "P" is a function. But "I" in Descartes' statement is not. It doesn't work the same way. I didn't mean to tell you what to do, when discussing a "P([bleep])" philosophy, I was telling you that - if you wanted to use a variable in the place of the word "I" in Descartes' statement - you had to replace "I" with some other entity.

I told you many times before. P is a helper device. In that proof P isn't being studied, P is "being used." P "is used" to study Descartes' statement. A tin-opener is not a can but it's used to open a can. When you open cans, you don't say "how can a tin-opener be relevant here?" The tin-opener and the can are different but they're both involved in the mutual task of opening a can.

But, as I've been trying to tell you, P is a helper device for other philosophies - not this philosophy of Descartes' (for the above reasons).

I've shown, you didn't get it. P([beep]) leads to undesirable results, that's right but how then? In association with Descartes' statement.

I didn't say P([beep]) reasoning is irrelevant to Descartes' statement, I said P([beep]) is distinct and irrelevant to that statement. A tin-opener's action isn't irrelevant to the can being opened but the tin-opener itself is irrelevant to and distinct from the can.

Yes, I know what you said. However, a tin-opener is useful for a can, while the P[bleep]-type philosophy that you are examining is not useful for understanding Descartes' statement.

Yes! You see how it works if you understand what is going on in that proof.

Once again, this isn't the way I've chosen. This is the way it is. Science is a disguise and Philosophy is not what you call Philosophy.

It is inevitable for it is the most general. How can you avoid the most general while you're concerned with its particulars?
How did you conclude that? That I'm uncertain of everything (you're right, I can't be but I pretend to) doesn't have any implication but that I'm uncertain of everything. It won't give me power over something so it won't break any hard boundaries. Broken are the boundaries of my mind, those chains that needn't be there.

And yet, in "breaking" those "chains", you enslave yourself to irrationality and paradox, and this is no better than being enslaved to progressive understanding.

And I have no problem with paradoxes and paradoxical speech. Your paradoxes are merely lexical ambiguities but those paradoxes I'm concerned with are those relying not on ambiguity in literary expressions but on the nature of human knowledge.
Yes, you have to look beyond Uncertainty, too. That's when that residual understanding I wrote of comes in.

You can't look beyond Uncertainty, if Uncertainty is your premise. That is the nature of absolute Uncertainty. It doesn't allow you to use it (or anything else, for that matter) as a foundation, because nothing is certain, and foundations must be at least partially certain.

Suppose Uncertainty is a dead-end, what then? Just tell me what then? Suppose you (and all humanity) have tried to sincerely study human knowledge or human being and you've encountered a dead-end. Wouldn't that be much more honorable than making an excuse, named Certainty, to intoxicate your mind and shield it against what is forthcoming? Certainty is a narcotic, I told you before. Narcotics aren't all bad, you need them sometimes to relieve but take it too much and you'll never get out of it.

And I have (repeatedly) told you that I like uncertainty, and I recognize it's necessity. I just know that too much of it is also bad. I'm certain of very few things, and leave most things uncertain. However, this is all - as I've said before - the subject for another thread.

One such apparent thing would be "the use of logic and progressive knowledge." Don't you mind questioning this one?

Not when the argument that I'm currently on requires this as a premise. As a matter of form, I cannot question all foundations at the same time. It's not just paradoxical, but it also doesn't allow me to ever answer the question that I started out trying to answer.

Those foundations you're talking of are for others. They had their own and you should have your own, if you're really interested in having them. I told you before, this isn't re-inventing the same wheel all the time, it's inventing your "own" "all-new" wheel which's "unlike" any wheel that's come before and that'll come after.

Yes, but your still inventing a wheel, when the problem your really trying to resolve has to do with the combustion engine of a Dodge Viper (please try to understand my illustration, I don't think I have enough space left, on this post, to explain it).

Irrationality has its own rationale like I said. That "rationale" is an extended version of the "rationale" you understand.

Irrationality, by definition and common use, cannot have a rationale of any kind.

You think of irrationality and imagine picturesque scenes of humans fighting to death for nothing. That's one sort of irrationality. There are other kinds of it. Think of so many hermits with all sorts of odd faith, and even no faith, who've lived peaceful lives without your rationality. They had their own way of ordering things and that was their rationale.

Yes, they didn't have my rationale, but they had one. That's the point. If they were truly irrational, they would have no rationale, whatsoever.

The order of things was different for them but it wasn't mishmash. Think of all peoples of ancient times who've lived their lives in so many ways that would seem absurd to the people of these days. Yet they were righteous over what they did.

Again, they were still rational, just in a different way than the typical person of today.

Once again, if you insist that's a paradox, well, that's a paradox,
what then?

You shouldn't speak of paradox as though it were just another logical approach. Or just another consequence. A paradox is the dead-end of reasoning on anyone idea. Resulting in paradox usually leads people to discard that idea and try another.

A Physicist will never be certain of the physical Universe but she/he will, led by the Uncertainty drive, approach Certainty day by day step by step.
You can take any foundation you like but I think, being uncertain is much more honorable that being certain of something that holds no certainty.

Uncertainty doesn't hold any certainty either.

Couldn't we be dying for we think we must die someday? This isn't ridicule, think about it.

Well, if we're dying because we think we will die, then discussing it is making us all the more likely to die :wink:.

"Nothing is certain" leaves a way open for any new idea to come in while "progressive knowledge is necessary" is like condemning a whole bunch of new ideas that have equal creditability to those ideas enhanced and promoted by the supposition, "progressive knowledge is necessary."

Well, actually, if your premise is "progressive knowledge is necessary", then those "other ideas" don't really have "equal creditability".

"Nothing is uncertain" is so general that it can incorporate the other supposition but the other supposition isn't that general.

"Nothing is uncertain" is not the premise that we were talking about. "Nothing is uncertain" is the opposite of your Uncertainty, and is equally wrong, IMO.

You may ask why I prefer more general suppositions. I'd say that's a matter of taste. If you agree to Uncertainty, everything and every choice will become a matter of taste. I don't know if you like this.

No, I don't. I think that moderation is important. Thus, whether to behave in a civilised manner on every occasion (for example) will not be a matter of taste, but a matter of form.
 
  • #73
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
But, Descartes' statement is not of the form "P([bleep])"...

... But "I" in Descartes' statement is not. It doesn't work the same way. I didn't mean to tell you what to do, when discussing a "P([bleep])" philosophy ...
That's right. The P([beep]) statement is not the statement category ("I think therefore I am" and similar) proven absurd in that proof. You're just stating the reason I wrote that P([beep]) was "irrelevant to" and "independent from" Descartes' statement, that it was just a helper device.

I've times described how this helper device works. It's irrelevant to Descartes' statement but it's engineered so that it causes trouble when the study of Descartes' statement is seen in association with P([beep]) state.

There may be faults in that proof. It may be wrong but what you're pointing out is "your" misconception. I've wrote so many times that the subject of study in that proof is Descartes' statement and P([beep]) is only a "helper device," so you can't tell me that since my P([beep]) isn't Descartes' statement the proof isn't studying that statement. Back to the tin-opener analogy, you can't tell me that since a tin-opener isn't a can, its task can't be opening cans.

I've done the best I could to describe it for you. Understanding that proof and criticizing it in its own context is your job. I think it'd be beneficial if you invite some PF member to take a look at it and explain it some other way so that you can understand.
And yet, in "breaking" those "chains", you enslave yourself to irrationality and paradox, ...
At every given time, one is chained to a specific system of thoughts. What matters is the fairness and sincerity of that system of thoughts. Another thing that matters is the awareness of the chained mind of its chains.

So far that I've learnt, Uncertainty (if you like, Paradox and Irrationality) is the most sincere way to study something. Uncertainty implies absence of bias and prejudice.

Obviously enough, Uncertainty isn't a practical way. This isn't because of Uncertainty being useless, it's because of what we mean with "practice" and "practicality." We see practicality in terms of what satisfies our desires (the roots of these desires I don't know) and the more of satisfaction is the more of practicality. Uncertainty is for known and unknown reasons dissatisfying for it robs one of security, simplicity, ease, self-confidence and self-righteousness. These aspects of human life that fade away when Uncertainty comes in, are necessary for leading a normal life. Without them we could never be choosing our next moments' actions. These aspects are so important that they simply can't be taken away. Resultant is a milder version of Uncertainty that won't hurt these aspects much.

There's a fair way to avoid the loss of these aspects while avoiding being unfair with ignoring Uncertainty. That's the way of simultaneous acceptance and denial (another paradox, spot it, get it right there, get it up against "The Wall" ). One will be aware and cautious of Uncertainty while one acts as if nothing's happened.

In order not to waste the fairness of this way, one should be warned against any unnecessary certainties. One such "unnecessary" certainty is the existence (lest you see me, I know :wink:). It really won't change much of one's perspective if one's informed of her/his existence/non-existence if this information doesn't change any aspect of her/his life.

I have to admit you wrote of "mild" Uncertainty before and were right with that but I didn't like the way you talked of it; it sounded to me like you were saying "well, we have this here and that there, I like this you like that, but if you insist I'll take a bit of that, too."
... As a matter of form, I cannot question all foundations at the same time. It's not just paradoxical, ...
Let me see, you question a part of the foundation, make it up with it and go to the next. Seems pretty procedural task! Yet it's problematic. Whilst you question a certain part of the foundation you'll be assuming other parts true, won't you? And if the foundation is a coherent structure the validity of every part of it will be enough to prove other parts valid. Now "you" have a dead-end at hand, if you only question one part of the foundation, which is a coherent structure, every time you'll simply prove that part valid because you've assumed the other parts of the foundation.

The foundation, as a coherent structure, must be removed, thoroughly examined and then put back where it belongs. No part of the foundation can be allowed as a premise for studying the same foundation.
Yes, but your still inventing a wheel, when the problem your really trying to resolve has to do with the combustion engine...
I understand what you wrote as "you are trying to modify the whole while you're asked to modify only the particulars."

This doesn't seem right to me. Making one's own system of thoughts involves the re-thinking of all one has as thoughts and then thinking new thoughts. This task must be done bottom-to-top and in order of complexity. The most basic intuition seems to be an intuition of existence (one that you're trying to change into a solid statement) so the first thing to be re-thought is the meaning, validity and works of existence. For this re-thinking one can't rely on any other thoughts for they are yet-to-come thoughts that haven't been revised.

Re-thinking isn't a work on particulars, it's ought to alter the whole. Consqeuently, it's equal to re-inventing a "new" wheel, not a mistake between the rudimentary conecpt of a wheel and the much higher level concept of a combustion engine peculiar to a specific car. Systems of thoughts are peculiar to their owners, the thinkers, so every system of thoughts must be built from the bottom to the top and without referencing other systems for the validity of other systems is, in the best case, limited to their owner. External references can only be used as helpers in explaining common or similar concepts, ie you can't point out Kant's idea on something and take that for a part of your system of thoughts but you may point at his idea and say "see, it's these points in common." It's obvious that similarities between two systems of thoughts one of which has gained public credit can't be held as an advantage for either of the systems.
Irrationality, by definition and common use, cannot have a rationale of any kind.

Yes, they didn't have my rationale, but they had one. That's the point. If they were truly irrational, they would have no rationale, whatsoever.
Let's have your word. The consequence: there's never been such thing as irrationality for there's never been actions without some sort of rationale behind them. And there's never been systems of thoughts without a supportive skeleton of "rationale," one way or the other.

You claim that Uncertainty leads to irrationality but then you claim that every order in the things can be considered a rationale and isn't included in irrationals list. Now, Uncertainty has its own order of things. This order may be comlicated or even too complicated to comprehend but it is there. To conclude, Uncertainty isn't irrationality or irrational.

If you like it that way I can say that Uncertainty isn't irrational but has it's own not-so-much-publicized rationale. Does that work?
You shouldn't speak of paradox as though it were just another logical approach...
I don't speak of paradox as another logical approach. I speak of it as the end to a "specific" form of logic. That which is a paradox in one logical system can be worked out simply in another system. The sight of a paradox isn't a dead-end. It's a call to change and a call to a new system. A paradox indicates that a logical system isn't even self-sufficient, let alone sufficient. A paradox is the rise of countless possibilities that were oppressed by the materialization of a certain possibility which hasn't "necessarily" been superior to those countless possibilities.

And what "people" do isn't the measure of what we do.
Uncertainty doesn't hold any certainty either.
That's true but it gives you a perspective of countless options, at least. I didn't say it held certainty. I said it was more honorable than the "usual" excuse, certainty.
Well, if we're dying because we think we will die, then discussing it is making us all the more likely to die.
You see the dark side of it. The same discussion may make us re-think the concept of death and, who knows, perhaps discard it.
Well, actually, if your premise is "progressive knowledge is necessary", then those "other ideas" don't really have "equal creditability".
That's it. If you want to be fair in judging suppositions, first you have to be independent of them. In the court of fair judgment all suppositions are equally creditable for the judge isn't initially committed to any of them. It's after the judgment that premises come. Premises are the outcome of judgment and a choice of suppositions that've seemed the best to the court of fair judgment.
"Nothing is uncertain" is not the premise that we were talking about...
Shame on me! I've played this certain-uncertain thing so much that I mix them all up. I beg your pardon. I meant "nothing is certain."
No, I don't. I think that moderation is important...
You mean you tend to choose certain behavior and "officially" declare them "superior in form" and then present them as the "right" behavior?

Every choice is a matter of the chooser's taste. You may like to behave in a civilized manner on every ocassion while this me likes better not to do it that way every once in a while.

Do you give up chooser's choice for the groundless superiority assigned by the society?
 
  • #74
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
1. For Mentat:
That's right. The P([beep]) statement is not the statement category ("I think therefore I am" and similar) proven absurd in that proof. You're just stating the reason I wrote that P([beep]) was "irrelevant to" and "independent from" Descartes' statement, that it was just a helper device.

Ok, for the millionth time. P([bleep]) reasoning is a helper device for other philosophies. It cannot be applied to Descartes' philosophy, unless you have some argument that you haven't yet presented. A tin-opener can be fitted to a can, thus it can be useful. However, I'm telling you that P([bleep]) reasoning doesn't "fit" with Descartes' statement. It cannot be made to fit, as far as I've seen - and you have not made any effort to "fit" them, taking it as obvious that this kind of reasoning (P([bleep])) is helpful.

I've times described how this helper device works. It's irrelevant to Descartes' statement but it's engineered so that it causes trouble when the study of Descartes' statement is seen in association with P([beep]) state.

There is no association. P([bleep]) requires that P is a function of whatever [bleep] stands for. Descartes' statement requires that P is an entity, that acts out [bleep].

There may be faults in that proof. It may be wrong but what you're pointing out is "your" misconception. I've wrote so many times that the subject of study in that proof is Descartes' statement and P([beep]) is only a "helper device," so you can't tell me that since my P([beep]) isn't Descartes' statement the proof isn't studying that statement. Back to the tin-opener analogy, you can't tell me that since a tin-opener isn't a can, its task can't be opening cans.

The proof isn't studying the statement, but not because they are different. It's because they are unrelated, the don't "fit" (see above).

At every given time, one is chained to a specific system of thoughts. What matters is the fairness and sincerity of that system of thoughts.

And yet, to ascertain the "fairness and sincerity" of that system, you need to look at it from outside that system. In doing so, you must make use of another system, whose "fairness and sincerity" you haven't determined.

Obviously enough, Uncertainty isn't a practical way. This isn't because of Uncertainty being useless, it's because of what we mean with "practice" and "practicality." We see practicality in terms of what satisfies our desires (the roots of these desires I don't know) and the more of satisfaction is the more of practicality.

I'll tell you the root of these desires: survival. Humans would not have survived this long, if they hadn't used "practicality" and "progressive knowledge". Now, they are safe enough to question, but the "roots" are now deeply engrained.

Uncertainty is for known and unknown reasons dissatisfying for it robs one of security, simplicity, ease, self-confidence and self-righteousness.

This sounds like wuliheron's reasoning, and I only partially agree. I think that some uncertainty can accomplish this purpose, but full Uncertainty just robs you of any progressive knowledge, and thus you get "stuck".

There's a fair way to avoid the loss of these aspects while avoiding being unfair with ignoring Uncertainty. That's the way of simultaneous acceptance and denial (another paradox, spot it, get it right there, get it up against "The Wall" ). One will be aware and cautious of Uncertainty while one acts as if nothing's happened.

I don't get this. You are saying, "I have an answer", then you say "My answer is paradoxical". What is supposed to incline me toward listening to this "answer"?

It really won't change much of one's perspective if one's informed of her/his non-existence

But, this "information" (of his/her non-existence) cannot be true, otherwise who would you be "informing" (Descartes' reasoning again)?

I have to admit you wrote of "mild" Uncertainty before and were right with that but I didn't like the way you talked of it; it sounded to me like you were saying "well, we have this here and that there, I like this you like that, but if you insist I'll take a bit of that, too."

That wasn't the way I intended you to take it. I meant that it's good to have some uncertainty, and that everything can be questioned, but in turns. You must take some things for granted while questioning others, and then later question the things that you previously took for granted, while taking the previous uncertainties as now certain. You just shouldn't be uncertain of all things at once. Can't be, IMHO.

Whilst you question a certain part of the foundation you'll be assuming other parts true, won't you? And if the foundation is a coherent structure the validity of every part of it will be enough to prove other parts valid. Now "you" have a dead-end at hand, if you only question one part of the foundation, which is a coherent structure, every time you'll simply prove that part valid because you've assumed the other parts of the foundation.

This reasoning isn't just for questioning foundations, but for questioning new assumptions/speculations, as well.

I'll finish my response in the next post...
 
  • #75
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
The foundation, as a coherent structure, must be removed, thoroughly examined and then put back where it belongs. No part of the foundation can be allowed as a premise for studying the same foundation.
I understand what you wrote as "you are trying to modify the whole while you're asked to modify only the particulars."

What you are missing is that it is impossible to question all foundations at once. I've tried to reason on it, and I can't, it's just not possible to do it. Let me explain: If it tried to question all foundations, then my foundation would become "question all previous foundations". However, since this is a foundation in itself, you are not questioning all foundations.

This doesn't seem right to me. Making one's own system of thoughts involves the re-thinking of all one has as thoughts and then thinking new thoughts. This task must be done bottom-to-top and in order of complexity. The most basic intuition seems to be an intuition of existence (one that you're trying to change into a solid statement) so the first thing to be re-thought is the meaning, validity and works of existence. For this re-thinking one can't rely on any other thoughts for they are yet-to-come thoughts that haven't been revised.

Exactly, and it is thus impossible to disprove existence! If re-thinking relies on other thoughts (which it obviously does) and you can't have had other thoughts without existing (as you've pointed out, in so many words), then you cannot really re-think your existence.

Re-thinking isn't a work on particulars, it's ought to alter the whole. Consqeuently, it's equal to re-inventing a "new" wheel, not a mistake between the rudimentary conecpt of a wheel and the much higher level concept of a combustion engine peculiar to a specific car.

That's what I've been saying you are not supposed to do. If you keep reinventing the wheel, then you'll never get to a car. Also, if you cannot work on any particular problem, without having to start form scratch, you will never solve any problem.

External references can only be used as helpers in explaining common or similar concepts, ie you can't point out Kant's idea on something and take that for a part of your system of thoughts but you may point at his idea and say "see, it's these points in common." It's obvious that similarities between two systems of thoughts one of which has gained public credit can't be held as an advantage for either of the systems.

I don't understand this. Do you mean that I can't use someone else's opinion to help create my own?

Let's have your word. The consequence: there's never been such thing as irrationality for there's never been actions without some sort of rationale behind them. And there's never been systems of thoughts without a supportive skeleton of "rationale," one way or the other.

You claim that Uncertainty leads to irrationality but then you claim that every order in the things can be considered a rationale and isn't included in irrationals list.

Yes, that's why Uncertainty (btw, I capitalize the first letter of "uncertainty" when I want it to mean "uncertainty of all things at once") is unusable, IMO.

Now, Uncertainty has its own order of things. This order may be comlicated or even too complicated to comprehend but it is there. To conclude, Uncertainty isn't irrationality or irrational.

Uncertainty does not have an order of things. If your uncertainty has an order to it, then it is not true Uncertainty.

If you like it that way I can say that Uncertainty isn't irrational but has it's own not-so-much-publicized rationale. Does that work?

No. It is, demonstrably, irrational and paradoxical (we've already shown this in previous posts).

I don't speak of paradox as another logical approach. I speak of it as the end to a "specific" form of logic. That which is a paradox in one logical system can be worked out simply in another system. The sight of a paradox isn't a dead-end. It's a call to change and a call to a new system. A paradox indicates that a logical system isn't even self-sufficient, let alone sufficient.

Which means that Uncertainty isn't sufficient, because it leads to paradox, right?

That's it. If you want to be fair in judging suppositions, first you have to be independent of them.

That, in itself, is a supposition. I have to get off-line now, but I hope you think about what I've written.

Until next time...
 
  • #76
Originally posted by RageSk8
I like "I think therefore I know"




-Stolen from Nagel in his characterization of Davidson.
yeah.this one is good.

by the way I'm means a lots of other things not just thinking.
let me put it this way:
i have 36 oC therefore i'm.
 
  • #77
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

I won’t discuss the proof anymore. You’re in harsh misunderstanding of it and I’ve done my best to clarify but have failed. I re-shape and re-explain the proof one more time, but I won’t discuss it until you show you’ve understood what I mean. I don’t mean for you to agree with it, I just want you to understand it and then say whatever you like. For one time only put aside all you think of the proof and read these lines, forget what we wrote before:

Take the statement “I think therefore I am” and call it Descartes’ statement and show it with Q. Now put this in the back of your mind. Put it away for later study. Don’t think about it for a moment.

Take the statement “There need be an I to think” and show it with P.

Since this proof is meant to be understood in Boolean logic framework, P may only assume one of these two states, T or F. I ask of you: “What state do you assign to P?” You may choose either T or F.

Now we come to study Q. We know nothing of its state because this is what we’re going to find out.

For P you have chosen either T or F.

If you’ve chosen P to be T, then you’ve pre-assumed truth for Q. P is independent of Q and you’ve chosen P to be true before we come to study Q, so you’ve pre-assumed truth for Q because Q is a corollary of P. In pre-assuming truth for Q and coming to study it after this pre-assumption you’ve made a circular deduction. You’ve first assumed Q is true then come to study it and then concluded, again, that Q is true. Circular deduction is non-informative and isn’t allowed in the framework of Boolean logic.

If you’ve chosen P to be F, then you’ve contradicted this pre-assumption with asserting that Q is true. If P is false then Q can’t be true so Q must be false, too. P being F and Q being T is a paradox and this isn’t allowed in the framework of Boolean logic.

Questions that may be asked concerning the proof:

00. How are P and Q related?
01. Why should I assign any state to P?
02. What if I want to study Q before assigning a state to P?
03. What does this whole mean?
04. Could this proof be applied to other statements?

Answers:

00. P and Q are semantically equal but logically independent. In the course of proof, they’re studied independently but then the results are synthesized and shown to be incompatible in a specific logical framework, namely Boolean logic.

01. For in a logical framework where only two states, true (T) or false (F), can be assigned to a statement, the state of any statement should be definitively determinable at any given time. Other logical frameworks, too, have this characteristic but they may incorporate additional/totally different states that make them more flexible and less vulnerable.

02. You can’t because even if you don’t assign a state to P it must have some state which is either T or F. No matter what the state for P is, it’s shown in the proof that either way will cause trouble.

03. Anyone can generate countless statements. These statements may be studied in countless logical systems, one of which is Boolean logic. The best logical system is the most consistent one, one that doesn’t contain any internal inconsistency. For this purpose the logical system must be able to synthesize and analyze all of the countless statements that can be generated without contradicting its own axioms. Out of countless statements two are chosen, P and Q. If a logical system is minimally consistent it must be, at least, able to synthesize these two statements. Boolean logic assumes an axiom that prohibits the collocation of contraries (which we call paradox) and the study of axioms or rather pre-assumed statements (which we call a loop, a circle or a self-referenced statement). In this proof it’s shown that Boolean logic is unable to synthesize these two statements although these two are valid statements (validity is not equal to truth, it means they’re really statements that can be assigned states).

04. Many other statements may be proven to be incompatible in the framework of Boolean logic.
And yet, to ascertain the "fairness and sincerity" of that system, you need to look at it from outside that system. In doing so, you must make use of another system, whose "fairness and sincerity" you haven't determined.
That’s right. Isn’t that another plus for Uncertainty? Since no system of thoughts can be shown fair and sincere without being committed to another or the same system of thoughts, one must always be aware of distortions in the judgment. Wouldn’t it be the fairest to be uncertain of everything? Being uncertain is just another way of thinking, the most general one.
I'll tell you the root of these desires: survival. Humans would not have survived this long, if they hadn't used "practicality" and "progressive knowledge". Now, they are safe enough to question, but the "roots" are now deeply engrained.
Survival exists in the scientific Universe, it needn’t exist anywhere else. The struggle for survival has been scientifically observed in the nature. To say the root of desires is survival is equal to saying that there’s the nature, that it can be observed, that these observations can be concluded from and that the certain conclusion is the struggle for survival. This doesn’t seem to be much of Philosophy.

You can’t make any scientific claim in a realm beyond and over Science. Philosophy may study Science but Science may not get involved in Philosophy. Philosophy is meant as the study of anything and everything using all possible tools while Science is the study of a certain realm of knowledge with specific methodic tools.
This sounds like wuliheron's reasoning, and I only partially agree. I think that some uncertainty can accomplish this purpose, but full Uncertainty just robs you of any progressive knowledge, and thus you get "stuck".
You tend to mention that “progressive knowledge,” too much. Perhaps I like it, too, but it won’t prevent me from seeing clearly that sticking to “progressive knowledge” may be as bad as “getting stuck.”

Let’s have your word and “suppose,” only “suppose,” that one will “get stuck” in Uncertainty. I just don’t see the problem with that. You may hate “getting stuck” but that’s your emotional state of mind, it may not enter this discussion.
I don't get this. You are saying, "I have an answer", then you say "My answer is paradoxical". What is supposed to incline me toward listening to this "answer"?
Nothing. Absolutely nothing can incline you, or anyone else, towards listening to anything. One’s inclinations lie deep in the dark labyrinth of one’s mind. There’s as much rationale behind your preference of “progressive knowledge” to “Uncertainty,” as there’s behind your preference of, say, McDonald’s fast food to fish and chips.

You may be inclined towards inquisitiveness and like to see other options. One such option that you’re offered is Uncertainty. You aren’t obliged to accept it, you aren’t even invited to take a look at it but you’ve come to, at least, flash past it once. What makes you choose something over the other is unknown to me, and I guess it’s unknown to you as well. I, too, have no idea what drives me towards choosing something.

A solid mountain of logic or an ocean of emotion or a blinding lightning of power, when applied from outside of you won’t change your mind. However, the slightest breeze of logic, emotion or power blowing “in” your mind may become a critical point to your life.
But, this "information" (of his/her non-existence) cannot be true, otherwise who would you be "informing" (Descartes' reasoning again)?
I’d be informing the “non-existing one.” Your system of thoughts doesn’t allow such thing, mine does. It’s up to you to fairly decide if a change is necessary somewhere.
… and that everything can be questioned, but in turns. You must take some things for granted while questioning others, and then later question the things that you previously took for granted, while taking the previous uncertainties as now certain. You just shouldn't be uncertain of all things at once…
I want to emphasize these words of yours. You say I “must” do this, you say I “should” do that, where do you take these from? These “must” and “should” of yours aren’t of our points of agreement in this discussion.

Once again, if my knowledge is a coherent structure the truth of every part of it will directly result in the truth of other parts of it. Now if I question things in turn, I’ll always be taking something for granted. That something will be part of this coherent structure so it will always prove other parts true. Nothing will change if I do that. Is that all with fair questioning? I question but go back to where I was? My saying “everything happens in loops” is much similar to this. Isn’t it?

Even worse (from you point of view), is that every part of my knowledge is an assertion of other parts. Now if I take some part for granted, I’ll be asserting the truth of other parts and then getting into showing their truth. Isn’t that self-reference come back again?
This reasoning isn't just for questioning foundations, but for questioning new assumptions/speculations, as well.

What you are missing is that it is impossible to question all foundations at once. I've tried to reason on it, and I can't, it's just not possible to do it...
I understand this but I don’t view it like you do. You’re assessing these situations according to your own priorities. You say paradoxes, self-reference, dead-ends and “getting stuck” are the results of being as fair as one can (that “fairness” is Uncertainty), and then insist one would better be a bit less fair but gain something worth that much effort put into many years of thinking.

continued on the next post...
 
  • #78
... continued from the previous post

You have your choice but then I’m also interested in Certainty just as much as I’m interested in Uncertainty. In spite of this interest I don’t assess those situations, assessed by you as “must-be-avoided,” as “must-be-avoided” but as “must-be-thought-of.”

Those situations are inevitable whenever one’s trying to use an encompassing logical system (see Gödel’s Theorem, I’m not much into it but I know a bit about it). Think about them and think why you think they must be avoided.
Exactly, and it is thus impossible to disprove existence! If re-thinking relies on other thoughts (which it obviously does) and you can't have had other thoughts without existing (as you've pointed out, in so many words), then you cannot really re-think your existence.
I didn’t mean you have to exist to think. I “only” said that re-thinking “existence” as “the most basic intuition” when done in a “bottom-to-top” manner must occur independent of any other thoughts. One such thought is “there should be an entity if an entity is thinking.”

However, there’s something good with your words. I’ve never said it is possible to disprove existence, I only said it is impossible to prove it. These two are complementary sides of one thing, that one thing being Uncertainty. If one’s uncertain of one’s existence, one wouldn’t be thinking one exists, one wouldn’t also be thinking one doesn’t exist.
That's what I've been saying you are not supposed to do. If you keep reinventing the wheel, then you'll never get to a car. Also, if you cannot work on any particular problem, without having to start form scratch, you will never solve any problem.
You like it the practical way. I won’t give up fairness for practicality. I haven’t come to solve a problem. I haven’t come to help the human species. I haven’t come to take something out of this. I want to build my own way of thought and for that purpose I’ll be scrutinizing every bit of every bit.

I’m doing it from scratch for I want to have it cleansed. Others seem to have introduced a hell of a lot of their own obsessions and absolute rubbish into the field. Even though there’ve surely been a few whose speech deserves reverence.
I don't understand this. Do you mean that I can't use someone else's opinion to help create my own?
You can but you can’t take their validity and/or truth for granted. You have to question them and take them apart to see if they’re valid and/or true in the context for/in which you’re going to use them.
Uncertainty does not have an order of things. If your uncertainty has an order to it, then it is not true Uncertainty.
The order of things in Uncertainty is their being uncertain and their being equally creditable.
No. It is, demonstrably, irrational and paradoxical (we've already shown this in previous posts).
Paradox and irrationality aren’t synonyms. Paradoxes are the brinks of rationality; they’re as much rational as they’re irrational.
… I have to get off-line now, but I hope you think about what I've written.
I seem to have thought about them :wink:.
 
  • #79
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

I won’t discuss the proof anymore. You’re in harsh misunderstanding of it and I’ve done my best to clarify but have failed. I re-shape and re-explain the proof one more time, but I won’t discuss it until you show you’ve understood what I mean. I don’t mean for you to agree with it, I just want you to understand it and then say whatever you like.


I had a pretty good understanding of what you were trying to say. My problem was that I couldn't make it "fit" the statement, "I think therefore I am".

Oh well, I don't think it was applicable anyway, so I'm glad enough to move on without it.

For one time only put aside all you think of the proof and read these lines, forget what we wrote before:

Take the statement “I think therefore I am” and call it Descartes’ statement and show it with Q. Now put this in the back of your mind. Put it away for later study. Don’t think about it for a moment.

Take the statement “There need be an I to think” and show it with P.

Just so long as you don't think that I ever implied proposition P. I never did. I said (and this is important): There need be an I for 'I' to think". The distinction being, obviously, the reference to the entity doing the thinking.

Since this proof is meant to be understood in Boolean logic framework, P may only assume one of these two states, T or F. I ask of you: “What state do you assign to P?” You may choose either T or F.

Rephrased as "There need be an I, for 'I' to think" - I say it is true.

Now we come to study Q. We know nothing of its state because this is what we’re going to find out.

For P you have chosen either T or F.

If you’ve chosen P to be T, then you’ve pre-assumed truth for Q. P is independent of Q and you’ve chosen P to be true before we come to study Q, so you’ve pre-assumed truth for Q because Q is a corollary of P. In pre-assuming truth for Q and coming to study it after this pre-assumption you’ve made a circular deduction. You’ve first assumed Q is true then come to study it and then concluded, again, that Q is true. Circular deduction is non-informative and isn’t allowed in the framework of Boolean logic.

Wait a minute now. I said "P" was true, not "Q". Yes, I may be implying it, but that's just because Q inevitably follows P (as you've said). I was not even considering Q, because you told me not to.

If you’ve chosen P to be F, then you’ve contradicted this pre-assumption with asserting that Q is true. If P is false then Q can’t be true so Q must be false, too. P being F and Q being T is a paradox and this isn’t allowed in the framework of Boolean logic.

Questions that may be asked concerning the proof:

00. How are P and Q related?
01. Why should I assign any state to P?
02. What if I want to study Q before assigning a state to P?
03. What does this whole mean?
04. Could this proof be applied to other statements?

Answers:

00. P and Q are semantically equal but logically independent. In the course of proof, they’re studied independently but then the results are synthesized and shown to be incompatible in a specific logical framework, namely Boolean logic.

You didn't show them incompatible. You just showed that if P is true, then Q must be, what's wrong with that?

Besides, your proposition "P" is not the same as any of the propositions that I have made (as I've shown above, it (P) requires some adjustment before it becomes one of my postulates). I don't agree with: "There need be an I to think", but I do agree with: "There need be an I, for 'I' to think".

02. You can’t because even if you don’t assign a state to P it must have some state which is either T or F. No matter what the state for P is, it’s shown in the proof that either way will cause trouble.

No, you just showed that calling it false could be problematic, and I tend to agree.

04. Many other statements may be proven to be incompatible in the framework of Boolean logic.
That’s right. Isn’t that another plus for Uncertainty? Since no system of thoughts can be shown fair and sincere without being committed to another or the same system of thoughts, one must always be aware of distortions in the judgment. Wouldn’t it be the fairest to be uncertain of everything? Being uncertain is just another way of thinking, the most general one.

Has the paradox of trying to be completely Uncertain gone over your head, or are you just ignoring it?

Survival exists in the scientific Universe, it needn’t exist anywhere else. The struggle for survival has been scientifically observed in the nature. To say the root of desires is survival is equal to saying that there’s the nature, that it can be observed, that these observations can be concluded from and that the certain conclusion is the struggle for survival. This doesn’t seem to be much of Philosophy.

You forget, Science is a branch of Philosophy. Thus, any Scientific claims that I make, can be considered Philosophical.

You can’t make any scientific claim in a realm beyond and over Science. Philosophy may study Science but Science may not get involved in Philosophy. Philosophy is meant as the study of anything and everything using all possible tools while Science is the study of a certain realm of knowledge with specific methodic tools.

Science is one of the tools that Philosophy uses.

You tend to mention that “progressive knowledge,” too much. Perhaps I like it, too, but it won’t prevent me from seeing clearly that sticking to “progressive knowledge” may be as bad as “getting stuck.”

It may be, but the human race (and other animal races) seem to have a greater chance of surviving, if they progress in knowledge and understanding.

Also, you seem to like Philosophy. In case you haven't heard this before, Philosophy is the love and pursuit of Wisdom. Wisdom is applied Knowledge. Thus you cannot Philosophize without taking in knowledge, can you?

Let’s have your word and “suppose,” only “suppose,” that one will “get stuck” in Uncertainty. I just don’t see the problem with that. You may hate “getting stuck” but that’s your emotional state of mind, it may not enter this discussion.

No, it's not that I have a problem with getting stuck, it's that Uncertainty is not just "sticky", it's unusable. With paradox at it's very heart, it's impossible to use it in any way. In fact, it can be (and has been, by me) argued that it is impossible to completely Uncertain.

Nothing. Absolutely nothing can incline you, or anyone else, towards listening to anything. One’s inclinations lie deep in the dark labyrinth of one’s mind. There’s as much rationale behind your preference of “progressive knowledge” to “Uncertainty,” as there’s behind your preference of, say, McDonald’s fast food to fish and chips.

Didn't I already show that Uncertainty is inherently irrational? If so, then isn't it obvious that there can be no "rationale" to Uncertainty, while there is some to "progressive knowledge"? If so, then my choice is rather a bit more justified then my choice of Pizza Hut (one of my personal favorite restaurants), to Little Ceasers (who also makes good pizza, but not as good IMO :smile:).

You may be inclined towards inquisitiveness and like to see other options. One such option that you’re offered is Uncertainty. You aren’t obliged to accept it, you aren’t even invited to take a look at it but you’ve come to, at least, flash past it once. What makes you choose something over the other is unknown to me, and I guess it’s unknown to you as well. I, too, have no idea what drives me towards choosing something.

I don't know either. You know, It's interesting enough to point out that the fact that you can settle on Uncertainty, means that you aren't truly Uncertain.

I’d be informing the “non-existing one.” Your system of thoughts doesn’t allow such thing, mine does.

Then why do you still refer to "it" as "the non-existing one?

Once again, if my knowledge is a coherent structure the truth of every part of it will directly result in the truth of other parts of it. Now if I question things in turn, I’ll always be taking something for granted. That something will be part of this coherent structure so it will always prove other parts true. Nothing will change if I do that. Is that all with fair questioning? I question but go back to where I was? My saying “everything happens in loops” is much similar to this. Isn’t it?

And yet this reasoning only applies to questioning your foundations.

Even worse (from you point of view), is that every part of my knowledge is an assertion of other parts. Now if I take some part for granted, I’ll be asserting the truth of other parts and then getting into showing their truth. Isn’t that self-reference come back again?
I understand this but I don’t view it like you do. You’re assessing these situations according to your own priorities. You say paradoxes, self-reference, dead-ends and “getting stuck” are the results of being as fair as one can (that “fairness” is Uncertainty), and then insist one would better be a bit less fair but gain something worth that much effort put into many years of thinking.

Fairness and Uncertainty (please notice the capitalized "U") are not the same thing. Uncertainty requires a bias also. (Of course, that bias is just the bias of trying to be unbiased...which is a paradoxical concept of the same type as the Paradox of Limitlessness).
 
  • #80
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Those situations are inevitable whenever one’s trying to use an encompassing logical system (see Gödel’s Theorem, I’m not much into it but I know a bit about it). Think about them and think why you think they must be avoided.
I didn’t mean you have to exist to think. I “only” said that re-thinking “existence” as “the most basic intuition” when done in a “bottom-to-top” manner must occur independent of any other thoughts. One such thought is “there should be an entity if an entity is thinking.”

But who is doing the reasoning then? The thought that there should be an entity if an entity is thinking, can be taken apart into it's two parts ("there should be an entity", and "an entity is thinking"), the second of which is composed of two propositions, one of which is "there is an entity". Oh well, I've already said this same thing before, and I still haven't gotten a good response, on this particular point.

However, there’s something good with your words. I’ve never said it is possible to disprove existence, I only said it is impossible to prove it. These two are complementary sides of one thing, that one thing being Uncertainty. If one’s uncertain of one’s existence, one wouldn’t be thinking one exists, one wouldn’t also be thinking one doesn’t exist.
You like it the practical way. I won’t give up fairness for practicality. I haven’t come to solve a problem. I haven’t come to help the human species. I haven’t come to take something out of this. I want to build my own way of thought and for that purpose I’ll be scrutinizing every bit of every bit.

I’m doing it from scratch for I want to have it cleansed. Others seem to have introduced a hell of a lot of their own obsessions and absolute rubbish into the field. Even though there’ve surely been a few whose speech deserves reverence.
You can but you can’t take their validity and/or truth for granted. You have to question them and take them apart to see if they’re valid and/or true in the context for/in which you’re going to use them.
The order of things in Uncertainty is their being uncertain and their being equally creditable.
Paradox and irrationality aren’t synonyms. Paradoxes are the brinks of rationality; they’re as much rational as they’re irrational.

I would respond to this whole quote, but I don't have time. I think you make some excellent points, and some that I don't agree with, especially to do with Uncertainty. However, let me draw your attention to your last sentence. You see, I believe you are wrong about Paradox. They may be the brinks of rationality, but that means that they are still in "irrational" territory. Besides, I don't see them as the brinks of rationality, so much as they are the end of one line of reasoning, and thus - when pursued - can easily lead one to irrationality.
 
  • #81
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
I had a pretty good understanding of what you were trying to say. My problem was that I couldn't make it "fit" the statement, "I think therefore I am".

Oh well, I don't think it was applicable anyway, so I'm glad enough to move on without it.
No, unfortunately you don't seem to have a phantom of a shadow of having understood this proof. Your following sentences show this. And it's me who must be assured that you've understood the proof for you yourself are always sure you've understood the whole thing.

Please don't be glad. I'm not moving on without it, I only suspend it until you get the point. If you don't the entire discussion has been pointless. Here are my last words on this proof.
Just so long as you don't think that I ever implied proposition P. I never did. I said (and this is important): There need be an I for 'I' to think". The distinction being, obviously, the reference to the entity doing the thinking.
I didn't say you implied it. I proposed it. The proof doesn't care who's proposed this statement.
Rephrased as "There need be an I, for 'I' to think" - I say it is true.
You may not rephrase it. It’s my statement. I propose a specific statement and ask of you of its state. I'm not interested in any statements you may think are equal to that statement.
Wait a minute now. I said "P" was true, not "Q". Yes, I may be implying it, but that's just because Q inevitably follows P (as you've said). I was not even considering Q, because you told me not to.
This is logic. P and Q are independent but I may derive Q's state from the state you assigned to Q. I asked you not to consider Q in order to take care of this independence but the logical system can be used at any time to derive and conclude. That's why I say P and Q show inconsistency in Boolean logic. I use the rules and never break them but I arrive at a forbidden point.
You didn't show them incompatible. You just showed that if P is true, then Q must be, what's wrong with that?
I showed. That P's truth will result in Q's truth is taken from your premise that "for an entity to think there must be an entity," it doesn't relate to this proof. The proof shows that whatever state has been chosen for P, either T or F, P and Q together lead into either a loop or a paradox.
Besides, your proposition "P" is not the same as any of the propositions that I have made ... I don't agree with: "There need be an I to think", but I do agree with: "There need be an I, for 'I' to think".
See, it isn't important which state your choose for P. You may agree or disagree with it. The point in this proof is that no matter you agree or disagree with P, it will cause trouble. And for Boolean logic you must either agree or disagree with P, you can't postpone or suspend judgment. This is the vulnerability I'm talking of. P can't be suspended to be judged after Q has been judged. They must be judged at one time and this coincidence causes trouble.

P needn't be one of your premises. It's only a statement and for every given statement you have to be able to definitely determine its state, if you claim consistency in Boolean logic.
No, you just showed that calling it false could be problematic, and I tend to agree.
I also showed calling it true will be problematic. How then you ask? If you call it true you've slipped into pre-assuming an assertion of what you're just going to prove, the other statement, Q.
Has the paradox of trying to be completely Uncertain gone over your head, or are you just ignoring it?
Being uncertain isn't absolutely fair but it's relatively fairer than any other stance. This relative fairness in comparison to other stances is what I call a plus for Uncertainty.

Being uncertain requires no assumption but "nothing is certain."
You forget, Science is a branch of Philosophy. Thus, any Scientific claims that I make, can be considered Philosophical.

Science is one of the tools that Philosophy uses.

It may be, but the human race (and other animal races) seem to have a greater chance of surviving, if they progress in knowledge and understanding.

Also, you seem to like Philosophy. In case you haven't heard this before, Philosophy is the love and pursuit of Wisdom. Wisdom is applied Knowledge. Thus you cannot Philosophize without taking in knowledge, can you?
If Science is a branch of Philosophy, it can be seen as Philosophy's subset. A subset has all its members contained in its superset but it doesn't contain all of the superset's members. Hence Philosophy may embrace non-scientific or even anti-scientific claims, which means scientific claims don't qualify for assessing philosophical claims. Philosophy is simply "over" Science.

Philosophy may study Science and scientific tools but it may not use Science as a tool. Using Science as a tool to assess/evaluate/judge will result in all scientific claims being approved and all non-scientific ones disapproved. It also limits the borders of Philosophy to Science.

And I don't like your way of talking the words, Philosophy, Wisdom and applied Wisdom. "Survival" is a piece of knowledge from scientific Universe; it may not be mixed with philosophical thought.

Philosophy is the study of human situation in all of its aspects. Philosophy must use tools independent of specific viewpoints, Science for example, in order to avoid confirming those viewpoints with their own tools. It's obvious that Science will seem consistent viewed by its own tools and premises. Philosophy must study Science and other ways of viewing the Universe from their outside.
No, it's not that I have a problem with getting stuck, it's that Uncertainty is not just "sticky", it's unusable...
Let's suppose, only suppose, that Uncertainty is unusable. What's the problem with that? Suppose we've tried to study human situation and we've come to this unusable concept, is there a problem with that?

You may argue that total Uncertainty is impossible and I may "perhaps" accept that. In which logical framework has this happened? Boolean logic. Aren't there any other logical systems? There are. You must prove this for all logical systems and now this is impossible.
Didn't I already show that Uncertainty is inherently irrational? If so, then isn't it obvious that there can be no "rationale" to Uncertainty, while there is some to "progressive knowledge"?...
You didn't show for I wrote of the order of things in Uncertainty and you accepted that every order may be considered rationale.

Even if we suppose, only suppose, Uncertainty is irrational, nothing is more "justified." Why do you think rationalization can distinguish one idea among others, that a rational idea is "better" than an irrational one?
You know, It's interesting enough to point out that the fact that you can settle on Uncertainty, means that you aren't truly Uncertain.
For me, Uncertainty is only one step in a way. I don't settle on it. I take this step and then come new understandings. You view my stance as an aggressive attempt to Certainty about Uncertainty while it actually isn't that way. My way is another between-the-lines hint. Try to see the hint, between the lines, don't struggle to break the lines up, they aren't worth the effort.
Then why do you still refer to "it" as "the non-existing one?
"It" may include and refer to the "non-existing" ones as well as the "existing" ones.
And yet this reasoning only applies to questioning your foundations.
Accept it for the foundations. Extend it to all knowledge for every piece of knowledge may be taken as an equally creditable foundation.
... Uncertainty requires a bias also...
Yes, it is. Yet it's the fairest bias.
But who is doing the reasoning then? The thought that there should be an entity if an entity is thinking, can be taken apart into it's two parts ... the second of which is composed of two propositions, one of which is "there is an entity"...
The non-existing one. See, I understand what you mean. You say "thinking" is so firmly in correspondence with "existing" (by the bond of Causality, that there must be a doer for a deed to be) that any form of "thinking" (eg, thinking about non-existence) can be an undeniable indication of "existing." I doubted that bond of Causality and talked of it being broken and its substitutes. Did you take this into account? If you avoid relying on Causality then a deed will no more be an undeniable indication of a doer, be the deed reasoning, thinking, eating, whatever.

Once again, I suggest you take a look at Gödel’s Theorem. Many things will be clear then.
... They may be the brinks of rationality, but that means that they are still in "irrational" territory. Besides, I don't see them as the brinks of rationality, so much as they are the end of one line of reasoning, and thus - when pursued - can easily lead one to irrationality.
Let's see how you come to a paradox. A paradox is reached when you start out with valid premises, use valid rules of deduction but you end with an invalid result (the collocation of contraries). Everything in here is rational. It's rationalization come to a brink for only rationality may have brinks. Irrationality may even be "limitless" for it's irrational, where your argument of "limitlessness" no more works.

Paradox lies on the border of rationality and irrationality. You come to a paradox after some lines of reasoning and then you "may" bypass it into irrationality. You stop at the sight of a paradox, that's what you do. You won't go on after a paradox and that's exactly why it's the brink of rationality. You reach the border and you don't want to step into irrationality so you'll take aback for a while and then try to find another way.
 
  • #82
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
No, unfortunately you don't seem to have a phantom of a shadow of having understood this proof. Your following sentences show this. And it's me who must be assured that you've understood the proof for you yourself are always sure you've understood the whole thing.

Truth be told, I haven't made all that much effort to understand the proof, as you have yet to show me how it "fits" Descartes' statement. It still doesn't appear to.

Please don't be glad. I'm not moving on without it, I only suspend it until you get the point. If you don't the entire discussion has been pointless.

Only because you have placed so much emphasis on a proof that doesn't have anything to do with Descartes' statement. If you would argue the statement itself, I would not declare anything you said to be irrelevant.

I didn't say you implied it. I proposed it. The proof doesn't care who's proposed this statement.

No, I know, but then this statement would just be a random statement, designed for proving that Boolean Logic was inconsistent, but not designed to attack the statement in any way.

It now becomes apparent (please correct me if I'm wrong) that that's what you've been doing this entire time. You've just been trying to prove that Boolean Logic is inconsistent, while still claiming ultimate Uncertainty. This is obviously also contradictory, as you've said that Uncertainty is fair to all systems.

This is logic. P and Q are independent but I may derive Q's state from the state you assigned to Q. I asked you not to consider Q in order to take care of this independence but the logical system can be used at any time to derive and conclude. That's why I say P and Q show inconsistency in Boolean logic. I use the rules and never break them but I arrive at a forbidden point.

I'm sorry, I really do not see it. Maybe there's something wrong with me, but I can't see anything wrong with one proposition's implying another.

I showed. That P's truth will result in Q's truth is taken from your premise that "for an entity to think there must be an entity," it doesn't relate to this proof. The proof shows that whatever state has been chosen for P, either T or F, P and Q together lead into either a loop or a paradox.

Where is the paradox?

See, it isn't important which state your choose for P. You may agree or disagree with it. The point in this proof is that no matter you agree or disagree with P, it will cause trouble. And for Boolean logic you must either agree or disagree with P, you can't postpone or suspend judgment. This is the vulnerability I'm talking of. P can't be suspended to be judged after Q has been judged. They must be judged at one time and this coincidence causes trouble.

Why? There coincidence means that they are inter-related. So? What's wrong with that? Is there some proposition of Boolean Logic that states that there can be no two inter-related propositions?

P needn't be one of your premises. It's only a statement and for every given statement you have to be able to definitely determine its state, if you claim consistency in Boolean logic.

I understand. Please forgive my past attempts to show that it didn't apply to Descartes' statement. It's obvious that you didn't care about Descartes' statement, but were trying to show an inconsistency with Boolean Logic as a whole. That's what the P([bleep]) analogy was for too, wasn't it? While I still don't see the inconsistency caused by these proofs, I do see that that's all you were trying to show (inconsistency in Boolean Logic).

I also showed calling it true will be problematic. How then you ask? If you call it true you've slipped into pre-assuming an assertion of what you're just going to prove, the other statement, Q.

So? In deciding that P is true, I pre-suppose that another (very related) statement is also true. So what?

For example, if I say "I'm alive" = proposition P. Then I say that propostion Q = "I exist". Taking "P" to be true necessitates that I pre-suppose the truth of "Q" - but what's wrong with that?

Being uncertain requires no assumption but "nothing is certain."

Yes, and that would be an assumption, wouldn't it? If that is an assumption, then Uncertainty is not entirely free of assumptions, is it? However, if the one assumption that it has is "there are no assumptions", then it must both have and not have any assumptions...this is a paradox/self-contradictory idea, just like limitlessness.

Philosophy may study Science and scientific tools but it may not use Science as a tool. Using Science as a tool to assess/evaluate/judge will result in all scientific claims being approved and all non-scientific ones disapproved. It also limits the borders of Philosophy to Science.

Not necessarily. Let's say that Philosophy makes use of both religious philosophy, and nihilism. So what if they contradict each other? They are still both important Philosophies. Neither of them limit Philosophy, they simply provide structures - within the realm of Philosophy - for different kinds of people to form their opinions in.

Let's suppose, only suppose, that Uncertainty is unusable. What's the problem with that? Suppose we've tried to study human situation and we've come to this unusable concept, is there a problem with that?

You have called Uncertainty "fair", "more reliable then certainty", "better conclusion", etc... . If Uncertainty is unusable, then none of these terms apply to it.

You may argue that total Uncertainty is impossible and I may "perhaps" accept that. In which logical framework has this happened? Boolean logic. Aren't there any other logical systems? There are. You must prove this for all logical systems and now this is impossible.

Why do you ask me to do something that you know very well is impossible? Different logic systems often contradict each other directly. That means that no one can use all of them to prove something, at the same time.

You didn't show for I wrote of the order of things in Uncertainty and you accepted that every order may be considered rationale.

There is no order of things in true Uncertainty. You have shown the rationale (by my definition) of uncertainty, but not of Uncertainty.

Even if we suppose, only suppose, Uncertainty is irrational, nothing is more "justified." Why do you think rationalization can distinguish one idea among others, that a rational idea is "better" than an irrational one?

You think so too, otherwise you wouldn't have tried to assign a rationale to Uncertainty.

"It" may include and refer to the "non-existing" ones as well as the "existing" ones.

"It" may not include "non-existing" ones. In speaking of specific "ones" you imply their existence, at least in a conceptual manner.

Yes, it is. Yet it's the fairest bias.

No it's not, because it denies all other biases. At least Science allows for some of the things that it finds/theorizes to be wrong. Uncertainty has only one premise, and that is that there can be no premises (which doesn't allow for any of the other fields of study to be correct). How is that fair?

The non-existing one. See, I understand what you mean. You say "thinking" is so firmly in correspondence with "existing" (by the bond of Causality, that there must be a doer for a deed to be) that any form of "thinking" (eg, thinking about non-existence) can be an undeniable indication of "existing." I doubted that bond of Causality and talked of it being broken and its substitutes. Did you take this into account? If you avoid relying on Causality then a deed will no more be an undeniable indication of a doer, be the deed reasoning, thinking, eating, whatever.

I took your "substitutions" into account. As it turns out, they all rely on Causality anyway. Or at least it appears that way to me. For example, the inter-relationship between two "Quantum-bound electrons"; the reaction is instantaneous, and thus neither of the two can be considered the "cause". However, the "observer" can be considered the "cause", and without him/her, there would be no effect (the change of spin of the two electrons).

Let's see how you come to a paradox. A paradox is reached when you start out with valid premises, use valid rules of deduction but you end with an invalid result (the collocation of contraries). Everything in here is rational. It's rationalization come to a brink for only rationality may have brinks. Irrationality may even be "limitless" for it's irrational, where your argument of "limitlessness" no more works.

Paradox lies on the border of rationality and irrationality. You come to a paradox after some lines of reasoning and then you "may" bypass it into irrationality. You stop at the sight of a paradox, that's what you do. You won't go on after a paradox and that's exactly why it's the brink of rationality. You reach the border and you don't want to step into irrationality so you'll take aback for a while and then try to find another way.

Yes, and that's what so many logicians/philosophers/scientists/mathematicians/etc... have done in the past. When they come to a paradox, they realize that there must be some flaw in the particular line of reasoning that they've been following, and they abandon it in search of a better one.
 
  • #83
As I see it, 'thinking' is how existence is assertained - along with 'sensation-of-awareness'. Thus thinking is the source of knowing that 'existence is'.
Therefore, it can definitely be claimed that 'thought' is evidence of existence. Since it is.
Therefore, since am-ness equates to existence, we can definitely say that I think, therefore I am.
Descartes was correct I think, about this. The only talking-point is the meaning of 'I'. "Who exactly am I?", is the only thing left to ponder.
 
  • #84
Originally posted by Lifegazer
As I see it, 'thinking' is how existence is assertained - along with 'sensation-of-awareness'. Thus thinking is the source of knowing that 'existence is'.
Therefore, it can definitely be claimed that 'thought' is evidence of existence. Since it is.
Therefore, since am-ness equates to existence, we can definitely say that I think, therefore I am.
Descartes was correct I think, about this. The only talking-point is the meaning of 'I'. "Who exactly am I?", is the only thing left to ponder.

So Descartes' reasoning applies, whether there is anything other than the Mind's thoughts, or not, right?

Good point, lifegazer.
 
  • #85
Originally posted by Mentat
So Descartes' reasoning applies, whether there is anything other than the Mind's thoughts, or not, right?
I claim to be a rationalist too. I don't know a lot about Descartes, though I understand that his statement "I think, therefore I am." is rationally correct. Though like I say, the question of "Who am I?" is left untouched. By Descartes, anyway.:wink:
 
  • #86
Originally posted by Lifegazer
I claim to be a rationalist too. I don't know a lot about Descartes, though I understand that his statement "I think, therefore I am." is rationally correct. Though like I say, the question of "Who am I?" is left untouched. By Descartes, anyway.:wink:

That's very true, at least as far as I've read from his Philosophies.
 
  • #87
Originally posted by Mentat
That's very true, at least as far as I've read from his Philosophies.
You surprise me. Do you realize that Descartes' axiom puts you within touching-distance of my own personal mind-hypothesis? I'm not asking you to discuss my hypothesis - I'm just 'shocked' (pardon the exaggeration) at your responses here.
 
  • #88
Originally posted by Lifegazer
You surprise me. Do you realize that Descartes' axiom puts you within touching-distance of my own personal mind-hypothesis? I'm not asking you to discuss my hypothesis - I'm just 'shocked' (pardon the exaggeration) at your responses here.

I've always agreed with some of the points of your idea. I just don't agree with the premise/conclusion (there really should be a word for a premise that is also a conclusion). You are probably correct that we can't get information without the use of the "senses". And perhaps even correct that we can thus never prove the existence of an external reality. I just don't agree with your alternative.

Besides, even if I fully agreed with you, I would probably still present an argument against you :wink:. That's just the kind of person I am: The true Devil's Advocate .
 
  • #89
Originally posted by Mentat
I've always agreed with some of the points of your idea. I just don't agree with the premise/conclusion (there really should be a word for a premise that is also a conclusion).
My premise builds upon sensation & thought. The conclusion about God is not the same as the opening-premise.
Besides, even if I fully agreed with you, I would probably still present an argument against you :wink:. That's just the kind of person I am: The true Devil's Advocate .
There's nothing wrong with that. But you should apply the same challenges to your own philosophies. Never close your mind to anything that you cannot disprove.
 
  • #90
Originally posted by Lifegazer
There's nothing wrong with that. But you should apply the same challenges to your own philosophies. Never close your mind to anything that you cannot disprove.

Good point. I do try to apply my Devil's Advocate mentality to my own philosophies. I don't, however, type my contradictions to my own philosophy on the Forums (unless other people aren't making any worthy attempt to contradict it, in which case I decide to give them something to work off of, but this is rare).
 
  • #91
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

Apologies for the delay.
Truth be told, I haven't made all that much effort to understand the proof, as you have yet to show me how it "fits" Descartes' statement. It still doesn't appear to.
How could you say that if you still haven't understood what it's talking about?

I explained many times the reason I think that proof applies, just look around the posts. Did you counter my reasons?
Only because you have placed so much emphasis on a proof that doesn't have anything to do with Descartes' statement. If you would argue the statement itself, I would not declare anything you said to be irrelevant.
It was/is relevant. Only because you place so much emphasis on a stance that doesn't have anything to do with my proof doesn't mean you've shown it's irrelevant.
... but then this statement would just be a random statement, designed for proving that Boolean Logic was inconsistent, but not designed to attack the statement in any way.

... You've just been trying to prove that Boolean Logic is inconsistent, while still claiming ultimate Uncertainty. This is obviously also contradictory, as you've said that Uncertainty is fair to all systems.

... It's obvious that you didn't care about Descartes' statement, but were trying to show an inconsistency with Boolean Logic as a whole. That's what the P([bleep]) analogy was for too, wasn't it?...
First, you're right. I've been trying to show the inconsistency but there's a specific place where the inconsistency occurs and that's when statements like "I think therefore I am" are studied. This shows an incompatibility between this statement and the viewpoint from which it's meant to be seen.

My statement, P, isn't random. If it was then I needn't even mention it. It's a statement engineered to suit your "I think therefore I am." If you had another statement, which fell in the category of statements that I think are incompatible with Boolean logic then I'd have made P different.

Like I wrote before, Descartes' statement isn't intrinsically problematic. Problems rise when this statement is viewed in a specific logical framework.

Uncertainty's fairness doesn't mean that it can't detect inconsistencies of knowledge structures. Uncertainty is fair in the sense that it let's one see inconsistencies that wouldn't be seen if the knowledge structure isn't doubted. To study a knowledge body you have to live outside that body, and then observe it. Uncertainty provides this "living outside." It let's one doubt the principles and that's why it's fair. It's worth noting that Uncertainty won't give an evaluation system by which to rank knowledge bodies, it only shows (or is meant to show) their status quo, show them as they are not as they're seen from inside. Uncertainty won't prefer one idea over the other but it enables its user to see that one idea is consistent while the other one isn't. It should be clear that inconsistency is only an attribute of a knowledge body, not a means of preference or else.
I'm sorry, I really do not see it. Maybe there's something wrong with me, but I can't see anything wrong with one proposition's implying another.
It isn't a simple implication; it's pre-assumption. This situation is similar to that you say: "I must live for living is an obligation." By saying "living is an obligation," you've already assumed you have to live, consequently deducing that "I must live" is logically incorrect (if you're bound to Boolean logic).

You may pre-assume something and then prove it, apparently, true. For me, there's no real problem with this, except that it's circular reasoning and it's non-informative.
Where is the paradox?
If you say "P is T and Q is T" you've gone the way of circular reasoning. If you say "P is F and Q is T" then you've made paradox because P is an assertion of Q and may not be F when Q is considered T.

One way to overcome this loop and this paradox is to say "P is F and Q is F." Q and its assertion, P, can be simultaneously wrong without causing any trouble. The only problem is that you insist that Q is T.
Why? There coincidence means that they are inter-related. So? What's wrong with that? Is there some proposition of Boolean Logic that states that there can be no two inter-related propositions?
No, but circular reasoning is forbidden (for you, of course). An assertion of Q, that is P, may not be assumed T when one is about to study Q's state. If Q is pre-assumed T then there's no need for studying it.

P may not be set T but it also must have a definite state and what remains is F, and P set as F will lead to paradox. Only if there was a third state like "null" then P could be assumed "null" while Q was being studied and then set to whatever suitable state. Such suspension is impossible in the framework of Boolean logic.
For example, if I say "I'm alive" = proposition P. Then I say that propostion Q = "I exist". Taking "P" to be true necessitates that I pre-suppose the truth of "Q" - but what's wrong with that?
If you pre-suppose the truth of Q then there's no point in discussing if Q is true for its truth is your premise. Q must be kept "untouched" before it's studied thoroughly and during the time it's being studied. If Q's state is pre-supposed then the outcome of every study or discussion of Q will not result in a state for Q that's different from that pre-supposition.

You surely know of Vienna Circle and their "verifiability criterion." In analogy to that "verifiability criterion" (ie, "that which can't be verified may not be claimed"), one can say "that which can't be proven wrong may be claimed but is non-informative."
Yes, and that would be an assumption, wouldn't it? If that is an assumption, then Uncertainty is not entirely free of assumptions, is it? However, if the one assumption that it has is "there are no assumptions", then it must both have and not have any assumptions...this is a paradox/self-contradictory idea, just like limitlessness.
Uncertainty has only one assumption which makes it fairer compared to other stances that require a plethora of assumptions.

Uncertainty's paradoxical nature makes it all open even to paradoxes. That's another plus compared to the selective nature of many other viewpoints (eg, they let some paradoxes in while they keep others out).

And, like I said before, Uncertainty should better be viewed as a step in a way. It isn't far different from countless other stances one may assume but it's distinguished by the degrees of freedom it offers. One step after Uncertainty there may be anything, even Certainty, who knows.
Not necessarily. Let's say that Philosophy makes use of both religious philosophy, and nihilism. So what if they contradict each other? They are still both important Philosophies...
Philosophy doesn't "make use" of these viewpoints. Its main task is to "study" and "compare" them and in order to remain fair it must remain neutral to them. After having "studied" and "compared" them, they "may" be evaluated and ordered based on some criteria. Resultant is the choice of a viewpoint that would be one's stance on the subject. This stance is also called "one's Philosophy" but this is merely a lexical ambiguity. Philosophy happens before the selection, manipulation and implementation of a viewpoint.

Viewpoints may contradict each other while Philosophy, as the means of study, remains intact. Philosophy only needs to reflect these contradictions as comparative reports but need not and should not get involved in them. One such viewpoint is Science, another is Christianity, yet another is Logical Positivism and so on. Philosophy's task is to study these one by one and then comparatively. That a scientist thinks this planet has been around for some 4.5 billion years while biblical words say that the Creation happened some thousands of years ago, is something worth noting for Philosophy but nothing worth getting involved in.
You have called Uncertainty "fair", "more reliable then certainty", "better conclusion", etc... . If Uncertainty is unusable, then none of these terms apply to it.
"You" associate "fairness", "reliability," and "supremacy" of an idea with its "practicality."

By the way, I couldn't find out where I'd claimed Uncertainty to be "reliable." I said what we think we know is unreliable. This doesn't mean that doubting our knowledge is more reliable. I clearly said that Uncertainty (quoting myself) "robs one of security, simplicity, ease, self-confidence and self-righteousness."
Why do you ask me to do something that you know very well is impossible? Different logic systems often contradict each other directly. That means that no one can use all of them to prove something, at the same time.
Because, as a result of this impossibility, one can't claim one's reasoning inbound some logical system is encompassing. You said: "total Uncertainty is impossible." If it's possible for you to claim something is impossible then it's possible for me to ask for something impossible. I wanted you to see that your statement doesn't work outside the framework it's designed for and to see that this framework is just one out of countless possible frameworks. If you say you've proven total Uncertainty impossible, you must have proven it for all logical systems (which is a cumbersome task, at least).

Many concepts may be invalid inbound a logical system but this is no indication of those concepts being erroneous in other systems. And all logical systems are equally creditable.

continued on the next post...
 
  • #92
... continued from the previous post
There is no order of things in true Uncertainty. You have shown the rationale (by my definition) of uncertainty, but not of Uncertainty.
Let's see what "order" means. The books in the Library of Congress are "ordered." What does this mean? I guess it means there's a well-defined well-rounded rule set that assigns them to their respective places. This rule set has been chosen based on an analysis of the premises assumed for building a library (eg, accessibility, exactness, clarity, whatever). Notice that this rule set doesn't give significance or distinction to some books. It only orders them but doesn't rank them. There is an "order" but it isn't an order of "significance" or "preference."

So an "order" is the placing of things under a well-defined rule set based on the premises for assuming a viewpoint or for doing a task.

Now what's the premise for Uncertainty? "Nothing is certain." And what's the rule set? A rule set containing one rule, "everything is to be doubted." This rule set assigns everything one place, the place of equality. Nothing is different from nothing in any aspect. This is an "order" which places everything in the same attribute class, "uncertain."
You think so too, otherwise you wouldn't have tried to assign a rationale to Uncertainty.
I don't. If it was me, Uncertainty needn't even be discussed because it's part of the past for me. It's "you" I'm talking to and for that purpose I need to satisfy your requests and your way of talking this over.

By showing (or at least, trying to show) that Uncertainty can be well interpreted as having rationale (within the boundaries of this discussion), I'm showing that "rationale" isn't as strict and significant as it appears to be.
"It" may not include "non-existing" ones. In speaking of specific "ones" you imply their existence, at least in a conceptual manner.
This is "your" interpretation of what "referring to ones" implies. Ones can be non-existent ones (a paradox and a loop, you'd say ).
No it's not, because it denies all other biases. At least Science allows for some of the things that it finds/theorizes to be wrong. Uncertainty has only one premise, and that is that there can be no premises (which doesn't allow for any of the other fields of study to be correct). How is that fair?
Premises are chosen by individuals. Uncertainty's fairness is in that it allows everything, for it doesn't honor or lower any state of mind. All states of mind are equally doubtable thus equally creditable. Uncertainty doesn't judge the situation; it informs of the situation. Being uncertain, one may choose whatever premises that seem suitable to her/him, including those premises of Science.

That one isn't certain of the situation doesn't mean one must not, should not or ought not to choose her/his own way. It means condition, diversity, value, significance and outcome of every choice are wrapped in Uncertainty. One can risk choosing or even risk not choosing.

Science, on the other hand, prefers a methodic way of thinking and treating the Universe and not every method but a specific method. Out of countless ways, one way is chosen. That's what I call "unfair." Why would you choose one way out of countless ways and then insist it's the way to go? You could reason that Science is "practical" and "useful." Then I have to repeat, "practicality" and "usefulness" are intra-scientific criteria and it's clear they'll see Science consistent with their implications. Practicality can be defined either as "what Science is concerned with" or as anything else. The first definition is intra-scientific so it doesn't qualify to evaluate anything but Science. If the second definition, anything else, is allowed then there would be countless other definitions. If one of the countless definitions can be chosen at will one may choose one that corresponds with what Uncertainty concerned with. Now, with this new definition, Uncertainty is "practical."
I took your "substitutions" into account. As it turns out, they all rely on Causality anyway. Or at least it appears that way to me. For example, the inter-relationship between two "Quantum-bound electrons"; the reaction is instantaneous, and thus neither of the two can be considered the "cause". However, the "observer" can be considered the "cause", and without him/her, there would be no effect (the change of spin of the two electrons).
I wrote of the structure and the function for Causality and for that "proposed" substitute which was Pre-established Harmony. The structure is different, the function is different, yet you say they're (almost) the same. What prevents you from seeing the difference is your affection for Causality as a means of scientific interpretation of the Universe.

Like I wrote, Pre-established Harmony is different from Causality in that it doesn't assume the cause-effect pair. Causality is the bond between cause and effect while Pre-established Harmony is the harmonized incidence of two (or more) phenomena. For Causality to work, there should be a distinction between two phenomena which are coinciding and what distinguishes the cause from the effect is the chronological order. For Pre-established Harmony to work, nothing is necessary. No interaction, stimulus-response set or similar concept is required. The two coinciding phenomena can be considered isolated just like two spatially or chronologically far apart phenomena would be. The pattern of events and the distribution of coincidences are governed by the Harmony. This central governance of Harmony ensures the simultaneous occurring of many pairs of phenomena but it doesn't require any bond or relation between them. There are no spatial or chronological limits to seemingly related phenomena.

What if I told you I've thrown a coin three times and have got tails every time and then conclude that an invisible bond relates this phenomenon with the presence of a mosquito in my room? You'd possibly say, in the best case, that I have to experiment many more times before I conclude. You know, however, that Probability Theory is all about a limit when the number of experiments yields to infinity. And I can never conclude (not without experimenting infinite number of times) if these two phenomena are really related or I've only experienced a statistical not-very-odd oddity. The Causality bond isn't a necessity; it isn't even a probabilistic conclusion. Causality is an optimization method based on hopes for recurring of events. One may use it as much as one wants but relying on it is senseless.

As for the EPR experiment, there are two problems with your interpretation. First, even if you consider the Physicist you can't find a delay between her/his action and the spin change in the far off particle. Exactly when the action takes place a far off event occurs. Second, the distinction you make here is based on your knowledge of the Physicist's intention. You know she/he wants to initiate a change somewhere so you conclude a relation between her/his action and the change. This knowledge of intention isn't intrinsic to your understanding of the situation. You could have observed an alien Physicist with her/his invisible particles performing the EPR experiment. Then, you couldn't have concluded based on your knowledge of her/his intention. Even though the same experiment occurs in both cases (eg, human Physicist and alien Physicist), you're able to distinguish the cause and the effect in the former while you wouldn't be able to do so in the latter. This means that the distinction of cause and effect is nothing but a mental pattern you try to impose on this event.
Yes, and that's what so many logicians/philosophers/scientists/mathematicians/etc... have done in the past. When they come to a paradox, they realize that there must be some flaw in the particular line of reasoning that they've been following, and they abandon it in search of a better one.
Their actions were valid for them, yours should be proven valid for you. Nevertheless, a real paradox isn't made in case of erroneous reasoning but in case of an erroneous reasoning system.

Achilles and the tortoise (I'm not sure if it was a tortoise or a turtle) paradox, has been around for almost 2000 years. Is it there because of a mistake in reasoning? And 2000 years haven't been enough to find this mistake? Or is it solved now?

Not all Philosophers/Scientists have given up at the sight of paradox. There've been some to think of its nature and why it's faced everywhere. The great example is Kurt Gödel. Some of them have even based their views on the paradox-ridden ruins of the previous views. Some whole new concepts have been invented to avoid paradoxes, for example the concept of a Universal set in Set Theory came after Russell's Paradox. And these are only the outcome of evading Paradox. Great thoughts have been all put into diving into the depth of Paradox, especially by Eastern thinkers.

There's been a clear evasion in face of paradox in Science history. The reason may have been Paradox being "impractical" or something similar. This, however, means nothing here.

Hint: I told you Uncertainty is a double-edged sword. See if you can use the other edge.
 
  • #93
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

Apologies for the delay.
How could you say that if you still haven't understood what it's talking about?

I explained many times the reason I think that proof applies, just look around the posts. Did you counter my reasons?
It was/is relevant. Only because you place so much emphasis on a stance that doesn't have anything to do with my proof doesn't mean you've shown it's irrelevant.

I also apologize for the delay, your post was simply too long for me to respond to, with the time I had left, yesterday.

You never showed how your reasoning applied to Descartes' statement. You showed the problems with your proof. You also showed that a "helper device" need not be of the same form as the proposition that they are trying to resolve/explain. However, you didn't show how your particular proof "fit" Descartes' philosophy.

My statement, P, isn't random. If it was then I needn't even mention it. It's a statement engineered to suit your "I think therefore I am." If you had another statement, which fell in the category of statements that I think are incompatible with Boolean logic then I'd have made P different.

How does it "suit" Descartes' statement? Your statement only examines the inconsistency found when trying to analyze a proof of the form "P([bleep]), doesn't it? Descartes' statement isn't of the form "P([bleep])".

Uncertainty's fairness doesn't mean that it can't detect inconsistencies of knowledge structures. Uncertainty is fair in the sense that it let's one see inconsistencies that wouldn't be seen if the knowledge structure isn't doubted.

But it's still not entirely "fair", because it contradicts itself.

To study a knowledge body you have to live outside that body, and then observe it. Uncertainty provides this "living outside." It let's one doubt the principles and that's why it's fair.

I agree with you, provided you are talking about limited uncertainty. I don't think that Uncertainty (which is the full form of uncertainty) can give you the "outside perspective", because you have to doubt that premise (the Uncertainty premise) as well. Of course, you only have to doubt the Uncertainty premise if you accept it (because it is that premise which states that you must doubt all premises). Do you see why this is paradoxical?

Uncertainty won't prefer one idea over the other...

Except it's own idea/premise? Come one, it's obviously no more useful than any other premise, because in any case, you are taking something for granted.

This situation is similar to that you say: "I must live for living is an obligation." By saying "living is an obligation," you've already assumed you have to live, consequently deducing that "I must live" is logically incorrect (if you're bound to Boolean logic).

This is a very important point that I don't understand. Please explain it to me. I don't get why the fact that a proposition's truth necessitates the truth of another proposition means that that it is logically incorrect.

You may pre-assume something and then prove it, apparently, true. For me, there's no real problem with this, except that it's circular reasoning and it's non-informative.

Yes, it is non-informative. However (briefly returning to the point of the thread), if someone were to try to prove to me that I don't exist, then they are also pre-assuming my existence (otherwise, who are they trying to convince?), and thus it doesn't "inform" them of anything that they didn't already know, it just doesn't allow them to try to disprove that which they knew (that I exist) without contradicting themselves.

If you say "P is T and Q is T" you've gone the way of circular reasoning. If you say "P is F and Q is T" then you've made paradox because P is an assertion of Q and may not be F when Q is considered T.

It (assuming that P is T and that Q is T) is not so much circular as it is non-productive. However, the Evil Demon is assuming that P is T (otherwise, who is he trying to convince?), and then trying to prove that Q is F at the same time. Thus the paradox, and thus the conviction that trying to prove my non-existence is futile (according to Descartes).

One way to overcome this loop and this paradox is to say "P is F and Q is F." Q and its assertion, P, can be simultaneously wrong without causing any trouble. The only problem is that you insist that Q is T.
No, but circular reasoning is forbidden (for you, of course). An assertion of Q, that is P, may not be assumed T when one is about to study Q's state. If Q is pre-assumed T then there's no need for studying it.

I've already said that there is no need of studying it. It is the Evil Demon that has the problem of trying to prove that Q is F, while pre-assuming that P is T.

Also, isn't it just as "circular" (non-productive) to assume that P is F, and then to assume that Q is also F?

P may not be set T but it also must have a definite state and what remains is F, and P set as F will lead to paradox. Only if there was a third state like "null" then P could be assumed "null" while Q was being studied and then set to whatever suitable state. Such suspension is impossible in the framework of Boolean logic.

But it is also unnecessary. We are assuming the truth of both statements at the same time. What's wrong with that?

If you pre-suppose the truth of Q then there's no point in discussing if Q is true for its truth is your premise. Q must be kept "untouched" before it's studied thoroughly and during the time it's being studied. If Q's state is pre-supposed then the outcome of every study or discussion of Q will not result in a state for Q that's different from that pre-supposition.

Tell that to the Evil Demon.

Uncertainty has only one assumption which makes it fairer compared to other stances that require a plethora of assumptions.

Wrong. Uncertainty's one assumption makes it paradoxical and self-contradictory, not "fair".

Uncertainty's paradoxical nature makes it all open even to paradoxes. That's another plus compared to the selective nature of many other viewpoints (eg, they let some paradoxes in while they keep others out).

Uncertainty's paradoxical nature doesn't make it open to anything, it just makes it unusable. If it cannot even "agree with" itself, how can you use it to explain other phenomena?

And, like I said before, Uncertainty should better be viewed as a step in a way. It isn't far different from countless other stances one may assume but it's distinguished by the degrees of freedom it offers. One step after Uncertainty there may be anything, even Certainty, who knows.

Uncertainty shouldn't be viewed as a "step in a way" (IMO). It should be viewed as a road-block, because it's paradoxical.

Besides, if it leads to Certainty (which would the absolute form of "certainty") then it's not much good anyway. I don't want "Certainty". I want a healthy amount of uncertainty. If one can keep these things (certainty and uncertainty) in balance, then one doesn't run into the paradoxes of either extreme. This is the "fair" way (or so it seems to me).

"You" associate "fairness", "reliability," and "supremacy" of an idea with its "practicality."

As do you. You keep talking about how much better Uncertainty is than Certainty, and you also talk a lot about it's being more "fair".

You said: "total Uncertainty is impossible." If it's possible for you to claim something is impossible then it's possible for me to ask for something impossible. I wanted you to see that your statement doesn't work outside the framework it's designed for and to see that this framework is just one out of countless possible frameworks. If you say you've proven total Uncertainty impossible, you must have proven it for all logical systems (which is a cumbersome task, at least).

You yourself have said (posted but un-quoted - ran out of room) that many systems contradict each other. So how is it that you ask me to use all of them at the same time, to prove anything?

Many concepts may be invalid inbound a logical system but this is no indication of those concepts being erroneous in other systems. And all logical systems are equally creditable.

Except those unusable ones, like Uncertainty (couldn't resist :wink:).

continued on the next post...

As is my response...
 
  • #94
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
... continued from the previous post
So an "order" is the placing of things under a well-defined rule set based on the premises for assuming a viewpoint or for doing a task.

OK.

Now what's the premise for Uncertainty? "Nothing is certain." And what's the rule set? A rule set containing one rule, "everything is to be doubted." This rule set assigns everything one place, the place of equality. Nothing is different from nothing in any aspect. This is an "order" which places everything in the same attribute class, "uncertain."

But the one rule contradicts the very concept of forming any "order" at all. You cannot assign this rule to things that will be "put in place", because the rule is that things cannot be "put in place" in any certain manner.

I don't. If it was me, Uncertainty needn't even be discussed because it's part of the past for me. It's "you" I'm talking to and for that purpose I need to satisfy your requests and your way of talking this over.

Fine, but you still haven't proven it's usefulness, or even it's existence (IMO).

By showing (or at least, trying to show) that Uncertainty can be well interpreted as having rationale (within the boundaries of this discussion), I'm showing that "rationale" isn't as strict and significant as it appears to be.

It doesn't matter. Uncertainty's only premise is that nothing is certain. In taking this premise as true, you have eliminated any possibility of producing any rationale of any kind.

This is "your" interpretation of what "referring to ones" implies. Ones can be non-existent ones (a paradox and a loop, you'd say ).

Then why are you using this reasoning (when even you see the loop/paradox)?

Premises are chosen by individuals. Uncertainty's fairness is in that it allows everything, for it doesn't honor or lower any state of mind. All states of mind are equally doubtable thus equally creditable. Uncertainty doesn't judge the situation; it informs of the situation. Being uncertain, one may choose whatever premises that seem suitable to her/him, including those premises of Science.

Let me try to be more clear than I've been (though I don't know if that's possible): Uncertainty does not allow you to choose a premise, at any time, for any reason, because it's premise is that you cannot have premises.

That one isn't certain of the situation doesn't mean one must not, should not or ought not to choose her/his own way.

No, but that one is certain that nothing can be certain does mean that one must/should/ought not choose a "way".

Science, on the other hand, prefers a methodic way of thinking and treating the Universe and not every method but a specific method. Out of countless ways, one way is chosen. That's what I call "unfair." Why would you choose one way out of countless ways and then insist it's the way to go?

It's not the only way I go.

You could reason that Science is "practical" and "useful." Then I have to repeat, "practicality" and "usefulness" are intra-scientific criteria and it's clear they'll see Science consistent with their implications.

Now this I disagree with. "Practicality" and "usefulness" are intrinsic of many different reasoning systems. The fact that Science satisfies them, in spite of coming into existence after them, is what makes it so appealing to humans.

I wrote of the structure and the function for Causality and for that "proposed" substitute which was Pre-established Harmony. The structure is different, the function is different, yet you say they're (almost) the same. What prevents you from seeing the difference is your affection for Causality as a means of scientific interpretation of the Universe.

I don't understand the question (was it a question?). I was saying that Pre-established Harmony also necessitates a form of Cause-and-effect relationship, and is thus not an alternative to Causality, but merely one of the forms of it.

Like I wrote, Pre-established Harmony is different from Causality in that it doesn't assume the cause-effect pair. Causality is the bond between cause and effect while Pre-established Harmony is the harmonized incidence of two (or more) phenomena. For Causality to work, there should be a distinction between two phenomena which are coinciding and what distinguishes the cause from the effect is the chronological order. For Pre-established Harmony to work, nothing is necessary. No interaction, stimulus-response set or similar concept is required. The two coinciding phenomena can be considered isolated just like two spatially or chronologically far apart phenomena would be. The pattern of events and the distribution of coincidences are governed by the Harmony. This central governance of Harmony ensures the simultaneous occurring of many pairs of phenomena but it doesn't require any bond or relation between them. There are no spatial or chronological limits to seemingly related phenomena.

No, the limit is not between them, as it would under "usual" Causal reasoning. But that doesn't mean that there is no cause at all. I really don't remember what Pre-established harmony is. I thought it had to do with the Quantum binding of two particles, and that there states change instaneously/simultaneouly. It is in this particular case that I still see a cause (the "observer").

What if I told you I've thrown a coin three times and have got tails every time and then conclude that an invisible bond relates this phenomenon with the presence of a mosquito in my room? You'd possibly say, in the best case, that I have to experiment many more times before I conclude. You know, however, that Probability Theory is all about a limit when the number of experiments yields to infinity. And I can never conclude (not without experimenting infinite number of times) if these two phenomena are really related or I've only experienced a statistical not-very-odd oddity. The Causality bond isn't a necessity; it isn't even a probabilistic conclusion. Causality is an optimization method based on hopes for recurring of events. One may use it as much as one wants but relying on it is senseless.

Relying on it when speaking of abstract, unlikely, causes is rather senseless, I agree. However, if when I smack someone, they get hurt I can assume the bond, because science shows us exactly what chemical reactions are occurring.

As for the EPR experiment, there are two problems with your interpretation. First, even if you consider the Physicist you can't find a delay between her/his action and the spin change in the far off particle. Exactly when the action takes place a far off event occurs.

I can see that I confused the EPR experiment with "Pre-established Harmony". I'm sorry. Could you re-explain "Pre-established Harmony" please?

Now, for your counter-argument: You said "exactly when the action takes place, a far off event occurs". Does this not illustrate the relationship between the action and the far-off event?

Second, the distinction you make here is based on your knowledge of the Physicist's intention. You know she/he wants to initiate a change somewhere so you conclude a relation between her/his action and the change. This knowledge of intention isn't intrinsic to your understanding of the situation. You could have observed an alien Physicist with her/his invisible particles performing the EPR experiment. Then, you couldn't have concluded based on your knowledge of her/his intention. Even though the same experiment occurs in both cases (eg, human Physicist and alien Physicist), you're able to distinguish the cause and the effect in the former while you wouldn't be able to do so in the latter. This means that the distinction of cause and effect is nothing but a mental pattern you try to impose on this event.

But I wasn't taking their intention into account. I was saying that their making the observation (regardless of intent) caused the change.

Their actions were valid for them, yours should be proven valid for you. Nevertheless, a real paradox isn't made in case of erroneous reasoning but in case of an erroneous reasoning system.

But all reasoning systems are erroneous at some level, and will thus all yield paradoxes. However, in all cases - and within all reasoning systems - paradox signifies that you've been headed "in the wrong direction".

Achilles and the tortoise (I'm not sure if it was a tortoise or a turtle) paradox, has been around for almost 2000 years. Is it there because of a mistake in reasoning? And 2000 years haven't been enough to find this mistake? Or is it solved now?

It seems resolved. See the thread, "Zeno's Paradoxes".

Some of them have even based their views on the paradox-ridden ruins of the previous views. Some whole new concepts have been invented to avoid paradoxes, for example the concept of a Universal set in Set Theory came after Russell's Paradox. And these are only the outcome of evading Paradox. Great thoughts have been all put into diving into the depth of Paradox, especially by Eastern thinkers.

No, all of these people (including Kurt Godel) were forced to make their new conclusions, because paradox was "getting in the way" of progress.

There's been a clear evasion in face of paradox in Science history. The reason may have been Paradox being "impractical" or something similar. This, however, means nothing here.

It means everything here. It is the reason why I don't use Uncertainty.
 
  • #95
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
You never showed how your reasoning applied to Descartes' statement...
I repeat, you said you didn't understand the proof (or you haven't put much in effort into that) then how could you criticize it?

The storyline I used in describing the proof first goes through defining the state for P and then studies Q by asking what state you associate with it (which is T, for you're the defender of Q). On the next step it shows how P will lead into either a loop or a paradox when it's seen along with Q. This is how the proof is suitable for studying Q: it shows that Q results in undesirable results (loop or paradox) when it's studied along with P. It seems clear to me, exactly where do you see an ambiguity?

To criticize that proof you must be able to show one or more of these faults have happened:

00. P isn't a valid statement (but it is).
01. P can't be studied along with Q (but it can be for any two statements may be studied together).
02. There's a fault in deduction (there's none, as far as I can see).
03. Q won't lead to loop or paradox (the paradox case you've accepted, there remains the loop and that I will explain more).
But it's still not entirely "fair", because it contradicts itself.
Why do you think "fairness" can't be found "paradox?" By contradicting itself it's doing its task of fairness. It tells you: "this isn't the end of it, this isn't an absolute point, and it’s only a relative climax."

You say it isn't "entirely fair," and you're right. I haven't claimed it's "entirely fair;" I claimed it's "the fairest." Relatively more fairness when seen in comparison to other stances doesn't mean absolute fairness. It's only "the fairest" and not "absolutely fair."
... I don't think that Uncertainty (which is the full form of uncertainty) can give you the "outside perspective", because you have to doubt that premise (the Uncertainty premise) as well...
I see why it's paradoxical but I don't run away at the sight of paradox. You accept that uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" to whatever subject of study you've chosen. See, whatever subject of study "except uncertainty itself," and Uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" for everything including itself.

You accept that for studying a knowledge body one must stand and view it from "outside." Now, by standing "outside" where does one exactly stand? Isn't it the "inside" to another knowledge body? And the "inside" to another knowledge body means the acceptance of its premises. Could then one be fair in studying a knowledge body while one is submitted to the premises of another?

The situation, even without Uncertainty, is naturally paradoxical. Running away from paradox dawned on one in one specific form won't get one far, soon paradox will come back in another form but with the same content.

Two knowledge bodies have had many firm defenders in the course of history: Science and Religion. Do you think it's fair to stand inside Science and judge Religion? I think not, for Science will call to discard Religion because it's "impractical;" why should one take into account an intangible agent that acts in an unforeseeable manner? And then, do you think it's fair to stand inside Religion and judge Science? I think not, for Religion will call to give up Science because it's "blasphemy," "sin," "interference in the work of God," "rudeness against the Creation," whatever; why should one commit something against the rule of a supreme power ready to take revenge on the sinners?

So if one's to study Science or Religion fairly one has to stay outside both of them and whatever other knowledge body that may interfere in fair judgment by the means of its premises. The same is valid for any study of any other knowledge body.

Is that possible? I think not but there's a way to offset those interferences, to doubt them. Whatever comes near should better be doubted before it's taken into account. This is exactly the task of Uncertainty. One premise that may interfere with fair judgment is that premise of Uncertainty (ie, "nothing is certain"), and Uncertainty itself advises one on doubting (and being cautious of) everything. That's why Uncertainty's paradoxical nature helps it be the fairest. This paradoxical nature is a reflection of the paradoxical situation of a "fair" observer. I guess you don't oppose a fair observer, do you?
Except it's own idea/premise? Come one, it's obviously no more useful than any other premise, because in any case, you are taking something for granted.
First, it won't prefer even its own premise over others for it's paradoxical and contradicts itself. This is the function of paradox; it's simultaneous acceptance and denial that means it won't prefer anything over the other even itself.

Second, even if it prefers one premise over the others, like all other stances do, that premise is one that offers high degrees of freedom. If one has to assume one or more premise(s) in any case then wouldn't it better be chosen to be more flexible?
This is a very important point that I don't understand. Please explain it to me. I don't get why the fact that a proposition's truth necessitates the truth of another proposition means that that it is logically incorrect.
This isn't true for any two statements, it's true for two statements which are assertions of each other.

For the statement Q, there's the statement P that asserts it. If P, the assertion of Q, is assumed T before Q is studied then Q itself has been assumed T before Q is studied. What happens here is what I call "circular" reasoning: a line of deduction which starts with the pre-assumed truth of some statement, Q here, and ends with the truth of the same statement, again Q.

I wrote that P was "engineered" to suit Q. The trick in this "engineering" is that P is an assertion of Q. If you set P as T, then you've set Q as T and later you start talking about Q but if you've set Q as T before even starting with your study of Q then the outcome of your study can't be anything other than Q being T.

Circular reasoning is non-informative because it starts and ends with the same thing. Starting with Q "pre-assumed" (you see, it's assumed "before" anything else) as T and ending with Q as T is non-informative and circular. One can start with any statement "pre-assumed" T and end with that statement being T.

Remember when you said "one can't be thinking if one doesn't exist" and I responded that such premise will turn "I think therefore I am" into "I am therefore I am." "I am therefore I am" is an ever-true statement but it's circular. One can't oppose a statement that is made of itself and that's why one can't oppose "I am therefore I am." Unfortunately, or fortunately, circular reasoning that makes up such statements is forbidden in the framework of Boolean logic. "I am therefore I am" is circular hence incompatible with Boolean logic. And for those who "like" Boolean logic too much and want to find "absolute truth" out of statements, as claimed by Boolean logic, "I am therefore I am" is, well, out of question.
... if someone were to try to prove to me that I don't exist, then they are also pre-assuming my existence (otherwise, who are they trying to convince?), and thus it doesn't "inform" them of anything that they didn't already know...
And if "you" try to convince them that they exist, you'll get "the same problem."

There's a reason to that I accompany a discussion of Descartes' statement with a discussion of Uncertainty. Descartes' statement is one of the many places that Uncertainty shows up in full strength. Particularly because the statement has to do with foundations of one's thoughts (existence in this case). Descartes' statement can't be disproved (for it's circular) but it also can't be proven (for it's incompatible with Boolean logic). Where's the way out? Uncertainty. That statement is both ways equally creditable, and that's the essence of Uncertainty.
Uncertainty's paradoxical nature doesn't make it open to anything, it just makes it unusable. If it cannot even "agree with" itself, how can you use it to explain other phenomena?
One thing to notice, have you thought of the name by which "that which agrees with itself" is called? That which expects and asserts its own righteousness is called a "loop," I guess.

Any knowledge body, in order to remain consistent, must somewhere assert its own premises. Many times though, this is done with much subtlety.

Let's see an example, Science. If I come to you and claim "there's an intangible unforeseeable uncontrollable agent acting in this Universe," you (depicted as a defender of Science) will possibly tell me to throw it away because it's an "impractical" premise. Where's the twist? By comparing that premise to a scientific criterion, that is practicality, you've pre-assumed Science's righteousness. Obviously enough, having pre-assumed Science's righteousness, you won't go much further than asserting that righteousness by telling me to throw away an "impractical" premise.

Furthermore, Uncertainty needn't care for explaining the "phenomenal" Universe. The "phenomenal" Universe is the "sensible" one and "senses" and "relying on the input from the senses" are all from the "scientific" Universe. Philosophy comes before one chooses to submit to the scientific Universe.

continued on the next post...
 
  • #96
... continued from the previous post

The balance you talk about is achieved after both extremes are experienced. That balance, I guess, is somehow like that "residual understanding" I wrote of. One experiences Certainty (in the form of scientific and/or religious and/or whatever belief) then one experiences Uncertainty and then comes the residual understanding, or as you call it "the balance." If you're in balance then you won't be sure that you're absolutely right but you also won't be sure that you're wrong. You have a good amount of hope in that that your thoughts may work as you wish and choose and think on the basis of that hope. Am I correct here? If yes, then I think you already have experienced with Uncertainty and Certainty.
As do you. You keep talking about how much better Uncertainty is than Certainty, and you also talk a lot about it's being more "fair".
I never said it's "better." I said it's a "fairer" substitute. And again "you" interpret the "fairness" I talk about as "practicality." I don't put any value on Uncertainty for it's worthless but it's "fair" and "sincere" to that which is called Philosophy.
You yourself have said ... that many systems contradict each other. So how is it that you ask me to use all of them at the same time, to prove anything?
Don't prove and don't claim your argument "encompassing" and "ever-true." Your arguments are good inside a framework of Boolean logic, beyond that isn't in your, or anyone else's, power.

We can discuss the thing in some framework and get results for that framework and we can be satisfied with those results in their respective framework. However, there's no warranty, even limited, for outside of that framework. And clearly there's much more to outside than to inside.
Except those unusable ones, like Uncertainty...
Seriously, do you have some grounds for that claim? If yes, do you know that if your grounds are creditable you would have overcome one of the most compelling challenges humanity has faced?

Claiming that some logical systems are "less creditable" makes a basis for choosing among logical systems. Do you know what this means? This means some forms of attitude can be preferred to other forms. This means some individuals have been "right" while some others have been "wrong." This means there's always been "absolute rightness" and "absolute wrongness." Do you know of what order of magnitude is such a claim?
But the one rule contradicts the very concept of forming any "order" at all. You cannot assign this rule to things that will be "put in place", because the rule is that things cannot be "put in place" in any certain manner.
No, the rule is "there's no distinction between any two places, put them wherever and they'll be equal." Things are "put into place" but all into "one place" and that's the "place of equality."
Fine, but you still haven't proven it's usefulness, or even it's existence (IMO).
I can't prove what I haven't even claimed. I never claimed that Uncertainty is useful; I said it shouldn't be assessed by practicality criterion. I never claimed its existence, I said it's paradoxical and can't be given a definite state.
... Uncertainty's only premise is that nothing is certain. In taking this premise as true, you have eliminated any possibility of producing any rationale of any kind.
Why? And how? "Nothing is uncertain" doesn't seem to me like opposing "any" order. It surely opposes "many" orders but not "any" order. I wrote of an order that is well suited to this premise, the order that places everything in one place, the place of equality.
Then why are you using this reasoning (when even you see the loop/paradox)?
For I don't run away from loops and paradoxes. I like to see how they work and why they appear all around.
Let me try to be more clear than I've been (though I don't know if that's possible): Uncertainty does not allow you to choose a premise, at any time, for any reason, because it's premise is that you cannot have premises.

No, but that one is certain that nothing can be certain does mean that one must/should/ought not choose a "way".
Again, this is "your" interpretation (or rather "misinterpretation"). Uncertainty asks for caution, clarity and hesitation in the face of anything and everything; not a bit less, not a bit more. Uncertainty is of paradoxical nature that means it's nothing more than a between-the-lines hint. One may choose one's premises at will while one's uncertain of their truth.

One's choice for one's life isn't associated with one's stance on one's choice. Uncertainty provides a ground for always being cautious of what one chooses but doesn't prevent a choice from being made. Being cautious of one's choice one will always be ready to change it if one finds out that choice has been erroneous. This readiness is a basis for a dynamic system of thoughts that can change with new packets of knowledge (even though uncertain they are). Instead of taking "progression" as a premise (like with Science) one will be experiencing "change" as a consequence of a fairer, more general, less demanding and more open premise.
It's not the only way I go.
You seem to.
Now this I disagree with. "Practicality" and "usefulness" are intrinsic of many different reasoning systems. The fact that Science satisfies them, in spite of coming into existence after them, is what makes it so appealing to humans.
Practicality does have meaning in many knowledge bodies but doesn't have the same meaning all over these places. Practicality can be defined even for a Religion, as "conformance to God's commandments" for example. This practicality is apparently different from the other one discussed in words of Science.

Science has to do with its own definition of this term which is an intra-scientific concept confined to a scientific understanding of scientific Universe. I don't think "practicality" in this sense is even an outcome of observing the scientific Universe. One can study the scientific Universe with scientific method but nowhere around this Universe it's written "survival, longevity, prosperity is our motto." We know that living beings, being living beings by scientific definition in the scientific Universe, want to live, live longer, produce more of their instances and get more energy/matter for their lives. Anyway, that's no necessity, it's not an obligation. We know there's this desire but we can't say it's an aim. That we want to "live, live long and prosper" doesn't make this desire a logical obligation. Nowhere in any description of the scientific method is stated that we have to reach for this target by the means of that method. This aim isn't intrinsic even to Science; it's intrinsic to scientifically-defined living beings, when they're viewed scientifically.
Relying on it when speaking of abstract, unlikely, causes is rather senseless, I agree. However, if when I smack someone, they get hurt I can assume the bond, because science shows us exactly what chemical reactions are occurring.

I can see that I confused the EPR experiment with "Pre-established Harmony". I'm sorry. Could you re-explain "Pre-established Harmony" please?

Now, for your counter-argument: You said "exactly when the action takes place, a far off event occurs". Does this not illustrate the relationship between the action and the far-off event?
Causality bond is explained for scientifically through the declaration of forces. The four forces are the source of all interaction including that you smack someone. Forces are elements from the scientific Universe. They're of fundamentals of Science. Let's think of them for a moment. What's a force? An obscure concept that explains for a coincidence that is later called an "interaction."

How do you know they're hurt when you smack them? You see them getting hurt but do you see them? You see a consistent representation in your mind that goes through a transition but what's the nature of this representation? No one knows and is that what "really" (supposing there's some "real" thing around) happening? No one knows.

I meant EPR Experiment and Pre-established Harmony as two separate lines of discussion. Here comes my re-explanation of Pre-established Harmony:

You ask if there isn't a bond between two coinciding events and that's the central question to Causality and its substitutes. All of them try to explain for coincidences that are observed over and over.

Pre-established Harmony explains these coincidences as parts of the Harmony that governs the events of this Universe. The coincidence of two events is a part of the Harmony but not a necessity of Universe's structure which is supposed to be made of abstract Monads that are isolated from each other. While one part of the Harmony may force a coincidence and a seemingly relation between some of the Monads (of the two coinciding phenomena), a repetition is noway guaranteed. Monads are totally isolated and play their own roles in the Harmony but these roles may or may not be synchronized to mimic some relation.

continued on the next post...
 
  • #97
... continued from the previous post
But I wasn't taking their intention into account. I was saying that their making the observation (regardless of intent) caused the change.
How do you know they're observing something? Isn't that you have a picture of an observing Physicist to compare them to? The alien Physicist may not comply with this picture so you'll never know it's been observing but you'll see the change.

Moreover, this doesn't solve the problem with zero time. Some "cause" (say, a Physicist or a particle) "causes" some "effect" but there's no time delay between them. How could you say which one is the cause and which one is the effect without previously knowing one of them (eg, the Physicist) has an intention for a change?
But all reasoning systems are erroneous at some level, and will thus all yield paradoxes. However, in all cases - and within all reasoning systems - paradox signifies that you've been headed "in the wrong direction".
"The wrong direction" for that system but maybe "the right direction" for another totally unnoticed one which can bring you extension to the horizons of your thought.
No, all of these people (including Kurt Godel) were forced to make their new conclusions, because paradox was "getting in the way" of progress.
Kurt Gödel’s "Incompleteness Theorem" seems different. I read a second-hand (or even worse, who knows) version of the theorem like this: "every encompassing system of logic must have at least one premise that can not be proven or verified without contradicting itself." It was referenced to "Scientific American, Gödel’s Proof, Vol. CXCVI.6, 71-86 (1965)." We can check it out if necessary.

Not "all" of them for sure. Eastern thinkers (that you seem not to count in "all") didn't do as you say, they even didn't go the way of "progression."
 
  • #98
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
[BKurt Gödel’s "Incompleteness Theorem" seems different. I read a second-hand (or even worse, who knows) version of the theorem like this: "every encompassing system of logic must have at least one premise that can not be proven or verified without contradicting itself." It was referenced to "Scientific American, Gödel’s Proof, Vol. CXCVI.6, 71-86 (1965)." We can check it out if necessary.
[/B]

The wording I know of for the theorem of Godel reads that any formal, axiomatic system is either incomplete or inconsistent (or both).

incomplete:
the system has not the capacity to produce all the truths. there are truths that can not be produced by the axiomatix rules of the system

inconsistent:
the system has some internal problem of consistently defining the truth value of statements based on the axiomatic rules
 
  • #99
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
I repeat, you said you didn't understand the proof (or you haven't put much in effort into that) then how could you criticize it?

I repeat, I am not criticizing the proof, I am waiting for you to show me it's applicability, otherwise it's not important to the discussion.

The storyline I used in describing the proof first goes through defining the state for P and then studies Q by asking what state you associate with it (which is T, for you're the defender of Q). On the next step it shows how P will lead into either a loop or a paradox when it's seen along with Q. This is how the proof is suitable for studying Q: it shows that Q results in undesirable results (loop or paradox) when it's studied along with P. It seems clear to me, exactly where do you see an ambiguity?

It may seem clear to you, but perhaps you are witholding something from me, because it doesn't make any sense - to me - to say that one proposition's implying another proposition's truth leads to a paradox/loop.

To criticize that proof you must be able to show one or more of these faults have happened:

00. P isn't a valid statement (but it is).
01. P can't be studied along with Q (but it can be for any two statements may be studied together).
02. There's a fault in deduction (there's none, as far as I can see).
03. Q won't lead to loop or paradox (the paradox case you've accepted, there remains the loop and that I will explain more).

I perfectly agree with point 03. Q won't lead to paradox, and I haven't agreed to anything of the kind.

Why do you think "fairness" can't be found "paradox?" By contradicting itself it's doing its task of fairness. It tells you: "this isn't the end of it, this isn't an absolute point, and it’s only a relative climax."

No, it's telling you "I'm unreliable, and self-contradictory". If something cannot even be self-consistent, how can it be consistent with any other system?

You say it isn't "entirely fair," and you're right. I haven't claimed it's "entirely fair;" I claimed it's "the fairest."

It's not that it's not "entirely fair". It's that it cannot exist. It's supposed "fairness" just contradicts it's premise, and thus leads to unusability.

You accept that uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" to whatever subject of study you've chosen. See, whatever subject of study "except uncertainty itself," and Uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" for everything including itself.

No, Uncertainty doesn't give a perspective for anything, because it's unusable/paradoxical/self-contradictory - and thus self/defeating.

You accept that for studying a knowledge body one must stand and view it from "outside." Now, by standing "outside" where does one exactly stand? Isn't it the "inside" to another knowledge body?

Yeah.

And the "inside" to another knowledge body means the acceptance of its premises. Could then one be fair in studying a knowledge body while one is submitted to the premises of another?

Yes.

The situation, even without Uncertainty, is naturally paradoxical. Running away from paradox dawned on one in one specific form won't get one far, soon paradox will come back in another form but with the same content.

How is it paradoxical, without the use of "Uncertainty"?

Two knowledge bodies have had many firm defenders in the course of history: Science and Religion. Do you think it's fair to stand inside Science and judge Religion? I think not, for Science will call to discard Religion because it's "impractical;" why should one take into account an intangible agent that acts in an unforeseeable manner? And then, do you think it's fair to stand inside Religion and judge Science? I think not, for Religion will call to give up Science because it's "blasphemy," "sin," "interference in the work of God," "rudeness against the Creation," whatever; why should one commit something against the rule of a supreme power ready to take revenge on the sinners?

First off, there are many (rather intelligent) people, that I know of, that can study science with the Bible as their premise, and they have no problem. I think your problem here is that you are saying "stand inside X, to judge Y". This is not what I was talking about. I'm saying "take X for granted (as part of the foundation/premise), to judge Y".

Is that possible? I think not but there's a way to offset those interferences, to doubt them. Whatever comes near should better be doubted before it's taken into account. This is exactly the task of Uncertainty.

But saying that something necessitates Uncertainty is also contradictory to the premise of Uncertainty, can you see why?

One premise that may interfere with fair judgment is that premise of Uncertainty (ie, "nothing is certain"), and Uncertainty itself advises one on doubting (and being cautious of) everything. That's why Uncertainty's paradoxical nature helps it be the fairest. This paradoxical nature is a reflection of the paradoxical situation of a "fair" observer. I guess you don't oppose a fair observer, do you?
First, it won't prefer even its own premise over others for it's paradoxical and contradicts itself. This is the function of paradox; it's simultaneous acceptance and denial that means it won't prefer anything over the other even itself.

You are totally missing the point (IMO). You are saying "it will do this" and "it will do that". This implies it's practicality, when in fact such a thing (as practicality) cannot exist in an Uncertain world, nor can it exist along with paradox.

Second, even if it prefers one premise over the others, like all other stances do, that premise is one that offers high degrees of freedom. If one has to assume one or more premise(s) in any case then wouldn't it better be chosen to be more flexible?

It's not more flexible, when will you get this? It's unusable, that's not the same thing as "flexible".

answer continued on next post...
 
  • #100
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
This isn't true for any two statements, it's true for two statements which are assertions of each other.

For the statement Q, there's the statement P that asserts it. If P, the assertion of Q, is assumed T before Q is studied then Q itself has been assumed T before Q is studied. What happens here is what I call "circular" reasoning: a line of deduction which starts with the pre-assumed truth of some statement, Q here, and ends with the truth of the same statement, again Q.

I wrote that P was "engineered" to suit Q. The trick in this "engineering" is that P is an assertion of Q. If you set P as T, then you've set Q as T and later you start talking about Q but if you've set Q as T before even starting with your study of Q then the outcome of your study can't be anything other than Q being T.

I understand this. That still doesn't show any inconsistency the logic. Yes, assuming the proof of one of these things assumes the proof of the other. So what? What is wrong with my saying "I'm fifteen", and then saying "I was born fifteen years ago"? In fact, I could just omit one, and it wouldn't matter, because these things don't prove each other, they just assume the same thing.

Circular reasoning is non-informative because it starts and ends with the same thing. Starting with Q "pre-assumed" (you see, it's assumed "before" anything else) as T and ending with Q as T is non-informative and circular. One can start with any statement "pre-assumed" T and end with that statement being T.

Yes, you are right, they can. Also, why is it that it matters to you that it is "non-informative", when you were previously trying to show the folly of sticking to that which leads to progressive understanding/knowledge?

Remember when you said "one can't be thinking if one doesn't exist" and I responded that such premise will turn "I think therefore I am" into "I am therefore I am." "I am therefore I am" is an ever-true statement but it's circular.

I know. The point of all of Descartes' reasoning was not so much to prove that he existed (pay attention, please, this is important), it was to prove that the fact that he could contemplate not existing proved his existence - thus any attempt to prove his non-existence further validated his existence.

Unfortunately, or fortunately, circular reasoning that makes up such statements is forbidden in the framework of Boolean logic. "I am therefore I am" is circular hence incompatible with Boolean logic. And for those who "like" Boolean logic too much and want to find "absolute truth" out of statements, as claimed by Boolean logic, "I am therefore I am" is, well, out of question.

Again, and this is important, it is not so much circular, as restating the same thing twice. Pay attention to this, please, Boolean Logic doesn't say that it is wrong to postulate the same thing twice (does it?), so "I am therefore I am" shouldn't be forbidden.

(Just to make sure you get this): The point of the statement is not to be found in the statement, it is found in the context. As I've said before, the point is that, the more one tries to prove that I don't exist, the more proof I have of my existence.

And if "you" try to convince them that they exist, you'll get "the same problem."

There's a reason to that I accompany a discussion of Descartes' statement with a discussion of Uncertainty. Descartes' statement is one of the many places that Uncertainty shows up in full strength. Particularly because the statement has to do with foundations of one's thoughts (existence in this case). Descartes' statement can't be disproved (for it's circular) but it also can't be proven (for it's incompatible with Boolean logic). Where's the way out? Uncertainty. That statement is both ways equally creditable, and that's the essence of Uncertainty.
One thing to notice, have you thought of the name by which "that which agrees with itself" is called? That which expects and asserts its own righteousness is called a "loop," I guess.

See above, for why it's not a loop; why Uncertainty is not an answer; and why the statement ought not be studied outside of it's context (the story about the Evil Demon).

Let's see an example, Science. If I come to you and claim "there's an intangible unforeseeable uncontrollable agent acting in this Universe," you (depicted as a defender of Science) will possibly tell me to throw it away because it's an "impractical" premise. Where's the twist? By comparing that premise to a scientific criterion, that is practicality, you've pre-assumed Science's righteousness. Obviously enough, having pre-assumed Science's righteousness, you won't go much further than asserting that righteousness by telling me to throw away an "impractical" premise.

However, Science is a perfectly sound branch of Philosophy, and thus there is nothing wrong with my using it to prove something's practicality (which, btw, is not just a scientific tool, it is a tool of practically all of the different reasoning systems that I've ever been introduced to).
 
  • #101
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
The balance you talk about is achieved after both extremes are experienced. That balance, I guess, is somehow like that "residual understanding" I wrote of. One experiences Certainty (in the form of scientific and/or religious and/or whatever belief) then one experiences Uncertainty and then comes the residual understanding, or as you call it "the balance."

No, this isn't anything like what I was saying at all. I was saying that "uncertainty" is a balance, and you can't reach "uncertainty" (which means "partial uncertainty", btw) if you use the premise of "Uncertainty" at any time.

If you're in balance then you won't be sure that you're absolutely right but you also won't be sure that you're wrong. You have a good amount of hope in that that your thoughts may work as you wish and choose and think on the basis of that hope. Am I correct here? If yes, then I think you already have experienced with Uncertainty and Certainty.

You act like these are the only two choices. There is also the choice of "uncertainty", which is the one I've been pushing.

I never said it's "better." I said it's a "fairer" substitute. And again "you" interpret the "fairness" I talk about as "practicality." I don't put any value on Uncertainty for it's worthless but it's "fair" and "sincere" to that which is called Philosophy.

How can you say that it's both worthless and fair at the same time.

We can discuss the thing in some framework and get results for that framework and we can be satisfied with those results in their respective framework. However, there's no warranty, even limited, for outside of that framework. And clearly there's much more to outside than to inside.

There is no point in leaving a logical framework that works.

Seriously, do you have some grounds for that claim? If yes, do you know that if your grounds are creditable you would have overcome one of the most compelling challenges humanity has faced?

Honestly, have you ignored all of my posts in the past couple of pages?! Let me spell it out for you: Uncertainty is unusable because it requires you to accept a premise, while at the same time telling you not to accept any premises. This leaves you with no place to go, and thus you can't get anywhere. For a more detailed explanation of it's ineptitude, read my previous posts.

No, the rule is "there's no distinction between any two places, put them wherever and they'll be equal." Things are "put into place" but all into "one place" and that's the "place of equality."
I can't prove what I haven't even claimed. I never claimed that Uncertainty is useful; I said it shouldn't be assessed by practicality criterion. I never claimed its existence, I said it's paradoxical and can't be given a definite state.

In referring to "it", you claim "it's" existence, and you know it. You've been speaking about "it" as a reasoning system, and thus (obviously) implying it's existence.

Why? And how? "Nothing is uncertain" doesn't seem to me like opposing "any" order. It surely opposes "many" orders but not "any" order. I wrote of an order that is well suited to this premise, the order that places everything in one place, the place of equality.

Yes, it makes them all equally unreliable, and unimportant, if taken as a premise. It opposes all order, because to assume an order is to violate it's premise of not assuming anything.

Again, this is "your" interpretation (or rather "misinterpretation"). Uncertainty asks for caution, clarity and hesitation in the face of anything and everything; not a bit less, not a bit more.

DEAD wrong, even by your own previous explanations of Uncertainty. In case you've forgotten, Uncertainty relies on the premise that "nothing is certain". This means that to believe in "caution" is against it's very premise. To believe in "clarity and hesitation" is against it's very premise.

Uncertainty is of paradoxical nature that means it's nothing more than a between-the-lines hint. One may choose one's premises at will while one's uncertain of their truth.

No, that's how "uncertainty" works, not "Uncertainty".

Uncertainty provides a ground for always being cautious of what one chooses but doesn't prevent a choice from being made.

YES IT DOES!

If you make a choice of premise to take for granted, you have violated the premise of Uncertainty, which doesn't allow you to take anything for granted (at least, that's how you've presented it).

Being cautious of one's choice one will always be ready to change it if one finds out that choice has been erroneous. This readiness is a basis for a dynamic system of thoughts that can change with new packets of knowledge (even though uncertain they are). Instead of taking "progression" as a premise (like with Science) one will be experiencing "change" as a consequence of a fairer, more general, less demanding and more open premise.

Don't you see that all through this you are speaking of the ability to take a certain premise for granted when you choose to. Uncertainty doesn't allow one to take anything for granted.

Practicality does have meaning in many knowledge bodies but doesn't have the same meaning all over these places. Practicality can be defined even for a Religion, as "conformance to God's commandments" for example. This practicality is apparently different from the other one discussed in words of Science.

It doesn't matter, it still exists in all reasoning systems.

Causality bond is explained for scientifically through the declaration of forces. The four forces are the source of all interaction including that you smack someone. Forces are elements from the scientific Universe. They're of fundamentals of Science. Let's think of them for a moment. What's a force? An obscure concept that explains for a coincidence that is later called an "interaction."

Or, it is that which causes the interaction. Haven't you considered that yours is a viewpoint based solely on non-conformance to other viewpoints, while Causality is explaining what is happening without postulating any extra speculations?

How do you know they're hurt when you smack them? You see them getting hurt but do you see them? You see a consistent representation in your mind that goes through a transition but what's the nature of this representation? No one knows and is that what "really" (supposing there's some "real" thing around) happening? No one knows.

I'm definitely not going to get into a discussion of whether there is a reality or not. I 1) don't have time right now; and 2) don't see it's relevance, because you are assuming your own reality/existence every time you argue with me anyway. What's to make you think that I'm actually seeing what you type? It doesn't matter, because that's not the topic of our discussions.

Pre-established Harmony explains these coincidences as parts of the Harmony that governs the events of this Universe. The coincidence of two events is a part of the Harmony but not a necessity of Universe's structure which is supposed to be made of abstract Monads that are isolated from each other. While one part of the Harmony may force a coincidence and a seemingly relation between some of the Monads (of the two coinciding phenomena), a repetition is noway guaranteed. Monads are totally isolated and play their own roles in the Harmony but these roles may or may not be synchronized to mimic some relation.

So the "mimicing" of relation isn't caused by the "Monadic" (is that a word? :smile:) nature of the universe?
 
  • #102
Greetz,

1. For heusdens:

Thank you. A logical system is a form of an axiomatic system, right? Truth values, structuring of statements and rules of deduction are the axioms of a logical system, I guess.

2. For Mentat:
I repeat, I am not criticizing the proof, I am waiting for you to show me it's applicability, otherwise it's not important to the discussion.
You "are" criticizing it by claiming it's inapplicable. Isn't that sort of critique?

The proof's aim is to show that Q (Descartes' statement) and a valid statement, P, together make either a loop or a paradox based on arbitrarily-chosen state for P. "If" it succeeds in showing this point, it's also succeeded in showing that Q is somehow incompatible with the viewpoint in which all the proof has taken place. This seems so apparent to me. Is it unclear?

If one's to criticize this proof one must show one of those cases numbered 00-03 has happened.
... it doesn't make any sense - to me - to say that one proposition's implying another proposition's truth leads to a paradox/loop.

I perfectly agree with point 03. Q won't lead to paradox, and I haven't agreed to anything of the kind.
Loop is one case and Paradox is another. The proof follows either of two different lines according to the state chosen for P. If P is set T then, so the proof claims, a loop is made. If P is set F then, so the proof claims, a paradox is made.

You accepted that if Q is set T then its assertion, P, may not be set F because that would lead to a paradox (saying that Q is both T and F is a paradox). So one of the lines that the proof follows has been approved. The other line should be followed when P is set T, and that's the loop case.
How is it paradoxical, without the use of "Uncertainty"?
You didn't consider what I said. I asked if one could remain fair to some knowledge body as one's subject of study while one's submitted to another knowledge body's premises. And you answered "yes" but how could you ever answer "yes?"

Isn't it clear that one can't be fair if one's got premises? If one assumes some premises one will always assess everything with those premises in mind. Consequently, one won't evaluate one's subject(s) of study fairly anymore. Do you think an observer whose premise is "the event X will happen in this experiment" can observe that experiment fairly?

One wants to be fair in assessing a knowledge body. To be fair, one has to stand outside that knowledge body. Standing "outside" a knowledge body is standing "inside" another. Standing "inside" another knowledge body means being submitted to its premises. Now that one's submitted to some premises one isn’t fair. One can't stand in any place and claim that one's fair. This is the paradoxical situation of a "fair" observer. And this paradoxical situation is independent from Uncertainty.
First off, there are many (rather intelligent) people, that I know of, that can study science with the Bible as their premise, and they have no problem. I think your problem here is that you are saying "stand inside X, to judge Y". This is not what I was talking about. I'm saying "take X for granted (as part of the foundation/premise), to judge Y".
One can't be both "religious" and "scientific" at the same time. Because Science and Religion have contradictory predispositions.

The Old Testament starts with Genesis, the cosmogony of Judaism and Christianity. Scientific cosmogony is totally different and in contradiction to Genesis. One can't believe in both of them at the same time.

Then, you don't seem to have the faintest idea what you were told with that Science and Religion example. Try to understand it.
But saying that something necessitates Uncertainty is also contradictory to the premise of Uncertainty, can you see why?
I see, but did I say something "necessitates" Uncertainty? I said Uncertainty is a way to offset the interference of premises.
... You are saying "it will do this" and "it will do that". This implies it's practicality, when in fact such a thing (as practicality) cannot exist in an Uncertain world, nor can it exist along with paradox.
"You" think that's implied by my words. And you say practicality may not exist for an uncertain viewpoint, now wouldn't this claim of yours be wrong if I've really shown that Uncertainty does this and that?
It's not more flexible, when will you get this? It's unusable, that's not the same thing as "flexible".
Is there a problem with saying that something is "unusable" (as you claim) yet "flexible?"
... That still doesn't show any inconsistency the logic. Yes, assuming the proof of one of these things assumes the proof of the other. So what? What is wrong with my saying "I'm fifteen", and then saying "I was born fifteen years ago"?...
No problem as long as you don't assume one of them as a proof for the other. You may say that "I'm fifteen" and "I was born fifteen years ago" are logically equal but you may not assume "I'm fifteen" and deduce "so I was born fifteen year ago" exactly because these two are logical equivalents. In assuming one of them true you've assumed the other one true. This is starting with "I'm fifteen" as true and ending with "I'm fifteen" as true, and this is a loop. "I'm fifteen" can be true but this truth must be deduced through the rules of deduction for the logical system in which you're working from the truth of "a distinct statement."

"I am therefore I am" is a loop because the deduction starts with "I am" pre-assumed T and ends with "I am" deduced T. "I am" may be true or false but this true/false state may only be deduced from another statement. Suppose we call "I am" statement R. Saying "I am therefore I am" is saying "R is T so R is T."
... it was to prove that the fact that he could contemplate not existing proved his existence - thus any attempt to prove his non-existence further validated his existence.
And any attempt to prove his existence further validated his non-existence, right?
However, Science is a perfectly sound branch of Philosophy, and thus there is nothing wrong with my using it to prove something's practicality (which, btw, is not just a scientific tool, it is a tool of practically all of the different reasoning systems that I've ever been introduced to).
What do you mean with "perfectly sound?" To whose evaluation is it "perfectly sound" and by which means of assessment?

Practicality? Some American Churches' "practical" way was not to install lightning rods until many years after their invention by Benjamin Franklin. And to oppose birth control for many years until now. Is that practical by scientific measures? Surely not, but it's practical and favorable by those Churches' measures. Practicality isn't a solid idea shared among everyone. Any individual/group has its own view of practicality. Hence, practicality isn't a universal criterion to measure everything with.
You act like these are the only two choices. There is also the choice of "uncertainty", which is the one I've been pushing.
As far as I've understood your "uncertainty" allows for doubting things but not all of them. Why not all of them? What's the difference between those things you doubt and those you don't?
How can you say that it's both worthless and fair at the same time.
Is there a problem with something being worthless yet fair?
There is no point in leaving a logical framework that works.
Is it really working? Medieval Churches thought their logical framework and their way of governance really worked. I guess they really believed this from the depths of their hearts.

I hear the voice of an Inquisitor: "Burn him! He's leaving our framework that really works, what's made him leave the Kingdom of our Lord?"

That Inquisitor apparently believed his way was "working" but the one being burnt didn't think so, I guess. Every framework will seem working when it's evaluated by its own criteria.
... Uncertainty is unusable because it requires you to accept a premise, while at the same time telling you not to accept any premises. This leaves you with no place to go, and thus you can't get anywhere...
And in this self-contradiction lies a reflection of "fair" observer's paradoxical situation.
In referring to "it", you claim "it's" existence, and you know it. You've been speaking about "it" as a reasoning system, and thus (obviously) implying it's existence.
And who says this? Who says referring to "it" is an implication of "existence?"

"You" may think one way or the other but you may not generalize your way to everyone.
Yes, it makes them all equally unreliable, and unimportant, if taken as a premise. It opposes all order, because to assume an order is to violate it's premise of not assuming anything
You don't "assume" an order. You "discover" an order. One takes Uncertainty and discovers the order I wrote of. Uncertainty asks to take nothing for granted but doesn't require an avoidance from discovering that Uncertainty has made everything equally unreliable thus equally creditable.
... This means that to believe in "caution" is against it's very premise. To believe in "clarity and hesitation" is against it's very premise.
This isn't a belief, it's a suggestion.
If you make a choice of premise to take for granted, you have violated the premise of Uncertainty, which doesn't allow you to take anything for granted (at least, that's how you've presented it).
Since I know that Uncertainty contradicts itself, I won't be taking anything too serious, Uncertainty included.

Once again, Uncertainty is a step in a way. This step has much to tell us but it isn't meant to be the terminus.

continued on the next post...
 
  • #103
... continued from the previous post
It doesn't matter, it still exists in all reasoning systems.
You mean you've studied all "known" and "unknown" logical systems? How did you do this? And suppose, only suppose, it really exists in all logical systems. Doesn't it matter that its meaning changes from one system to the other?
So the "mimicing" of relation isn't caused by the "Monadic" ... nature of the universe?
No. Monads are isolated. They don't interact but they may undergo harmonized changes. Two events coincide but aren't bound to each other by Universe's structural properties for the monads taking part in those events are isolated.

Note that I'm not particularly interested in Pre-established Harmony but I think it's a creditable substitute for Causality.
 
  • #104
Greetings, Manuel_Silvio.

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
For Mentat:
You "are" criticizing it by claiming it's inapplicable. Isn't that sort of critique?

Yes, in that way, I am criticizing it. What I meant was that I am not criticizing the proof itself, but rather, it's applicability to Descartes' philosophy.

The proof's aim is to show that Q (Descartes' statement) and a valid statement, P, together make either a loop or a paradox based on arbitrarily-chosen state for P. "If" it succeeds in showing this point, it's also succeeded in showing that Q is somehow incompatible with the viewpoint in which all the proof has taken place. This seems so apparent to me. Is it unclear?

It's not that it's unclear, it's that I disagree. (I've asked this a few times...) how does the fact that one proposition suggests (or, really, requires) the truth of another propostion lead to a paradox/loop?

Loop is one case and Paradox is another. The proof follows either of two different lines according to the state chosen for P. If P is set T then, so the proof claims, a loop is made. If P is set F then, so the proof claims, a paradox is made.

But I don't see a loop, so much as I see a restating of the same premise. If I state "I'm 15 years old", and then state "I was born 15 years ago", I have no loop/paradox, I have merely restated the same thing. Of course, accepting one necessitates that you accept the other, but there is still no paradox, IMO.

You didn't consider what I said. I asked if one could remain fair to some knowledge body as one's subject of study while one's submitted to another knowledge body's premises. And you answered "yes" but how could you ever answer "yes?"

Isn't it clear that one can't be fair if one's got premises? If one assumes some premises one will always assess everything with those premises in mind. Consequently, one won't evaluate one's subject(s) of study fairly anymore. Do you think an observer whose premise is "the event X will happen in this experiment" can observe that experiment fairly?

No. So? I wasn't saying that you had to actually believe any other premises, merely that you should take them for granted (as being true) for the purpose of testing something else.

I'll give you an example: If I want to test the response of a particle to near-light-speed velocities, I have to take for granted that the speed of light is ~186,000 miles/per second. I can test the other premise (that the speed of light is what I think it is) later, but I need it as a premise, when testing what happens at near-light-speed velocities.

One wants to be fair in assessing a knowledge body. To be fair, one has to stand outside that knowledge body. Standing "outside" a knowledge body is standing "inside" another. Standing "inside" another knowledge body means being submitted to its premises. Now that one's submitted to some premises one isn’t fair. One can't stand in any place and claim that one's fair. This is the paradoxical situation of a "fair" observer. And this paradoxical situation is independent from Uncertainty.

I don't get this last sentence. Uncertainty has it's own premises as well. You cannot stand within the framework of Uncertainty, and [fairly] judge another framework - according to your own reasoning.

One can't be both "religious" and "scientific" at the same time. Because Science and Religion have contradictory predispositions.

The Old Testament starts with Genesis, the cosmogony of Judaism and Christianity. Scientific cosmogony is totally different and in contradiction to Genesis. One can't believe in both of them at the same time.

Yes you can. However, I don't suppose this is the thread to discuss that in.

Then, you don't seem to have the faintest idea what you were told with that Science and Religion example. Try to understand it.

You need to start recognizing the difference between misunderstanding and disagreement. I used to do the same thing, and I got quite a few people angry with me (please don't think that I'm angry with you, I'm not, I just don't approve of this misunderstanding about misunderstandings :smile:).

I don't agree with the application of the Science vs. Religion reasoning, to our discussion, because I wasn't talking about stepping outside of an entire reasoning system. I was talking about studying one premise at a time, which necessitates the acceptance of some other premises. If you want to test an entire reasoning system, then there is no "fair" place to stand.

I see, but did I say something "necessitates" Uncertainty? I said Uncertainty is a way to offset the interference of premises.

Indirectly. You said:

Previously Posted by Manuel_Silvio
Whatever comes near should better be doubted before it's taken into account. This is exactly the task of Uncertainty.

In this, you are using the concept "should" (forget about word-usage, the concept has been present throughout most of this discussion).

"You" think that's implied by my words. And you say practicality may not exist for an uncertain viewpoint, now wouldn't this claim of yours be wrong if I've really shown that Uncertainty does this and that?

No. If you can find practicality in a reasoning system, then the reasoning system doesn't fit in the framework of Uncertainty. Something's practicality is an assumption, and Uncertainty doesn't allow for any assumptions.

Is there a problem with saying that something is "unusable" (as you claim) yet "flexible?"

Yes. The premises of "it's flexible" are (basically):

1. "It" exists.
2. "It is usable in a flexible manner".

No problem as long as you don't assume one of them as a proof for the other. You may say that "I'm fifteen" and "I was born fifteen years ago" are logically equal but you may not assume "I'm fifteen" and deduce "so I was born fifteen year ago" exactly because these two are logical equivalents. In assuming one of them true you've assumed the other one true. This is starting with "I'm fifteen" as true and ending with "I'm fifteen" as true, and this is a loop. "I'm fifteen" can be true but this truth must be deduced through the rules of deduction for the logical system in which you're working from the truth of "a distinct statement."

"From the truth of a distinct statement"? "I'm fifteen" is a distinct statement. The fact that I restate it later (even if in the same sentence) doesn't change that, does it?

"I am therefore I am" is a loop because the deduction starts with "I am" pre-assumed T and ends with "I am" deduced T. "I am" may be true or false but this true/false state may only be deduced from another statement. Suppose we call "I am" statement R. Saying "I am therefore I am" is saying "R is T so R is T."

Yes, stating the same things twice, so what? If I say "God doesn't exist, therefore God cannot act on anything", I am stating God's inability to act twice, but there is no loop. Besides, it was the Evil Demon who made the error of trying to convince someone (thus assuming their existence) of their not existing.

And any attempt to prove his existence further validated his non-existence, right?

No! Have you been reading my words and not my reasoning this whole time? No offense, but I think you have entirely missed the point of "keep the statement within it's context".

Any individual/group has its own view of practicality.

Yes, and thus "practicality" is not a strictly Scientific concept.

Hence, practicality isn't a universal criterion to measure everything with.

Yes it is, you just need to define which kind of practicality you are using at any given time.

As far as I've understood your "uncertainty" allows for doubting things but not all of them. Why not all of them?

Because I would then have to doubt my doubt, and doubt that doubt, and so on ad infinitum. If I doubt that I must doubt, then I can just as easily fall into Certainty as Uncertainty.

What's the difference between those things you doubt and those you don't?

Isn't that obvious?

Is there a problem with something being worthless yet fair?

Yes, it can't be fair, otherwise it would be (at least in some way) worthwile, instead of worthless.

Reponse continued on next post...
 
Last edited:
  • #105
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
That Inquisitor apparently believed his way was "working" but the one being burnt didn't think so, I guess. Every framework will seem working when it's evaluated by its own criteria.
And in this self-contradiction lies a reflection of "fair" observer's paradoxical situation.

Yes, thus your striving for a "fair" standpoint is in vain, is it not?

And who says this? Who says referring to "it" is an implication of "existence?"

Oh, come on! If I refer to "it", "him", or "her", I am referring to an individual entity, through the use of a pronoun. This is much too basic, and it's why I said that you fall under the unadvisable category of Descates' Second Rule.

"You" may think one way or the other but you may not generalize your way to everyone.

Says who? :wink:

Uncertainty asks to take nothing for granted...

This is wrong, and you know it.

...but doesn't require an avoidance from discovering that Uncertainty has made everything equally unreliable thus equally creditable.

"Equally unreliable" and "equally creditable" are opposites not synonymous, as you would have me believe.

This isn't a belief, it's a suggestion.

A suggestion is fine, but you cannot ask that one accept - or, even for an instant, take for granted - these suggestions, without contradicting the rule of Uncertainty.

Since I know that Uncertainty contradicts itself, I won't be taking anything too serious, Uncertainty included.

And yet, your "cautiousness" is based on Uncertainty, isn't it?

Once again, Uncertainty is a step in a way. This step has much to tell us but it isn't meant to be the terminus.

Once again, if Uncertainty were a step in the way, it would be one with no physical substance, and without any imaginable usefulness.

continued on the next post...

As is my response...
 

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