Is 'I Think, Therefore I Am' a Valid and Obvious Philosophy?

[Manuel_Silvio]

Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

Apologies for the delay.

Truth be told, I haven't made all that much effort to understand the proof, as you have yet to show me how it "fits" Descartes' statement. It still doesn't appear to.

How could you say that if you still haven't understood what it's talking about?

I explained many times the reason I think that proof applies, just look around the posts. Did you counter my reasons?

Only because you have placed so much emphasis on a proof that doesn't have anything to do with Descartes' statement. If you would argue the statement itself, I would not declare anything you said to be irrelevant.

It was/is relevant. Only because you place so much emphasis on a stance that doesn't have anything to do with my proof doesn't mean you've shown it's irrelevant.

... but then this statement would just be a random statement, designed for proving that Boolean Logic was inconsistent, but not designed to attack the statement in any way.

... You've just been trying to prove that Boolean Logic is inconsistent, while still claiming ultimate Uncertainty. This is obviously also contradictory, as you've said that Uncertainty is fair to all systems.

... It's obvious that you didn't care about Descartes' statement, but were trying to show an inconsistency with Boolean Logic as a whole. That's what the P([bleep]) analogy was for too, wasn't it?...

First, you're right. I've been trying to show the inconsistency but there's a specific place where the inconsistency occurs and that's when statements like "I think therefore I am" are studied. This shows an incompatibility between this statement and the viewpoint from which it's meant to be seen.

My statement, P, isn't random. If it was then I needn't even mention it. It's a statement engineered to suit your "I think therefore I am." If you had another statement, which fell in the category of statements that I think are incompatible with Boolean logic then I'd have made P different.

Like I wrote before, Descartes' statement isn't intrinsically problematic. Problems rise when this statement is viewed in a specific logical framework.

Uncertainty's fairness doesn't mean that it can't detect inconsistencies of knowledge structures. Uncertainty is fair in the sense that it let's one see inconsistencies that wouldn't be seen if the knowledge structure isn't doubted. To study a knowledge body you have to live outside that body, and then observe it. Uncertainty provides this "living outside." It let's one doubt the principles and that's why it's fair. It's worth noting that Uncertainty won't give an evaluation system by which to rank knowledge bodies, it only shows (or is meant to show) their status quo, show them as they are not as they're seen from inside. Uncertainty won't prefer one idea over the other but it enables its user to see that one idea is consistent while the other one isn't. It should be clear that inconsistency is only an attribute of a knowledge body, not a means of preference or else.

I'm sorry, I really do not see it. Maybe there's something wrong with me, but I can't see anything wrong with one proposition's implying another.

It isn't a simple implication; it's pre-assumption. This situation is similar to that you say: "I must live for living is an obligation." By saying "living is an obligation," you've already assumed you have to live, consequently deducing that "I must live" is logically incorrect (if you're bound to Boolean logic).

You may pre-assume something and then prove it, apparently, true. For me, there's no real problem with this, except that it's circular reasoning and it's non-informative.

Where is the paradox?

If you say "P is T and Q is T" you've gone the way of circular reasoning. If you say "P is F and Q is T" then you've made paradox because P is an assertion of Q and may not be F when Q is considered T.

One way to overcome this loop and this paradox is to say "P is F and Q is F." Q and its assertion, P, can be simultaneously wrong without causing any trouble. The only problem is that you insist that Q is T.

Why? There coincidence means that they are inter-related. So? What's wrong with that? Is there some proposition of Boolean Logic that states that there can be no two inter-related propositions?

No, but circular reasoning is forbidden (for you, of course). An assertion of Q, that is P, may not be assumed T when one is about to study Q's state. If Q is pre-assumed T then there's no need for studying it.

P may not be set T but it also must have a definite state and what remains is F, and P set as F will lead to paradox. Only if there was a third state like "null" then P could be assumed "null" while Q was being studied and then set to whatever suitable state. Such suspension is impossible in the framework of Boolean logic.

For example, if I say "I'm alive" = proposition P. Then I say that propostion Q = "I exist". Taking "P" to be true necessitates that I pre-suppose the truth of "Q" - but what's wrong with that?

If you pre-suppose the truth of Q then there's no point in discussing if Q is true for its truth is your premise. Q must be kept "untouched" before it's studied thoroughly and during the time it's being studied. If Q's state is pre-supposed then the outcome of every study or discussion of Q will not result in a state for Q that's different from that pre-supposition.

You surely know of Vienna Circle and their "verifiability criterion." In analogy to that "verifiability criterion" (ie, "that which can't be verified may not be claimed"), one can say "that which can't be proven wrong may be claimed but is non-informative."

Yes, and that would be an assumption, wouldn't it? If that is an assumption, then Uncertainty is not entirely free of assumptions, is it? However, if the one assumption that it has is "there are no assumptions", then it must both have and not have any assumptions...this is a paradox/self-contradictory idea, just like limitlessness.

Uncertainty has only one assumption which makes it fairer compared to other stances that require a plethora of assumptions.

Uncertainty's paradoxical nature makes it all open even to paradoxes. That's another plus compared to the selective nature of many other viewpoints (eg, they let some paradoxes in while they keep others out).

And, like I said before, Uncertainty should better be viewed as a step in a way. It isn't far different from countless other stances one may assume but it's distinguished by the degrees of freedom it offers. One step after Uncertainty there may be anything, even Certainty, who knows.

Not necessarily. Let's say that Philosophy makes use of both religious philosophy, and nihilism. So what if they contradict each other? They are still both important Philosophies...

Philosophy doesn't "make use" of these viewpoints. Its main task is to "study" and "compare" them and in order to remain fair it must remain neutral to them. After having "studied" and "compared" them, they "may" be evaluated and ordered based on some criteria. Resultant is the choice of a viewpoint that would be one's stance on the subject. This stance is also called "one's Philosophy" but this is merely a lexical ambiguity. Philosophy happens before the selection, manipulation and implementation of a viewpoint.

Viewpoints may contradict each other while Philosophy, as the means of study, remains intact. Philosophy only needs to reflect these contradictions as comparative reports but need not and should not get involved in them. One such viewpoint is Science, another is Christianity, yet another is Logical Positivism and so on. Philosophy's task is to study these one by one and then comparatively. That a scientist thinks this planet has been around for some 4.5 billion years while biblical words say that the Creation happened some thousands of years ago, is something worth noting for Philosophy but nothing worth getting involved in.

You have called Uncertainty "fair", "more reliable then certainty", "better conclusion", etc... . If Uncertainty is unusable, then none of these terms apply to it.

"You" associate "fairness", "reliability," and "supremacy" of an idea with its "practicality."

By the way, I couldn't find out where I'd claimed Uncertainty to be "reliable." I said what we think we know is unreliable. This doesn't mean that doubting our knowledge is more reliable. I clearly said that Uncertainty (quoting myself) "robs one of security, simplicity, ease, self-confidence and self-righteousness."

Why do you ask me to do something that you know very well is impossible? Different logic systems often contradict each other directly. That means that no one can use all of them to prove something, at the same time.

Because, as a result of this impossibility, one can't claim one's reasoning inbound some logical system is encompassing. You said: "total Uncertainty is impossible." If it's possible for you to claim something is impossible then it's possible for me to ask for something impossible. I wanted you to see that your statement doesn't work outside the framework it's designed for and to see that this framework is just one out of countless possible frameworks. If you say you've proven total Uncertainty impossible, you must have proven it for all logical systems (which is a cumbersome task, at least).

Many concepts may be invalid inbound a logical system but this is no indication of those concepts being erroneous in other systems. And all logical systems are equally creditable.

continued on the next post...

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

... continued from the previous post

There is no order of things in true Uncertainty. You have shown the rationale (by my definition) of uncertainty, but not of Uncertainty.

Let's see what "order" means. The books in the Library of Congress are "ordered." What does this mean? I guess it means there's a well-defined well-rounded rule set that assigns them to their respective places. This rule set has been chosen based on an analysis of the premises assumed for building a library (eg, accessibility, exactness, clarity, whatever). Notice that this rule set doesn't give significance or distinction to some books. It only orders them but doesn't rank them. There is an "order" but it isn't an order of "significance" or "preference."

So an "order" is the placing of things under a well-defined rule set based on the premises for assuming a viewpoint or for doing a task.

Now what's the premise for Uncertainty? "Nothing is certain." And what's the rule set? A rule set containing one rule, "everything is to be doubted." This rule set assigns everything one place, the place of equality. Nothing is different from nothing in any aspect. This is an "order" which places everything in the same attribute class, "uncertain."

You think so too, otherwise you wouldn't have tried to assign a rationale to Uncertainty.

I don't. If it was me, Uncertainty needn't even be discussed because it's part of the past for me. It's "you" I'm talking to and for that purpose I need to satisfy your requests and your way of talking this over.

By showing (or at least, trying to show) that Uncertainty can be well interpreted as having rationale (within the boundaries of this discussion), I'm showing that "rationale" isn't as strict and significant as it appears to be.

"It" may not include "non-existing" ones. In speaking of specific "ones" you imply their existence, at least in a conceptual manner.

This is "your" interpretation of what "referring to ones" implies. Ones can be non-existent ones (a paradox and a loop, you'd say ).

No it's not, because it denies all other biases. At least Science allows for some of the things that it finds/theorizes to be wrong. Uncertainty has only one premise, and that is that there can be no premises (which doesn't allow for any of the other fields of study to be correct). How is that fair?

Premises are chosen by individuals. Uncertainty's fairness is in that it allows everything, for it doesn't honor or lower any state of mind. All states of mind are equally doubtable thus equally creditable. Uncertainty doesn't judge the situation; it informs of the situation. Being uncertain, one may choose whatever premises that seem suitable to her/him, including those premises of Science.

That one isn't certain of the situation doesn't mean one must not, should not or ought not to choose her/his own way. It means condition, diversity, value, significance and outcome of every choice are wrapped in Uncertainty. One can risk choosing or even risk not choosing.

Science, on the other hand, prefers a methodic way of thinking and treating the Universe and not every method but a specific method. Out of countless ways, one way is chosen. That's what I call "unfair." Why would you choose one way out of countless ways and then insist it's the way to go? You could reason that Science is "practical" and "useful." Then I have to repeat, "practicality" and "usefulness" are intra-scientific criteria and it's clear they'll see Science consistent with their implications. Practicality can be defined either as "what Science is concerned with" or as anything else. The first definition is intra-scientific so it doesn't qualify to evaluate anything but Science. If the second definition, anything else, is allowed then there would be countless other definitions. If one of the countless definitions can be chosen at will one may choose one that corresponds with what Uncertainty concerned with. Now, with this new definition, Uncertainty is "practical."

I took your "substitutions" into account. As it turns out, they all rely on Causality anyway. Or at least it appears that way to me. For example, the inter-relationship between two "Quantum-bound electrons"; the reaction is instantaneous, and thus neither of the two can be considered the "cause". However, the "observer" can be considered the "cause", and without him/her, there would be no effect (the change of spin of the two electrons).

I wrote of the structure and the function for Causality and for that "proposed" substitute which was Pre-established Harmony. The structure is different, the function is different, yet you say they're (almost) the same. What prevents you from seeing the difference is your affection for Causality as a means of scientific interpretation of the Universe.

Like I wrote, Pre-established Harmony is different from Causality in that it doesn't assume the cause-effect pair. Causality is the bond between cause and effect while Pre-established Harmony is the harmonized incidence of two (or more) phenomena. For Causality to work, there should be a distinction between two phenomena which are coinciding and what distinguishes the cause from the effect is the chronological order. For Pre-established Harmony to work, nothing is necessary. No interaction, stimulus-response set or similar concept is required. The two coinciding phenomena can be considered isolated just like two spatially or chronologically far apart phenomena would be. The pattern of events and the distribution of coincidences are governed by the Harmony. This central governance of Harmony ensures the simultaneous occurring of many pairs of phenomena but it doesn't require any bond or relation between them. There are no spatial or chronological limits to seemingly related phenomena.

What if I told you I've thrown a coin three times and have got tails every time and then conclude that an invisible bond relates this phenomenon with the presence of a mosquito in my room? You'd possibly say, in the best case, that I have to experiment many more times before I conclude. You know, however, that Probability Theory is all about a limit when the number of experiments yields to infinity. And I can never conclude (not without experimenting infinite number of times) if these two phenomena are really related or I've only experienced a statistical not-very-odd oddity. The Causality bond isn't a necessity; it isn't even a probabilistic conclusion. Causality is an optimization method based on hopes for recurring of events. One may use it as much as one wants but relying on it is senseless.

As for the EPR experiment, there are two problems with your interpretation. First, even if you consider the Physicist you can't find a delay between her/his action and the spin change in the far off particle. Exactly when the action takes place a far off event occurs. Second, the distinction you make here is based on your knowledge of the Physicist's intention. You know she/he wants to initiate a change somewhere so you conclude a relation between her/his action and the change. This knowledge of intention isn't intrinsic to your understanding of the situation. You could have observed an alien Physicist with her/his invisible particles performing the EPR experiment. Then, you couldn't have concluded based on your knowledge of her/his intention. Even though the same experiment occurs in both cases (eg, human Physicist and alien Physicist), you're able to distinguish the cause and the effect in the former while you wouldn't be able to do so in the latter. This means that the distinction of cause and effect is nothing but a mental pattern you try to impose on this event.

Yes, and that's what so many logicians/philosophers/scientists/mathematicians/etc... have done in the past. When they come to a paradox, they realize that there must be some flaw in the particular line of reasoning that they've been following, and they abandon it in search of a better one.

Their actions were valid for them, yours should be proven valid for you. Nevertheless, a real paradox isn't made in case of erroneous reasoning but in case of an erroneous reasoning system.

Achilles and the tortoise (I'm not sure if it was a tortoise or a turtle) paradox, has been around for almost 2000 years. Is it there because of a mistake in reasoning? And 2000 years haven't been enough to find this mistake? Or is it solved now?

Not all Philosophers/Scientists have given up at the sight of paradox. There've been some to think of its nature and why it's faced everywhere. The great example is Kurt Gödel. Some of them have even based their views on the paradox-ridden ruins of the previous views. Some whole new concepts have been invented to avoid paradoxes, for example the concept of a Universal set in Set Theory came after Russell's Paradox. And these are only the outcome of evading Paradox. Great thoughts have been all put into diving into the depth of Paradox, especially by Eastern thinkers.

There's been a clear evasion in face of paradox in Science history. The reason may have been Paradox being "impractical" or something similar. This, however, means nothing here.

Hint: I told you Uncertainty is a double-edged sword. See if you can use the other edge.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

Apologies for the delay.
How could you say that if you still haven't understood what it's talking about?

I explained many times the reason I think that proof applies, just look around the posts. Did you counter my reasons?
It was/is relevant. Only because you place so much emphasis on a stance that doesn't have anything to do with my proof doesn't mean you've shown it's irrelevant.

I also apologize for the delay, your post was simply too long for me to respond to, with the time I had left, yesterday.

You never showed how your reasoning applied to Descartes' statement. You showed the problems with your proof. You also showed that a "helper device" need not be of the same form as the proposition that they are trying to resolve/explain. However, you didn't show how your particular proof "fit" Descartes' philosophy.

My statement, P, isn't random. If it was then I needn't even mention it. It's a statement engineered to suit your "I think therefore I am." If you had another statement, which fell in the category of statements that I think are incompatible with Boolean logic then I'd have made P different.

How does it "suit" Descartes' statement? Your statement only examines the inconsistency found when trying to analyze a proof of the form "P([bleep]), doesn't it? Descartes' statement isn't of the form "P([bleep])".

Uncertainty's fairness doesn't mean that it can't detect inconsistencies of knowledge structures. Uncertainty is fair in the sense that it let's one see inconsistencies that wouldn't be seen if the knowledge structure isn't doubted.

But it's still not entirely "fair", because it contradicts itself.

To study a knowledge body you have to live outside that body, and then observe it. Uncertainty provides this "living outside." It let's one doubt the principles and that's why it's fair.

I agree with you, provided you are talking about limited uncertainty. I don't think that Uncertainty (which is the full form of uncertainty) can give you the "outside perspective", because you have to doubt that premise (the Uncertainty premise) as well. Of course, you only have to doubt the Uncertainty premise if you accept it (because it is that premise which states that you must doubt all premises). Do you see why this is paradoxical?

Uncertainty won't prefer one idea over the other...

Except it's own idea/premise? Come one, it's obviously no more useful than any other premise, because in any case, you are taking something for granted.

This situation is similar to that you say: "I must live for living is an obligation." By saying "living is an obligation," you've already assumed you have to live, consequently deducing that "I must live" is logically incorrect (if you're bound to Boolean logic).

This is a very important point that I don't understand. Please explain it to me. I don't get why the fact that a proposition's truth necessitates the truth of another proposition means that that it is logically incorrect.

You may pre-assume something and then prove it, apparently, true. For me, there's no real problem with this, except that it's circular reasoning and it's non-informative.

Yes, it is non-informative. However (briefly returning to the point of the thread), if someone were to try to prove to me that I don't exist, then they are also pre-assuming my existence (otherwise, who are they trying to convince?), and thus it doesn't "inform" them of anything that they didn't already know, it just doesn't allow them to try to disprove that which they knew (that I exist) without contradicting themselves.

If you say "P is T and Q is T" you've gone the way of circular reasoning. If you say "P is F and Q is T" then you've made paradox because P is an assertion of Q and may not be F when Q is considered T.

It (assuming that P is T and that Q is T) is not so much circular as it is non-productive. However, the Evil Demon is assuming that P is T (otherwise, who is he trying to convince?), and then trying to prove that Q is F at the same time. Thus the paradox, and thus the conviction that trying to prove my non-existence is futile (according to Descartes).

One way to overcome this loop and this paradox is to say "P is F and Q is F." Q and its assertion, P, can be simultaneously wrong without causing any trouble. The only problem is that you insist that Q is T.
No, but circular reasoning is forbidden (for you, of course). An assertion of Q, that is P, may not be assumed T when one is about to study Q's state. If Q is pre-assumed T then there's no need for studying it.

I've already said that there is no need of studying it. It is the Evil Demon that has the problem of trying to prove that Q is F, while pre-assuming that P is T.

Also, isn't it just as "circular" (non-productive) to assume that P is F, and then to assume that Q is also F?

P may not be set T but it also must have a definite state and what remains is F, and P set as F will lead to paradox. Only if there was a third state like "null" then P could be assumed "null" while Q was being studied and then set to whatever suitable state. Such suspension is impossible in the framework of Boolean logic.

But it is also unnecessary. We are assuming the truth of both statements at the same time. What's wrong with that?

If you pre-suppose the truth of Q then there's no point in discussing if Q is true for its truth is your premise. Q must be kept "untouched" before it's studied thoroughly and during the time it's being studied. If Q's state is pre-supposed then the outcome of every study or discussion of Q will not result in a state for Q that's different from that pre-supposition.

Tell that to the Evil Demon.

Uncertainty has only one assumption which makes it fairer compared to other stances that require a plethora of assumptions.

Wrong. Uncertainty's one assumption makes it paradoxical and self-contradictory, not "fair".

Uncertainty's paradoxical nature makes it all open even to paradoxes. That's another plus compared to the selective nature of many other viewpoints (eg, they let some paradoxes in while they keep others out).

Uncertainty's paradoxical nature doesn't make it open to anything, it just makes it unusable. If it cannot even "agree with" itself, how can you use it to explain other phenomena?

And, like I said before, Uncertainty should better be viewed as a step in a way. It isn't far different from countless other stances one may assume but it's distinguished by the degrees of freedom it offers. One step after Uncertainty there may be anything, even Certainty, who knows.

Uncertainty shouldn't be viewed as a "step in a way" (IMO). It should be viewed as a road-block, because it's paradoxical.

Besides, if it leads to Certainty (which would the absolute form of "certainty") then it's not much good anyway. I don't want "Certainty". I want a healthy amount of uncertainty. If one can keep these things (certainty and uncertainty) in balance, then one doesn't run into the paradoxes of either extreme. This is the "fair" way (or so it seems to me).

"You" associate "fairness", "reliability," and "supremacy" of an idea with its "practicality."

As do you. You keep talking about how much better Uncertainty is than Certainty, and you also talk a lot about it's being more "fair".

You said: "total Uncertainty is impossible." If it's possible for you to claim something is impossible then it's possible for me to ask for something impossible. I wanted you to see that your statement doesn't work outside the framework it's designed for and to see that this framework is just one out of countless possible frameworks. If you say you've proven total Uncertainty impossible, you must have proven it for all logical systems (which is a cumbersome task, at least).

You yourself have said (posted but un-quoted - ran out of room) that many systems contradict each other. So how is it that you ask me to use all of them at the same time, to prove anything?

Many concepts may be invalid inbound a logical system but this is no indication of those concepts being erroneous in other systems. And all logical systems are equally creditable.

Except those unusable ones, like Uncertainty (couldn't resist ).

continued on the next post...

As is my response...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
... continued from the previous post
So an "order" is the placing of things under a well-defined rule set based on the premises for assuming a viewpoint or for doing a task.

OK.

Now what's the premise for Uncertainty? "Nothing is certain." And what's the rule set? A rule set containing one rule, "everything is to be doubted." This rule set assigns everything one place, the place of equality. Nothing is different from nothing in any aspect. This is an "order" which places everything in the same attribute class, "uncertain."

But the one rule contradicts the very concept of forming any "order" at all. You cannot assign this rule to things that will be "put in place", because the rule is that things cannot be "put in place" in any certain manner.

I don't. If it was me, Uncertainty needn't even be discussed because it's part of the past for me. It's "you" I'm talking to and for that purpose I need to satisfy your requests and your way of talking this over.

Fine, but you still haven't proven it's usefulness, or even it's existence (IMO).

By showing (or at least, trying to show) that Uncertainty can be well interpreted as having rationale (within the boundaries of this discussion), I'm showing that "rationale" isn't as strict and significant as it appears to be.

It doesn't matter. Uncertainty's only premise is that nothing is certain. In taking this premise as true, you have eliminated any possibility of producing any rationale of any kind.

This is "your" interpretation of what "referring to ones" implies. Ones can be non-existent ones (a paradox and a loop, you'd say ).

Then why are you using this reasoning (when even you see the loop/paradox)?

Premises are chosen by individuals. Uncertainty's fairness is in that it allows everything, for it doesn't honor or lower any state of mind. All states of mind are equally doubtable thus equally creditable. Uncertainty doesn't judge the situation; it informs of the situation. Being uncertain, one may choose whatever premises that seem suitable to her/him, including those premises of Science.

Let me try to be more clear than I've been (though I don't know if that's possible): Uncertainty does not allow you to choose a premise, at any time, for any reason, because it's premise is that you cannot have premises.

That one isn't certain of the situation doesn't mean one must not, should not or ought not to choose her/his own way.

No, but that one is certain that nothing can be certain does mean that one must/should/ought not choose a "way".

Science, on the other hand, prefers a methodic way of thinking and treating the Universe and not every method but a specific method. Out of countless ways, one way is chosen. That's what I call "unfair." Why would you choose one way out of countless ways and then insist it's the way to go?

It's not the only way I go.

You could reason that Science is "practical" and "useful." Then I have to repeat, "practicality" and "usefulness" are intra-scientific criteria and it's clear they'll see Science consistent with their implications.

Now this I disagree with. "Practicality" and "usefulness" are intrinsic of many different reasoning systems. The fact that Science satisfies them, in spite of coming into existence after them, is what makes it so appealing to humans.

I wrote of the structure and the function for Causality and for that "proposed" substitute which was Pre-established Harmony. The structure is different, the function is different, yet you say they're (almost) the same. What prevents you from seeing the difference is your affection for Causality as a means of scientific interpretation of the Universe.

I don't understand the question (was it a question?). I was saying that Pre-established Harmony also necessitates a form of Cause-and-effect relationship, and is thus not an alternative to Causality, but merely one of the forms of it.

Like I wrote, Pre-established Harmony is different from Causality in that it doesn't assume the cause-effect pair. Causality is the bond between cause and effect while Pre-established Harmony is the harmonized incidence of two (or more) phenomena. For Causality to work, there should be a distinction between two phenomena which are coinciding and what distinguishes the cause from the effect is the chronological order. For Pre-established Harmony to work, nothing is necessary. No interaction, stimulus-response set or similar concept is required. The two coinciding phenomena can be considered isolated just like two spatially or chronologically far apart phenomena would be. The pattern of events and the distribution of coincidences are governed by the Harmony. This central governance of Harmony ensures the simultaneous occurring of many pairs of phenomena but it doesn't require any bond or relation between them. There are no spatial or chronological limits to seemingly related phenomena.

No, the limit is not between them, as it would under "usual" Causal reasoning. But that doesn't mean that there is no cause at all. I really don't remember what Pre-established harmony is. I thought it had to do with the Quantum binding of two particles, and that there states change instaneously/simultaneouly. It is in this particular case that I still see a cause (the "observer").

What if I told you I've thrown a coin three times and have got tails every time and then conclude that an invisible bond relates this phenomenon with the presence of a mosquito in my room? You'd possibly say, in the best case, that I have to experiment many more times before I conclude. You know, however, that Probability Theory is all about a limit when the number of experiments yields to infinity. And I can never conclude (not without experimenting infinite number of times) if these two phenomena are really related or I've only experienced a statistical not-very-odd oddity. The Causality bond isn't a necessity; it isn't even a probabilistic conclusion. Causality is an optimization method based on hopes for recurring of events. One may use it as much as one wants but relying on it is senseless.

Relying on it when speaking of abstract, unlikely, causes is rather senseless, I agree. However, if when I smack someone, they get hurt I can assume the bond, because science shows us exactly what chemical reactions are occurring.

As for the EPR experiment, there are two problems with your interpretation. First, even if you consider the Physicist you can't find a delay between her/his action and the spin change in the far off particle. Exactly when the action takes place a far off event occurs.

I can see that I confused the EPR experiment with "Pre-established Harmony". I'm sorry. Could you re-explain "Pre-established Harmony" please?

Now, for your counter-argument: You said "exactly when the action takes place, a far off event occurs". Does this not illustrate the relationship between the action and the far-off event?

Second, the distinction you make here is based on your knowledge of the Physicist's intention. You know she/he wants to initiate a change somewhere so you conclude a relation between her/his action and the change. This knowledge of intention isn't intrinsic to your understanding of the situation. You could have observed an alien Physicist with her/his invisible particles performing the EPR experiment. Then, you couldn't have concluded based on your knowledge of her/his intention. Even though the same experiment occurs in both cases (eg, human Physicist and alien Physicist), you're able to distinguish the cause and the effect in the former while you wouldn't be able to do so in the latter. This means that the distinction of cause and effect is nothing but a mental pattern you try to impose on this event.

But I wasn't taking their intention into account. I was saying that their making the observation (regardless of intent) caused the change.

Their actions were valid for them, yours should be proven valid for you. Nevertheless, a real paradox isn't made in case of erroneous reasoning but in case of an erroneous reasoning system.

But all reasoning systems are erroneous at some level, and will thus all yield paradoxes. However, in all cases - and within all reasoning systems - paradox signifies that you've been headed "in the wrong direction".

Achilles and the tortoise (I'm not sure if it was a tortoise or a turtle) paradox, has been around for almost 2000 years. Is it there because of a mistake in reasoning? And 2000 years haven't been enough to find this mistake? Or is it solved now?

It seems resolved. See the thread, "Zeno's Paradoxes".

Some of them have even based their views on the paradox-ridden ruins of the previous views. Some whole new concepts have been invented to avoid paradoxes, for example the concept of a Universal set in Set Theory came after Russell's Paradox. And these are only the outcome of evading Paradox. Great thoughts have been all put into diving into the depth of Paradox, especially by Eastern thinkers.

No, all of these people (including Kurt Godel) were forced to make their new conclusions, because paradox was "getting in the way" of progress.

There's been a clear evasion in face of paradox in Science history. The reason may have been Paradox being "impractical" or something similar. This, however, means nothing here.

It means everything here. It is the reason why I don't use Uncertainty.

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

You never showed how your reasoning applied to Descartes' statement...

I repeat, you said you didn't understand the proof (or you haven't put much in effort into that) then how could you criticize it?

The storyline I used in describing the proof first goes through defining the state for P and then studies Q by asking what state you associate with it (which is T, for you're the defender of Q). On the next step it shows how P will lead into either a loop or a paradox when it's seen along with Q. This is how the proof is suitable for studying Q: it shows that Q results in undesirable results (loop or paradox) when it's studied along with P. It seems clear to me, exactly where do you see an ambiguity?

To criticize that proof you must be able to show one or more of these faults have happened:

00. P isn't a valid statement (but it is).
01. P can't be studied along with Q (but it can be for any two statements may be studied together).
02. There's a fault in deduction (there's none, as far as I can see).
03. Q won't lead to loop or paradox (the paradox case you've accepted, there remains the loop and that I will explain more).

But it's still not entirely "fair", because it contradicts itself.

Why do you think "fairness" can't be found "paradox?" By contradicting itself it's doing its task of fairness. It tells you: "this isn't the end of it, this isn't an absolute point, and it’s only a relative climax."

You say it isn't "entirely fair," and you're right. I haven't claimed it's "entirely fair;" I claimed it's "the fairest." Relatively more fairness when seen in comparison to other stances doesn't mean absolute fairness. It's only "the fairest" and not "absolutely fair."

... I don't think that Uncertainty (which is the full form of uncertainty) can give you the "outside perspective", because you have to doubt that premise (the Uncertainty premise) as well...

I see why it's paradoxical but I don't run away at the sight of paradox. You accept that uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" to whatever subject of study you've chosen. See, whatever subject of study "except uncertainty itself," and Uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" for everything including itself.

You accept that for studying a knowledge body one must stand and view it from "outside." Now, by standing "outside" where does one exactly stand? Isn't it the "inside" to another knowledge body? And the "inside" to another knowledge body means the acceptance of its premises. Could then one be fair in studying a knowledge body while one is submitted to the premises of another?

The situation, even without Uncertainty, is naturally paradoxical. Running away from paradox dawned on one in one specific form won't get one far, soon paradox will come back in another form but with the same content.

Two knowledge bodies have had many firm defenders in the course of history: Science and Religion. Do you think it's fair to stand inside Science and judge Religion? I think not, for Science will call to discard Religion because it's "impractical;" why should one take into account an intangible agent that acts in an unforeseeable manner? And then, do you think it's fair to stand inside Religion and judge Science? I think not, for Religion will call to give up Science because it's "blasphemy," "sin," "interference in the work of God," "rudeness against the Creation," whatever; why should one commit something against the rule of a supreme power ready to take revenge on the sinners?

So if one's to study Science or Religion fairly one has to stay outside both of them and whatever other knowledge body that may interfere in fair judgment by the means of its premises. The same is valid for any study of any other knowledge body.

Is that possible? I think not but there's a way to offset those interferences, to doubt them. Whatever comes near should better be doubted before it's taken into account. This is exactly the task of Uncertainty. One premise that may interfere with fair judgment is that premise of Uncertainty (ie, "nothing is certain"), and Uncertainty itself advises one on doubting (and being cautious of) everything. That's why Uncertainty's paradoxical nature helps it be the fairest. This paradoxical nature is a reflection of the paradoxical situation of a "fair" observer. I guess you don't oppose a fair observer, do you?

Except it's own idea/premise? Come one, it's obviously no more useful than any other premise, because in any case, you are taking something for granted.

First, it won't prefer even its own premise over others for it's paradoxical and contradicts itself. This is the function of paradox; it's simultaneous acceptance and denial that means it won't prefer anything over the other even itself.

Second, even if it prefers one premise over the others, like all other stances do, that premise is one that offers high degrees of freedom. If one has to assume one or more premise(s) in any case then wouldn't it better be chosen to be more flexible?

This is a very important point that I don't understand. Please explain it to me. I don't get why the fact that a proposition's truth necessitates the truth of another proposition means that that it is logically incorrect.

This isn't true for any two statements, it's true for two statements which are assertions of each other.

For the statement Q, there's the statement P that asserts it. If P, the assertion of Q, is assumed T before Q is studied then Q itself has been assumed T before Q is studied. What happens here is what I call "circular" reasoning: a line of deduction which starts with the pre-assumed truth of some statement, Q here, and ends with the truth of the same statement, again Q.

I wrote that P was "engineered" to suit Q. The trick in this "engineering" is that P is an assertion of Q. If you set P as T, then you've set Q as T and later you start talking about Q but if you've set Q as T before even starting with your study of Q then the outcome of your study can't be anything other than Q being T.

Circular reasoning is non-informative because it starts and ends with the same thing. Starting with Q "pre-assumed" (you see, it's assumed "before" anything else) as T and ending with Q as T is non-informative and circular. One can start with any statement "pre-assumed" T and end with that statement being T.

Remember when you said "one can't be thinking if one doesn't exist" and I responded that such premise will turn "I think therefore I am" into "I am therefore I am." "I am therefore I am" is an ever-true statement but it's circular. One can't oppose a statement that is made of itself and that's why one can't oppose "I am therefore I am." Unfortunately, or fortunately, circular reasoning that makes up such statements is forbidden in the framework of Boolean logic. "I am therefore I am" is circular hence incompatible with Boolean logic. And for those who "like" Boolean logic too much and want to find "absolute truth" out of statements, as claimed by Boolean logic, "I am therefore I am" is, well, out of question.

... if someone were to try to prove to me that I don't exist, then they are also pre-assuming my existence (otherwise, who are they trying to convince?), and thus it doesn't "inform" them of anything that they didn't already know...

And if "you" try to convince them that they exist, you'll get "the same problem."

There's a reason to that I accompany a discussion of Descartes' statement with a discussion of Uncertainty. Descartes' statement is one of the many places that Uncertainty shows up in full strength. Particularly because the statement has to do with foundations of one's thoughts (existence in this case). Descartes' statement can't be disproved (for it's circular) but it also can't be proven (for it's incompatible with Boolean logic). Where's the way out? Uncertainty. That statement is both ways equally creditable, and that's the essence of Uncertainty.

Uncertainty's paradoxical nature doesn't make it open to anything, it just makes it unusable. If it cannot even "agree with" itself, how can you use it to explain other phenomena?

One thing to notice, have you thought of the name by which "that which agrees with itself" is called? That which expects and asserts its own righteousness is called a "loop," I guess.

Any knowledge body, in order to remain consistent, must somewhere assert its own premises. Many times though, this is done with much subtlety.

Let's see an example, Science. If I come to you and claim "there's an intangible unforeseeable uncontrollable agent acting in this Universe," you (depicted as a defender of Science) will possibly tell me to throw it away because it's an "impractical" premise. Where's the twist? By comparing that premise to a scientific criterion, that is practicality, you've pre-assumed Science's righteousness. Obviously enough, having pre-assumed Science's righteousness, you won't go much further than asserting that righteousness by telling me to throw away an "impractical" premise.

Furthermore, Uncertainty needn't care for explaining the "phenomenal" Universe. The "phenomenal" Universe is the "sensible" one and "senses" and "relying on the input from the senses" are all from the "scientific" Universe. Philosophy comes before one chooses to submit to the scientific Universe.

continued on the next post...

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

... continued from the previous post

The balance you talk about is achieved after both extremes are experienced. That balance, I guess, is somehow like that "residual understanding" I wrote of. One experiences Certainty (in the form of scientific and/or religious and/or whatever belief) then one experiences Uncertainty and then comes the residual understanding, or as you call it "the balance." If you're in balance then you won't be sure that you're absolutely right but you also won't be sure that you're wrong. You have a good amount of hope in that that your thoughts may work as you wish and choose and think on the basis of that hope. Am I correct here? If yes, then I think you already have experienced with Uncertainty and Certainty.

As do you. You keep talking about how much better Uncertainty is than Certainty, and you also talk a lot about it's being more "fair".

I never said it's "better." I said it's a "fairer" substitute. And again "you" interpret the "fairness" I talk about as "practicality." I don't put any value on Uncertainty for it's worthless but it's "fair" and "sincere" to that which is called Philosophy.

You yourself have said ... that many systems contradict each other. So how is it that you ask me to use all of them at the same time, to prove anything?

Don't prove and don't claim your argument "encompassing" and "ever-true." Your arguments are good inside a framework of Boolean logic, beyond that isn't in your, or anyone else's, power.

We can discuss the thing in some framework and get results for that framework and we can be satisfied with those results in their respective framework. However, there's no warranty, even limited, for outside of that framework. And clearly there's much more to outside than to inside.

Except those unusable ones, like Uncertainty...

Seriously, do you have some grounds for that claim? If yes, do you know that if your grounds are creditable you would have overcome one of the most compelling challenges humanity has faced?

Claiming that some logical systems are "less creditable" makes a basis for choosing among logical systems. Do you know what this means? This means some forms of attitude can be preferred to other forms. This means some individuals have been "right" while some others have been "wrong." This means there's always been "absolute rightness" and "absolute wrongness." Do you know of what order of magnitude is such a claim?

But the one rule contradicts the very concept of forming any "order" at all. You cannot assign this rule to things that will be "put in place", because the rule is that things cannot be "put in place" in any certain manner.

No, the rule is "there's no distinction between any two places, put them wherever and they'll be equal." Things are "put into place" but all into "one place" and that's the "place of equality."

Fine, but you still haven't proven it's usefulness, or even it's existence (IMO).

I can't prove what I haven't even claimed. I never claimed that Uncertainty is useful; I said it shouldn't be assessed by practicality criterion. I never claimed its existence, I said it's paradoxical and can't be given a definite state.

... Uncertainty's only premise is that nothing is certain. In taking this premise as true, you have eliminated any possibility of producing any rationale of any kind.

Why? And how? "Nothing is uncertain" doesn't seem to me like opposing "any" order. It surely opposes "many" orders but not "any" order. I wrote of an order that is well suited to this premise, the order that places everything in one place, the place of equality.

Then why are you using this reasoning (when even you see the loop/paradox)?

For I don't run away from loops and paradoxes. I like to see how they work and why they appear all around.

Let me try to be more clear than I've been (though I don't know if that's possible): Uncertainty does not allow you to choose a premise, at any time, for any reason, because it's premise is that you cannot have premises.

No, but that one is certain that nothing can be certain does mean that one must/should/ought not choose a "way".

Again, this is "your" interpretation (or rather "misinterpretation"). Uncertainty asks for caution, clarity and hesitation in the face of anything and everything; not a bit less, not a bit more. Uncertainty is of paradoxical nature that means it's nothing more than a between-the-lines hint. One may choose one's premises at will while one's uncertain of their truth.

One's choice for one's life isn't associated with one's stance on one's choice. Uncertainty provides a ground for always being cautious of what one chooses but doesn't prevent a choice from being made. Being cautious of one's choice one will always be ready to change it if one finds out that choice has been erroneous. This readiness is a basis for a dynamic system of thoughts that can change with new packets of knowledge (even though uncertain they are). Instead of taking "progression" as a premise (like with Science) one will be experiencing "change" as a consequence of a fairer, more general, less demanding and more open premise.

It's not the only way I go.

You seem to.

Now this I disagree with. "Practicality" and "usefulness" are intrinsic of many different reasoning systems. The fact that Science satisfies them, in spite of coming into existence after them, is what makes it so appealing to humans.

Practicality does have meaning in many knowledge bodies but doesn't have the same meaning all over these places. Practicality can be defined even for a Religion, as "conformance to God's commandments" for example. This practicality is apparently different from the other one discussed in words of Science.

Science has to do with its own definition of this term which is an intra-scientific concept confined to a scientific understanding of scientific Universe. I don't think "practicality" in this sense is even an outcome of observing the scientific Universe. One can study the scientific Universe with scientific method but nowhere around this Universe it's written "survival, longevity, prosperity is our motto." We know that living beings, being living beings by scientific definition in the scientific Universe, want to live, live longer, produce more of their instances and get more energy/matter for their lives. Anyway, that's no necessity, it's not an obligation. We know there's this desire but we can't say it's an aim. That we want to "live, live long and prosper" doesn't make this desire a logical obligation. Nowhere in any description of the scientific method is stated that we have to reach for this target by the means of that method. This aim isn't intrinsic even to Science; it's intrinsic to scientifically-defined living beings, when they're viewed scientifically.

Relying on it when speaking of abstract, unlikely, causes is rather senseless, I agree. However, if when I smack someone, they get hurt I can assume the bond, because science shows us exactly what chemical reactions are occurring.

I can see that I confused the EPR experiment with "Pre-established Harmony". I'm sorry. Could you re-explain "Pre-established Harmony" please?

Now, for your counter-argument: You said "exactly when the action takes place, a far off event occurs". Does this not illustrate the relationship between the action and the far-off event?

Causality bond is explained for scientifically through the declaration of forces. The four forces are the source of all interaction including that you smack someone. Forces are elements from the scientific Universe. They're of fundamentals of Science. Let's think of them for a moment. What's a force? An obscure concept that explains for a coincidence that is later called an "interaction."

How do you know they're hurt when you smack them? You see them getting hurt but do you see them? You see a consistent representation in your mind that goes through a transition but what's the nature of this representation? No one knows and is that what "really" (supposing there's some "real" thing around) happening? No one knows.

I meant EPR Experiment and Pre-established Harmony as two separate lines of discussion. Here comes my re-explanation of Pre-established Harmony:

You ask if there isn't a bond between two coinciding events and that's the central question to Causality and its substitutes. All of them try to explain for coincidences that are observed over and over.

Pre-established Harmony explains these coincidences as parts of the Harmony that governs the events of this Universe. The coincidence of two events is a part of the Harmony but not a necessity of Universe's structure which is supposed to be made of abstract Monads that are isolated from each other. While one part of the Harmony may force a coincidence and a seemingly relation between some of the Monads (of the two coinciding phenomena), a repetition is noway guaranteed. Monads are totally isolated and play their own roles in the Harmony but these roles may or may not be synchronized to mimic some relation.

continued on the next post...

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

... continued from the previous post

But I wasn't taking their intention into account. I was saying that their making the observation (regardless of intent) caused the change.

How do you know they're observing something? Isn't that you have a picture of an observing Physicist to compare them to? The alien Physicist may not comply with this picture so you'll never know it's been observing but you'll see the change.

Moreover, this doesn't solve the problem with zero time. Some "cause" (say, a Physicist or a particle) "causes" some "effect" but there's no time delay between them. How could you say which one is the cause and which one is the effect without previously knowing one of them (eg, the Physicist) has an intention for a change?

But all reasoning systems are erroneous at some level, and will thus all yield paradoxes. However, in all cases - and within all reasoning systems - paradox signifies that you've been headed "in the wrong direction".

"The wrong direction" for that system but maybe "the right direction" for another totally unnoticed one which can bring you extension to the horizons of your thought.

No, all of these people (including Kurt Godel) were forced to make their new conclusions, because paradox was "getting in the way" of progress.

Kurt Gödel’s "Incompleteness Theorem" seems different. I read a second-hand (or even worse, who knows) version of the theorem like this: "every encompassing system of logic must have at least one premise that can not be proven or verified without contradicting itself." It was referenced to "Scientific American, Gödel’s Proof, Vol. CXCVI.6, 71-86 (1965)." We can check it out if necessary.

Not "all" of them for sure. Eastern thinkers (that you seem not to count in "all") didn't do as you say, they even didn't go the way of "progression."

 

[heusdens]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
[BKurt Gödel’s "Incompleteness Theorem" seems different. I read a second-hand (or even worse, who knows) version of the theorem like this: "every encompassing system of logic must have at least one premise that can not be proven or verified without contradicting itself." It was referenced to "Scientific American, Gödel’s Proof, Vol. CXCVI.6, 71-86 (1965)." We can check it out if necessary.
[/B]

The wording I know of for the theorem of Godel reads that any formal, axiomatic system is either incomplete or inconsistent (or both).

incomplete:
the system has not the capacity to produce all the truths. there are truths that can not be produced by the axiomatix rules of the system

inconsistent:
the system has some internal problem of consistently defining the truth value of statements based on the axiomatic rules

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
I repeat, you said you didn't understand the proof (or you haven't put much in effort into that) then how could you criticize it?

I repeat, I am not criticizing the proof, I am waiting for you to show me it's applicability, otherwise it's not important to the discussion.

The storyline I used in describing the proof first goes through defining the state for P and then studies Q by asking what state you associate with it (which is T, for you're the defender of Q). On the next step it shows how P will lead into either a loop or a paradox when it's seen along with Q. This is how the proof is suitable for studying Q: it shows that Q results in undesirable results (loop or paradox) when it's studied along with P. It seems clear to me, exactly where do you see an ambiguity?

It may seem clear to you, but perhaps you are witholding something from me, because it doesn't make any sense - to me - to say that one proposition's implying another proposition's truth leads to a paradox/loop.

To criticize that proof you must be able to show one or more of these faults have happened:

00. P isn't a valid statement (but it is).
01. P can't be studied along with Q (but it can be for any two statements may be studied together).
02. There's a fault in deduction (there's none, as far as I can see).
03. Q won't lead to loop or paradox (the paradox case you've accepted, there remains the loop and that I will explain more).

I perfectly agree with point 03. Q won't lead to paradox, and I haven't agreed to anything of the kind.

Why do you think "fairness" can't be found "paradox?" By contradicting itself it's doing its task of fairness. It tells you: "this isn't the end of it, this isn't an absolute point, and it’s only a relative climax."

No, it's telling you "I'm unreliable, and self-contradictory". If something cannot even be self-consistent, how can it be consistent with any other system?

You say it isn't "entirely fair," and you're right. I haven't claimed it's "entirely fair;" I claimed it's "the fairest."

It's not that it's not "entirely fair". It's that it cannot exist. It's supposed "fairness" just contradicts it's premise, and thus leads to unusability.

You accept that uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" to whatever subject of study you've chosen. See, whatever subject of study "except uncertainty itself," and Uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" for everything including itself.

No, Uncertainty doesn't give a perspective for anything, because it's unusable/paradoxical/self-contradictory - and thus self/defeating.

You accept that for studying a knowledge body one must stand and view it from "outside." Now, by standing "outside" where does one exactly stand? Isn't it the "inside" to another knowledge body?

Yeah.

And the "inside" to another knowledge body means the acceptance of its premises. Could then one be fair in studying a knowledge body while one is submitted to the premises of another?

Yes.

The situation, even without Uncertainty, is naturally paradoxical. Running away from paradox dawned on one in one specific form won't get one far, soon paradox will come back in another form but with the same content.

How is it paradoxical, without the use of "Uncertainty"?

Two knowledge bodies have had many firm defenders in the course of history: Science and Religion. Do you think it's fair to stand inside Science and judge Religion? I think not, for Science will call to discard Religion because it's "impractical;" why should one take into account an intangible agent that acts in an unforeseeable manner? And then, do you think it's fair to stand inside Religion and judge Science? I think not, for Religion will call to give up Science because it's "blasphemy," "sin," "interference in the work of God," "rudeness against the Creation," whatever; why should one commit something against the rule of a supreme power ready to take revenge on the sinners?

First off, there are many (rather intelligent) people, that I know of, that can study science with the Bible as their premise, and they have no problem. I think your problem here is that you are saying "stand inside X, to judge Y". This is not what I was talking about. I'm saying "take X for granted (as part of the foundation/premise), to judge Y".

Is that possible? I think not but there's a way to offset those interferences, to doubt them. Whatever comes near should better be doubted before it's taken into account. This is exactly the task of Uncertainty.

But saying that something necessitates Uncertainty is also contradictory to the premise of Uncertainty, can you see why?

One premise that may interfere with fair judgment is that premise of Uncertainty (ie, "nothing is certain"), and Uncertainty itself advises one on doubting (and being cautious of) everything. That's why Uncertainty's paradoxical nature helps it be the fairest. This paradoxical nature is a reflection of the paradoxical situation of a "fair" observer. I guess you don't oppose a fair observer, do you?
First, it won't prefer even its own premise over others for it's paradoxical and contradicts itself. This is the function of paradox; it's simultaneous acceptance and denial that means it won't prefer anything over the other even itself.

You are totally missing the point (IMO). You are saying "it will do this" and "it will do that". This implies it's practicality, when in fact such a thing (as practicality) cannot exist in an Uncertain world, nor can it exist along with paradox.

Second, even if it prefers one premise over the others, like all other stances do, that premise is one that offers high degrees of freedom. If one has to assume one or more premise(s) in any case then wouldn't it better be chosen to be more flexible?

It's not more flexible, when will you get this? It's unusable, that's not the same thing as "flexible".

answer continued on next post...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
This isn't true for any two statements, it's true for two statements which are assertions of each other.

For the statement Q, there's the statement P that asserts it. If P, the assertion of Q, is assumed T before Q is studied then Q itself has been assumed T before Q is studied. What happens here is what I call "circular" reasoning: a line of deduction which starts with the pre-assumed truth of some statement, Q here, and ends with the truth of the same statement, again Q.

I wrote that P was "engineered" to suit Q. The trick in this "engineering" is that P is an assertion of Q. If you set P as T, then you've set Q as T and later you start talking about Q but if you've set Q as T before even starting with your study of Q then the outcome of your study can't be anything other than Q being T.

I understand this. That still doesn't show any inconsistency the logic. Yes, assuming the proof of one of these things assumes the proof of the other. So what? What is wrong with my saying "I'm fifteen", and then saying "I was born fifteen years ago"? In fact, I could just omit one, and it wouldn't matter, because these things don't prove each other, they just assume the same thing.

Circular reasoning is non-informative because it starts and ends with the same thing. Starting with Q "pre-assumed" (you see, it's assumed "before" anything else) as T and ending with Q as T is non-informative and circular. One can start with any statement "pre-assumed" T and end with that statement being T.

Yes, you are right, they can. Also, why is it that it matters to you that it is "non-informative", when you were previously trying to show the folly of sticking to that which leads to progressive understanding/knowledge?

Remember when you said "one can't be thinking if one doesn't exist" and I responded that such premise will turn "I think therefore I am" into "I am therefore I am." "I am therefore I am" is an ever-true statement but it's circular.

I know. The point of all of Descartes' reasoning was not so much to prove that he existed (pay attention, please, this is important), it was to prove that the fact that he could contemplate not existing proved his existence - thus any attempt to prove his non-existence further validated his existence.

Unfortunately, or fortunately, circular reasoning that makes up such statements is forbidden in the framework of Boolean logic. "I am therefore I am" is circular hence incompatible with Boolean logic. And for those who "like" Boolean logic too much and want to find "absolute truth" out of statements, as claimed by Boolean logic, "I am therefore I am" is, well, out of question.

Again, and this is important, it is not so much circular, as restating the same thing twice. Pay attention to this, please, Boolean Logic doesn't say that it is wrong to postulate the same thing twice (does it?), so "I am therefore I am" shouldn't be forbidden.

(Just to make sure you get this): The point of the statement is not to be found in the statement, it is found in the context. As I've said before, the point is that, the more one tries to prove that I don't exist, the more proof I have of my existence.

And if "you" try to convince them that they exist, you'll get "the same problem."

There's a reason to that I accompany a discussion of Descartes' statement with a discussion of Uncertainty. Descartes' statement is one of the many places that Uncertainty shows up in full strength. Particularly because the statement has to do with foundations of one's thoughts (existence in this case). Descartes' statement can't be disproved (for it's circular) but it also can't be proven (for it's incompatible with Boolean logic). Where's the way out? Uncertainty. That statement is both ways equally creditable, and that's the essence of Uncertainty.
One thing to notice, have you thought of the name by which "that which agrees with itself" is called? That which expects and asserts its own righteousness is called a "loop," I guess.

See above, for why it's not a loop; why Uncertainty is not an answer; and why the statement ought not be studied outside of it's context (the story about the Evil Demon).

Let's see an example, Science. If I come to you and claim "there's an intangible unforeseeable uncontrollable agent acting in this Universe," you (depicted as a defender of Science) will possibly tell me to throw it away because it's an "impractical" premise. Where's the twist? By comparing that premise to a scientific criterion, that is practicality, you've pre-assumed Science's righteousness. Obviously enough, having pre-assumed Science's righteousness, you won't go much further than asserting that righteousness by telling me to throw away an "impractical" premise.

However, Science is a perfectly sound branch of Philosophy, and thus there is nothing wrong with my using it to prove something's practicality (which, btw, is not just a scientific tool, it is a tool of practically all of the different reasoning systems that I've ever been introduced to).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
The balance you talk about is achieved after both extremes are experienced. That balance, I guess, is somehow like that "residual understanding" I wrote of. One experiences Certainty (in the form of scientific and/or religious and/or whatever belief) then one experiences Uncertainty and then comes the residual understanding, or as you call it "the balance."

No, this isn't anything like what I was saying at all. I was saying that "uncertainty" is a balance, and you can't reach "uncertainty" (which means "partial uncertainty", btw) if you use the premise of "Uncertainty" at any time.

If you're in balance then you won't be sure that you're absolutely right but you also won't be sure that you're wrong. You have a good amount of hope in that that your thoughts may work as you wish and choose and think on the basis of that hope. Am I correct here? If yes, then I think you already have experienced with Uncertainty and Certainty.

You act like these are the only two choices. There is also the choice of "uncertainty", which is the one I've been pushing.

I never said it's "better." I said it's a "fairer" substitute. And again "you" interpret the "fairness" I talk about as "practicality." I don't put any value on Uncertainty for it's worthless but it's "fair" and "sincere" to that which is called Philosophy.

How can you say that it's both worthless and fair at the same time.

We can discuss the thing in some framework and get results for that framework and we can be satisfied with those results in their respective framework. However, there's no warranty, even limited, for outside of that framework. And clearly there's much more to outside than to inside.

There is no point in leaving a logical framework that works.

Seriously, do you have some grounds for that claim? If yes, do you know that if your grounds are creditable you would have overcome one of the most compelling challenges humanity has faced?

Honestly, have you ignored all of my posts in the past couple of pages?! Let me spell it out for you: Uncertainty is unusable because it requires you to accept a premise, while at the same time telling you not to accept any premises. This leaves you with no place to go, and thus you can't get anywhere. For a more detailed explanation of it's ineptitude, read my previous posts.

No, the rule is "there's no distinction between any two places, put them wherever and they'll be equal." Things are "put into place" but all into "one place" and that's the "place of equality."
I can't prove what I haven't even claimed. I never claimed that Uncertainty is useful; I said it shouldn't be assessed by practicality criterion. I never claimed its existence, I said it's paradoxical and can't be given a definite state.

In referring to "it", you claim "it's" existence, and you know it. You've been speaking about "it" as a reasoning system, and thus (obviously) implying it's existence.

Why? And how? "Nothing is uncertain" doesn't seem to me like opposing "any" order. It surely opposes "many" orders but not "any" order. I wrote of an order that is well suited to this premise, the order that places everything in one place, the place of equality.

Yes, it makes them all equally unreliable, and unimportant, if taken as a premise. It opposes all order, because to assume an order is to violate it's premise of not assuming anything.

Again, this is "your" interpretation (or rather "misinterpretation"). Uncertainty asks for caution, clarity and hesitation in the face of anything and everything; not a bit less, not a bit more.

DEAD wrong, even by your own previous explanations of Uncertainty. In case you've forgotten, Uncertainty relies on the premise that "nothing is certain". This means that to believe in "caution" is against it's very premise. To believe in "clarity and hesitation" is against it's very premise.

Uncertainty is of paradoxical nature that means it's nothing more than a between-the-lines hint. One may choose one's premises at will while one's uncertain of their truth.

No, that's how "uncertainty" works, not "Uncertainty".

Uncertainty provides a ground for always being cautious of what one chooses but doesn't prevent a choice from being made.

YES IT DOES!

If you make a choice of premise to take for granted, you have violated the premise of Uncertainty, which doesn't allow you to take anything for granted (at least, that's how you've presented it).

Being cautious of one's choice one will always be ready to change it if one finds out that choice has been erroneous. This readiness is a basis for a dynamic system of thoughts that can change with new packets of knowledge (even though uncertain they are). Instead of taking "progression" as a premise (like with Science) one will be experiencing "change" as a consequence of a fairer, more general, less demanding and more open premise.

Don't you see that all through this you are speaking of the ability to take a certain premise for granted when you choose to. Uncertainty doesn't allow one to take anything for granted.

Practicality does have meaning in many knowledge bodies but doesn't have the same meaning all over these places. Practicality can be defined even for a Religion, as "conformance to God's commandments" for example. This practicality is apparently different from the other one discussed in words of Science.

It doesn't matter, it still exists in all reasoning systems.

Causality bond is explained for scientifically through the declaration of forces. The four forces are the source of all interaction including that you smack someone. Forces are elements from the scientific Universe. They're of fundamentals of Science. Let's think of them for a moment. What's a force? An obscure concept that explains for a coincidence that is later called an "interaction."

Or, it is that which causes the interaction. Haven't you considered that yours is a viewpoint based solely on non-conformance to other viewpoints, while Causality is explaining what is happening without postulating any extra speculations?

How do you know they're hurt when you smack them? You see them getting hurt but do you see them? You see a consistent representation in your mind that goes through a transition but what's the nature of this representation? No one knows and is that what "really" (supposing there's some "real" thing around) happening? No one knows.

I'm definitely not going to get into a discussion of whether there is a reality or not. I 1) don't have time right now; and 2) don't see it's relevance, because you are assuming your own reality/existence every time you argue with me anyway. What's to make you think that I'm actually seeing what you type? It doesn't matter, because that's not the topic of our discussions.

Pre-established Harmony explains these coincidences as parts of the Harmony that governs the events of this Universe. The coincidence of two events is a part of the Harmony but not a necessity of Universe's structure which is supposed to be made of abstract Monads that are isolated from each other. While one part of the Harmony may force a coincidence and a seemingly relation between some of the Monads (of the two coinciding phenomena), a repetition is noway guaranteed. Monads are totally isolated and play their own roles in the Harmony but these roles may or may not be synchronized to mimic some relation.

So the "mimicing" of relation isn't caused by the "Monadic" (is that a word? ) nature of the universe?

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

Greetz,

1. For heusdens:

Thank you. A logical system is a form of an axiomatic system, right? Truth values, structuring of statements and rules of deduction are the axioms of a logical system, I guess.

2. For Mentat:

I repeat, I am not criticizing the proof, I am waiting for you to show me it's applicability, otherwise it's not important to the discussion.

You "are" criticizing it by claiming it's inapplicable. Isn't that sort of critique?

The proof's aim is to show that Q (Descartes' statement) and a valid statement, P, together make either a loop or a paradox based on arbitrarily-chosen state for P. "If" it succeeds in showing this point, it's also succeeded in showing that Q is somehow incompatible with the viewpoint in which all the proof has taken place. This seems so apparent to me. Is it unclear?

If one's to criticize this proof one must show one of those cases numbered 00-03 has happened.

... it doesn't make any sense - to me - to say that one proposition's implying another proposition's truth leads to a paradox/loop.

I perfectly agree with point 03. Q won't lead to paradox, and I haven't agreed to anything of the kind.

Loop is one case and Paradox is another. The proof follows either of two different lines according to the state chosen for P. If P is set T then, so the proof claims, a loop is made. If P is set F then, so the proof claims, a paradox is made.

You accepted that if Q is set T then its assertion, P, may not be set F because that would lead to a paradox (saying that Q is both T and F is a paradox). So one of the lines that the proof follows has been approved. The other line should be followed when P is set T, and that's the loop case.

How is it paradoxical, without the use of "Uncertainty"?

You didn't consider what I said. I asked if one could remain fair to some knowledge body as one's subject of study while one's submitted to another knowledge body's premises. And you answered "yes" but how could you ever answer "yes?"

Isn't it clear that one can't be fair if one's got premises? If one assumes some premises one will always assess everything with those premises in mind. Consequently, one won't evaluate one's subject(s) of study fairly anymore. Do you think an observer whose premise is "the event X will happen in this experiment" can observe that experiment fairly?

One wants to be fair in assessing a knowledge body. To be fair, one has to stand outside that knowledge body. Standing "outside" a knowledge body is standing "inside" another. Standing "inside" another knowledge body means being submitted to its premises. Now that one's submitted to some premises one isn’t fair. One can't stand in any place and claim that one's fair. This is the paradoxical situation of a "fair" observer. And this paradoxical situation is independent from Uncertainty.

First off, there are many (rather intelligent) people, that I know of, that can study science with the Bible as their premise, and they have no problem. I think your problem here is that you are saying "stand inside X, to judge Y". This is not what I was talking about. I'm saying "take X for granted (as part of the foundation/premise), to judge Y".

One can't be both "religious" and "scientific" at the same time. Because Science and Religion have contradictory predispositions.

The Old Testament starts with Genesis, the cosmogony of Judaism and Christianity. Scientific cosmogony is totally different and in contradiction to Genesis. One can't believe in both of them at the same time.

Then, you don't seem to have the faintest idea what you were told with that Science and Religion example. Try to understand it.

But saying that something necessitates Uncertainty is also contradictory to the premise of Uncertainty, can you see why?

I see, but did I say something "necessitates" Uncertainty? I said Uncertainty is a way to offset the interference of premises.

... You are saying "it will do this" and "it will do that". This implies it's practicality, when in fact such a thing (as practicality) cannot exist in an Uncertain world, nor can it exist along with paradox.

"You" think that's implied by my words. And you say practicality may not exist for an uncertain viewpoint, now wouldn't this claim of yours be wrong if I've really shown that Uncertainty does this and that?

It's not more flexible, when will you get this? It's unusable, that's not the same thing as "flexible".

Is there a problem with saying that something is "unusable" (as you claim) yet "flexible?"

... That still doesn't show any inconsistency the logic. Yes, assuming the proof of one of these things assumes the proof of the other. So what? What is wrong with my saying "I'm fifteen", and then saying "I was born fifteen years ago"?...

No problem as long as you don't assume one of them as a proof for the other. You may say that "I'm fifteen" and "I was born fifteen years ago" are logically equal but you may not assume "I'm fifteen" and deduce "so I was born fifteen year ago" exactly because these two are logical equivalents. In assuming one of them true you've assumed the other one true. This is starting with "I'm fifteen" as true and ending with "I'm fifteen" as true, and this is a loop. "I'm fifteen" can be true but this truth must be deduced through the rules of deduction for the logical system in which you're working from the truth of "a distinct statement."

"I am therefore I am" is a loop because the deduction starts with "I am" pre-assumed T and ends with "I am" deduced T. "I am" may be true or false but this true/false state may only be deduced from another statement. Suppose we call "I am" statement R. Saying "I am therefore I am" is saying "R is T so R is T."

... it was to prove that the fact that he could contemplate not existing proved his existence - thus any attempt to prove his non-existence further validated his existence.

And any attempt to prove his existence further validated his non-existence, right?

However, Science is a perfectly sound branch of Philosophy, and thus there is nothing wrong with my using it to prove something's practicality (which, btw, is not just a scientific tool, it is a tool of practically all of the different reasoning systems that I've ever been introduced to).

What do you mean with "perfectly sound?" To whose evaluation is it "perfectly sound" and by which means of assessment?

Practicality? Some American Churches' "practical" way was not to install lightning rods until many years after their invention by Benjamin Franklin. And to oppose birth control for many years until now. Is that practical by scientific measures? Surely not, but it's practical and favorable by those Churches' measures. Practicality isn't a solid idea shared among everyone. Any individual/group has its own view of practicality. Hence, practicality isn't a universal criterion to measure everything with.

You act like these are the only two choices. There is also the choice of "uncertainty", which is the one I've been pushing.

As far as I've understood your "uncertainty" allows for doubting things but not all of them. Why not all of them? What's the difference between those things you doubt and those you don't?

How can you say that it's both worthless and fair at the same time.

Is there a problem with something being worthless yet fair?

There is no point in leaving a logical framework that works.

Is it really working? Medieval Churches thought their logical framework and their way of governance really worked. I guess they really believed this from the depths of their hearts.

I hear the voice of an Inquisitor: "Burn him! He's leaving our framework that really works, what's made him leave the Kingdom of our Lord?"

That Inquisitor apparently believed his way was "working" but the one being burnt didn't think so, I guess. Every framework will seem working when it's evaluated by its own criteria.

... Uncertainty is unusable because it requires you to accept a premise, while at the same time telling you not to accept any premises. This leaves you with no place to go, and thus you can't get anywhere...

And in this self-contradiction lies a reflection of "fair" observer's paradoxical situation.

In referring to "it", you claim "it's" existence, and you know it. You've been speaking about "it" as a reasoning system, and thus (obviously) implying it's existence.

And who says this? Who says referring to "it" is an implication of "existence?"

"You" may think one way or the other but you may not generalize your way to everyone.

Yes, it makes them all equally unreliable, and unimportant, if taken as a premise. It opposes all order, because to assume an order is to violate it's premise of not assuming anything

You don't "assume" an order. You "discover" an order. One takes Uncertainty and discovers the order I wrote of. Uncertainty asks to take nothing for granted but doesn't require an avoidance from discovering that Uncertainty has made everything equally unreliable thus equally creditable.

... This means that to believe in "caution" is against it's very premise. To believe in "clarity and hesitation" is against it's very premise.

This isn't a belief, it's a suggestion.

If you make a choice of premise to take for granted, you have violated the premise of Uncertainty, which doesn't allow you to take anything for granted (at least, that's how you've presented it).

Since I know that Uncertainty contradicts itself, I won't be taking anything too serious, Uncertainty included.

Once again, Uncertainty is a step in a way. This step has much to tell us but it isn't meant to be the terminus.

continued on the next post...

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

... continued from the previous post

It doesn't matter, it still exists in all reasoning systems.

You mean you've studied all "known" and "unknown" logical systems? How did you do this? And suppose, only suppose, it really exists in all logical systems. Doesn't it matter that its meaning changes from one system to the other?

So the "mimicing" of relation isn't caused by the "Monadic" ... nature of the universe?

No. Monads are isolated. They don't interact but they may undergo harmonized changes. Two events coincide but aren't bound to each other by Universe's structural properties for the monads taking part in those events are isolated.

Note that I'm not particularly interested in Pre-established Harmony but I think it's a creditable substitute for Causality.

 

[Mentat]

Greetings, Manuel_Silvio.

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
For Mentat:
You "are" criticizing it by claiming it's inapplicable. Isn't that sort of critique?

Yes, in that way, I am criticizing it. What I meant was that I am not criticizing the proof itself, but rather, it's applicability to Descartes' philosophy.

The proof's aim is to show that Q (Descartes' statement) and a valid statement, P, together make either a loop or a paradox based on arbitrarily-chosen state for P. "If" it succeeds in showing this point, it's also succeeded in showing that Q is somehow incompatible with the viewpoint in which all the proof has taken place. This seems so apparent to me. Is it unclear?

It's not that it's unclear, it's that I disagree. (I've asked this a few times...) how does the fact that one proposition suggests (or, really, requires) the truth of another propostion lead to a paradox/loop?

Loop is one case and Paradox is another. The proof follows either of two different lines according to the state chosen for P. If P is set T then, so the proof claims, a loop is made. If P is set F then, so the proof claims, a paradox is made.

But I don't see a loop, so much as I see a restating of the same premise. If I state "I'm 15 years old", and then state "I was born 15 years ago", I have no loop/paradox, I have merely restated the same thing. Of course, accepting one necessitates that you accept the other, but there is still no paradox, IMO.

You didn't consider what I said. I asked if one could remain fair to some knowledge body as one's subject of study while one's submitted to another knowledge body's premises. And you answered "yes" but how could you ever answer "yes?"

Isn't it clear that one can't be fair if one's got premises? If one assumes some premises one will always assess everything with those premises in mind. Consequently, one won't evaluate one's subject(s) of study fairly anymore. Do you think an observer whose premise is "the event X will happen in this experiment" can observe that experiment fairly?

No. So? I wasn't saying that you had to actually believe any other premises, merely that you should take them for granted (as being true) for the purpose of testing something else.

I'll give you an example: If I want to test the response of a particle to near-light-speed velocities, I have to take for granted that the speed of light is ~186,000 miles/per second. I can test the other premise (that the speed of light is what I think it is) later, but I need it as a premise, when testing what happens at near-light-speed velocities.

One wants to be fair in assessing a knowledge body. To be fair, one has to stand outside that knowledge body. Standing "outside" a knowledge body is standing "inside" another. Standing "inside" another knowledge body means being submitted to its premises. Now that one's submitted to some premises one isn’t fair. One can't stand in any place and claim that one's fair. This is the paradoxical situation of a "fair" observer. And this paradoxical situation is independent from Uncertainty.

I don't get this last sentence. Uncertainty has it's own premises as well. You cannot stand within the framework of Uncertainty, and [fairly] judge another framework - according to your own reasoning.

One can't be both "religious" and "scientific" at the same time. Because Science and Religion have contradictory predispositions.

The Old Testament starts with Genesis, the cosmogony of Judaism and Christianity. Scientific cosmogony is totally different and in contradiction to Genesis. One can't believe in both of them at the same time.

Yes you can. However, I don't suppose this is the thread to discuss that in.

Then, you don't seem to have the faintest idea what you were told with that Science and Religion example. Try to understand it.

You need to start recognizing the difference between misunderstanding and disagreement. I used to do the same thing, and I got quite a few people angry with me (please don't think that I'm angry with you, I'm not, I just don't approve of this misunderstanding about misunderstandings ).

I don't agree with the application of the Science vs. Religion reasoning, to our discussion, because I wasn't talking about stepping outside of an entire reasoning system. I was talking about studying one premise at a time, which necessitates the acceptance of some other premises. If you want to test an entire reasoning system, then there is no "fair" place to stand.

I see, but did I say something "necessitates" Uncertainty? I said Uncertainty is a way to offset the interference of premises.

Indirectly. You said:

Previously Posted by Manuel_Silvio
Whatever comes near should better be doubted before it's taken into account. This is exactly the task of Uncertainty.

In this, you are using the concept "should" (forget about word-usage, the concept has been present throughout most of this discussion).

"You" think that's implied by my words. And you say practicality may not exist for an uncertain viewpoint, now wouldn't this claim of yours be wrong if I've really shown that Uncertainty does this and that?

No. If you can find practicality in a reasoning system, then the reasoning system doesn't fit in the framework of Uncertainty. Something's practicality is an assumption, and Uncertainty doesn't allow for any assumptions.

Is there a problem with saying that something is "unusable" (as you claim) yet "flexible?"

Yes. The premises of "it's flexible" are (basically):

1. "It" exists.
2. "It is usable in a flexible manner".

No problem as long as you don't assume one of them as a proof for the other. You may say that "I'm fifteen" and "I was born fifteen years ago" are logically equal but you may not assume "I'm fifteen" and deduce "so I was born fifteen year ago" exactly because these two are logical equivalents. In assuming one of them true you've assumed the other one true. This is starting with "I'm fifteen" as true and ending with "I'm fifteen" as true, and this is a loop. "I'm fifteen" can be true but this truth must be deduced through the rules of deduction for the logical system in which you're working from the truth of "a distinct statement."

"From the truth of a distinct statement"? "I'm fifteen" is a distinct statement. The fact that I restate it later (even if in the same sentence) doesn't change that, does it?

"I am therefore I am" is a loop because the deduction starts with "I am" pre-assumed T and ends with "I am" deduced T. "I am" may be true or false but this true/false state may only be deduced from another statement. Suppose we call "I am" statement R. Saying "I am therefore I am" is saying "R is T so R is T."

Yes, stating the same things twice, so what? If I say "God doesn't exist, therefore God cannot act on anything", I am stating God's inability to act twice, but there is no loop. Besides, it was the Evil Demon who made the error of trying to convince someone (thus assuming their existence) of their not existing.

And any attempt to prove his existence further validated his non-existence, right?

No! Have you been reading my words and not my reasoning this whole time? No offense, but I think you have entirely missed the point of "keep the statement within it's context[/color]".

Any individual/group has its own view of practicality.

Yes, and thus "practicality" is not a strictly Scientific concept.

Hence, practicality isn't a universal criterion to measure everything with.

Yes it is, you just need to define which kind of practicality you are using at any given time.

As far as I've understood your "uncertainty" allows for doubting things but not all of them. Why not all of them?

Because I would then have to doubt my doubt, and doubt that doubt, and so on ad infinitum. If I doubt that I must doubt, then I can just as easily fall into Certainty as Uncertainty.

What's the difference between those things you doubt and those you don't?

Isn't that obvious?

Is there a problem with something being worthless yet fair?

Yes, it can't be fair, otherwise it would be (at least in some way) worthwile, instead of worthless.

Reponse continued on next post...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
That Inquisitor apparently believed his way was "working" but the one being burnt didn't think so, I guess. Every framework will seem working when it's evaluated by its own criteria.
And in this self-contradiction lies a reflection of "fair" observer's paradoxical situation.

Yes, thus your striving for a "fair" standpoint is in vain, is it not?

And who says this? Who says referring to "it" is an implication of "existence?"

Oh, come on! If I refer to "it", "him", or "her", I am referring to an individual entity, through the use of a pronoun. This is much too basic, and it's why I said that you fall under the unadvisable category of Descates' Second Rule.

"You" may think one way or the other but you may not generalize your way to everyone.

Says who?

Uncertainty asks to take nothing for granted...

This is wrong, and you know it.

...but doesn't require an avoidance from discovering that Uncertainty has made everything equally unreliable thus equally creditable.

"Equally unreliable" and "equally creditable" are opposites not synonymous, as you would have me believe.

This isn't a belief, it's a suggestion.

A suggestion is fine, but you cannot ask that one accept - or, even for an instant, take for granted - these suggestions, without contradicting the rule of Uncertainty.

Since I know that Uncertainty contradicts itself, I won't be taking anything too serious, Uncertainty included.

And yet, your "cautiousness" is based on Uncertainty, isn't it?

Once again, Uncertainty is a step in a way. This step has much to tell us but it isn't meant to be the terminus.

Once again, if Uncertainty were a step in the way, it would be one with no physical substance, and without any imaginable usefulness.

continued on the next post...

As is my response...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
... continued from the previous post
You mean you've studied all "known" and "unknown" logical systems? How did you do this?

I never said I did.

And suppose, only suppose, it really exists in all logical systems. Doesn't it matter that its meaning changes from one system to the other?

Sure it matters. It just doesn't change the fact that "practicality", by definition, is just something's usefulness in practice. Thus, people can have different ideas of what is "practical", but if they actually try their ideas out, they may (not necessarily, but likely) find that it is not really useful in practice.

No. Monads are isolated. They don't interact but they may undergo harmonized changes. Two events coincide but aren't bound to each other by Universe's structural properties for the monads taking part in those events are isolated.

Interesting. However, let's say that 100 times out of 100, certain Monads (harmoniously) change, after I clap my hands. Then it can be concluded that it is practical to assume a relationship (betwixt clapping and the change of those particular Monads). It is practical because it can be "put into practice" (and has been 100 times). If, at some point in the future, the clapping of my hands is not accompanied by the change of those particular Monads, then I will have to assume that something out-of-the-ordinary has happened. This is all just human nature.

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

... What I meant was that I am not criticizing the proof itself, but rather, it's applicability to Descartes' philosophy.

... how does the fact that one proposition suggests (or, really, requires) the truth of another propostion lead to a paradox/loop?

Questioning the applicability of this proof is senseless. "If" this proof is all right then it will show something about Descartes' statement (and that's clear), so it's applicable. It's "clear" that this proof is applicable for studying Descartes' statement because its aim is to show Descartes' statement's incompatibility with Boolean logic. Now "if" and only "if" this proof is all right "then" and only "then" we learn something about Descartes' statement. That's the "applicability" of "this proof" to "Descartes' statement."

The proof has "two" lines. These "two" lines are "different." One line leads to a "paradox." The other leads to a "loop." The paradox line is "clear." The loop line is what we are talking about right now. Don't use "loop/paradox," use "loop."

The proof claims that if statement P is set T, then any deduction resulting in statement Q set T will be circular reasoning, a "loop." Why is it that way? Because of the word "therefore" put there. We know P and Q are logical equivalents, so they can be used in place of each other. If one says "Q and Q" one would have said "P and Q" or "P and P." This isn't circular reasoning for it combines statements P and Q with the logical operator "and." (using mathematical notation, "Q ^ Q" isn't circular because it may be either T or F based on Q's state and the truth table for "and" operator).

Truth table for AND operator on statements R and S:

R----S----(R ^ S)
T----T----T
T----F----F
F----T----F
F----F----F

According to truth table:

If Q = T then (Q ^ Q) = T;
If Q = F then (Q ^ Q) = F;

On the other hand, it would be circular to say "Q therefore Q" or equally "P therefore Q" because "therefore" is the conditional logical operator, mathematically shown as "Q => Q." This form of reasoning is circular and non-informative because regardless of Q's "real" state, Q's conditional combination with Q will be true.

Truth table for CONDITIONAL operator on statements R and S:

R----S----(R => S)
T----T----T
T----F----F
F----T----T
F----F----T

According to truth table:

If Q = T then (Q => Q) = T;
If Q = F then (Q => Q) = T;

The difference here lies in the obvious distinction between AND and CONDITIONAL logical operators. Saying "Q and Q" is right but saying "Q therefore Q" is wrong. "Q and Q" is stating the same thing twice while "Q therefore Q" is deduction of Q's state from itself.

Clear enough?

No. So? I wasn't saying that you had to actually believe any other premises, merely that you should take them for granted (as being true) for the purpose of testing something else.

Taking premises for granted means "believing" them. If you take a premise "true" then you'll judge everything according to the "truth" of that premise.

... If I want to test the response of a particle to near-light-speed velocities, I have to take for granted that the speed of light is ~186,000 miles/per second...

This is different. Speed of light isn't a premise, it's a measurement. The premise here is that "everything in scientific Universe can be measured."

The premises of a knowledge body, Science for example, are the most basic statements which are necessary for conformance to that knowledge body.

Speed of light is a particular from scientific Universe. Particulars aren't challenged here, generalizations are called to judgment.

... Uncertainty has it's own premises as well. You cannot stand within the framework of Uncertainty, and [fairly] judge another framework - according to your own reasoning.

"Fair" observer's situation is paradoxical. Uncertainty's paradoxical nature is a reflection of that other more basic paradox.

The point with Uncertainty is that there's "no framework." You said that "Uncertainty" can never be achieved because it's paradoxical. That's right and that's why Uncertainty has no framework. I wrote many times before that "Uncertainty is a between-the-lines hint." It's a hint of "fair" observer's paradoxical situation.

By working inside Uncertainty one's working actually nowhere. It's surely somewhere but no certain place. Uncertainty provides dynamism. At any given time one's submitted to some set of premises, but Uncertainty let's one be aware of the uncertain nature of these premises and of interferences caused by them and also prepares one for change at every moment.

Like I wrote before, Uncertainty is one facet of something more basic. The other facets are Paradox and Self-reference. That more basic thing seems unreachable to me but its facets give clues to its nature.

Absolute fairness can't be achieved but relative fairness is at hand. Uncertainty is relatively fairer than other stances because it has a hint to the more basic concept of "fair" observer while many other stances only hide away that more basic problem.

Yes you can. However, I don't suppose this is the thread to discuss that in.

No, you can't. Nonetheless, I don't think this is the thread to talk that over

You need to start recognizing the difference between misunderstanding and disagreement.

And you need to start recognizing the difference between a well-thought disagreement and a disagreement made upon misunderstanding (and I'm not angry with you ).

I was talking about studying one premise at a time, which necessitates the acceptance of some other premises. If you want to test an entire reasoning system, then there is no "fair" place to stand.

We talked about this before. There's no point in studying one premise at a time while other premises are taken for granted.

Every knowledge body is "internally consistent." Inconsistencies and discrepancies can't be seen from "inside." This means you have no option of proving one of premises wrong when you have accepted other premises to be true.

Neither "inside" nor "outside" is fair. Now this is a point of agreement for us, right?

Previously Posted by Manuel_Silvio
Whatever comes near should better be doubted before it's taken into account. This is exactly the task of Uncertainty.

In this, you are using the concept "should" (forget about word-usage, the concept has been present throughout most of this discussion).

That isn't a "should" which is an obligation. It's a "should better" which is a suggestion.

As an aside, at this level nothing is necessitated because necessities are against "fairness." If something is necessitated then it's been "preferred" and "preference" has no place here.

... If you can find practicality in a reasoning system, then the reasoning system doesn't fit in the framework of Uncertainty. Something's practicality is an assumption, and Uncertainty doesn't allow for any assumptions.

"Practicality" isn't an assumption. It's a "criterion." You define it and then compare things to it. One may define "practicality" as "being uncertain" and then Uncertainty is practical.

You've accepted that practicality may be defined at will.

Yes. The premises of "it's flexible" are (basically):

1. "It" exists.
2. "It is usable in a flexible manner".

Who has associated these premises with "flexibility?" And what's given her/him an undeniable right to do so and to generalize her/his personal definition?

"From the truth of a distinct statement"? "I'm fifteen" is a distinct statement. The fact that I restate it later (even if in the same sentence) doesn't change that, does it?

Yes, it changes based on the logical operator used in statement synthesis (see above).

No! Have you been reading my words and not my reasoning this whole time? No offense, but I think you have entirely missed the point of "keep the statement within it's context".

Even if it's an "unfair, biased and personal" context that is claimed to be "fair, unbiased and encompassing?"

Yes it is, you just need to define which kind of practicality you are using at any given time.

It just doesn't change the fact that "practicality", by definition, is just something's usefulness in practice. Thus, people can have different ideas of what is "practical", but if they actually try their ideas out, they may (not necessarily, but likely) find that it is not really useful in practice.

Smells like "self-contradiction."

The fact? What fact?
By definition? Whose definition?
Usefulness? What use?
Practice? Which practice?
Actually? Which, what or whose Actuality?

Because I would then have to doubt my doubt, and doubt that doubt, and so on ad infinitum. If I doubt that I must doubt, then I can just as easily fall into Certainty as Uncertainty.

That's the dear price of "relative fairness." Be cautious, you will fall nowhere.

Isn't that obvious?

No.

Yes, it can't be fair, otherwise it would be (at least in some way) worthwile, instead of worthless.

And who associates "fairness" with "worthiness?"

Yes, thus your striving for a "fair" standpoint is in vain, is it not?

Hell knows, it's in vain. All in vain but I didn't know this when I started out. I started doubting and went on till nothing remained but doubting itself. I doubted the doubt and I asked why ask why.

There's much more to the landscapes one sees on the way than to those one sees at the destination. The way is the destination.

This is humane treatment of human situation.

continued on the next post...

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

... continued from the previous post

If I refer to "it", "him", or "her", I am referring to an individual entity, through the use of a pronoun. This is much too basic...

Yes, "you" are doing that and "you" think it's "much too basic."

Says who?

Me .

"Equally unreliable" and "equally creditable" are opposites not synonymous, as you would have me believe.

On a homogenous scale of credibility that starts from "most unreliable" and ends with "most creditable" those which are "equally unreliable" are "equally creditable."

Scale of credibility:

(-) most unreliable
(+) most creditable

X is at (*)
(-)----------------*------(+)

Y is at (*)
(-)----------------*------(+)

X and Y are equally close to (-);
Hence, X and Y are equally close to (+);

Note that saying X is as much creditable as it's unreliable is wrong (because X is 16 dashes away from (-) and 6 dashes away from (+)). However, saying that X and Y are equally creditable thus equally unreliable is right (because this means they occupy the same place on the scale).

A suggestion is fine, but you cannot ask that one accept - or, even for an instant, take for granted - these suggestions, without contradicting the rule of Uncertainty.

Descartes' statement was fine, too, as long as it was a suggestion.

You're right but Uncertainty is a step in a way. What one gathers at this step can be used on next steps (seems like I've always got too many metaphors).

And yet, your "cautiousness" is based on Uncertainty, isn't it?

Not "based on" but rather "derived from."

Once again, if Uncertainty were a step in the way, it would be one with no physical substance, and without any imaginable usefulness.

Do you take your steps of thought for "usefulness?" Have you considered a situation in which you may take a step essentially creditable yet essentially impractical to scientific measures?

Why did you start asking why somewhere in your childhood? Is that scientifically practical? I think not, for those things you've asked "why" from have been of no scientific use.

Wouldn't it be more "practical" to swallow all scientific premises and then start out with them "blindly?" You could have taken many more "practical" steps if you studied Calculus all the time you were contemplating more basic things.

I never said I did.

You said, however, that practicality exists in all logical systems.

Interesting. However, let's say that 100 times out of 100, certain Monads (harmoniously) change, after I clap my hands. Then it can be concluded that it is practical to assume a relationship (betwixt clapping and the change of those particular Monads). It is practical because it can be "put into practice" (and has been 100 times). If, at some point in the future, the clapping of my hands is not accompanied by the change of those particular Monads, then I will have to assume that something out-of-the-ordinary has happened. This is all just human nature.

A "bond" among Monads can't be concluded. No structural property can be devised for the Universe.

Nevertheless, one can devise a property for the Harmony and hope that this property remains there within a very long (but not infinite) stretch of time. Now this property of Harmony may be put to "use," whatever "use" may mean.

Causality and all of its substitutes, including Pre-established Harmony, are mental patterns imposed on events happening here and there. That's why they're all equally creditable.

Using these mental patterns may end in desirable results but this use introduces a risk factor (for there's a considerable possibility that these patterns become invalid). That's why I call Causality and its substitutes "optimization" methods. These methods can "optimize" processing routines but at the cost of a new risk factor.

And notice, "probabilistic" conclusions can't be made because number of experiments never yields to infinity. Moreover, "probabilistic" conclusions don't describe the "distribution" of possible events in order of happening.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
Questioning the applicability of this proof is senseless. "If" this proof is all right then it will show something about Descartes' statement (and that's clear), so it's applicable.

So, the fact that 1+1=2 is right means that it is applicable to Descartes' statement? What I mean by this is that any proposition could be proven correct in some framework, but that doesn't mean that all of them are "helper devices" for Descartes' philosophy. I can show you the inapplicability of "1+1=2" to Descartes' philosophy, but can you show me the applicability of your proof to his philosophy?

The proof has "two" lines. These "two" lines are "different." One line leads to a "paradox." The other leads to a "loop." The paradox line is "clear." The loop line is what we are talking about right now. Don't use "loop/paradox," use "loop."

Yes sir!

However, a loop is a paradox. If you have looping reasoning, then you have a paradox. But I'll just use "loop" from now on.

The proof claims that if statement P is set T, then any deduction resulting in statement Q set T will be circular reasoning, a "loop." Why is it that way? Because of the word "therefore" put there. We know P and Q are logical equivalents, so they can be used in place of each other. If one says "Q and Q" one would have said "P and Q" or "P and P." This isn't circular reasoning for it combines statements P and Q with the logical operator "and." (using mathematical notation, "Q ^ Q" isn't circular because it may be either T or F based on Q's state and the truth table for "and" operator).

I still don't think that the use of the word "therefore" makes a loop. Here's why: If I say "I'm fifteen, therefore I will be 30 in 15 years", I have no logical loop. Yes, the second proposition has a sub-proposition that is equal to the first proposition (in the sentence), but there is still no loop.

Also, I would like to take this opportunity to remind you that you are examining the sentence outside of it's context. This would be fine, if there were no story involving a Demon that does create a loop (by trying to convince someone that they don't exist), but as it is I don't think it correct that one examine the statement, without making any reference to the context.

Truth table for AND operator on statements R and S:

R----S----(R ^ S)
T----T----T
T----F----F
F----T----F
F----F----F

According to truth table:

If Q = T then (Q ^ Q) = T;
If Q = F then (Q ^ Q) = F;

On the other hand, it would be circular to say "Q therefore Q" or equally "P therefore Q" because "therefore" is the conditional logical operator, mathematically shown as "Q => Q." This form of reasoning is circular and non-informative because regardless of Q's "real" state, Q's conditional combination with Q will be true.

I know this. I've already admitted to it's non-informative nature. However, I stil disagree. You are saying that because I say "this is true, therefore it is true", there is a loop. I just don't see the loop. Also, look at the example of my age. I have written that one in the same style as Descartes' statement, to get the point across. "I was born 15 years ago, therefore I am 15" is not circular, even though the first premise contains (as a sub-premise) the second premise.

Truth table for CONDITIONAL operator on statements R and S:

R----S----(R => S)
T----T----T
T----F----F
F----T----T
F----F----T

According to truth table:

If Q = T then (Q => Q) = T;
If Q = F then (Q => Q) = T;

The difference here lies in the obvious distinction between AND and CONDITIONAL logical operators. Saying "Q and Q" is right but saying "Q therefore Q" is wrong. "Q and Q" is stating the same thing twice while "Q therefore Q" is deduction of Q's state from itself.

Clear enough?

No, sorry (I mean that I'm really sorry, if my disagreeing is frustrating you). See above for why.

Taking premises for granted means "believing" them. If you take a premise "true" then you'll judge everything according to the "truth" of that premise.

Exactly, that's why Uncertainty doesn't allow one to take anything for granted - which is something that you seemed to disagree with me on before.

Also, there is something wrong with the (above quoted) comment. You said that I would then judge everything according to the "truth" of that premise. This is not necessarily true, I may just be judging one thing with that premise as my basis, and then discarding the premise later.

This is different. Speed of light isn't a premise, it's a measurement. The premise here is that "everything in scientific Universe can be measured."

No, it's that the speed of light can, and has been measured. It has nothing to do with any other measurements. Besides, how is it that I am not taking for granted the measurement, when performing an experiment on what happens at near-light-speed?

The premises of a knowledge body, Science for example, are the most basic statements which are necessary for conformance to that knowledge body.

Speed of light is a particular from scientific Universe. Particulars aren't challenged here, generalizations are called to judgment.

True Uncertainty must challenge everything. You may not like this one example (I don't much either, but it was the first thing that popped into my head), but that doesn't mean that you can take it for granted, and still be Uncertain.

"Fair" observer's situation is paradoxical. Uncertainty's paradoxical nature is a reflection of that other more basic paradox.

I know, that's the point I was making: Your attempt to find a "fair" (or even "fairer") observer's situation is doomed to failure, and Uncertainty is probably a step backwards, because that's just accepting that it can't be done, while (at the same time) believing that you have the answer.

By working inside Uncertainty one's working actually nowhere.

Exactly why it is utterly pointless, and impossible.

It's surely somewhere but no certain place.

Beware of contradictions.

Uncertainty provides dynamism. At any given time one's submitted to some set of premises, but Uncertainty let's one be aware of the uncertain nature of these premises and of interferences caused by them and also prepares one for change at every moment.

No, that's what uncertainty does. Uncertainty doesn't allow you (even for a moment) to submit yourself to any knowledge body or any premise of any kind.

Like I wrote before, Uncertainty is one facet of something more basic. The other facets are Paradox and Self-reference. That more basic thing seems unreachable to me but its facets give clues to its nature.

A true paradox is unsolvable. Self-reference is truly paradoxical. Thus, the grand thing that your searching for is probably going to end up being complete acceptance of the unsolvable nature of everything. I don't like this conclusion, therefore I don't like it's facets.

Answer continued on next post...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Absolute fairness can't be achieved but relative fairness is at hand. Uncertainty is relatively fairer than other stances because it has a hint to the more basic concept of "fair" observer while many other stances only hide away that more basic problem.

Look, the fact that it hints at paradox more than any other reasoning system does not make it more fair. I just makes it closer to what the concept of fairness actually is, impossible[/color].

No, you can't. Nonetheless, I don't think this is the thread to talk that over

Well, if we were discussing it (which we're not), I would reply that knowing which things are symbolic and which things are literal resolves the situation. But, of course, we're not discussing it, so it really doesn't matter .

And you need to start recognizing the difference between a well-thought disagreement and a disagreement made upon misunderstanding

Actually, the difference I mentioned was not between a disagreement and a disagreement made upon misunderstanding. It was between a disagreement (any disagreement) and a misunderstanding.

We talked about this before. There's no point in studying one premise at a time while other premises are taken for granted.

And there's not point in denying all premises. They're both wrong. But, it does seem that one has had greater success in the history of humankind .

Besides, you have made it rather obvious that Uncertainty does exactly the same thing as any other system (it takes one premise for granted while examining all others), so it's no better.

Neither "inside" nor "outside" is fair. Now this is a point of agreement for us, right?

Sure, we can agree on that - provided you realize that that leaves out Uncertainty.

That isn't a "should" which is an obligation. It's a "should better" which is a suggestion.

No, it's a proposition. You are assuming that you know what's better. You are also assuming that the way you have posted here is better than others. Both of these are assumptions, not suggestions.

As an aside, at this level nothing is necessitated because necessities are against "fairness." If something is necessitated then it's been "preferred" and "preference" has no place here.

Then why do you prefer Uncertainty? *Contradiction Alert!*

"Practicality" isn't an assumption. It's a "criterion." You define it and then compare things to it. One may define "practicality" as "being uncertain" and then Uncertainty is practical.

None of this fits the definition of "praciticality".

You've accepted that practicality may be defined at will.

Not exactly. I have accepted that people may have different views of what is practical, but "practical" retains the meaning of "useful when put into practice".

Who has associated these premises with "flexibility?" And what's given her/him an undeniable right to do so and to generalize her/his personal definition?

I/myself have associated these premises with "flexibility". Prove that they are inapplicable, and I/myself will change my/his mind .

Yes, it changes based on the logical operator used in statement synthesis (see above).

(See previous post for refutation.)

Even if it's an "unfair, biased and personal" context that is claimed to be "fair, unbiased and encompassing?"

How can you know any of this, if you don't put the statement where it belongs (in it's context) and try to study it as it was intended.

Smells like "self-contradiction."

Not self-contradiction, completion of a point. I've already explained this (previous post) so I suggest that you read that explanation

In fact, I must go now. I apologize, but I will complete my response later.

 

[heusdens]

Originally posted by Mentat
This philosophy of Descarte has been brought up numerous times, in the old PFs. I'm just starting it up again.

Descarte gave an illustration that went (somewhat) as follows:

And Evil Demon sought to convince a man that everything he (the man) had ever believed, was false. The Demon had such power that it almost succeeded. The only thing that the Demon could not prove to the man was that the man himself did not exist. It could not do this because you cannot convince someone that doesn't exist, of anything. From this came the saying, "I think, therefore, I am".

What is your opinion?

The statement "I think, therefore, I am" I regard as a statement regarding the issue of the relation between being and thinking.

It says that thinking requires being.

The inverse statement is "I am, therefore, I think".

This would claim that all being requires thinking. Something is, only if it is able of thinking.

I would consider the first "I think, therefore, I am" as the right statement regarding the relation between being and thinking. Thinking requires being. The inverse statement, claims a false relationship between being and thinking. Being does not require thinking.

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

... can you show me the applicability of your proof to his philosophy?

Let's see. If I gave you a proof (just some proof not this one) that shows that Descartes' statement is incompatible with Boolean logic then would this exemplary proof be applicable to Descartes' statement? I think the answer is "yes."

Now I claim that the proof we're discussing here is one that shows such incompatibility. If this proof succeeds in its task, that is showing some incompatibility, then it can be considered an "applicable" proof. Do you agree?

And in order to prove this proof "inapplicable" one has to "understand" it and then show that it either doesn't succeed in its task or that it just does another task. Please "show" either of these cases.

By the way, this proof isn't "every" proof. It's a specific one concerned with its specific task (and it isn't 1 + 1 = 2).

However, a loop is a paradox.

How did you make that? A loop is based on self-reference. A paradox is based on the collocation of contraries. Are these two equal? If yes, why have they been forbidden through distinct rules of logic and not under a single rule?

You are saying that because I say "this is true, therefore it is true", there is a loop.

Please make sure you read and re-read my following words until you get the point. I'm really tired of this and I can't describe my point more clearly.

No. (Q => Q) isn't "this is true therefore it is true." It's "because this is true therefore it is true." A loop is an instance of self-reference, where the validity/truth of some statement is taken from the validity/truth of the same statement.

As I showed on the previous post a (Q => Q) statement is "always" true, no matter whether or not Q is T. It was rock solid Boolean logic. You may insist that your (Q => Q) statement (which is "I am therefore I am" or "I'm fifteen therefore I'm fifteen") is T and you're right with that but you must note that the truth of Q can't be deduced from this.

Suppose we have (Q => Q) = T (means, "I am therefore I am" is considered T). You can't deduce Q = T (means, "I am" is T) because regardless of Q's state (means, the truth of "I am" which is I's existence and the matter of debate here) (Q => Q) is ever-true.

Whether or not I exist (means, whether or not "I am" is T), "I am therefore I am" is true. "I am therefore I am" leads nowhere but "I am therefore I am." From that you can't get "I am" as true and for I to be proven to exist "I am" must be proven true (and there's no discussion about that).

Non-informative-ness isn't only a "disadvantage," it's a "fault." The only non-informative statements in Boolean logic are those forbidden ones (they were forbidden because they were non-informative). If you have a non-informative statement you can know for sure that you have a "fault" at hand.

"I was born 15 years ago, therefore I am 15" is not circular, even though the first premise contains (as a sub-premise) the second premise.

This can't be compared to a (Q => Q). Here you have (R => Q) where Q's truth is deduced from R's truth and R's truth is independent of Q.

You may be born 15 years ago but have 20 years of age because you were involved in a hypothetical time machine experiment. "I was born 15 years ago" isn't a logical equivalent to "I am 15." These two can be converted to each other in presence of other statements which declare solemnly that you haven't experienced any time distortions.

Consequently, this statement isn't analogous to Descartes' statement which is a (Q => Q) (deduction of a statement's truth from its logical "equivalent" and not from its "result along with other auxiliary statements").

Exactly, that's why Uncertainty doesn't allow one to take anything for granted - which is something that you seemed to disagree with me on before.

Uncertainty is paradoxical so one can be taking its premise for granted while one doesn't violate "nothing is certain."

Uncertainty's premise assumes no definite state of T or F, its value is none of the members of truth value set defined for Boolean logic. It can be taken simultaneously T and F or none of them or a mixture of T and F or something beyond T and F.

Uncertainty is a step in a way. This step can be taken under many names, call it Uncertainty, call it Angst, call it whatever. Under one name or the other, this step must be taken. It's the righteous successor of all previous steps. One starts out with doubts, with precision, with clarity, with cautiousness, with hopes and with desire for knowledge. This individual will, I think, someday somehow understand how these starting steps give the clues to a critical step beyond them.

That critical step is where limits of knowledge, its righteousness, its fairness and the honesty in one's desire for knowledge become subjects to one's quest for knowledge. Knowledge is all we know. Consider the situation where knowledge itself becomes a subject for being known. What happens? Would our knowledge give us clues to its own nature? Isn't this another paradox?

If our knowledge contains the knowledge about the nature of knowledge then we'd be knowing it and there's no point in asking. If our knowledge doesn't contain the knowledge about its own nature then we'd never acquire that knowledge for we can't access something that lies outside itself (knowledge of any form or about anything must be somewhere inside knowledge and can't be outside of knowledge).

Uncertainty, Paradox and Self-reference are all evaded for they're the borders to rationalized knowledge. In studying the knowledge itself the most important aspects of study are the limits of knowledge - those borders.

No, it's that the speed of light can, and has been measured. It has nothing to do with any other measurements. Besides, how is it that I am not taking for granted the measurement, when performing an experiment on what happens at near-light-speed?

... This is not necessarily true, I may just be judging one thing with that premise as my basis, and then discarding the premise later.

I think we have different understandings of "premises" for a knowledge body. For me, the premises of a knowledge body are the "most basic" statements whose truth enforces the truth of all other statements of that knowledge body.

Science, for example, has its premises (historically) told in Francis Bacon's "Novum Organum." The most basic to Science is its methodology. Assuming that methodology will in time result in "all" scientific achievements, including a measurement of light speed.

You can't be working in a knowledge body without being "totally" (consciously or otherwise) believing in its premises (which are the "most basic" of all). You can't assume Science's methodology for studying stones but look from Bible's outlook at human beings. This is a paradox just like Uncertainty.

You choose to be a scientist. You understand Science's methodology. You use it to view the Universe, to view all. Then you get everything out of it. Science and all other knowledge bodies are self-sufficient encompassing systems of thought applied to an entire Universe (some knowledge bodies may assume more Universes or some Multiverse or no Universe at all).

Uncertainty's task is to detect inconsistencies and discrepancies in these knowledge bodies that wouldn't be seen if one's "inside" (or even "outside") these knowledge bodies. One concerned with Uncertainty won't fulfill the requirements of Uncertainty (eg, won't be "totally" Uncertain, as you say) but will be assuming a relatively fairer stance compared to other stances.

True Uncertainty must challenge everything. You may not like this one example (I don't much either, but it was the first thing that popped into my head), but that doesn't mean that you can take it for granted, and still be Uncertain.

Uncertainty challenges Science's methodology instead. This challenge invalidates all that relies on this methodology including but not limited to a measurement of light speed.

I know, that's the point I was making: Your attempt to find a "fair" (or even "fairer") observer's situation is doomed to failure, and Uncertainty is probably a step backwards, because that's just accepting that it can't be done, while (at the same time) believing that you have the answer.

This is humane treatment of human situation.

No, that's what uncertainty does. Uncertainty doesn't allow you (even for a moment) to submit yourself to any knowledge body or any premise of any kind.

Your "uncertainty" allows for unfair preference of some premises over others. Uncertainty, by its paradoxical nature, doesn't "allow" and/or "disallow" anything.

A true paradox is unsolvable. Self-reference is truly paradoxical. Thus, the grand thing that your searching for is probably going to end up being complete acceptance of the unsolvable nature of everything. I don't like this conclusion, therefore I don't like it's facets.

My current guess of that "grand" thing (as you call it) is that it's Unknown

There's even enough "scientific evidence" to the unsolvable nature of everything. Even Science doesn't claim "direct" observation or manipulation of everything or anything. Even Science asserts that what we observe and manipulate is a "representation," nothing more. However, this "unsolvable" case isn't my point here and now.

Look, the fact that it hints at paradox more than any other reasoning system does not make it more fair. I just makes it closer to what the concept of fairness actually is, impossible.

So the fact that one is always ready to review one's thoughts doesn't make one fairer?

continued on the next post…

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

… continued from the previous post

Well, if we were discussing it (which we're not), I would reply that knowing which things are symbolic and which things are literal resolves the situation. But, of course, we're not discussing it, so it really doesn't matter.

Nevertheless, if we were discussing it (which we never ever are) I would counter that knowing that symbolic things can be interpreted at will worsens the situation, but, more apparently than obviously we aren’t discussing it, so it more really than really doesn't matter and has never mattered to no one

Actually, the difference I mentioned was not between a disagreement and a disagreement made upon misunderstanding. It was between a disagreement (any disagreement) and a misunderstanding.

Well, I'm gradually learning to know that difference. Did you try, too?

And there's not point in denying all premises. They're both wrong. But, it does seem that one has had greater success in the history of humankind.

Success? From what point of view? By what definition of success? In what history of human beings?

No, it's a proposition. You are assuming that you know what's better. You are also assuming that the way you have posted here is better than others. Both of these are assumptions, not suggestions.

Then why do you prefer Uncertainty? *Contradiction Alert!*

You're right. Have you noticed you're using the other edge of the double-edged sword that Uncertainty is?

None of this fits the definition of "praciticality".

Not exactly. I have accepted that people may have different views of what is practical, but "practical" retains the meaning of "useful when put into practice".

And how "useful" and "practice" are defined?

I/myself have associated these premises with "flexibility". Prove that they are inapplicable, and I/myself will change my/his mind.

First you tell me, "inapplicable" to which measures and tell your grounds for choosing those measures.

How can you know any of this, if you don't put the statement where it belongs (in it's context) and try to study it as it was intended.

As far as I know, the context is an entity's opposition to a denial of that specific entity's existence. That entity used a statement that was problematic within the framework that that entity intended that statement to be understood in.

Not self-contradiction, completion of a point. I've already explained this (previous post) so I suggest that you read that explanation.

I'd read it. You used terms that weren't subject to consensus (in this two-individual community, of course) while we'd agreed to use terms that refer to the same (or almost the same) things on both sides of dialogue.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by heusdens
The statement "I think, therefore, I am" I regard as a statement regarding the issue of the relation between being and thinking.

It says that thinking requires being.

The inverse statement is "I am, therefore, I think".

This would claim that all being requires thinking. Something is, only if it is able of thinking.

I would consider the first "I think, therefore, I am" as the right statement regarding the relation between being and thinking. Thinking requires being. The inverse statement, claims a false relationship between being and thinking. Being does not require thinking.

And I would agree with you entirely.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Let's see. If I gave you a proof (just some proof not this one) that shows that Descartes' statement is incompatible with Boolean logic then would this exemplary proof be applicable to Descartes' statement? I think the answer is "yes."

Now I claim that the proof we're discussing here is one that shows such incompatibility. If this proof succeeds in its task, that is showing some incompatibility, then it can be considered an "applicable" proof. Do you agree?

Yes, if it can be used to show an incompatibility between Boolean Logic and Descartes' philosophy, then I agree to it's applicability.

And in order to prove this proof "inapplicable" one has to "understand" it and then show that it either doesn't succeed in its task or that it just does another task. Please "show" either of these cases.

Didn't you already show that it is the type statement, wherein "P" is a function of [bleep]? If this is so then I may understand the proof, but I still don't see how it accomplishes the aforementioned task.

By the way, this proof isn't "every" proof. It's a specific one concerned with its specific task (and it isn't 1 + 1 = 2).

Yes, but it's specific task is to show an incompatibility between Boolean Logic and a statement of the form "P ([bleep])", isn't it?

How did you make that? A loop is based on self-reference. A paradox is based on the collocation of contraries. Are these two equal? If yes, why have they been forbidden through distinct rules of logic and not under a single rule?

Hm, I guess a loop isn't a paradox. I had read a book that dealt with paradox (Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid), and it seems to have said that self-referential statements are paradoxical. Oh well, I have already agreed to use the word "loop".

Please make sure you read and re-read my following words until you get the point. I'm really tired of this and I can't describe my point more clearly.

No. (Q => Q) isn't "this is true therefore it is true." It's "because this is true therefore it is true." A loop is an instance of self-reference, where the validity/truth of some statement is taken from the validity/truth of the same statement.

As I showed on the previous post a (Q => Q) statement is "always" true, no matter whether or not Q is T. It was rock solid Boolean logic. You may insist that your (Q => Q) statement (which is "I am therefore I am" or "I'm fifteen therefore I'm fifteen") is T and you're right with that but you must note that the truth of Q can't be deduced from this.

Suppose we have (Q => Q) = T (means, "I am therefore I am" is considered T). You can't deduce Q = T (means, "I am" is T) because regardless of Q's state (means, the truth of "I am" which is I's existence and the matter of debate here) (Q => Q) is ever-true.

Whether or not I exist (means, whether or not "I am" is T), "I am therefore I am" is true. "I am therefore I am" leads nowhere but "I am therefore I am." From that you can't get "I am" as true and for I to be proven to exist "I am" must be proven true (and there's no discussion about that).

Alright. I understand it. It isn't much different then I thought it was. You are showing that "Q=>Q" doesn't prove anything. I agree entirely. Now, put the statement back into context, please, and see the impossible nature of the Evil Demon's task (to prove to someone that they don't exist), and we will have nothing left to discuss.

I keep mentioning context because I already knew that the statement itself doesn't get you anywhere. It is the application to the story that shows that, when someone tries to prove to you that you don't exist, they only further validate belief in your existence.

Non-informative-ness isn't only a "disadvantage," it's a "fault." The only non-informative statements in Boolean logic are those forbidden ones (they were forbidden because they were non-informative). If you have a non-informative statement you can know for sure that you have
a "fault" at hand.

Why is a non-informative statement forbidden by Boolean Logic?

This can't be compared to a (Q => Q). Here you have (R => Q) where Q's truth is deduced from R's truth and R's truth is independent of Q.

Oh no it's not independent. It's not possible that I was born 15 years ago, and yet am not 15 years old. Thus, this statement is of exactly the same nature as "I think therefore I am", because the first statement has the second statement as one of it's sub-premises.

You may be born 15 years ago but have 20 years of age because you were involved in a hypothetical time machine experiment. "I was born 15 years ago" isn't a logical equivalent to "I am 15." These two can be converted to each other in presence of other statements which declare solemnly that you haven't experienced any time distortions.

So now you introduce context? This is a little irritating.

Besides, if I was born 15 years ago, then I must be 15 years old. If I travel through time, I was still born 15 subjective years ago, and that's all that matters to the statement.

Consequently, this statement isn't analogous to Descartes' statement which is a (Q => Q) (deduction of a statement's truth from its logical "equivalent" and not from its "result along with other auxiliary statements").

Actually, Descartes' statement isn't the one that you showed to be equivalent to "Q=>Q", it was "I am therefore I am" that was of this kind.

Uncertainty is paradoxical so one can be taking its premise for granted while one doesn't violate "nothing is certain."

This is backward reasoning. You must take the premise for granted while not violating "nothing is certain", and thus Uncertainty is paradoxical.

Uncertainty's premise assumes no definite state of T or F, its value is none of the members of truth value set defined for Boolean logic. It can be taken simultaneously T and F or none of them or a mixture of T and F or something beyond T and F.

Then it isn't useful. You said that it's usefulness (and it's "fairness") were that it could be used to determine the truth of another knowledge body.

Response Continued on the Next Post...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Uncertainty is a step in a way. This step can be taken under many names, call it Uncertainty, call it Angst, call it whatever. Under one name or the other, this step must be taken. It's the righteous successor of all previous steps. One starts out with doubts, with precision, with clarity, with cautiousness, with hopes and with desire for knowledge. This individual will, I think, someday somehow understand how these starting steps give the clues to a critical step beyond them.

I don't want to sound repetitious, but you leave me no choice: You are not describing Uncertainty, you are describing uncertainty.

That critical step is where limits of knowledge, its righteousness, its fairness and the honesty in one's desire for knowledge become subjects to one's quest for knowledge. Knowledge is all we know. Consider the situation where knowledge itself becomes a subject for being known. What happens? Would our knowledge give us clues to its own nature? Isn't this another paradox?

Not really. Knowledge is not a system for learning, and thus does not fall into the paradoxes of Russel or Godel.

If our knowledge contains the knowledge about the nature of knowledge then we'd be knowing it and there's no point in asking. If our knowledge doesn't contain the knowledge about its own nature then we'd never acquire that knowledge for we can't access something that lies outside itself (knowledge of any form or about anything must be somewhere inside knowledge and can't be outside of knowledge).

You are (IMO) misusing the word "knowledge". You are asking things like "if our knowledge contains the knowledge about the nature of knowledge...", when in fact, unless you know something about the nature of knowledge, it is obvious that "our knowledge" doesn't (yet) contain knowledge about the nature of knowledge.

Uncertainty, Paradox and Self-reference are all evaded for they're the borders to rationalized knowledge. In studying the knowledge itself the most important aspects of study are the limits of knowledge - those borders.

Uncertainty, Paradox, and Loops are not the borders of rationality. "Borders" have recognizable existence on both sides of them. Uncertainty, Paradox, and Loops do not have recognizable (or understandable) existence on either side of the rationality/irrationality.

I think we have different understandings of "premises" for a knowledge body. For me, the premises of a knowledge body are the "most basic" statements whose truth enforces the truth of all other statements of that knowledge body.

That's what I think a premise of a knowledge body is as well.

Science, for example, has its premises (historically) told in Francis Bacon's "Novum Organum." The most basic to Science is its methodology. Assuming that methodology will in time result in "all" scientific achievements, including a measurement of light speed.

You can't be working in a knowledge body without being "totally" (consciously or otherwise) believing in its premises (which are the "most basic" of all). You can't assume Science's methodology for studying stones but look from Bible's outlook at human beings. This is a paradox just like Uncertainty.

Not paradoxical, but yes, it is as unusable as Uncertainty.

You choose to be a scientist. You understand Science's methodology. You use it to view the Universe, to view all. Then you get everything out of it. Science and all other knowledge bodies are self-sufficient encompassing systems of thought applied to an entire Universe (some knowledge bodies may assume more Universes or some Multiverse or no Universe at all).

Uncertainty's task is to detect inconsistencies and discrepancies in these knowledge bodies that wouldn't be seen if one's "inside" (or even "outside") these knowledge bodies. One concerned with Uncertainty won't fulfill the requirements of Uncertainty (eg, won't be "totally" Uncertain, as you say) but will be assuming a relatively fairer stance compared to other stances.

Again you describe "uncertainty" instead of "Uncertainty". This is not fitting, as my argument is against your belief in "Uncertainty".

Uncertainty challenges Science's methodology instead. This challenge invalidates all that relies on this methodology including but not limited to a measurement of light speed.

Then you agree with me?

This is humane treatment of human situation.

Thank you .

Your "uncertainty" allows for unfair preference of some premises over others. Uncertainty, by its paradoxical nature, doesn't "allow" and/or "disallow" anything.

Until you can prove to me that this reasoning system (Uncertainty) can even exist, I will keep on repeating myself: If it doesn't allow or disallow anything, then it is unusable.

My current guess of that "grand" thing (as you call it) is that it's Unknown

It's obviously unknown, the point is in getting to know it, isn't it?

So the fact that one is always ready to review one's thoughts doesn't make one fairer?

One cannot even take it for granted that they should review their thoughts, under the framework of Uncertainty.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Nevertheless, if we were discussing it (which we never ever are) I would counter that knowing that symbolic things can be interpreted at will worsens the situation, but, more apparently than obviously we aren’t discussing it, so it more really than really doesn't matter and has never mattered to no one

Yeah, so who cares that your absolutely wrong, and that the Bible supplies it's own interpretations, and makes itself clear to anyone who actually studies it? It isn't even an issue that historians don't call Herodutus' writings foolish, just because they use symbolisms.

Success?

Yes.

From what point of view?

The common one.

By what definition of success?

The usual one.

In what history of human beings?

The only one.

You're right. Have you noticed you're using the other edge of the double-edged sword that Uncertainty is?

I don't really consider it a double-edged sword. I consider it to have only one edge, and it's the one that pierces through whoever tries to use it. One may not turn it about, either, because that would be making use of it, and thus would (inevitably) lead to their being pierced, before any useful progress is made.

And how "useful" and "practice" are defined?

In my post, or in general use?

First you tell me, "inapplicable" to which measures and tell your grounds for choosing those measures.

Any measure that you choose. It is you that was assigned to prove the inapplicability of my premises, so it is you who decides what is and is not applicable. If I disagree with your definition of applicability, then I will argue that point later.

As far as I know, the context is an entity's opposition to a denial of that specific entity's existence. That entity used a statement that was problematic within the framework that that entity intended that statement to be understood in.

The statement is not problematic, merely self-evident (and thus non-informative, just as you said). He was telling the Evil Demond what it should have known to begin with: You can't convince me of [bleep] if I don't exist, and thus will never prove to me that I don't exist.

I'd read it. You used terms that weren't subject to consensus (in this two-individual community, of course) while we'd agreed to use terms that refer to the same (or almost the same) things on both sides of dialogue.

Please explain. What terms did I use, and which ones should I have used instead?

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

=

Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

Didn't you already show that it is the type statement, wherein "P" is a function of [bleep]?

Yes, but it's specific task is to show an incompatibility between Boolean Logic and a statement of the form "P ([bleep])", isn't it?

That P([beep]) was a generalization. I used it to prove that incompatibility case for all statements of the form "I [beep] therefore I am" ("I think therefore I am," "I eat therefore I am," "I want therefore I am," etc). Instead of using the specific verb, "think," I used a non-specific variable [beep]. You could say whatever verb in place of [beep] (for example "I discuss therefore I am") and P([beep]) would be a statement like "there need be an I to [beep]" (means, for example, "there need be an I to discuss").

Remember you claimed that one can't be thinking if one's not being. The function P([beep])'s value for [beep] = "think" is "there need be an I to think." P([beep]) is the generalization of your premise that thinking (or [beep]ing) and being are firmly bound. There's a reason for my using P([beep]). I took your premise (and generalized it, an action that complicated the matter), then I showed, during that proof, that your premise by which you claim the truth for Descartes' statement leads to a loop along with the same Descartes' statement. This was the loop case in that proof where I said if P = T and Q = T then we'll have a loop. And then I showed even if you put away your premise (eg, you say P = F) and we get P = F and Q = T you won't get much out of it because that would be a paradox. This was the paradox case.

Now, let's forget the P([beep]) generalization for it only complicates the matter (even though it's a decent generalization).

With or without P([beep]), it's clear that statements of form (Q => Q) are ever-true and that they "can't" be used to deduce the truth of Q itself. Take a look at this new formulation of the same proof, perhaps this one works for you.

You repeated many times that "if there wasn't an I, who could be thinking?" Let's have your word and say that "thinking" is the "undeniable" companion of "being." Saying this necessitates that "I think" be logically equivalent to "I am."

Descartes' statement is "I think therefore I am." Take "I think" and name it R. Take "I am" and name it Q. Descartes' statement can be expressed as (R => Q). Since R = Q (thinking is always the companion of being), we can always substitute Q with R so (R => Q) becomes (Q => Q). This (Q => Q) is an equivalent of Descartes' statement, (R => Q), by your premise that thinking and being are firmly bound. We know that any statement of form (Q => Q) is ever-true and the truth of Q itself (Q being "I am") can't be deduced from it. This is a non-informative case, a loop. You can't say if Q is T or F (eg, if you exist or not) by knowing that (Q => Q) is true.

It's worth noting that the equivalence of (R => Q) and (Q => Q) was taken from your premise. If you decide to put aside the firm bond between thinking and being then such equivalence can't be claimed and we have a (R => Q) which deduces Q's truth from R's truth like many other plain statements. However, in putting aside the firm bond between thinking (eg, "I think" which is R) and being (eg, "I am" which is Q) you've already accepted that Q's truth is irrelevant to R's truth and deducing Q's truth from R's truth isn't allowed. This is a self-contrary case, a paradox. You can't say R indicates Q when you've previously stated that R and Q are independent (eg, aren't bound).

Now, put the statement back into context, please, and see the impossible nature of the Evil Demon's task (to prove to someone that they don't exist), and we will have nothing left to discuss.

Back to Evil Demon scenario, we have the Evil Demon claiming there's no Rene Descartes and Descartes claiming there is indeed a Rene Descartes by deducing from his ability to think of this scenario. Descartes is saying Q (eg, that "he is") is T because he's thinking of an Evil Demon scenario and from his thinking, his being can be directly derived, that (R => Q). Descartes is saying R = Q (eg, one's being can be derived from one's ability to think) and that (R => Q). The loop case happens here: (R => Q) can be turned to (Q => Q) and then Evil Demon can turn back to Descartes and tell him that from (Q => Q)'s truth (from "I think therefore I am"'s truth) Q's truth can't be derived without making a loop and violating the rules of game which are the boundaries of Boolean logic.

The incompatibility of Descartes' statement and Boolean logic gives the Evil Demon a chance to trap Descartes in a corner of the fight arena he's chosen to deal with the Evil Demon in; that fight arena being Boolean logic. Descartes' only way out is on the street and out of fight arena.

Why is a non-informative statement forbidden by Boolean Logic?

For those who invented and developed it didn't like what wasn't "productive" and "practical" based on "their" understanding of "practice" and "production."

Searching for non-informative statements you won't find any but those statements that are inherently paradoxical and/or self-referenced. A statement is a sentence that can be assigned a "state" (in case of Boolean logic, either of T and F states). If a statement can be assigned a definite state then it's informative for it surely tells us something about something. There remain those statements which can't be assigned a definite state, these can only be of the above categories and because of their indefiniteness are non-informative.

So now you introduce context? This is a little irritating.

Besides, if I was born 15 years ago, then I must be 15 years old. If I travel through time, I was still born 15 subjective years ago, and that's all that matters to the statement.

No, that wasn't a new context. I was only saying that "I was born 15 years ago" doesn't directly result in "I am 15." Hence, an "I was born 15 years ago therefore I am 15" can't be equaled to an "I am 15 therefore I am 15."

Even in the case you talk of 15 subjective years, those auxiliary statements (eg, those that must accompany "I was born 15 years ago" to get "I am 15") are present. Now they solemnly declare that there's a distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Or they may declare Special Relativity and time dilation. Nonetheless, there should be some statements additional to "I was born 15 years ago" to deduce "I was 15." Your statement is of form (R => Q), R and Q being convertible to each other only under special circumstances, thus it isn't of form (Q => Q).

This is backward reasoning. You must take the premise for granted while not violating "nothing is certain", and thus Uncertainty is paradoxical.

What happens after I realize Uncertainty's paradoxical nature? I know that its premise has no definite state and can be rejected while it is accepted.

Then it isn't useful. You said that it's usefulness (and it's "fairness") were that it could be used to determine the truth of another knowledge body.

Truth or falsity aren't of the properties of knowledge bodies; they're states defined "within" knowledge bodies. Uncertainty doesn't determine "truth," it determines "attributes."

Here's an example. We can use aerial photos and telemetry to understand the geomorphology of Sierra Nevada. We can use the same methods to understand the geomorphology of Rockies. A geomorphologic assessment will determine the "attributes" of these terrains. Sierra Nevada will be seen with much more discontinuities than Rockies. Whether or not discontinuities are "good" or "bad" isn't a matter of geomorphology's interest; it's up to the inhabitants of these terrains to honor or lower the discontinuities of their land.

In analogy, Uncertainty isn't interested in finding out the "truth" (it would be biased if it was interested in truth which requires much debate before it can be defined), it will only reveal the attributes of knowledge bodies, for example if one specific knowledge body is consistent (or if is has whatever attribute) or not. It's up to the inhabitants of that knowledge body to decide if they like consistency (or any other attribute) or not. For example, those who live within Science like to see it consistent with observations while those who live within a Religion like to see their observations consistent with their Religion.

Not really. Knowledge is not a system for learning, and thus does not fall into the paradoxes of Russell or Godel.

I wasn't talking about Gödel’s theorem or Russell’s paradox. Knowledge isn't a system for learning but this has nothing to do with its being studied. I was only asking if a study of knowledge, or rather gathering knowledge about knowledge, doesn't give rise to new problems.

... You are asking things like "if our knowledge contains the knowledge about the nature of knowledge...", when in fact, unless you know something about the nature of knowledge, it is obvious that "our knowledge" doesn't (yet) contain knowledge about the nature of knowledge.

That's a repetition of my own question. If I ask "what's the nature of knowledge?" two possibilities are faced:

00. I know about the nature of knowledge, or the nature of my knowledge is contained in it. If so, why could I be asking this question?

01. I don't know about the nature of knowledge, or the knowledge of the nature of knowledge isn't contained in the knowledge. One part of the knowledge lies outside itself, so it can never be accessed.

continued on the next post...

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

... continued from the previous topic

Uncertainty, Paradox, and Loops are not the borders of rationality. "Borders" have recognizable existence on both sides of them. Uncertainty, Paradox, and Loops do not have recognizable (or understandable) existence on either side of the rationality/irrationality.

I have another definition of a "border," that's where one realm ends and another starts, a virtual line that inhabitants of one realm would pass in order to get to the other realm.

Suppose I'm a rational thinker. I start sorting out things rationally. I go on and on but then isn't there a limit to this task? I think there is. Whenever I, being a rational thinker, face Paradox, Self-reference and Uncertainty I go back and change my way in order to remain rational. If I went on my way I would've become irrational. I can pass these "borders" to go back and forth between these two realms. If I want to know in which realm I reside I only have to check out my log and see if I've passed these borders (eg, took into account these three or evaded them). Regardless of the nature of these three, they function like "borders" so I call them "borders."

Not paradoxical, but yes, it is as unusable as Uncertainty.

Yeah, so who cares that your absolutely wrong, and that the Bible supplies it's own interpretations, and makes itself clear to anyone who actually studies it? It isn't even an issue that historians don't call Herodutus' writings foolish, just because they use symbolisms.

Not paradoxical, just in case you want to force match Science and Bible by interpreting Bible words as scientific statements. Does Bible include an interpretation of the symbolism used in Genesis? Does it say how to understand what "the throne of God" is? Does it say how to explain for Eve being second to Adam? Does it contain instructions to map Genesis' naïveté about Creation or Cosmogony into the hyper-complexity that this Universe is?

You can compare Genesis to Big Bang and then map the Christian God into Big Bang's primary fireball. Do you like it that way?

I haven't studied Bible. I haven't even read it completely once. However, I've seen people of the three major Western faiths (Christian, Judaist and Muslim) and seen them interpreting their "holy" books into scientific concepts. I've seen how they contradict both Science and their own Religion. I've seen how they modify Science to work to their liking and how they modify their Religion to work to the this-worldly necessity that is Science. In both of situations they were modifying these rigid bodies not to match them honestly but to explain for their actions, to make excuse for what they would anyway do.

Again you describe "uncertainty" instead of "Uncertainty". This is not fitting, as my argument is against your belief in "Uncertainty".

Your "uncertainty" doesn't allow to see the inconsistencies in "uncertainty" itself but Uncertainty does even encourage one into looking at the inconsistency, the paradox that Uncertainty points at.

What I described required this condition and this condition is peculiar to Uncertainty and can't be satisfied with "uncertainty."

Then you agree with me?

Conditionally yes. If you, too, think that Uncertainty challenges the generalizations and not the particulars because particulars are challenged naturally.

Until you can prove to me that this reasoning system (Uncertainty) can even exist, I will keep on repeating myself: If it doesn't allow or disallow anything, then it is unusable.

Unusable for what use? And why do you want to "use" everything?

It's obviously unknown, the point is in getting to know it, isn't it?

No. By the nature of its facets, it can't be known but it can be guessed at. Every two guesses are equally creditable .

One cannot even take it for granted that they should review their thoughts, under the framework of Uncertainty.

One needn't take that for granted. One will naturally be continuously reviewing one's thoughts to find out where this Uncertainty comes from and why one's is Uncertain.

The common one.

The usual one.

The only one.

Common? Common among whom?

Usual? What's the usual definition of something? What's called usual?

Only one? Is this only one the only one written in history books or in cultural sediments or the only one advertised by governments? Viewed from whose point of view, from Blue Whales' point of view?

I don't really consider it a double-edged sword. I consider it to have only one edge, and it's the one that pierces through whoever tries to use it.

I saw it flashing past me then I saw nothing. It's double-edged for it first challenges everything else then itself, it first pierces all other stances then itself.

In my post, or in general use?

Neither. In your opinion.

Any measure that you choose. It is you that was assigned to prove the inapplicability of my premises, so it is you who decides what is and is not applicable. If I disagree with your definition of applicability, then I will argue that point later.

My measures? I can make bizarre requests. Well, only those ideas are applicable that their written form is made up of 10,000 words each containing exactly 10 letters. By this measure, no idea is applicable.

Please explain. What terms did I use, and which ones should I have used instead?

You said:

It just doesn't change the fact that "practicality", by definition, is just something's usefulness in practice. Thus, people can have different ideas of what is "practical", but if they actually try their ideas out, they may (not necessarily, but likely) find that it is not really useful in practice.

Where I think the terms:

00. Fact
01. Definition (you say by "definition" like there is "the" definition, a solemn one that is common among all beings)
02. Usefulness and/or Use
03. Practice
04. Actuality (referred to by the adverb "actually")

are unclear in the context of their containing sentences. I don't suggest any words in place of them, but I suggest we use them after we've made a common definition of them.

 

[heusdens]

I think that the statement "I think, therefore I am" tells a different story as is stated above.

I think the statement is about telling a relationship between "thinking" and "being". The statement just says that "thinking" implies "being". The reverse statement however ("I am, therefore I think") is not necesseraliy true, which does not contradict the fact that if Descartes says it, or anyone else, it is nevertheless true.

Being is not reserved for the entities that think. A rock "is". But nowhere this implies that therefore the rock also "thinks".

When thinking about being, I could in principle doubt my being. But that would deny the fact that in any case I think. Because I know I think, it necessitates me to assume also I exist.

The main proposition therefore is:

~P -> ~Q

where P stand for "being" and Q stands for "thinking"

The proposition claims that non-being implies non-thinking. It does not however claim that non-thinking implies non-being, or that being implies thinking.

If the it is stated that Q is true ("I think") the argument is then that P also must be true ("I am").

As we can see, this makes logical sense. If we assume that "non-being" impies "non-thinking", and we can state that there is thinking, this implies that there is being.

Hence: I think, therefore I am.