Is Consciousness Simple or Complex?

[GladScientist]

Consciousness is still a big mystery, and I've always wondered what causes it. I've decided that it is most likely one of two possibilities: that consciousness is "simple," or "complex."

1) If consciousness is simple, then that means that it is simply an inherent property of the universe. Imagine your consciousness if you did not have a brain: you wouldn't be able to see, hear, or even think. You would be dead in all ways, however there would still be an "awareness" present, aware of the nothingness that it is experiencing.

If consciousness is simple, then that "empty awareness" exists just as fundamentally as space, time, and particles. If an organ evolves that is capable of feeling any kind of sensation, then the empty awareness would "pick up" the senses. This would mean that even an organism with no brain can still feel, and have a subjective experience (although it obviously can't think). It would also mean that everything subconscious is still happening consciously, just not communicating with the consciousness of your brain. Your leg, while you are asleep, will still consciously feel the pain of being bitten by a mosquito. But since that information isn't communicated to your brain, "your" consciousness doesn't pick it up.

2) The second way consciousness could operate would be through complexity. If this is the case, then consciousness is a sort of program running on your brain, just like all of the other "programs" that contain your information and behavior. This would mean that consciousness is 100% physical, which brings about some paradoxical thinking.

Think of the "Star Trek teleporter" situation. A machine records exactly all of your physical information, destroys you, and reconstructs you. Is that "you?" If consciousness is complex and thus a result of physical matter, then an exact copy of you should be exactly "you." What happens if the original you isn't destroyed, and a copy is still made? Do you experience being in both of these vessels at the same time, but your two minds just can't communicate with each other? Some might argue that their brains would soon become different because they would have different experiences, and thus they would have different consciousnesses (since consciousness is a product of physical matter, if it is indeed complex). But wouldn't that mean that every time you have an experience, you die and are replaced by a new consciousness?

This question can be asked another way. Suppose someone created an artificial organ that could feel pain, but with no brain attached to it. The organ receiving the pain would be structured exactly like any part of a human body that can feel pain. The question is, would there be something there to experience that pain, (although it wouldn't know that pain is "bad," having no brain) or would the subjective experience of pain not exist for that organ?

Yet a simpler way of asking the question is to ask: is a brain required to have a subjective experience, or does anything that "feels" in any way automatically have a subjective experience??

Hopefully I made this coherent enough to understand. It is hard for me to put these concepts into words. Please let me know if anything needs to be clarified.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

"Simple consciousness" in the manner you describe it makes no sense. Consciousness is demonstrable a product of the brain, without a brain their is no consciousness. It does not continue to exist without perception.

On the other hand "complex consciousness" in the manner you describe is a good description of consciousness as we currently understand it with the exception of the part where you speculate that if two identical copies were made they would share one consciousness; no, they would have two identical minds that with each passing moment are becoming different. Regarding changes in consciousness over time see the Ship of Theseus. Regarding an artificial organ that can feel pain with no brain see Philosophical Zombie.

 

[GladScientist]

Make it simple and suppose the Star Trek teleporter works likes it's supposed to, destroys you and makes a copy 15 feet away. Is that still you? You said that two copies do not share a consciousness, so I imagine you think the copy would not be you. But if consciousness is complex and thus a result of your brain being in the physical state that it's in, what's the difference between you and your copy? There simply is none.

How is it any different than if you had just walked that 15 feet rather than being destroyed and reconstructed?

I just don't understand how two perfectly identical brains can have two different "subjective experiencers" if "subjective experience" is the result of the brain being a certain way.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

Make it simple and suppose the Star Trek teleporter works likes it's supposed to, destroys you and makes a copy 15 feet away. Is that still you? You said that two copies do not share a consciousness, so I imagine you think the copy would not be you. But if consciousness is complex and thus a result of your brain being in the physical state that it's in, what's the difference between you and your copy? There simply is none.

The problem here is the philosophy of identity. We don't have an everyday definition that can adequately cope with these situations. I would argue that a perfect copy of me is me in every way that matters, if the original copy isn't destroyed then there is simply two mes.

I just don't understand how two perfectly identical brains can have two different "subjective experiencers" if "subjective experience" is the result of the brain being a certain way.

Why not? Two identical computers can run two identical pieces of software but they aren't linked in any way are they?

 

[pftest]

I think that consciousness in the brain is complex, because the brain is complex. And just like the brain has simpler predecessors, so does consciousness. So the answer to your question would be that consciousness can be very complex but also very simple.

I do not think it makes sense to view consciousness only as complexity, because the very term complex implies there is a simpler version. Complexity without a simpler version is like hot temperatures without the possibility of cold temperatures.

 

[GladScientist]

@Ryan: So if the machine doesn't destroy the original and there are two yous, in which one do you experience the continuation of your existence? In the original, right?

But what if it DOES destroy the original? Then you experience the continuation of your existence in the copy? It can't be both ways.

And that's why I earlier argued that you would experience your continuation in both vessels; although each would not be aware of the other's existence.

It seems you've somewhat contradicted yourself because at first you said that two copies do not share a consciousness, but then say that two copies would be the same "you."

And to be clear I'm not disagreeing with anything you're saying, I'm simply posing questions as they come to me.

@pftest: I use the words "simple" and "complex" merely to describe how I view the two possibilities. What I call simple consciousness would be that it is inherent and basic (like empty space), whereas complex consciousness involves a bunch of specific neuroscientific processes that no one fully understands.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

So if the machine doesn't destroy the original and there are two yous, in which one do you experience the continuation of your existence? In the original, right?

But what if it DOES destroy the original? Then you experience the continuation of your existence in the copy? It can't be both ways.

And that's why I earlier argued that you would experience your continuation in both vessels; although each would not be aware of the other's existence.

It seems you've somewhat contradicted yourself because at first you said that two copies do not share a consciousness, but then say that two copies would be the same "you."

And to be clear I'm not disagreeing with anything you're saying, I'm simply posing questions as they come to me.

All these points can be addressed with what I said above. The problem is a weak definition of identity that we use every day.

Yes I would argue that a perfect copy is "me" in every way that matters and that there would be two "mes" who from the moment of construction would go on to be separate people. I haven't made a contradiction. Regarding continuity both of us would perceive it. If the original body steps into the copying machine then from his perspective he has entered a machine and then left it. Say the copy comes out of a machine on the other side of the room then from his perspective he has entered a machine and then instantly been teleported to another where he then exited.

It really depends on if you think the first body has any intrinsic value of identity over the identical second.

 

[GladScientist]

So if the machine destroys the original you AND makes TWO copies in different locations;

You could say that, from your point of view, you have a 50% chance of waking up at at A and a 50% chance of waking up at B,

Or you could say that you have a 100% chance of being placed at both A and B,

And both of these would be correct? Because either of them would feel as though they were continuing the path of the original self.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

So if the machine destroys the original you AND makes TWO copies in different locations;

You could say that, from your point of view, you have a 50% chance of waking up at at A and a 50% chance of waking up at B,

Or you could say that you have a 100% chance of being placed at both A and B,

And both of these would be correct? Because either of them would feel as though they were continuing the path of the original self.

Yes to the first no to the second. Yes because from the point of view of stepping into the machine you know that you are either going to experience stepping out of the same one or the copier. No because after the copying there are two "you" so "you" don't have 100% chance of being in both.

Incidentally you may want to look up the philosopher John Hicks' replica thought experiment. It deals with this very topic.

 

[Maui]

Both mind and matter emerge from the brain(as far as we can tell at this point) and there is hardly any philosophical duality to their nature as they are just formal mental abstractions. Some people believe mind is less real than matter, while some believe mind is real and matter isn't real. IMO they both fail to embrace the abstract nature of the mental represenations generated by the brain that people refer to as 'world' or 'mind'. There is hardly ever going to be a winner in these debates, as they are talking about the same thing - a non-local, non-real but realistic looking mental abstraction.
The big question is - what is existence?

 

[PlayingMonk]

So if the machine destroys the original you AND makes TWO copies in different locations;

You could say that, from your point of view, you have a 50% chance of waking up at at A and a 50% chance of waking up at B,

Or you could say that you have a 100% chance of being placed at both A and B,

And both of these would be correct? Because either of them would feel as though they were continuing the path of the original self.

Why would you "wake up" in either location? If the machine destroys you then doesn't that end your consciousness? I think both of the copies will think they are you and have all your memories up to that point but I don't see how your consciousness would continue in either one.

 

[Pythagorean]

It's an interesting scenario. We can theoretically make as many copies as we like and start hundreds of "yous" off at your current point by arranging the same type of matter in the same type of ways, but there's seemingly no way to transfer actual you without destroying you, so each new "you" is now independent and stuck in their respective matter, just like you.

It suggests that you are an information entity. And if the information is destroyed, the entity is destroyed; making a new "instance" of that information makes a completely new entity. It's reminiscent of classes vs. objects in object-oriented programming. The blueprint of the information is a class, but the actual implementation of that blueprint is the object, and each object is a unique and continuous instance of the blueprint. I.e. the list of geometric coordinates that describe the particles is not the same thing as the actual physical geometric arrangement of the particles.

 

[apeiron]

So if the machine destroys the original you AND makes TWO copies in different locations;

You could say that, from your point of view, you have a 50% chance of waking up at at A and a 50% chance of waking up at B,

Or you could say that you have a 100% chance of being placed at both A and B,

And both of these would be correct? Because either of them would feel as though they were continuing the path of the original self.

They would not even be replica consciousnesses because, being at different locations, they would be experiencing different views of the world.

And presuming that one copy gets recreated in the same spot, the other ends up suddenly somewhere else, then the one that stayed in the same spot would have the most reason to think "nothing happened" and so that it was "the real one". The other would find itself suddenly somewhere else. And if it knew about transporter technology, might even have a strong suspicion that it was now just a duplicate.

There is a big philosophical literature on the identity question. The same subject was raised just a few threads back - https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=608199

The Ship of Theseus is indeed very relevant to the discussion as neurons, like any other cells, are subject to molecular turnover and are constantly remaking themselves.

The half-life of a basic building block molecule like tubulin is about 10 minutes. The actin filaments in dendrites are being replaced by the minute. So the brain you had yesterday is made of a substantially different collection of atoms than it was today. Though because the arrangement is relatively preserved, you are still "you".

You go to sleep. You wake up. And critical elements of your neurons like the post synaptic densities will have been recycled maybe six or seven times. Nature already conducts this transporter experiment you could say.

Because this points the finger at the information, at the arrangement of the brain rather than its substance, you can see why the case for "complex" is taken as read. Your brain has the complexity, your leg doesn't.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

Your brain has the complexity, your leg doesn't.

I wouldn't go that far. Every part of the body is incredibly complex with multiple interacting tissue types.

 

[KiwiKid]

"Simple consciousness" in the manner you describe it makes no sense. Consciousness is demonstrable a product of the brain, without a brain their is no consciousness. It does not continue to exist without perception.

To play devil's advocate for a moment, by that logic a radio produces its own music. After all, without a [radio] there is no [music].

 

[apeiron]

I wouldn't go that far. Every part of the body is incredibly complex with multiple interacting tissue types.

If you are in the mood to nit-pick, then perhaps you might supply some evidence that the complexity of the brain and the complexity of a limb are even in the same ball park.

 

[apeiron]

George Bernard Shaw joked about it a century ago...

Physiologists inform us that the substance of our bodies (and
consequently of our souls) is shed and renewed at such a rate that no
part of us lasts longer than eight years: I am therefore not now in any
atom of me the person who wrote The Irrational Knot in 1880. The last
of that author perished in 1888; and two of his successors have since
joined the majority. Fourth of his line, I cannot be expected to take
any very lively interest in the novels of my literary great-grandfather.

http://www.online-literature.com/george_bernard_shaw/irrational-knot/0/

 

[Ryan_m_b]

If you are in the mood to nit-pick, then perhaps you might supply some evidence that the complexity of the brain and the complexity of a limb are even in the same ball park.

By what metric are you suggesting the brain is so much more complex?

 

[apeiron]

By what metric are you suggesting the brain is so much more complex?

You are making an issue of it, so you supply the evidence.

I never said that "life" was not complex. Just that "mind" is of another order of complexity.

But if you are now struggling to back up your nit-picking, or worse still, now actually claiming that legs and brains are of the same order of complexity, then try the metric of negentropy.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

You are making an issue of it, so you supply the evidence.

You and I have different definitions of issue. Apparently for you a pleasant query in a discussion means one is making an issue out of something.

I never said that "life" was not complex. Just that "mind" is of another order of complexity.

But if you are now struggling to back up your nit-picking, or worse still, now actually claiming that legs and brains are of the same order of complexity, then try the metric of negentropy.

Apeiron: chill out. It's pretty hard to have an enjoyable discussion if you are going to act in a passive aggressive/insulting manner.

I'm not claiming anything, I don't have a firm position. I was highlighting you claim that the brain is far more complex than a leg by suggesting that personally I wouldn't say that. Reason being the increased number and diversity of tissue types found in a limb over just the brain. I'm unaware of the MoN, perhaps you could explain it.

 

[Number Nine]

To play devil's advocate for a moment, by that logic a radio produces its own music. After all, without a [radio] there is no [music].

Music continues to exist without radio.

The range of Human experience that can be attributed to "the Universe" is rapidly shrinking. Does consciousness encompass memory? Does it encompass learning? Reasoning? The brain is already entirely responsible for these processes. How do we know? Because we can construct biophysically realistic models of the brain (I'm working on one right now), and when we do, we get these things for free. Things like memory emerge automatically whenever we build something that behaves like the brain. This whole line of argument reeks of ID style God of the gaps reasoning.

 

[apeiron]

You and I have different definitions of issue. Apparently for you a pleasant query in a discussion means one is making an issue out of something.

There was no question. You simply stated that "you would not go so far as that."

When all I had done was agree with Pythagorean and others in the thread that the arrangement, the information, was the critical issue.

So can you supply sources to show a) that legs actually do have a greater diversity of tissue types than brains, and b) that that would be valid metric of complexity?

I doubt both, but especially b. In my opinion, complexity is not merely differentiation but also integration. Brain clearly wins there. And complexity is not merely structure but also dynamics. Again the brain clearly wins.

 

[Pythagorean]

I am aware of no such calculation between limb and brain of the negentropy, but I would assume Ryan is mostly right. The negentropy of ANY living animal tissue is going to demonstrate magnitudes of complexity over non living tissue. Comparison between tissues (brain vs limb) aren't going to share the same disparity.

The brain is just one organ. A limb is several interacting organs. And consder the immune system alone (that doesn't exist in the brain; the brain has a simpler immune system since it has a blood-brain barrier to do a lot of the work) but the limbs are under constant exposure to immune threat.

It really is a nontrivial question of which is more complex.

 

[Number Nine]

I am aware of no such calculation between limb and brain of the negentropy, but I would assume Ryan is mostly right. The negentropy of ANY living animal tissue is going to demonstrate magnitudes of complexity over non living tissue. Comparison between tissues (brain vs limb) aren't going to share the same disparity.

The brain is just one organ. A limb is several interacting organs. And consder the immune system alone (that doesn't exist in the brain; the brain has a simpler immune system since it has a blood-brain barrier to do a lot of the work) but the limbs are under constant exposure to immune threat.

It really is a nontrivial question of which is more complex.

It may be more accurate to say the the information processing capabilities of the brain are considerably more advanced ("complexity" is fairly vague term...though I would still argue that the brain is orders of magnitude more complex than a limb for almost any conceivable definition of complexity).

 

[Ryan_m_b]

There was no question. You simply stated that "you would not go so far as that."

Then perhaps we're facing a misunderstanding of language. I wasn't claiming you were wrong, I was suggesting that I wouldn't necessarily agree.

When all I had done was agree with Pythagorean and others in the thread that the arrangement, the information, was the critical issue.

It seems looking at Pythagorean's post immediately above that you and he aren't in agreement.

So can you supply sources to show a) that legs actually do have a greater diversity of tissue types than brains, and b) that that would be valid metric of complexity?

Regarding A, I'm not 100% sure (and never claimed to be) but the various anatomy modules I have taken over the years indicate to me that this is the case. Limbs contain a multitude of organs and tissue types such as vasculature, lymphatic system, musculoskeletal system, peripheral nervous system, various layers of skin etc etc. I'm not going to bother quoting chunks of anatomy books at you but if I do find something short and simple confirming it I'll be sure to post.

I doubt both, but especially b. In my opinion, complexity is not merely differentiation but also integration. Brain clearly wins there. And complexity is not merely structure but also dynamics. Again the brain clearly wins.

Why is the brain more integrated or more dynamic than a limb?

 

[pftest]

Music continues to exist without radio.

The range of Human experience that can be attributed to "the Universe" is rapidly shrinking.

I disagree, virtually everything about the human body can be attributed to the universe. The electrons, particles, spacetime, the four interactions, the way they behave (by universal laws), etc. The human brain really isn't as special as we'd like it to be.

And let's look and what a radio does physically. It receives EM waves and outputs airwaves. Neither EM waves nor airwaves originate in or are limited to radios, so yes they continue to exist without, and have existed long before radios.

Does consciousness encompass memory? Does it encompass learning? Reasoning? The brain is already entirely responsible for these processes. How do we know? Because we can construct biophysically realistic models of the brain (I'm working on one right now), and when we do, we get these things for free. Things like memory emerge automatically whenever we build something that behaves like the brain. This whole line of argument reeks of ID style God of the gaps reasoning.

Some scientists think that even microbes have memory. And even that would be an arbitrary definition of the word. A rock that gets cracked might be considered having memory just as well. Emergence is a problematic concept, unless it simply refers to increasing levels of complexity, which is what can be readily observed throughout nature. So if we want to talk about the emergence of memory, it would be that of simple memory getting more complex. Memory popping up just in brains does not fit the type of emergence that nature offers.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

To play devil's advocate for a moment, by that logic a radio produces its own music. After all, without a [radio] there is no [music].

I don't understand what you mean. A radio detects radiowaves and converts them into sound, a brain generates a mind internally.

 

[apeiron]

I am aware of no such calculation between limb and brain of the negentropy, but I would assume Ryan is mostly right. The negentropy of ANY living animal tissue is going to demonstrate magnitudes of complexity over non living tissue. Comparison between tissues (brain vs limb) aren't going to share the same disparity.

Just compare the resting metabolic rate of the two for starters. Brain's is 200x that of muscle. And dissipation is payment for maintaining organisation.

 

[pftest]

Just compare the resting metabolic rate of the two for starters. Brain's is 200x that of muscle. And dissipation is payment for maintaining organisation.

Do the both of you agree that the differences between brains and limbs are quantitative?

 

[Pythagorean]

When all I had done was agree with Pythagorean and others in the thread that the arrangement, the information, was the critical issue.

It seems looking at Pythagorean's post immediately above that you and he aren't in agreement.

I agree with apeiron's statement about arrangement/information. But I think there's plenty of that going on in limbs too. The core genetic operations are really quite complex on their own. I think we all might be having very different connotaitons in mind though for words like "complexity" and "information".

I suspect apeiron is focusing more on types of information available to consciousness, where you and I are thinking more generally of the arrangement and operations of particles. I specifically think of Kolmogorov's analyses.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

The core genetic operations are really quite complex on their own. I think we all might be having very different connotaitons in mind though for words like "complexity" and "information"...you and I are thinking more generally of the arrangement and operations of particles.

I agree with this analysis.

 

[Pythagorean]

Just compare the resting metabolic rate of the two for starters. Brain's is 200x that of muscle. And dissipation is payment for maintaining organisation.

More energy is not always more complexity. Especially in a dispersive system where the foot is on the gas and the break at the same time.

 

[Number Nine]

Do the both of you agree that the differences between brains and limbs are quantitative?

That doesn't seem to me to be a defensible position. Almost any cellular or genetic process that occurs in the foot occurs in the head, so the differences we're looking for are large scale, emergent properties of tissues and cellular networks. Most of these (e.g. blood flow) occur in both the brain and the foot, so we're left with the fact that the brain performs large scale parallel, distributed information processing, whereas the foot does...what? Incredibly fine and detailed muscle contractions, yes, that are programmed by the brain. The statistical procedures performed the brain alone would fill many a textbook, each with fairly sophisticated mathematical prerequisites. Did you know that an ensemble of neurons, each experiencing Hebbian synaptic changes, can perform principal component analysis? Your brain is literally deriving optimal basis vectors to best express the information fed to it by the outside world.

 

[Pythagorean]

Almost any cellular or genetic process that occurs in the foot occurs in the head

That't not correct. The foots has bone and skin for starters.

The brain takes no part in decisions on:
how to grow bones so that they'll support the structure
how to align muscles right
regulate and respond locally to environmental signals

I'm sure someone more experienced directly in biology could come up with thousands more of organized processes that don't require a brian. Cellular metabolic and genetic signaling is really quite complex, especially between such diverse cells as skin, bone, muscle, and blood. The brain is one organ with a relatively tight diversity of cells compared to a limb (which consists of several different organs and many more types of cell differentiations).

 

[apeiron]

I agree with this analysis.

Let's get it clear. Are you claiming that legs and brains are of equal complexity?

If so, how are you defining complexity?

And then what sources are there that show by your chosen measure that the complexity is in fact equivalent.