* The nature of subjective experience, or 'qualia'- our 'inner life' (Chalmers' "hard problem");
* Binding of spatially distributed brain activities into unitary objects in vision, and a coherent sense of self, or 'oneness';
* Transition from pre-conscious processes to consciousness itself;
* Non-computability, or the notion that consciousness involves a factor which is neither random, nor algorithmic, and that consciousness cannot be simulated (Penrose, 1989, 1994, 1997);
* Free will; and,
* Subjective time flow.
There are, arguable, perfectly tenable non dual explanations for all of those points. For instance, Dennett denies qualia, rejects any notion of a Cartesian theater (leads to an infinite regress), holds that cognition is an emergent property, does not agree that cognition is non-computational, that compatibilist freedom is fully compatible with determinism. The last point is too vague for me to address.
I will ask my general purpose questions for the dualist perspective and see if anyone care to discuss these from a dualist stand point. I would be very interesting how a dualist would respond to these.
If the mind is not the brain, then
- Why is there a correlation between brain damage and impaired cognitive functions?
- Why is there a correlation between chemical imbalances and impaired cognitive functions?
- Why is there a correlation between drug use and impaired cognitive functions?
- Why is there a correlation between complexity of the brain and complexity of the mind in the animal kingdom?
- How does the immaterial part of cognition interact with the material part? Anything that can interact with something material must surely be material by definition.
- Why did human evolution select for large, messy, and vulnerable brains? If that which we really do is determined by a Cartesian style ghost in the machine, then there is no evolutionary rationale for these sort of brains.
- Why does the brain appear to be modular?
- When and how in the evolutionary history of the human brain did it become dual? Most dualists do not hold that the other great apes or, say, amniotes, are dual in this way. Why?
etc.
It seems to me that these questions are very difficult to answer from the dualist perspective. It also seems that dualism is a minority position among cognitive scientists and that a lot of scientists who are uncomfortable with a non-dual explanation is really looking for a skyhook (An explanation of design complexity in the universe that does not build on lower, simpler layers). Obviously, this last part is an heavily biased interpretation in favor of some sort of mind-brain identity explanation.