Is it possible for all truths to be known?

[alt]

It's easy. As a simple example, if I have a standard deck of cards, I know exactly one of the following statements is a truth:

• The first card is the ace of spades
• The second card is the ace of spades
• The third card is the ace of spades
• ...

And yet, I cannot identify any particular statement as being a truth.

Having set up the initial finite alternatives (standard deck) of course one of them is the ace of spades. There is nothing, no unknown truth here. You'll know it in up to 52 guesses. Similarly, I could make, say, 50,000 guesses about the number of hairs on Obamas head, and I'm sure I'd get it right.

If I didn't know the deck was standard, there is still exactly one truth among those statements, but I wouldn't even know that!

If you didn't know the deck was standard, how would you know if it contained an ace of spades ?

 

[alt]

And I told you, feel free to substitute "it was possible" for "it is possible".

I did - again, you said;

The conclusion to this 'paradox' is that "it is possible that Benjamin Franklin did not invent bifocals."

Wrong conclusion. It WAS possible that BF did not or would not invent bifocals (before he did so) but when he did invent bi focals, he invented them.

Therefore, it is now IMPOSSIBLE that BF did not invent bifocals.

Glad we got that sorted.

Next !

 

[alt]

Sorry, If I missed something by not following the whole thread. But the thread looks like cycling around anyways. :)

Good, enough assumption, I accept that.

Re-writing: Q = "There exist some truth P, which is unknown to you (but may be know to others". If this Re-writing is allowed, then
Q, just repeats our assumption. So, it must be true. (Because, Assumption means we take it to be true for granted)

Well, Q = Our assumption. We got to know our assumption when working on a problem, don't we? :)

Well, it was assumed, so we have been knowing it all way along.

If I knew my assumption (which is what you are referring by the word 'that'), I would know that there exist some truth P, which is unknown to me. I would know nothing whatsoever about what the truth exactly is.
I can't understand how you jumped to the conclusion that P is known to me? The only thing known to me is my assumption, which states that there exist some truth P, which is unknown to me.
To my knowledge, P is just an unknown variable (like the x in algebra). I am yet to solve the puzzle and find out what particular truth P contains.

I am not a philosophy student, but just sometimes get interested in such things.

Underlined .. yep - that's part of what I've been trying to say all along. I think it arises from a degree of word play.

 

[Office_Shredder]

Having set up the initial finite alternatives (standard deck) of course one of them is the ace of spades. There is nothing, no unknown truth here. You'll know it in up to 52 guesses. Similarly, I could make, say, 50,000 guesses about the number of hairs on Obamas head, and I'm sure I'd get it right.

You're interchanging "asserting P to be true" with "knowing P to be true" here

 

[lugita15]

Sorry, If I missed something by not following the whole thread. But the thread looks like cycling around anyways. :)

Good, enough assumption, I accept that.

Re-writing: Q = "There exist some truth P, which is unknown to you (but may be know to others". If this Re-writing is allowed, then
Q, just repeats our assumption. So, it must be true. (Because, Assumption means we take it to be true for granted)

Well, Q = Our assumption. We got to know our assumption when working on a problem, don't we? :)

Well, it was assumed, so we have been knowing it all way along.

If I knew my assumption (which is what you are referring by the word 'that'), I would know that there exist some truth P, which is unknown to me. I would know nothing whatsoever about what the truth exactly is.
I can't understand how you jumped to the conclusion that P is known to me? The only thing known to me is my assumption, which states that there exist some truth P, which is unknown to me.
To my knowledge, P is just an unknown variable (like the x in algebra). I am yet to solve the puzzle and find out what particular truth P contains.

I am not a philosophy student, but just sometimes get interested in such things.

Sorry, a lot of your confusion is because I didn't word things well enough. The "you" that I'm discussing the argument with is different from the "you" whose knowledge we're discussing. So instead of using "you", let me call the individual John, and let me restate the argument in that way.

Assume that the truth P is unknown to John. Let Q be the statement "P is a truth unknown to John." The question is, is Q knowable by John? Well, suppose Q were known to John. Then John would know that P is a truth unknown to him. But if he knew that P is a truth, that's the same as knowing P. So he would know P and he would know that P is a truth unknown to him. But if he knew P, then it would be incorrect to say that P is a truth unknown to him, so Q would be false, and you can't know a false statement. Thus from the supposition that Q were known to John we get a contradiction, so it must be impossible for John to know Q. Hence Q is a truth unknowable by John, and therefore not all truths are knowable to John. Now do you get it?

 

[lugita15]

I still maintain that I do not believe there is such a thing as an unkown truth - at least if not reduced to the absurd. I'm not deliberatley being obstinate about this - I really haven't seen any proof of any unknown truth here. Will try to address Hurkyl's post soon.

You literally don't think there are any true statements that are unknown? Don't you think the results of the 2016 US Presidential election are unknown? When you flip a coin in the air, don't you think it's unknown which side it will land on?

 

[lugita15]

Having set up the initial finite alternatives (standard deck) of course one of them is the ace of spades. There is nothing, no unknown truth here. You'll know it in up to 52 guesses. Similarly, I could make, say, 50,000 guesses about the number of hairs on Obamas head, and I'm sure I'd get it right.

Perhaps you'll know it after you check each one of your 52 guesses, but do you agree that right when your handed the deck you don't know which place the Ace of Spades is? So if the Ace of Spades is in the 10th place, then at that moment wouldn't "The Ace of Spades is in the 10th place" be an unknown truth?

 

[lugita15]

I did - again, you said;

The conclusion to this 'paradox' is that "it is possible that Benjamin Franklin did not invent bifocals."

Wrong conclusion. It WAS possible that BF did not or would not invent bifocals (before he did so) but when he did invent bi focals, he invented them.

Therefore, it is now IMPOSSIBLE that BF did not invent bifocals.

How many times do I have to say this? You can change "it is possible" to "it was possible" if you want. That's not the important part of the logic. Let me change it myself, so there's no confusion.

Benjamin Franklin invented the bifocals. But we can imagine alternative histories, so we can say "It was possible for Ben Franklin to not have been the inventor of bifocals". And for any person X, we can say "It was possible for X to not have been the inventor of bifocals." For instance, X can be "William Shakespeare" or "The inventor of special relativity" or "The eighth president of the United States", etc. Thus we can let X = "the inventor of bifocals" and thus we reach the conclusion "It was possible for the inventor of the bifocals to not have been to inventor of the bifocals." But that seems absurd, because obviously the inventor of bifocals had to be the inventor of bifocals. How can you have the inventor of bifocals not be the inventor of bifocals?

Now do you understand the paradox?

 

[Office_Shredder]

My gut feeling says that the resolution of the paradox is that the bifocals don't have to be invented, so assuming there is an inventor is a fallacy. However the way that it's worded makes the whole premise absurd

If the statement "it was possible for the inventor of the bifocals to not invent the bifocals" is a paradox, then the statement "it was possible for Benjamin Franklin to not invent the bifocals" is the exact same paradox, because Benjamin Franklin IS the inventor of the bifocals (so you can freely substitute 'inventor of the bifocals' for him).

 

[Hurkyl]

"The inventor of bifocals" is a well-defined^* 'variable constant'.

The informal argument that "it is not necessary that X invented bifocals" makes critical use of X being a non-'variable' constant. Roughly speaking, it boils down to observing "X does not vary with 'the inventor of bifocals'", and therefore it is possible for "X" and "the inventor of bifocals" to be different.

The argument, of course, doesn't work if X is a constant that does vary along with 'the inventor of bifocals'.*: Ignoring the technicalities of whether there is an inventor and it is unique

 

[lugita15]

"The inventor of bifocals" is a well-defined^* 'variable constant'.

The informal argument that "it is not necessary that X invented bifocals" makes critical use of X being a non-'variable' constant. Roughly speaking, it boils down to observing "X does not vary with 'the inventor of bifocals'", and therefore it is possible for "X" and "the inventor of bifocals" to be different.

The argument, of course, doesn't work if X is a constant that does vary along with 'the inventor of bifocals'.

Congratulations Hurkyl, you solved it! The technical way to say this is that in modal logic, you can only freely subsitute "rigid designators" into the modal operators.

 

[alt]

Sorry, a lot of your confusion is because I didn't word things well enough. The "you" that I'm discussing the argument with is different from the "you" whose knowledge we're discussing. So instead of using "you", let me call the individual John, and let me restate the argument in that way.

Assume that the truth P is unknown to John. Let Q be the statement "P is a truth unknown to John." The question is, is Q knowable by John? Well, suppose Q were known to John. Then John would know that P is a truth unknown to him. But if he knew that P is a truth, that's the same as knowing P. So he would know P and he would know that P is a truth unknown to him. But if he knew P, then it would be incorrect to say that P is a truth unknown to him, so Q would be false, and you can't know a false statement. Thus from the supposition that Q were known to John we get a contradiction, so it must be impossible for John to know Q. Hence Q is a truth unknowable by John, and therefore not all truths are knowable to John. Now do you get it?

No .. I gets me P's & Q's mixed up. Can you try it again with a real example ?

Will read the rest of your posts soon. All look very interesting and worthwile, mind.

 

[lugita15]

No .. I gets me P's & Q's mixed up. Can you try it again with a real example ?

Sure. John's coat is in his closet, but he doesn't know it. So "the coat is in the closet", which we'll call P, is a truth unknown to John. So let Q="P is a truth unknown to John". Then Q is certainly a true statement, because in fact P IS a truth unknown to John. With me so far?

Now the question, is Q knowable by John? Well, that's the same asking, can John know that P is a truth unknown to John? And more concretely, that's the same as asking, can John know that the statement that the coat is in the closet is a truth unknown to him? Or equivalently, can John know that it is true that the coat is in the closet and know that the statement that the coat is in the closet is unknown to him? Or in other words, can John know that the coat is in the closet and know that he does not know that the coat is in the closet? And the answer to the last rephrasing of the question is obviously No, because if he knew the coat was in the closet, then it would be wrong to say that he does not know that the coat is in the closet, so the statement "John does not know that the coat is in the closet" is false, and it's impossible to know a false statement. Thus the answer to the initial question, is Q knowable by John, is also No. So not all truths are knowable by John.

When I write it out like that in words, I'm afraid it will sound too confusing, which is why I wrote it using lots of P's and Q's before. I hope this helps.

 

[I_am_learning]

hi lugita,
Thanks for the clarification.
Lets assume john doesn't know sun rises in the east.
Now , can john know that "he doesn't know that sun rises in the east"?
No. Because that is a paradoxical sentence. Ah! I see it now.
P = Sun rises in east.
Q = I/jhon don't know P.
Jhon don't know thousands of truth. He may know lot of them later. But for now Q is truth. Suppose Jhon searches really hard to know all truths. He may eventually know P but not Q because knowing P (or trying to know Q) makes Q false.
So Q will rather be destroyed than being known to john.
But jhon may know R = "Q was a truth."
But its not same as knowing Q.
Things are making sense. So, where is the paradox?

 

[lugita15]

hi lugita,
Thanks for the clarification.
Lets assume john doesn't know sun rises in the east.
Now , can john know that "he doesn't know that sun rises in the east"?
No. Because that is a paradoxical sentence. Ah! I see it now.
P = Sun rises in east.
Q = I/jhon don't know P.
Jhon don't know thousands of truth. He may know lot of them later. But for now Q is truth. Suppose Jhon searches really hard to know all truths. He may eventually know P but not Q because knowing P (or trying to know Q) makes Q false.
So Q will rather be destroyed than being known to john.

Exactly, you see the solution! By knowing P, John makes Q false, so he cannot know that Q is true, because it's not. But he can know that Q is false. So the only reason Fitch's paradox says there are unknowable truths is that there are some truths that become false as soon as you find out their truth value, so you can never know them to be true, but you can know them to be false.

If you look at my post #33, you'll see that I discussed exactly this resolution to Fitch's paradox. See the attached paper by Joseph Melia in that post.

 

[alt]

You literally don't think there are any true statements that are unknown? Don't you think the results of the 2016 US Presidential election are unknown? When you flip a coin in the air, don't you think it's unknown which side it will land on?

Earlier in a post you said;
People use fantastical examples to illustrate logical or philosophical points all the time.

Very well. Let's do a bit of that.

The election might never happen as you think it would. The anarchist party might take over, or any other political upheaval might occur that would prevent them.
(In fact, this is not nearly so fantastical)

The coin might fall down a drain in the pavement - or any other similar possibility.
(Not too fantastical, either)

The ace of clubs - before you examined the deck, it might be vapourized by some explosion - imagine you were in the Twin Towers just as you were about to examine it.
(A little more fantastical, but hey, I'm no 911 denier)

All above three, therefore, cannot be called unknown truths with 100% certainty.

I still maintain that 'unknown truth' is an oxymoron - to the one observer.

Sure, my 2 year old niece doesn't know I have a 4 litre motor in my car, but if we go down that path, we are again skating on the trivial, which I can reduce to absurd infinities - as discussed earlier.

 

[alt]

Perhaps you'll know it after you check each one of your 52 guesses, but do you agree that right when your handed the deck you don't know which place the Ace of Spades is? So if the Ace of Spades is in the 10th place, then at that moment wouldn't "The Ace of Spades is in the 10th place" be an unknown truth?

See my above post.

 

[alt]

Sure. John's coat is in his closet, but he doesn't know it ..

But you do, in order to make the statement. Therefore, it is a known truth, and all John has to do is ask you.

But to use another fantastical example to illustrate a logical point - as you have allowed earlier, it might not even be there when he opens the closet. Someone might have stolen it. Or the cat might have pulled it through a crack in the floor. So YOU might even be wrong in your assumption of a KNOW truth, never mind Johns unknown truth.

 

[lugita15]

Earlier in a post you said;
People use fantastical examples to illustrate logical or philosophical points all the time.

And I meant it.

Very well. Let's do a bit of that.

All right, but I don't see what logical or philosophical point you're trying to illustrate.

The election might never happen as you think it would. The anarchist party might take over, or any other political upheaval might occur that would prevent them.

Yes, all of these are possible. But isn't it still true that either "Barack Obama will win the 2016 US Presidential Election" or "Barack Obama will not win the 2016 US Presidential Election" is an unknown truth?

The coin might fall down a drain in the pavement - or any other similar possibility.

Yes, but isn't it still true that either "the coin landed heads" or "the coin did not land heads" is an unknown truth?

The ace of clubs - before you examined the deck, it might be vapourized by some explosion - imagine you were in the Twin Towers just as you were about to examine it.

OK, but either "the Ace of Clubs was the 10th card in the deck" or "the Ace of Clubs was not the 10th card in the deck" was an unknown truth, correct?

All above three, therefore, cannot be called unknown truths with 100% certainty.

I'm not saying that there is a particular statement that we know to be an unknown truth. All I'm talking about is whether we know that there EXISTS an unknown truth. Don't you think "The Earth goes around the Sun" was an unknown truth in ancient times? Don't you think the Pythagorean theorem was an unknown truth in even more ancient times? Don't you think there are similar truths unknown to us, both trivial and profound?

And by the way, we are discussing logic, where truths both trivial and profound are treated on equal footing.

I still maintain that 'unknown truth' is an oxymoron - to the one observer.

To say "No truths are unknown" is the same as saying "all truths are known". Do you really believe that all truths are known, i.e. we are omniscient?

Sure, my 2 year old niece doesn't know I have a 4 litre motor in my car, but if we go down that path, we are again skating on the trivial, which I can reduce to absurd infinities - as discussed earlier.

The example of your niece is a perfectly good one. I don't know why you dismiss things for being trivial. What's wrong with trivial examples, fantastical examples, sensible-sounding examples, or anything else. In logic we talk about all kinds of examples.

And I still think what you're saying about "reducing to absurd infinities" makes no sense. Yes, we can find infinitely many examples of unknown truths, but so what? Just because we can find infinitely many examples of some notion does not mean that there is something wrong with the notion, does it? We can find infinitely many examples of truths, so does truth not make sense? We can find infinitely many examples of falsehoods, so does falsehood not make sense? We can find infinitely many examples of English sentence, so does English not make sense? We can find infinitely many examples of prime numbers, so do prime numbers not make sense?

 

[lugita15]

But you do, in order to make the statement.

Count me out of it. I don't know that there's a coat in the closet. I'm just supposing that "the coat is in the closet" is an unknown true statement, and I am deducing the consequences of that assumption.

Therefore, it is a known truth, and all John has to do is ask you.

First of all, the "John" formulation of Fitch's paradox is a restricted version of the paradox I made up to satisfy disregardthat's objections earlier in the thread. The point of this restricted version is just to prove that "not all truths are knowable by John". So the assumption for this restricted version is just "there exists a truth unknown to John", not the more general assumption "there exists an unknown truth". So even it was known to me that the coat is in the closet, it would still be unknown to John, which is what's relevant.

But in the more general version of the paradox, the statement we're proving is "there is an unknowable truth" and the assumption is "there is an unknown truth". So in that case the truth can still be "the coat is in the closet", but this time no one knows this.

But to use another fantastical example to illustrate a logical point - as you have allowed earlier, it might not even be there when he opens the closet. Someone might have stolen it. Or the cat might have pulled it through a crack in the floor.

Sure, but when the coat was in the closet, wasn't it an unknown truth that the coat was in the closet?

So YOU might even be wrong in your assumption of a KNOW truth, never mind Johns unknown truth.

Sure I may be wrong that the coat is in the closet. But assuming it is in the closet, that is a truth is unknown to John, and assuming it's not in the closet, THAT is a truth unknown to John. Either way, isn't there a truth unknown to John?

But let me go to the very first example of an unknown truth I presented in this thread: either the Riemann hypothesis (see here) is true or it is false. Either way, isn't one of these statements an unknown truth?

By the way, have you read the paper by Joseph Melia I attached in post #33?

 

[alt]

Lugita 15 - In your first post in this thread, you said;

we started with the hypothesis that P is an unknown truth

I replied that the hypothesis was flawed form the start - how would you know it's a truth if it's unknown ?

Since then, we've basically danced around this issue and not made much progress. I summarise my view thus - the phrase "unknown truth" is an oxymoron.

I haven't even addressed Fitch's so called paradox to any degree, because in my view, as it is based on an oxymoron, any non-sense could flow from it.

You sought to take it to another language - symbolic or whatever. I haven't followed you down that path, because firstly, I think that we should be able to resolve it or any other matter in the normal, modern English language, and secondly, because I am unfamiliar with the symbolic language to which you have repeatedly referred.

To this you replied that English can be ambiguous. I fully agree. But it can also be, and must in fact have the capacity to be, very specific and precise. So why prefer or defer to it's ambiguity (particularly in matters in dispute) when we can easily refer to it's precision and specificity ?

I maintain that "unknown truth" is oxymoron. In fact, I would even say that the term "known truth" is redundant. It is enough to say "truth".

To this end, I have consulted numerous dictionaries to see what they say about the word 'truth'. here are a couple of examples;

truth

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/truth
1. Conformity to fact or actuality.
2. A statement proven to be or accepted as true.
3. Sincerity; integrity.
4. Fidelity to an original or standard.
5. a. Reality; actuality. b. often Truth That which is considered to be the supreme reality and to have the ultimate meaning and value of existence.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/truth?s=t
1. the true or actual state of a matter.
2. conformity with fact or reality; verity: the truth of a statement.
3. a verified or indisputable fact, proposition, principle, or the like: mathematical truths.
4. the state or character of being true.
5. actuality or actual existence.

The principle definition on my computers background dictionary (Wordweb) is ..

truth - a fact that has been verified

.. and this seems to accord nicely with all the above, as well as being a good, concise definition of the word. So for brevity, I will use that.

Now, you CANNOT have an unknown 'fact that has been verified'. It is simply nonsense. As would most likely be anything flowing from it.

Thus, 'unknown truth' is nonsense and an oxymoron. A thing is either a truth, a falsehood, or unknown. An unknown truth is as nonsensical as a false truth.

Following that, you (and others who believe in unknown truths) sought to take it to, umm, how do I say it .. higher or lower order observers (although I'm sure your symbolic language caters for that).

The trouble is, if you do that, we quickly descend to the absurd, as has been shown earlier. I know a great many truths that my little niece does not. But to her, they are not truths - they are unknown. Similarly, you and I being of similar intelligence (well, you are probably much more intelligent than I, but just say ..) might not know a great many things that we might discover to be truths in the future - you can in no sense of the word, call them truths now. Probabilities, sure, but not truths. In fact, they could turn out to be falsehoods.

Sticking to the dictionary meanings of words tells me that ‘unknown truths’ is simply non-sense. And you haven’t shown otherwise. We have not moved past first base.

PS - yes, I downloaded the J Melia paper and read it. My view is why introduce complexity when we first haven't sorted out simplicity ?

PPS - remember; truth - a fact that has been verified

 

[lugita15]

truth - a fact that has been verified

That is just not how the word truth is used in logic. In logic we use Tarski's definition, which states that "P is true" is the same thing as saying "P". So far instance, saying that it is true that 1+1=2 means that 1+1 does equal 2. Do you understand that?

 

[alt]

That is just not how the word truth is used in logic.

Why not ? It seems perfectly logical to me, and I would guess, most other people on this planet.

In logic we use Tarski's definition, which states that "P is true" is the same thing as saying "P". So far instance, saying that it is true that 1+1=2 means that 1+1 does equal 2. Do you understand that?

Ohh .. I see .. you're going down another road not traveled by me. I had a peek through the thistles though ..

http://yduppen.home.xs4all.nl/pub/tarski.pdf
.. There has been a lot more criticism on Tarski than just his preference
for physicalism ..

.. and don't care much for it. Not because I don't want to get across town, but because the road I'm on at the moment is more than adequate.

 

[lugita15]

Why not ? It seems perfectly logical to me, and I would guess, most other people on this planet.

No, I think most people would disagree with the definition of truth as a verified fact. I think most people believe that some truths are unknown, i.e. that not all truths are known.

Ohh .. I see .. you're going down another road not traveled by me. I had a peek through the thistles though ..

http://yduppen.home.xs4all.nl/pub/tarski.pdf
.. There has been a lot more criticism on Tarski than just his preference
for physicalism ..

.. and don't care much for it. Not because I don't want to get across town, but because the road I'm on at the moment is more than adequate.

I'm not asking you to do research on Tarski's definition, just apply some common sense. If 1+1=2 is true, then isn't 1+1 equal to 2? And if 1+1=2, then isn't 1+1=2 true? So isn't it the case that "1+1=2" is equivalent to "1+1=2 is true"?

 

[disregardthat]

I think most people believe that some truths are unknown, i.e. that not all truths are known.

This is a shallowly semantical issue which translates into that people believe that not all propositions are verified. Truth is something we assign to propositions.

"P is true", and "P" means exactly the same thing. But this doesn't in any way reject a verificationist POV.

 

[Office_Shredder]

This thread was a lot more interesting before it became a debate over whether or not formal logic is a legitimate area of study

 

[alt]

No, I think most people would disagree with the definition of truth as a verified fact. I think most people believe that some truths are unknown, i.e. that not all truths are known.

OK - as disregardthat said, this does seem shallowly semantical. I would have said trivial. Are you latching on to the second part to my earlier sentence, ie, and I would guess, most other people on this planet. ? If so, it was just a guess. Scratch it.

If you think that the dictionaries referred to earlier (as well as several others I looked at, which you can look at too) are by some coincidence or design, all wrong in their definitions of 'truth', shouldn't you be writing off to them to effect urgent corrections ?

Do you or don't you accept the dictionary definitions ? If not, why not ? What makes you better at defining the English language than those dictionaries authors ?

I'm not asking you to do research on Tarski's definition, just apply some common sense. If 1+1=2 is true, then isn't 1+1 equal to 2? And if 1+1=2, then isn't 1+1=2 true? So isn't it the case that "1+1=2" is equivalent to "1+1=2 is true"?

Common sense - yes, 1+1=2, that's true.

 

[alt]

This thread was a lot more interesting before it became a debate over whether or not formal logic is a legitimate area of study

Is that what it's become ? Maybe it has, and I don't know it - quite possible.

My contention here, is that we should be able to discuss anything in the language of the day, in this case, Modern English. It couldn't be that hard. And I get a bit of a clue where the 'paradox' claim comes from, when I'm told I need to go to another language in order to see anothers point or to establish some truth.

I just did a quick reading of the forum rules and saw that they are pretty much structured in that manner.

I might also add that there are far more complex issues in other threads, such as to do with cosmology, physics, quantum physics, etc, which certain mentors are able to portray in clear and sufficient terms to non scientists - and that is most admirable, in fact, the way it should be (Einstein had a brilliant quote about this, though it's not at my fingertips at the moment).

You would think that a philosopher has the ability to employ normal language so as to have meaningful dialouge with non philosophers.

 

[Hurkyl]

Do you or don't you accept the dictionary definitions ? If not, why not ? What makes you better at defining the English language than those dictionaries authors ?

Dictionaries of general English are not technical lexicons.

That said, let's consult Merriam-Webster on truth. Here are some excerpts:

2 a:

1. the state of being the case : fact
2. the body of real things, events, and facts : actuality

2 b: a judgment, proposition, or idea that is true or accepted as true
3 a: the property (as of a statement) of being in accord with fact or reality​

So your argument doesn't even hold up to the unrealistic standard that we can get comprehensive, technical definitions out of a general English lexicon.

Out of the whole m-w definition of truth, the only part that resembles your definition is one of the variation on definition 2b, and the resemblance is not very strong, as the variation mainly just makes allowances for the fact that the worth "truth" is sometimes used for statements that aren't actually true (but are 'accepted' as true).

 

[alt]

Dictionaries of general English are not technical lexicons.

Do you mean we would find a better definition of 'truth' in a technical lexicon ? If so, please show it. I had a look around and couldn't find anything.

That said, let's consult Merriam-Webster on truth. Here are some excerpts:

2 a:

1. the state of being the case : fact
2. the body of real things, events, and facts : actuality

2 b: a judgment, proposition, or idea that is true or accepted as true
3 a: the property (as of a statement) of being in accord with fact or reality​

I agree with you taking out the archaic, the religious, the transcendent, spiritual, etc, but you must have missed this bit (it was at the very bottom) ..

4: in accordance with fact : actually

Now that, and the ones we agree on which you posted, are quite similar to the ones I posted. In any event, I see not a hint of unknown truth in the m-w dictionary definitions you referenced. Are you saying there are some ?

So your argument doesn't even hold up to the unrealistic standard that we can get comprehensive, technical definitions out of a general English lexicon.

In post #71, I did say;

.. English can be ambiguous. I fully agree. But it can also be, and must in fact have the capacity to be, very specific and precise.

In other words, you must be able to say what you want to say in the language of the day. I wouldn’t think it would survive for long as a language otherwise.

Out of the whole m-w definition of truth, the only part that resembles your definition is one of the variation on definition 2b, and the resemblance is not very strong, as the variation mainly just makes allowances for the fact that the worth "truth" is sometimes used for statements that aren't actually true (but are 'accepted' as true).

You mean this ..
truth - a fact that has been verified

It's not mine - it is a definition I got from my computer dictionary 'Wordweb'
http://wordweb.info/FAQ.html
(I'm almost certain that it's based on the Oxford Dictionary).

I submitted that as it was brief and to the point, and seemed to me anyway, to encapsulate the other more comprehensive ones. It doesn't vary to any great extent from your m-w definitions either, particularly the one you missed, i.e. ..

in accordance with fact : actually

 

[alt]

Hurkyl, further;

Earlier, in a discussion with lugita15 about 'unkown truth' I said;
Do you or don't you accept the dictionary definitions ? If not, why not ? What makes you better at defining the English language than those dictionaries authors ?
This was of course in our discussion about the definition of truth - this is obvious by reading the posts.

You referenced my above comment, and said;
Dictionaries of general English are not technical lexicons.

This got me somewhat perplexed. Lexocn ? Dictionary ? I thought they were much the same. I looked up 'lexicon' and got ..

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/lexicon
lex·i·cons or lex·i·ca (-k)
1. A dictionary.
2. A stock of terms used in a particular profession, subject, or style; a vocabulary: the lexicon of surrealist art.
3. Linguistics The morphemes of a language considered as a group.

.. a DICTIONARY

I went to your preferred dictionary and got ..

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/lexicon
1 : a book containing an alphabetical arrangement of the words in a language and their definitions : dictionary
2 a: the vocabulary of a language, an individual speaker or group of speakers, or a subject b: the total stock of morphemes in a language
3 : repertoire, inventory

.. a (underlining is theirs) DICTIONARY.

So I googled 'technical lexocon' and got, in this exact order ..

http://www.fda.gov/Food/ScienceResearch/ucm181420.htm
the FDA;
not much use asking the truth there ..

http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPorta...&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no&accno=ED192370
This technical lexicon for elementary school communication skills instruction was compiled from high-frequency words in six previously compiled technical lexicons: grammar, composition, spelling, handwriting, reading, and literature.
Searched 'truth' and got a dizzying array of educational papers for elementry schoolhttp://www.ats-group.net/glossaries/glossary-lexicon-technical.html
Searched 'truth' no result, it defaulted back to google

www.ats-group.net › Medical Glossary › Online Glossary
and also a bi lingal lexicon - too big, didn't want to download it.

- a Japanese bi lingal lexicon; didn't want to download it - could't even copy the address

- same

http://www.weishaupt-corp.com/mainService/mnServiceGlossar/
Something about heat technology and burner motorshttp://www.lans-tts.be/img/NS3/Linp153-163.PDF
The influence of the contemporary social background on the coinage of technical lexicons. The case of the lexicon of political economy in 19PthP century China
Tommaso Pellin Ca’ Foscari University, Venice
EEEEEEK !

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1336604
elementry school stuff as above

http://www.ac-schnitzer.de/en/bmw-cars/service/technical-lexicon/
BMW specifications ..
NICE ! I've actually been looking at a new Beemer of late - thanks for that !

Other than this sort of thing, no progress.

Why did you mention this 'technical lexicon' aspect ?

Next, I had in mind that you might have been infering some philosophical lexicon or dictionary. So I googled 'dictionary / lexocon of philosophy' and got a dizzying array of results, many of which, when 'truth' was searched, defaulted back to 'dictionary.com' or 'freedictionary.com'.

But I did find a gem ..
http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/t9.htm#truth
I really like this site - for reasons not relevant here. I looked up 'truth' and got ..

The conformity of a proposition to the way things are. Precise analysis of the nature of truth is the subject of the correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, redundancy, and semantic theories of truth.

This last I think, is a real gem, and kind of sums up the problem we've been having here. I think it defines truth pretty well. The way things are, being the first statement. Sure, we can then progress to more subtle, semantic issues, but in matters of dispute, the primary meaning wins out.

We can leave it there if you like.

 

[Hurkyl]

In any event, I see not a hint of unknown truth in the m-w dictionary definitions you referenced. Are you saying there are some ?

Really? You expect me to believe you see words like "verified" and "known" attached to all aspects of that definition?

Well, it's a moot point, since we're now in accord:

The conformity of a proposition to the way things are.

My point on dictionaries is that a dictionary of English contains things appropriate for general communication in English. It will include definitions unrelated to the technical usages of terms, or even in direct conflict with them. Examples include

• the usual English meaning of "work" (e.g. sustained physical effort) versus the scientific meaning,
• the usual English meaning of the word "real" versus its usage in the mathematical term "real number".

Dictionaries will also omit many aspects or subtleties as well; it's just a dictionary, not an encyclopedia of human knowledge! For example, general English is a really, really bad language for working with many-valued logic.


P.S.

4: in accordance with fact : actually

Actually, that was referring to the phrase "in truth".

 

[lugita15]

I think it defines truth pretty well. The way things are, being the first statement.

OK, according to that definition, don't you think (say) 500 years ago, no one knew that the Earth went around the sun, but the Earth going around the sun was still part of the way things were?

And by the way, let me just tell you that our discussion of truth is in some ways beside the point, because Fitch's paradox can be stated without any reference to the word truth. For instance, instead of saying all truths are knowable, we can say "If P, then P is knowable."

 

[alt]

OK, according to that definition, don't you think (say) 500 years ago, no one knew that the Earth went around the sun, but the Earth going around the sun was still part of the way things were?

I was attempting to reach some point of unanimity with Hurkyl, even if minor. Your example above is merely a repeats what we've already discussed. All you have to do is read my earlier responses to similar examples - they won't be any different.

And by the way, let me just tell you that our discussion of truth is in some ways beside the point, because Fitch's paradox can be stated without any reference to the word truth. For instance, instead of saying all truths are knowable, we can say "If P, then P is knowable."

Again, I point out that I didn’t really get to Fitch's paradox. I've said this many times already. You said in #1

"..we started with the hypothesis that P is an unknown truth.. "

I've consistently said that (as I reject the notion of an unknown truth and believe it is an oxymoron) the hypothesis is flawed from the start.




PS - send me a check for $1,000,000 would you please ? It is true that I will;

a) send you back $2M for your investment, or

b) send you back nothing at all.

(Pm me and I’ll give you banking details)

 

[lugita15]

I was attempting to reach some point of unanimity with Hurkyl, even if minor. Your example above is merely a repeats what we've already discussed. All you have to do is read my earlier responses to similar examples - they won't be any different.

I still haven't seen a coherent response from you on this. The most you've said is that the examples I give you are "trivial" and that there are infinitely many examples like the ones I give you, as if that's supposed to be a problem. As I said, there are infinitely many examples of prime numbers, so do prime numbers not make sense?

Again, I point out that I didn’t really get to Fitch's paradox. I've said this many times already. You said in #1

"..we started with the hypothesis that P is an unknown truth.. "

I've consistently said that (as I reject the notion of an unknown truth and believe it is an oxymoron) the hypothesis is flawed from the start.

Let me ask you this, do you believe that every statement is either true or false? Or do you believe that there are statements that are neither true nor false?

PS - send me a check for $1,000,000 would you please ? It is true that I will;

a) send you back $2M for your investment, or

b) send you back nothing at all.

(Pm me and I’ll give you banking details)

I don't understand the point you're making here.

 

[alt]

I still haven't seen a coherent response from you on this...

Yes, I agree we should respond and clear up existing issues before moving on to new ones. Let's back up a little further. In post #74 you said;

No, I think most people would disagree with the definition of truth as a verified fact. I think most people believe that some truths are unknown, i.e. that not all truths are known.

In post #77 I replied;

If you think that the dictionaries referred to earlier (as well as several others I looked at, which you can look at too) are by some coincidence or design, all wrong in their definitions of 'truth', shouldn't you be writing off to them to effect urgent corrections ?

Do you or don't you accept the dictionary definitions ? If not, why not ? What makes you better at defining the English language than those dictionaries authors ?

I still haven't seen a coherent response from you on this.

And it's quite important to this conversation. Before we make any progress, I think you should reply, being mindful of the primary definition of ‘truth’ in the various aformentioned (and other) dictionaries.

 

[lugita15]

Yes, I agree we should respond and clear up existing issues before moving on to new ones. Let's back up a little further. In post #74 you said;

No, I think most people would disagree with the definition of truth as a verified fact. I think most people believe that some truths are unknown, i.e. that not all truths are known.

In post #77 I replied;

If you think that the dictionaries referred to earlier (as well as several others I looked at, which you can look at too) are by some coincidence or design, all wrong in their definitions of 'truth', shouldn't you be writing off to them to effect urgent corrections ?

Do you or don't you accept the dictionary definitions ? If not, why not ? What makes you better at defining the English language than those dictionaries authors ?

I still haven't seen a coherent response from you on this.

And it's quite important to this conversation. Before we make any progress, I think you should reply, being mindful of the primary definition of ‘truth’ in the various aformentioned (and other) dictionaries.

I think many, if not most, dictionary definitions of truth agree with me and Hurkyl, not you. One of the few definitions that agree with you is "a fact that has been verified", but that is an uncommon definition.

 

[alt]

I think many, if not most, dictionary definitions of truth agree with me and Hurkyl, not you. One of the few definitions that agree with you is "a fact that has been verified", but that is an uncommon definition.

(underlined) Can you be a lot more specific please ?

Also, give evidence ?

 

[alt]

Ah So !

No real paradoxes here at all. Only a propensity to, like a stage magician, duck behind the screen for a moment, and 'Hey presto' rabbit out of hat ..

IOW, sticking to the principal meanings of words, obviates the paradox.

The real paradox here, is how do people convince themselves that these (the aforementioned 'paradoxes') are paradox.

 

[lugita15]

Ah So !

No real paradoxes here at all. Only a propensity to, like a stage magician, duck behind the screen for a moment, and 'Hey presto' rabbit out of hat ..

IOW, sticking to the principal meanings of words, obviates the paradox.

The real paradox here, is how do people convince themselves that these (the aforementioned 'paradoxes') are paradox.

Sorry about that alt, I forgot about this thread. Where we left off was arguing about dictionary definitions of the word truth, which I think isn't really that productive a discussion. Still, you wanted me to elaborate on why my use of the word corresponds to dictonaries, so rather than going through all the definitions, let me pick just one: "The conformity of a proposition to the way things are." You said of this definition "I think it defines truth pretty well." I agree. But I think that this definition conforms more to my use of the word truth rather than yours.

To repeat what I said earlier, 500 years ago "the way things were" was that the Earth went around the sun, even though people thought that the sun went around the earth. So "the Earth goes around the sun" is a true statement, but unknown. So this dictionary definition of truth is perfectly consistent with the notion of an unknown truth, because people may just not know the way things are.

In any case, I hope we can go past arguing about dictionaries. Let me ask you this: do you agree or disagree that any statement must either be true or false? For instance, either "the Earth goes around the sun" is true or false, even if no one knew which.

 

[lugita15]

In case anyone is still interested, let me introduce yet another of my favorite modal paradoxes, the paradox of the Gentle Murderer. (The previous two paradoxes, Fitch's paradox of Knowability and the Inventor of Bifocals paradox, are stated in posts 1 and 35 and resolved in posts 33 and 61). I think we should all be able to agree that murder is bad. To put it another way, you shouldn't kill people. Moreover, I think we can also agree that if you're going to kill someone, you shouldn't kill them in a cruel, painful way. So it's fair to say, isn't it, that "If you're going to kill someone, you should kill them gently"? Let's call this belief "mercyism".

Now suppose that you're actually going to kill someone. Then mercyism says "if you're going to kill them, you should kill them gently", so the fact that you are going to kill them means that mercyism says in this case "you should kill them gently". But if you kill them gently, then you kill them, so isn't mercyism saying "you should kill them"? To recap, under the assumption that you're going to kill them, we have concluded that mercyism says that you SHOULD kill them. So in other words, mercyism justifies all the murders you're going to commit as moral, because it says that you SHOULD commit all the murders that you DO commit. Isn't that absurd? What's going on here?

 

[alt]

Sorry about that alt, I forgot about this thread. Where we left off was arguing about dictionary definitions of the word truth, which I think isn't really that productive a discussion. Still, you wanted me to elaborate on why my use of the word corresponds to dictonaries, so rather than going through all the definitions, let me pick just one: "The conformity of a proposition to the way things are." You said of this definition "I think it defines truth pretty well." I agree. But I think that this definition conforms more to my use of the word truth rather than yours.

To repeat what I said earlier, 500 years ago "the way things were" was that the Earth went around the sun, even though people thought that the sun went around the earth. So "the Earth goes around the sun" is a true statement, but unknown. So this dictionary definition of truth is perfectly consistent with the notion of an unknown truth, because people may just not know the way things are.

In any case, I hope we can go past arguing about dictionaries. Let me ask you this: do you agree or disagree that any statement must either be true or false? For instance, either "the Earth goes around the sun" is true or false, even if no one knew which.

Earlier on, you said;

many, if not most, dictionary definitions of truth agree with me

In post 88 I asked you to verify this. At that point the thread went silent. Please state your precise definition of truth and show where many if not most dictionary meanings agree with you.

Other than this, all the questions or points raised in your post have been canvassed earlier, and I have responded. There's little point in going round in circles.

 

[alt]

In case anyone is still interested, let me introduce yet another of my favorite modal paradoxes, the paradox of the Gentle Murderer. (The previous two paradoxes, Fitch's paradox of Knowability and the Inventor of Bifocals paradox, are stated in posts 1 and 35 and resolved in posts 33 and 61). I think we should all be able to agree that murder is bad. To put it another way, you shouldn't kill people. Moreover, I think we can also agree that if you're going to kill someone, you shouldn't kill them in a cruel, painful way. So it's fair to say, isn't it, that "If you're going to kill someone, you should kill them gently"? Let's call this belief "mercyism".

Now suppose that you're actually going to kill someone. Then mercyism says "if you're going to kill them, you should kill them gently", so the fact that you are going to kill them means that mercyism says in this case "you should kill them gently". But if you kill them gently, then you kill them, so isn't mercyism saying "you should kill them"? To recap, under the assumption that you're going to kill them, we have concluded that mercyism says that you SHOULD kill them. So in other words, mercyism justifies all the murders you're going to commit as moral, because it says that you SHOULD commit all the murders that you DO commit. Isn't that absurd? What's going on here?

Word play .. feels like what being nibbled to death by a duck would feel, I imagine ..

 

[lugita15]

Earlier on, you said;

many, if not most, dictionary definitions of truth agree with me

In post 88 I asked you to verify this. At that point the thread went silent. Please state your precise definition of truth and show where many if not most dictionary meanings agree with you.

Other than this, all the questions or points raised in your post have been canvassed earlier, and I have responded. There's little point in going round in circles.

alt, I stand by my assertion that many if not most dictionary definitions are consistent with the notion of an unknown truth, but I really don't feel like wasting time going through them. I already went through one definition in my previous post and showed it agreed with me, and specifically chose a definition you said you liked. But rather than arguing dictionaries, let's argue substance.

1. Do you believe that every statement is true or false?
2. Do you believe that every statement is known or unknown?

 

[alt]

alt, I stand by my assertion that many if not most dictionary definitions are consistent with the notion of an unknown truth, but I really don't feel like wasting time going through them. I already went through one definition in my previous post and showed it agreed with me, and specifically chose a definition you said you liked. But rather than arguing dictionaries, let's argue substance.

1. Do you believe that every statement is true or false?
2. Do you believe that every statement is known or unknown?

No, I don’t like dictionaries at 20 paces either, but it becomes necessary when two people have such a divergent view of the meaning of a word, such as you and I do - in this case, the word truth. What else can one do but narrow the discussion down to the meaning of the word in dispute ?

So it is necessary to determine, and agree upon, what the principle meaning of the word is, and the only reasonable and fair way to do this, is to resort to the principle meaning (1, 2 at the most) as given in current, respected and accepted dictionaries. I have done this in several previous posts, and it seems to me (and for the sake of brevity) that the meaning of truth - now, here, today, is distilled into this;

1) a fact that has been verified
2) conformity to reality or actuality.
(source, wordweb, based on Oxford Dictionary)

So you see why I say we haven’t moved past first base. Because you refuse to accept this, and expect me to aquiesce to some more subtle, obscure, perhaps fifth level meaning (not that I’m even aware of one) of the word.

Before we go further, you need to prove your following statement;

I stand by my assertion that many if not most dictionary definitions are consistent with the notion of an unknown truth

If you can't do this, we can't talk further, because my use of the word truth would involve the above definition, and yours something else. Discussion from there would be chaotic and sensless.

 

[lugita15]

1) a fact that has been verified
2) conformity to reality or actuality.
(source, wordweb, based on Oxford Dictionary)

So you see why I say we haven’t moved past first base. Because you refuse to accept this, and expect me to aquiesce to some more subtle, obscure, perhaps fifth level meaning (not that I’m even aware of one) of the word.

Out of these two definitions, I agree with definition 2, which is perfectly consistent with the notion of an unknown truth. Definition 1 above is just not a commonly used definition, either in everyday use or in logic and philosophy, and I strongly disagree with it.

 

[lugita15]

Word play .. feels like what being nibbled to death by a duck would feel, I imagine ..

What makes you think it's word play? All the paradoxes I'm mentioning are serious issues that philosophers write books and papers about. I can again bring up the fact that this paradox can be formulated in symbolic terms, where word play is impossible, but you don't want me to resort to another language. So what do you disagree with in the reasoning? Where do you think the flaw is?

 

[alt]

1) a fact that has been verified
2) conformity to reality or actuality.
(source, wordweb, based on Oxford Dictionary)
So you see why I say we haven’t moved past first base. Because you refuse to accept this, and expect me to aquiesce to some more subtle, obscure, perhaps fifth level meaning (not that I’m even aware of one) of the word

Out of these two definitions, I agree with definition 2, which is perfectly consistent with the notion of an unknown truth. Definition 1 above is just not a commonly used definition, either in everyday use or in logic and philosophy, and I strongly disagree with it.

It's odd that you continue to argue as above.

Go to
http://www.onelook.com/?w=truth&ls=a

Then check the leading definition of the word truth in each. They are;

American Heritage Dictionary; Conformity to fact or actuality

Collins English Dictionary; the quality of being true, genuine, actual, or factual

Vocabulary.com; Truth is something that squares with reality. When you are sworn into give testimony in a U.S. court of law, you promise to "tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

Macmillan Dictionary; the actual facts or information about something, rather than what people think, expect, or make up

Merriam Webster; (I have omitted 1 because it is archaic) 2 a (1): the state of being the case : fact (2): the body of real things, events, and facts

Wordnik; Conformity to fact or actuality.

Cambridge Dictionaries Online; (I have omitted the first because it is redundant) the real facts about a situation, event or person

Wiktionary; (I omitted 1,2, & 3, those being feelings, archaic, obsolete, but 4 .. ) Conformity to fact or reality; correctness, accuracy.

Oxford Dictionaries; the quality or state of been true (somewhat redundant, but next ..) that which is true or in accordance with fact or reality.

Websters New World College Dictionary; Truth is something that has been proven by facts or sincerity.


So these definitions are replete with elements of fact, factual, reality, accuracy, actuality, etc, etc. Yet nothing - not a whisper of 'unknoweness' about them.

Yet you strongly disagree with them, and you won't show the alternative, that being your view that truth is commonly defined as having strong 'unknowness' about it.

-Edited last line
-Edited last paragraph

 

[alt]

What makes you think it's word play? All the paradoxes I'm mentioning are serious issues that philosophers write books and papers about. I can again bring up the fact that this paradox can be formulated in symbolic terms, where word play is impossible, but you don't want me to resort to another language. So what do you disagree with in the reasoning? Where do you think the flaw is?

I should probably leave this one for the minute. No point in starting another argument until we resolve the existing one - about truth.

 

[lugita15]

It's odd that you continue to argue as above.

Go to
http://www.onelook.com/?w=truth&ls=a

Then check the leading definition of the word truth in each. They are;

American Heritage Dictionary; Conformity to fact or actuality

Collins English Dictionary; the quality of being true, genuine, actual, or factual

Vocabulary.com; Truth is something that squares with reality. When you are sworn into give testimony in a U.S. court of law, you promise to "tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

Macmillan Dictionary; the actual facts or information about something, rather than what people think, expect, or make up

Merriam Webster; (I have omitted 1 because it is archaic) 2 a (1): the state of being the case : fact (2): the body of real things, events, and facts

Wordnik; Conformity to fact or actuality.

Cambridge Dictionaries Online; (I have omitted the first because it is redundant) the real facts about a situation, event or person

Wiktionary; (I omitted 1,2, & 3, those being feelings, archaic, obsolete, but 4 .. ) Conformity to fact or reality; correctness, accuracy.

Oxford Dictionaries; the quality or state of been true (somewhat redundant, but next ..) that which is true or in accordance with fact or reality.

Websters New World College Dictionary; Truth is something that has been proven by facts or sincerity.


So these definitions are replete with elements of fact, factual, reality, accuracy, actuality, etc, etc.

Yes, and I strongly AGREE with all these definitions. The only definition I disagree with is "a fact that has been verified". But yes, I definitely think that truth is conformity with fact, reality, or actuality. And something can conform to fact/reality/actuality and still be unknown. So as I said, my use of truth is fully consistent with the dictionary definitions.