Is Quantum Mechanics the Real Problem in Understanding Nature?

[rewebster]

I'll go with Causality, with a hint of Probability---unless animate (living) objects are involved, at which each and every intervention by that animate object would initiate another case/scenario of causality. Animate (living) objects make decisions by choice (free will) influencing the surrounding environment. The act of free will may seem random, may be partially determined by previous behaviors and patterns, but the reaction itself to a stimuli can't be 100% predicted.

The amount of data to predict 100% of the actions/interactions/results of, let's say, two meteors hitting in space--down to gravitation, magnetic, chemical, etc. changes and interplay may be possible someday--but why, in that case, do those calculations?

There probably has been done the same (some) experiment at Fermilab one hundred times. If it was done ten thousand times, the images would probably still not be identical.

I like Causality, with Probability ---there's are just too many 'field' effects that at any given instant that differ to predict most interactions.


e.g.---gross causality with probability is dropping a rock--

but who would want to make a bet on the exact course of a bacterium for a full day.

 

[rewebster]

The idea for a 'new' idea has to come from somewhere. For someone to suggest a new idea, that person has to have some kind of 'knowledge'. From ancient China and India, to Archimedes, to Newton and his apple, and to the present day, an event (heard, seen, read) has to occur before a 'new' idea is first thought. That new thought is derived from all past knowledge of that individual relating to the event to form, at that specific time of the person's knowledge base, the most reasonable, deductive and logical conclusions to that person. Any person with any knowledge of a specific area of interest can come up with a 'new' idea. Any other person can either formulate a derivative 'new' idea from that initial idea, or dismiss it, as it relates to that person's beliefs, interest, and knowledge.

Before an experiment is started, the idea for the experiment must come first----(free will)-- then, any results add to the idea--(whether proving the idea or not doesn't matter--new knowledge is gained).


Is "Imagination is more important than knowledge"?----Depends

Depends on YOUR OWN definition of imagination, for one major aspect.



I've got an imagination, I have ideas ---are they new and of importance? maybe ---and yours may be also.

 

[masudr]

You're just my imagination anyway. As was all of Newton's work &c.

I've just got a brilliantly cohesive and inventive imagination.

 

[rewebster]

I'm not Jung like I used to be to Freud over things---I. Kant but I'll try anyway

 

[Schrodinger's Dog]

He just said it might be an illusion.

What I find more amusing is the appeal to quantum randomness as supporting some kind of ultimate (contra-causal) free will.

I was always under the impression it was true chaos that threw this idea up(Copenhagen Interpretation) Randomness does not destroy predeterminism any more than it invokes free will.

I find the idea interesting, but it is a kind of holy grail atm, your just making far too many assumptiuons based on assumptions to be credible.

The QM of consciousness, as speculative as it is isn't too bad,but the philosophy of thinking though is sometimes a bit beyond my level. I would advise people to look into it though, those who haven't done so already it's if nothing else, interesting.

My personal greivence is without knowing all there is to know or even a vague slice, people make all these judgements, like freewill may be an illusion or predeterminism is dead, there really is no answer at the moment we are a blind man looking for a candle in a dark room, etc etc etc. Still if your looking for answers in philosophy try religion.

 

[reilly]

Wow. Before I vanished for family and vacation time, I had given up on this thread's potential to foster discussions and debates. All in good time.

I've got a few things to do over the next few days, so I'll 1. thank lot's of people for making this a "happening thing," and 2. say that, in my view consciousness has nothing at all to do with QM-- other than the obvious matters of matter and the various perceptual neural-transducers. Along with many neuroscientists, Sir Francis Crick in particular, it's my view that consciousness is simply the cumulative effect of neural activity.

Until recently, notions of free will., consciousness and "brain-mind" duality were predominantly considered by philosophers -- their's was really the only game in town. My how things have changed -- science has increasingly taken over from philosophy, as it must, and as it did during Newton's time. Seems to me that philosophers are becoming less and less relevant and much less important than even 15 years ago in the area of mental phenomena -- the 19th century's approach to understanding nature is losing ground to the realities of the late 20th century.

Does anyone really believe that Searle's Chinese Room (whatever-you-call it) has anything to do with reality? Indeed it is clever, just like the idea of the economic rational man, but, to me, it's just another case of, "Ma, look no hands."

To be continued.
Regards,
Reilly Atkinson

 

[lalbatros]

Reilly,

I 'agree' with all your questions but one:

6. How can anyone who does not have at least a few years of experience with QM, after school, be a legitimate critic of QM?

The point cannot be "experience". This is close to an argument of authority.
Maybe you shoud replace this question by a statement about the scientific nature of the debate.

In addition, I could argue that too much experience maybe an obstacle to scientific discovery.
Who was the nobelist that was reluctant to read the complete bibliography on his thesis topic?
Had Einstein "a lot of experience" or a great insight when he was 25?

 

[vanesch]

Along with many neuroscientists, Sir Francis Crick in particular, it's my view that consciousness is simply the cumulative effect of neural activity.

The externally behavioural effects, yes. But it doesn't explain the experience from "within". It is this *redefinition* of consciousness which neuroscientists, AI specialists and so on apply, and they change it into something that fits a certain arbitrary descriptive or behavioural definition.

But, as the saying goes: it is not because you know the ENTIRE neurological system of a bat, that you know "what it's like to be a bat". You will be able to predict entirely the behaviour of a bat, you will know every single neuron that will be firing when you have it flying and catching some flies, when it mates, and so on. And you'll still not know what the bat "experiences". Now of course, you could not care less about what "it is like to be a bat", and say that this is not a scientific question. If you can entirely explain the behaviour of a bat, then you KNOW all there is to know about bats. It might be seen differently from the PoV of a bat...

And then the discussion turns to your body. Others may say that one couldn't care less about what "you might experience", and if they can explain the behaviour of your body, then that's all there is to it, and there's no such thing as "you" experiencing something, that this is not a scientific question, because the behavioural part is all there is to it. And then you know there's something fishy about this, because you DO experience something. You cannot express this, because this expression itself is entirely behavioural and yes, those neurologists might say, ok, if I put this needle HERE in this foot, then a K/Na wave will propagate along THIS nerve, will then give rise to neurotransmitters at THAT neuron in the brain, will then activate THESE neurons here, which will then activate THOSE muscles there, who will contract the lungs, and the neurons THERE will send pulses to THESE muscles here, and will hear the sound "AAAHH", produced by the cavity of the torax and the tension of the vocal cords.
But there's, nowhere, a description of the subjective experience of pain. And the neurologists say: there's really no such thing as a subjective experience of pain, but we can classify certain types of neurological loops which seem to induce this "AAAAH" production, and, they seem to produce also restructurations of the brain in such a way as to produce avoidance reactions next time similar stimuli are applied.

Then you KNOW you better get out of that place !

 

[gptejms]

So vanesch,are you saying that there's a quality to a human being which can not be explained just by the material/physical laws?

 

[vanesch]

So vanesch,are you saying that there's a quality to a human being which can not be explained just by the material/physical laws?

I don't know about OTHER human beings, but to myself, yes. There is my subjective experience, which is not EXPLAINED by physical laws, and of which I know that it exists. My body's behaviour is of course explained by material/physical laws. Including all I say and type. Maybe there is a prerequisite that there first needs to be a behaviour that behaves AS IF there were also a conscious experience, before such a thing can somehow emerge. But I could fairly well imagine my body doing all these things, WITHOUT me experiencing anything. But I do. And that's the thing I'm talking about here.

I say I don't know about others, because I don't know if they have subjective experiences. As the only thing that is available to me, is behavioural information, and as that will be the same with or without a subjective experience on their side, there's no way for me to find out.

Somehow, I *assume* that they might have a subjective experience, by analogy to myself, but I only have myself and my own subjective experience and an observed analogy to motivate this from. And what concerns bats, ants, stones, computers and rooms full of books, I have no idea because the analogy becomes worse and worse.

 

[gptejms]

Your stand reminds me of Roger Penrose's stand against strong AI--though he talks of a quality of human intelligence not possessed by machines while you talk of another quality 'subjective experience'.

 

[vanesch]

Your stand reminds me of Roger Penrose's stand against strong AI--though he talks of a quality of human intelligence not possessed by machines while you talk of another quality 'subjective experience'.

Yes, I know. I have to say I think Penrose is somehow wrong there. It might be, or it might not be, that the brain is a quantum computer. I think there have been studies that show that it's hard to believe that there remains some coherence for long enough a time in a brain to achieve anything useful on purpose. But then, who knows. But if that's possible in a brain, why couldn't we build a machine based upon the same principles ?

I don't see what's fundamentally impossible in making a machine that is as intelligent as a human being. After all, intelligence is a behavioural concept (and is often confused with subjective experience!). Intelligence is the ability to solve problems. And then you can discuss about the class of problems we're talking about. 200 years ago, being able to play chess would have been considered as intelligent. But now that pocket computers can do so, we switch to other problem sets because we have a hard time admitting that a machine might solve problems better than we do (although computers do it all the time !). So we invent "human-scale", totally arbitrary, definitions, like the Turing test, which consists in tricking a human being into believing it is talking to another human being for at least, say, 20 minutes. This is a problem to be solved, which is deemed to define "human intelligence" (or shortly, intelligence). What if we turned that around, and asked for a human being to trick a computer into believing it was dealing with another computer ? We'd all quickly fail the test, because I don't see you manually working out in real time any ethernet protocol So humans seem to fail the "Turning test of machine intelligence" . We seem not to even pass the intelligence test of an ethernet card

But when I read strong AI proponents, and Penrose, it seems to me that at some point, they confuse "intelligence" with "subjective experiences". Penrose seems to think that we can use our subjective experiences to be mathematically more intelligent than any formal system (which would imply a genuine action of this subjective experience onto the physical world). And AI proponents seem to say that when a machine reaches behaviourally human-level intelligence (for instance, it passes the Turning test), then automatically goes with it some subjective experience (and hence all the ethics that goes with it).

 

[rewebster]

The problem I see with the Turing Test (tricking a human being) is that I've met some 'human beings' that could be tricked with dog on the other side of a screen. Which is the 'best' , 'acceptable' , 'most correct' , or 'true' (a law?) are all different answers that we all 'accept' in different ways. From 'worst' , 'unacceptable' , 'improbable' , to 'etc.' are also on the scale--just on the other end. --and all have been used to describe theories (from different people) that we use today---and ones that have been dismissed.

How were you (a person/anyone) raised?---How and why did it lead you toward QM or MW 's? (little pun with the etiology of the letters)


Another way to say it is, "How much fun can you have with a piece of string?"

 

[gptejms]

I don't see what's fundamentally impossible in making a machine that is as intelligent as a human being. After all, intelligence is a behavioural concept (and is often confused with subjective experience!). Intelligence is the ability to solve problems.

Intelligence also covers discovering new things(theory of relativity,quantum mechanics etc.),creativity,imaginative thinking etc.,looking at things with wonder(e.g. looking at wave-particle duality,measurement problem with wonder(&. coming up with MWI!))---these are the kind of things a machine can not do.So,I guess 'subjective experience' is required if you wish to go beyond solving problems or playing chess.Coming up with the game of chess is something a machine can't do.

What if we turned that around, and asked for a human being to trick a computer into believing it was dealing with another computer ? We'd all quickly fail the test, because I don't see you manually working out in real time any ethernet protocol So humans seem to fail the "Turning test of machine intelligence" . We seem not to even pass the intelligence test of an ethernet card

You are right about that except that a computer would never put/'think of putting' us to a Turing test to show us how inferior we are!

 

[rewebster]

"oh---noooo,



are you losing your 'emotion chip' ---again, Data?"

 

[gptejms]

Along with many neuroscientists, Sir Francis Crick in particular, it's my view that consciousness is simply the cumulative effect of neural activity.

Neural activity is associated with consciousness--you have greater neural activity while you are conscious than when you are unconscious.But consciousness is not equal to 'neural activity'.

 

[rewebster]

Maybe I'm mistaken, but the questions in post #1 deal more with the 'qualities' why QM isn't accepted more; and why hasn't QM been more fully examined as 'THE' primal theory of 'things'.



I think QM got sidetracked when a few brick walls were hit and no reasonable, logical, and definable hypotheses lead to experimental results.

 

[masudr]

looking at things with wonder(e.g. looking at wave-particle duality

Hah! wonder at wave-particle duality? Forget that rubbish for a moment!

Wonder at the marvel of trees! Of sunshine! Of blue skies! Of a fellow human's face! Of blank verse! Oh my, oh my! Some people would think we physicists don't do anything but read our physics books!

p.s. no offence meant, just light humour

 

[Haelfix]

Yea I don't believe the orthodox position of QM's is tenable to all orders of magnitude. Many of the obvious paradoxes that everyone knows are (in various senses) quite problematic, and its why they haven't dissappeared even after decades of debate.

Decoherence in my mind solved the majority of its problems, and made it a pragmatist approach. Otoh it does sweep various issues under the rug of the 'environment'. For instance, issues with say Von Neumann ideal measuring systems and so forth, nearly always imply some sort of logical adhoc separation of prescriptions for measurer, experiment and so forth and decoherence won't save you from those thought experiments.

Worse, talking about things like 'the wavefunction of the universe' immediately hits absurdities with Hilbert space seperability issues.

Measurement in curved spacetime also has numerous problems (some of which are sort of solved, others aren't).

I don't think many physicists believe orthodox Quantum mechanics is the end of the story (eg 2000 years from now it will be unchanged everywhere), but merely a perfectly sensible calculational tool and valid within the boundaries of experiment atm.

 

[rewebster]

The idea of being 'orthodox' isn't very creative. Maybe most 'have to be' orthodox.

History shows a lot of un-orthodox ideas-----gleaning one out of the many is hard to do at the time of its christening. Most of the presently 'accepted' ideas were challenged quite exhaustively, until facets of them gained some acceptance. What if the star's image wasn't deflected like Einstein predicted?


(I'm not a fan of relativity)

 

[vanesch]

Neural activity is associated with consciousness--you have greater neural activity while you are conscious than when you are unconscious.But consciousness is not equal to 'neural activity'.

My view too. "neural activity" is the underlying physical process, and from it "emerges" (in some cases ? In my case ?) consciousness, where I say "emerge" in a definitely vague meaning, because I don't know any better.

And now go telling which *other* physical processes potentially have such consciousness emerge...
Does consciousness emerge from phonon propagation and scattering in xtals ? From currents flowing on the surface of silicon chips ? In the convective pattern when I make stew ? From ionic waves in neurons ? In the motion of dust particles in a giant dust cloud ? In the waves at the surface of an ocean ? Inside a neutron star ?

Hard to tell, no ? I think the only way to be sure that there is a conscious activity, is to experience it ! (which brings us back to Descartes...)

So as of now, I know of one, for sure

 

[vanesch]

I don't think many physicists believe orthodox Quantum mechanics is the end of the story (eg 2000 years from now it will be unchanged everywhere), but merely a perfectly sensible calculational tool and valid within the boundaries of experiment atm.

I agree with you. But in the mean time, one has to do with what one has, and the more one can build a picture which makes sense, the better things are, no ? Realizing that ANY such picture, based upon ANY theory, will be potentially only temporary.

However, the issue becomes more important when one wants to do things like unifying quantum theory and gravity.

 

[rewebster]

We can use Popeye's paraphasing of Descartes to describe orthodox Quantum mechanics ---until things change, I suppose.

 

[rewebster]

Unifying quantum theory and gravity?

I wonder if that would be considered un-orthodox?

 

[nrqed]

@ Vanesch: I just noticed free will is an illusion? Such a fad thing to say, prove it? It's no better than saying predeterminism is preposterous based on modern theoretical physics. I hear that expression so often that it's almost like everyones convinced themselves it's true despite it being a hypothesis. Since as far as I am aware no philosophers have answered the questions either way or scientists for that matter, how can you prove that it is an illusion and if you just stated that, shouldn't you have chastised yourself for saying it on a physics thread?

this is not a proof but see

B. Libet., ''Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of consciousness will in voluntary action'', Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8: 529-566, December 1985.

A summarym copied from a book written by T.B. Czerner, M.D.:

''...a famous experiment by the University of California at San Francisco neurophysiologist Benjamin Libet in 1985...his subjects were asked to watch a spot revolving on a clock face in front of them and, at a time of their choosing, to flex their wrists. They were told to note exactly where the spot when they decided to act. With strategically placed electrodes, Libet measured two things: the time the action began and a brain wave called the readiness potential, an electrical pattern seen just before any complex action takes place. Invariably the readiness potential occurred before, not after, the moment of their ''decision''. The brain begins its activity *before* you ''decide'' that you want it to. If the readiness potential pccurs before your ''intention'', you are deluding yourself with your notion of free will. A shocking and depressing conclusion''

(the emphasis on before if the author's, not mine)


I am not saying this is conclusive proof that free will is an illusion. But I am saying that there *is* serious research suggesting this, and it's not just a ''fad'' (I remember reading in other books on consciousness some other experiment but that book is at the library right now)


It seems clear to me that no matter if quantum mechanics plays an important role in consciousnessor not, there is no place for the concept of free will in present scientific theories. By definition, free will involves an *directed* effect without a cause. There is no place for the idea of ''taking a decision'' in present scientific theories in my opinion.

Patrick

Materialists are so dull. Almost as bad as secular humanists

I am not sure what this is supposed to mean :-)

 

[rewebster]

Invariably the readiness potential occurred before, not after, the moment of their ''decision''. The brain begins its activity *before* you ''decide'' that you want it to. If the readiness potential occurs before your ''intention'', you are deluding yourself with your notion of free will.


The problem with this deduction is that since the clock is visible to the subject, and that the hand is visible to the subject as the hand moves toward the 'chosen spot' , --there is an anticipatory response to when to decide when the hand is at that given spot. Whether to choose to decide (free will) if and/or when the hand is getting close to that chosen spot is still part of the process of deciding to 'choose'. Intention is still a decision, whether is acted upon or not, doesn't matter---deciding is a process. The initial part of this scenario and of this total process is the thinking process to anticipate.

I see the conclusion of this experiment as flawed not realizing this.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Invariably the readiness potential occurred before, not after, the moment of their ''decision''. The brain begins its activity *before* you ''decide'' that you want it to. If the readiness potential occurs before your ''intention'', you are deluding yourself with your notion of free will.


The problem with this deduction is that since the clock is visible to the subject, and that the hand is visible to the subject as the hand moves toward the 'chosen spot' , --there is an anticipatory response to when to decide when the hand is at that given spot. Whether to choose to decide (free will) if and/or when the hand is getting close to that chosen spot is still part of the process of deciding to 'choose'. Intention is still a decision, whether is acted upon or not, doesn't matter---deciding is a process. The initial part of this scenario and of this total process is the thinking process to anticipate.

I see the conclusion of this experiment as flawed not realizing this.

You misunderstand the experiment. The time of decision is not taken from some observation of the hand moving but from the subject's own report. The subject sees the clock and reports, as he decides, where the second hand is. With training subjects can get good at this. The potential rises before the subject becomes aware of deciding and has nothing to do with the actual move.

 

[rewebster]

The time of decision is not taken from some observation of the hand moving but from the subject's own report. The subject sees the clock and reports, as he decides, where the second hand is. With training subjects can get good at this. The potential rises before the subject becomes aware of deciding and has nothing to do with the actual move.


The subject's own report is a time delayed process also. Yes, the (subject's) move is separate (which I didn't get into). The process of 'thinking about moving' is what I was referring to.--and even before that, something has to initiate that process also --'something' (free will?) chose to tell the brain that it's body is in an experiment and it (the body) must be ready to 'do' something--anticipation. Anticipation is the 'readiness' for action. Choosing to react is just one of the choices (free will).


'Time' and/or the 'amount of time' /'measurement of time' for a thought/thought process (reaction) differs from the already prepared anticipation (ongoing during the experiment) creating a chance for a decision to be made.

 

[rewebster]

Along side this---as for particles/subparticles in QM---they react ---they don't choose to react.

 

[nrqed]

Invariably the readiness potential occurred before, not after, the moment of their ''decision''. The brain begins its activity *before* you ''decide'' that you want it to. If the readiness potential occurs before your ''intention'', you are deluding yourself with your notion of free will.


The problem with this deduction is that since the clock is visible to the subject, and that the hand is visible to the subject as the hand moves toward the 'chosen spot' , --there is an anticipatory response to when to decide when the hand is at that given spot. Whether to choose to decide (free will) if and/or when the hand is getting close to that chosen spot is still part of the process of deciding to 'choose'. Intention is still a decision, whether is acted upon or not, doesn't matter---deciding is a process. The initial part of this scenario and of this total process is the thinking process to anticipate.

I see the conclusion of this experiment as flawed not realizing this.

This has bothered me too which is why I haven`t been able to see this as a proof of the absence of free will. Thinking more about this, it almost seems to me as if there would always be such a problem in any experiment involving free will testing because the subjects have to report when they took a decision. To do this, they have to be looking at a clock or anything that is moving and that can be used to assign a time to such a decision. But this necessarily (as far as I can tell) introduces a time delay of some sort which is impossible to quantify. One could always argue that there is a time delay between taking the *decision* to do something and looking at the clock so that the clock reading may be ''late''. So that the event could be

make a decision, then activate the readiness potential then record the time on the clock


Pat