tom.stoer said:
Even if everyone in physics would agree to the Platonic view (many do not) I am not sure if "nothingness" is a metaphysical pre-existing entity from which an "existing nothing" can be created.
I understand your point, but it does not limit an effort to model nothingness in a more physically complete fashion.
So yes, the standard position always defines nothingness in terms of an absence. First you have the something, then you imagine what is left when this removed. When done rigorously, you end up with just whatever mathematical forms or physical framework of laws that was the prevailing context for your substantial and localised things.
So whether it is GR, QM or thermodynamics - the big three successful bodies of physical theory - you can define a zero state in which you have the "everything" of the laws, and then the absence of any measureable local action within the context of those global constraints.
All fine as far as it goes. But then the next step would be a larger physical model that can imagine the absence even of these global constraints, these particular frameworks of bounding laws.
So a nothingness which is about no events AND no contexts. You may again protest that this is beyond physics or science, and is only a metaphysical or philosophical question. But I fail to see on what grounds.
In theoretical biology, for example, this kind of developmental perspective, where you have both the local events and global constraints emerging mutually, synergistically, hierarchically, is quite a common one these days. For example -
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructal_theory
The argument is thus that these "philosophical" considerations can guide us on what would actually constitute a final theory sufficient to talk about the creation of the universe. It is clear that it is not enough to explain the emergence of the local substance, we also have to be modelling the emergence of the global constraints as well. So if QM is the explanation, then we have to account for both the quantum event (some kind of fluctuation) and the quantum context (the field, laws, retrocausal platonic realm, or whatever).
It also tells us which kinds of speculations are beside the point. So Tegmark's multiverse is very entertaining, for instance, but it does not tackle the issue of where the global constraints necessary for his infinite realm came from. Likewise Smolin's evolving multiverse, or Linde's eternal inflation.
Any theoretical approach which does not attempt to also account for the emergence of global constraints just cannot answer questions about the ultimate origins of things, because they already presume the existence of things (global things, even if not local things).
Therefore what you say about QM having no trouble with local absence is both perfectly true, and completely beside the point. And to say the modelling of emergent global constraint is "outside science" is arguable. Depends how much you like biology I guess

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