Is There a Clear Explanation for A-Consciousness?

[Bartholomew]

Self-awareness is so commonly confused with consciousness that it is a pet peeve of mine.

The way you determine whether something is conscious or not is you determine a general principle that seems to lie behind your own consciousness, and generalize. Many people have not gotten past the "humanlike thought" stage of this process. I have advanced so far that I can recognize my toes as the thinking, feeling persons that they really are.

(I'm kidding... a little...)

 

[loseyourname]

The way you determine whether something is conscious or not is you determine a general principle that seems to lie behind your own consciousness, and generalize. Many people have not gotten past the "humanlike thought" stage of this process. I have advanced so far that I can recognize my toes as the thinking, feeling persons that they really are.

(I'm kidding... a little...)

You're going to have to state this a little clearer, because, given my understanding of the relevant terminology, it is impossible to generalize from a generalization unless you hop categories. The best I can tell, what you're doing is taking the general principle (consciousness is defined by x) and then applying it to specific instances; i.e. my toes have x, therefore they are conscious.

It also isn't clear what you mean by "general principle" that seems to lie behind your own consciousness. For one thing, what seems to lie behind our own consciousness might only be that, what seems and not what is. Second, not everyone will accept that consciousness is a divisable entity that can be reduced to a lowest common denominator. They will say that consciousness only occurs when x, y, and z are present, rather than when only x is present; that, in fact, the existence of consciousness is dependent on many interwoven entities that are not themselves consciousness. What steps do you take to counter their arguments?

 

[TENYEARS]

Kerrie, I will describe this only because I know you are intersted in the subject matter so I will give you the only logical deduction one can make if any connection with another human is a possibility. The brain and the more subtle functions which are yet to be acknowlged by science but do indeed exist. The question is is this connection a recpetion and translation of waves from another human being and translatable or does the human being exist also in a more subltle energy form which which also maintains conciousness outside of the "physical"(lol) body one more option which is a conbination of the two would be the energy field of a human extends beyond themselves for some distance. It may be that this big body is capable of interacting with others while still part of the physical.

If the second option is true then it still does not admit to the existence of a signle conciousness but extends the realm of human conciousness. That is indeed a begining. There is the possibility that the perceived option 2 is created by option one and is not real with the exception of the communication itself. BUT, if the human brain is capable of 1 then one would have to also admit the possiblity of the human system to not only interpret the wave funtion of brain energy but of possible physical objects and other living things which could in effect create a similated relm of experience which is actually based on the manifestation of the original. All just thoughts my experience leads me toward a particular end but I will present the possibilities.

If the energy state of the human exists is there another level which is finer than that? Pure thought without energy? I know for a fact that humans are more that they percieve. Would it not be an awsome venture to prove to the world that yes virgina there is a Santa Claus. How incredible would that experience be to the world to know there is more!

If one is lost one must start small and solidly and build a foundation of proof. This is a good place to start in terms of conciousness. The big picture would be like god and relativity because they are one and the same. That is unfortuante and fortunate. Fortunate because it is real unfortunate because most humans would not understand it but would acknowlge it. Humans need to connect in experience and that is the only way to truth, to connect with the environment. In that the expansion of conciousness begins.

 

[Kerrie]

TENYEARS, i was trying to give you a chance to shine, but i think you are tarnishing your reputation even more.

 

[TENYEARS]

Kerrie, what is to tarnish? I have seen and accomplished the things I say. If you hypothetically believed the things I said I have accomplished and done would you think such an individual would worry of what others thought of their words. It would seem that such an individual would be concerned with understanding and potentially help others if the moment and time presented itself in need. I came to this forum to figure out what to do with the very experiences you all so intensely debate.

In one vision I had of a terrible disaster of which I was part, one so many facets of the vision were so beyond statistical probability and all occurring within a 24 hour period. All were spoken before hand bla bla bla. The important point of this is logically if one extended themselves in the are of precogniction one could say humans have inate processes which all indepth pattern matching which is a projection of potential possibilites. The problem is if one were to know the events of the vision which were the "keys" one would recognize this would be far beyond pattern matching and only be attributed to the ability of the mind to completely connect to the singularity which is all of infinity. A logical person cannot let precognition be a reality unless this is the case or else it becomes illogical. I have been a witness to this one, but that is my experience and may or may not be redily provable. What can be done is prove the events of the vision and I can prove that scientifically to some degree with an idea that has not been done before.

 

[Bartholomew]

Loseyourname:
Consciousness is defined, in the strict sense of "defined," intuitively, and this definition is not available by default to the human mind. This is the "p-consciousness" that somebody was talking about earlier (Edit: it was Hypnagogue) and it is not questionable or debatable. If someone claims reasoning power is necessary for consciousness, they must support this; they can't define consciousness that way, because consciousness--meaning "p-consciousness" (which is a new term I like and I think I'll use in the future)--is already unquestionably defined.

The "generalization" is not an actual definition--it's an explanation. What is the general principle that unites perceiving the blueness of blue and the feeling of the texture of sand? And as with any explanation of the real world--especially since it can deal with only a single stream of experiences, varied though they might be--it is not going to be absolutely certain. But there are degrees of intuition that you can use with respect to consciousness explanations which you can't use for most other things; consciousness is so fundamentally different from everything else that any complicated explanation for it that involves specifying a lot of conditions is not going to ring true. Like, if you say thought is necessary, thought is just a mostly arbitrary set of neuronal patterns, which is just an arrangement of particles in such and such a way. Why should that particular arrangement produce anything as fundamentally removed from everything else as consciousness seems to be? It does not make sense. The true explanation must be relatively simple and... intuitive.

So in summary, the phenomenon of consciousness already exists and is not redefinable; it is not a math concept or a theory in physics. It can only be explained, and there are two tools to do this: examining the properties of your unquestionable p-consciousness, and using intuition to weed out bad explanations to a greater degree than is usual.

By the way, you have a cute picture, if that's you.

 

[loseyourname]

Consciousness is defined, in the strict sense of "defined," intuitively, and this definition is not available by default to the human mind. This is the "p-consciousness" that somebody was talking about earlier (Edit: it was Hypnagogue) and it is not questionable or debatable. If someone claims reasoning power is necessary for consciousness, they must support this; they can't define consciousness that way, because consciousness--meaning "p-consciousness" (which is a new term I like and I think I'll use in the future)--is already unquestionably defined.

As I said, there are people that will tell you that phenomenal experience is all there is to consciousness. I'm not so quick to agree just by considering the historical usage of the word. Especially if you look at the usage of the word "consciousness" in psychology texts as well as anthropological texts, we can see there is more to it, something that is unique to a brain organized, both by genetics and by memetics, the way the human brain is organized, something above and beyond the bare experiential character.

What is the general principle that unites perceiving the blueness of blue and the feeling of the texture of sand? And as with any explanation of the real world--especially since it can deal with only a single stream of experiences, varied though they might be--it is not going to be absolutely certain. But there are degrees of intuition that you can use with respect to consciousness explanations which you can't use for most other things; consciousness is so fundamentally different from everything else that any complicated explanation for it that involves specifying a lot of conditions is not going to ring true.

Again, I'm not so sure about that. It might not ring true to you, but to me, it doesn't ring true to say that your toes are conscious. If you say they are imbued with a raw experiential capacity, then I can see that. But when I read accounts of consciousness in various fields, there is clearly more to what is being talked about than raw experiential capacity. There is something that seems to be exclusively the capacity of higher mammals and maybe some birds.

Like, if you say thought is necessary, thought is just a mostly arbitrary set of neuronal patterns, which is just an arrangement of particles in such and such a way. Why should that particular arrangement produce anything as fundamentally removed from everything else as consciousness seems to be? It does not make sense. The true explanation must be relatively simple and... intuitive.

Well, I'm not sure how you can call thought an arbitrary set of neuronal patterns. Maybe some thoughts are arbitrary, but not all. Some thoughts are directed, some thoughts are intentional. It is this difference between raw thought and intentional thought that I think is the key to the rest of what consciousness is, aside from the raw experiential capacity. It isn't that intentional thought produces consciousness, but it is nonetheless an important element, without which you do not have consciousness. It takes intentional thought and experiential capacity.

By the way, you have a cute picture, if that's you.

Ha! I'm not a female and that picture is of Scarlett Johansson. I do agree that she's cute, though.

 

[Bartholomew]

Those other meanings of consciousness are not really fundamental. They are more on the order of "how does a car work" than "what is this special thing called consciousness which is somehow different from everything else." They are not the big question. The only important question--important meaning, "very, very important"--is the origin of p-consciousness.

Every thought is predetermined and not arbitrary by the meaning of "arbitrary" that you use, but what I meant by "arbitrary" is "having no clear physical characteristic to differentiate it from every other arrangement of particles."

Ha! I'm not a female and that picture is of Scarlett Johansson.

Dangit!

 

[loseyourname]

Those other meanings of consciousness are not really fundamental. They are more on the order of "how does a car work" than "what is this special thing called consciousness which is somehow different from everything else." They are not the big question. The only important question--important meaning, "very, very important"--is the origin of p-consciousness.

Not really. If conscious thought is indeed intentional, then there is something fundamental to the concept of intention that is not itself functional. Assuming panexperientialism, if it is this intentional capacity that makes our experience different from the experience of a rock, then I think it's important to consciousness.

Every thought is predetermined and not arbitrary by the meaning of "arbitrary" that you use, but what I meant by "arbitrary" is "having no clear physical characteristic to differentiate it from every other arrangement of particles."

Well, that's the question, isn't it? We don't know if every thought is predetermined. In fact, if we use your intuitive approach, then we can conclude that there are thoughts that aren't determined! If every thought is predetermined, maybe you're right, but that will require a huge overhaul of the word "consciousness." A lot of textbooks will need to be edited and common speech patterns will need to be changed.

 

[Bartholomew]

Every thought is predetermined because it comes from the brain, which is a part of the physical world. Welll, okay, because of uncertainty, all thoughts may have some element of randomness, but I don't think that makes any difference.

My "intuitive" approach is not the same as "accepting whatever concept you would have had before thinking about it." Intuition must be learned.

 

[hypnagogue]

As I said, there are people that will tell you that phenomenal experience is all there is to consciousness. I'm not so quick to agree just by considering the historical usage of the word. Especially if you look at the usage of the word "consciousness" in psychology texts as well as anthropological texts, we can see there is more to it, something that is unique to a brain organized, both by genetics and by memetics, the way the human brain is organized, something above and beyond the bare experiential character.

You're referring to what is called "access consciousness" or just "a-consciousness" in the literature. Whereas "p-consciousness" refers to the experiential nature of consciousness, "a-consciousness" refers to the cognitive/functional mechanisms that are normally attributed to the word. A mental object is said to be a-conscious if it is poised to be under direct control of reasoning, reporting, and action. As such, a-consciousness is roughly equivalent to what we mean by "awareness."

If you're familiar with Chalmers' work, he would probably say that understanding a-consciousness falls under the 'easy' problems of consciousness, whereas understanding p-consciousness is the hard problem. It also might be helpful to note that while a zombie is not p-conscious, it is nonetheless a-conscious.

 

[Bartholomew]

It also might be helpful to note that while a zombie is not p-conscious, it is nonetheless a-conscious.

You cannot determine definitely whether anything except yourself has p-consciousness. That's the point, and the reason you need a theory.

By the way, am I right in assuming that what you mean by p-consciousness includes things like memory and other kinds of awareness not covered under the conventional meaning of "sense"? Because those things are essentially the same as conventional senses and fall under the same "hard problem," as you call it.

 

[hypnagogue]

You cannot determine definitely whether anything except yourself has p-consciousness.

That's true, but the philosophical construct of the 'zombie' has no p-consciousness by definition. It's a hypothetical being that we use to help us reason about consciousness.

By the way, am I right in assuming that what you mean by p-consciousness includes things like memory and other kinds of awareness not covered under the conventional meaning of "sense"? Because those things are essentially the same as conventional senses and fall under the same "hard problem," as you call it.

The hard problem isn't about the senses, per se. It's just about subjective experience. Insofar as memory has an experiential aspect (it is 'like something' to experience a memory), it is part of the hard problem. But the cognitive mechanisms that make memory possible fall under the 'easy' problems. Understanding how sensory information is stored in the brain is in principle something that we should be able to figure out using standard scientific approaches (hence, an 'easy' problem) whereas understanding how/why that process of memory storage and retrieval is accompanied by subjective experience seems beyond standard scientific approaches (hence, a hard problem).

You might want to read a couple of Chalmers' papers to familiarize yourself a bit with the terminology and concepts. http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html are good places to start.

 

[loseyourname]

You're referring to what is called "access consciousness" or just "a-consciousness" in the literature. Whereas "p-consciousness" refers to the experiential nature of consciousness, "a-consciousness" refers to the cognitive/functional mechanisms that are normally attributed to the word. A mental object is said to be a-conscious if it is poised to be under direct control of reasoning, reporting, and action. As such, a-consciousness is roughly equivalent to what we mean by "awareness."

Well, I'm really referring to both, as I think it takes both to get what the common man would refer to as "consciousness."

If you're familiar with Chalmers' work, he would probably say that understanding a-consciousness falls under the 'easy' problems of consciousness, whereas understanding p-consciousness is the hard problem. It also might be helpful to note that while a zombie is not p-conscious, it is nonetheless a-conscious.

I'm familiar from second-hand sources, but I've never actually read anything written by Chalmers. I'll get around to it. I'd actually go a little further than Chalmers and say that I think a-consciousness is all but explained, or at least that I think the existing framework is enough with only a slight tweaking of competing models.