Undergrad Multiverse theory -- Why don't strange things happen here sometimes?

[rolnor]

The awareness that nature prevents certain kinds of knowledge, aka quantum behavior, resolves most if not all of the paradoxes.
The cat is there as you can ALWAYS infer something about it. If you isolated it WELL enough, you know it would be dead before you opened the lid, because the low temperature would kill it instantly.
Is the Moon there? Sure it is. All the time. There are so many ways to know about the Moon.
If you probed deep enough, at quantum scales, the Moon would prevent ascertaining certain joint quantities. But it does not mean that it doesn't exist.
People don't understand QT because of the wrong mindset with which they approach the subject.
Your mental illness is certainly grounded in medical circumstances and has classical physics at heart, like all problems we deal with. QM has nothing to do with it.

I did not say my emotional problems is QM-based? Maybe I was unclear, sorry.

 

[rolnor]

Indeed. We're all doomed to a decidedly boring existence, never to experience the exciting effects of total disintegration via all of our particles simultaneously quantum tunneling to different locations. Well, probably not. There's always a chance.

Thanx Drakkith. All my frustrastion about the popular science version of MVT is gone now, I am grateful to all the authors in this topic.

 

[rolnor]

There is a possibility of this, not a fact. Studies show it's mostly genetics and other environmental factors:
https://europepmc.org/backend/ptpmcrender.fcgi?accid=PMC4940219&blobtype=pdf

Yes, its my own experience and knowledge, I am convinced of this but its not consensus in the academic world that I am right. (but I am right)

 

[PeterDonis]

What you say is also that the very name multiverse is inapropriate? Its the same universe?

Yes.

Multi-branch-universe (MBU) would be better?

Yes, I think that term is better than either "multiverse" or "many worlds".

 

[PeroK]

Occam's razor deals easily with such propositions. Which for the MWI appears to be the most outlandish ever invented.

MWI is the simplest interpretation of QM, but lacks a plausible derivation of the Born rule.

Applying Occam's razor zealously might lead to MWI, where the universe is no more than a single, evolving wavefunction.

 

[PeroK]

For those who believe the MWI is an impossibly bizarre interpretation of QM, the following post by Sean Carroll is worth reading. I'm not an advocate of MWI, but I agree with Carroll that it's sad when MWI is dismissed for what are "obviously wrong reasons".

https://www.preposterousuniverse.co...y-worlds-interpretation-of-quantum-mechanics/

 

[vanhees71]

Well, the two postulates (stated in a very imprecise way, but this we can overread to demonstrate good will)

1. Quantum states are represented by wave functions, which are vectors in a mathematical space called Hilbert space.
2. Wave functions evolve in time according to the Schrödinger equation.

Are not sufficient to serve as a physical theory. All you have is a partial differential equation to calculate a wave function, which represents quantum states, but this is just a nice PDE you may solve if you like, but there's no physics in it. For this physics you need an interpretation, i.e., the connection with what's observable in Nature, where I neither observe (by my senses or with whatever delicate technical equipment) wave functions nor Hilbert-space vectors. I need a description, what's the meaning of the Schrödinger equation. If it's a one-particle Schrödinger equation, standard QT assumes that its modulus squared describes the probability-density distribution for registering this particle at the time and position given by its arguments.

In the paper, Carroll quotes,

https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1093/bjps/axw004
https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7577

however, he uses the standard formalism of defining states of subsystems of composite systems, namely the partial trace, now defining the state as given not by the wave functions but by statistical operators/density matrix (which of course is the only correct definition to begin with), and then using the standard interpretation of the density matrix to get the probabilities for the outcomes of measurements, leading to Born's rule, but isn't the density-matrix formalism just equivalent to Born's rule in its application to the special case of pure states (which are such states, for which the stat. op. is a projection operator, i.e., $\hat{\rho}^2=\hat{\rho}$)? So isn't he again assuming, in somewhat hidden form, just Born's rule?

I've nothing against the Everett interpretation per se, but I indeed only partially understand it, because it doesn't give a clear definition of the empirical meaning of the quantum state (probabilities in the minimally interpreted version of QT) and then pretends to derive Born's rule or the generalization to general states, defined via stat. ops. rather than "wave functions"/hilbert-space vectors.

Is there really no review/textbook, which just explains the Everett approach in a clear physicists' way as is done for orthodox QT, which I find way better (as long as one leaves out the collapse postulate and other oddities of the Copenhagen-interpretation mixtures) in just postulating the complete theory, including the probabilistic meaning of the quantum state right from the beginning, instead of pretending to derive it by just introducing it somehow assuming it through the "backdoor"?

 

[PeroK]

Well, the two postulates (stated in a very imprecise way, but this we can overread to demonstrate good will)

Are not sufficient to serve as a physical theory. All you have is a partial differential equation to calculate a wave function, which represents quantum states, but this is just a nice PDE you may solve if you like, but there's no physics in it. For this physics you need an interpretation, i.e., the connection with what's observable in Nature, where I neither observe (by my senses or with whatever delicate technical equipment) wave functions nor Hilbert-space vectors. I need a description, what's the meaning of the Schrödinger equation. If it's a one-particle Schrödinger equation, standard QT assumes that its modulus squared describes the probability-density distribution for registering this particle at the time and position given by its arguments.

This, IMO, sounds like a philosophical objection to the minimal MWI interpretation! Reading the paper below confirms my understanding that MWI is a minimalist interpretation. There is only the universal wavefunction - which behaves precisely according to orthodox QM. The difference is that MWI does not add a separate measurement process, but treats a measurement as just another QM unitary evolution. It has no need for the physical meaning that you are asking for.

In the paper, Carroll quotes,

https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1093/bjps/axw004
https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7577

however, he uses the standard formalism of defining states of subsystems of composite systems, namely the partial trace, now defining the state as given not by the wave functions but by statistical operators/density matrix (which of course is the only correct definition to begin with), and then using the standard interpretation of the density matrix to get the probabilities for the outcomes of measurements, leading to Born's rule, but isn't the density-matrix formalism just equivalent to Born's rule in its application to the special case of pure states (which are such states, for which the stat. op. is a projection operator, i.e., $\hat{\rho}^2=\hat{\rho}$)? So isn't he again assuming, in somewhat hidden form, just Born's rule?

I've nothing against the Everett interpretation per se, but I indeed only partially understand it, because it doesn't give a clear definition of the empirical meaning of the quantum state (probabilities in the minimally interpreted version of QT) and then pretends to derive Born's rule or the generalization to general states, defined via stat. ops. rather than "wave functions"/hilbert-space vectors.

Is there really no review/textbook, which just explains the Everett approach in a clear physicists' way as is done for orthodox QT, which I find way better (as long as one leaves out the collapse postulate and other oddities of the Copenhagen-interpretation mixtures) in just postulating the complete theory, including the probabilistic meaning of the quantum state right from the beginning, instead of pretending to derive it by just introducing it somehow assuming it through the "backdoor"?

I'm not sure why the simplicity of MWI is not clear. For example, if we prepare a system and allow it to evolve unmeasured, then that is MWI. Only on a subsystem scale. MWI applies that same process and mathematics to the universe as a whole.

There may be objections to that - one of which is that it's not a satisfactory theory of the macroscopic physical universe that we believe we measure. Another is that the complexities of the measurement process are simply shifted to the complexities of justifying the Born rule.

In any case, MWI and what Carroll is saying seems quite straightforward to me.

 

[gentzen]

Is there really no review/textbook, which just explains the Everett approach in a clear physicists' way as is done for orthodox QT, which I find way better (as long as one leaves out the collapse postulate and other oddities of the Copenhagen-interpretation mixtures) in just postulating the complete theory, including the probabilistic meaning of the quantum state right from the beginning, instead of pretending to derive it by just introducing it somehow assuming it through the "backdoor"?

Lev Vaidman's SEP article Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics should be a good no-nonsense review.
And Sean Carroll's Something Deeply Hidden should be a good readable book.

 

[PeroK]

Lev Vaidman's SEP article Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics should be a good no-nonsense review.
And Sean Carroll's Something Deeply Hidden should be a good readable book.

I'm quite gratified that Vaidman makes the same point about Ockham's razor that I made above!

 

[vanhees71]

I like Vaidman's emphasis of locality ;-)).

 

[pinball1970]

New to the party, I have read the first 20 or so posts. Should different/weird physics ever be expected? In our universe? I thought the whole point of MWI was that a branch is in a world we are not connected with AND why would it be weird?
Also I thought "multi verse" was to do with Guth's inflation not a measurement in QM.
Yes- My sources are popsci - just easier to get it out of the way.

 

[PeterDonis]

Should different/weird physics ever be expected? In our universe?

Not according to MWI; the MWI assumes our current laws of physics.

 

[LostInSpaces]

Not according to MWI; the MWI assumes our current laws of physics.

I think what most people who learn MWI through pop-sci think about is rather weirdness as in "If MWI is true, then that means I tunnel through the wall in some branch if I walk into the wall right now" or "the neurons in every person's brain could and thus will reconfigure such that we elect a duck as president of the whole planet". Neither of these explicitly violate the known laws of physics and since "everything happens" is preached, this is where the weirdness and confusion takes over

 

[PeterDonis]

Neither of these explicitly violate the known laws of physics

That "explicitly" hides the fact that the burden of proof is on the person proposing the weird scenario to show that it doesn't violate the known laws of physics--not just "explicitly" but at all. But nobody ever actually does that.

 

[vanhees71]

After reading some of the quoted texts in this forum, my main problem with MWI is that it promises more than it holds. First of all all of these texts are full of philosophy hiding the math and physics behind a wall of gibberish. The Vaidman article was the best I've seen yet:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/

The main obstacle from my physics-point of view is that they don't proof Born's rule for the probabilities, which finally are all that's observable also in this interpretation, from the other postulates but just assume them also more or less explicitly to begin with. That then the repetition of many realizations of an experiment on equally prepared systems (ensembles) reproduces these probabilities is just the central-limit theorem of probability theory. The probabilities a la Born are simply also assumed as they are in minimally interpreted QT. The rest is also just standard theory of "open quantum systems" with decoherence.

What I like is the strict avoidance of the quantum-classical cut a la Heisenberg, which is in no way observed yet but the validity of QT for larger and larger systems could be established. Also the emphasis of locality is on the plus side of this interpretation.

 

[GarberMoisha]

The MWI is not a complete interpeation like the CI. It would be strange if any interpretation was able to recover the Born's rule without somehow implicating the one doing the experiment.
How would they accomplish such a feat?
Physical matter is neither classical nor quantum. It is sort of both but in reality - neither. These are 2 aspects of something else that is matter in reality.

There is no law that dictates that quanta must make up a chair and act classically. There is also no law of physics that dictates that chairs must act quantum mechanically under certain circumstances.
These endless conceptual issues arise due to the ingrained intuitive Newtonian picture of what physical matter must be.

 

[LostInSpaces]

That "explicitly" hides the fact that the burden of proof is on the person proposing the weird scenario to show that it doesn't violate the known laws of physics--not just "explicitly" but at all. But nobody ever actually does that.

I agree, but this nuance is rarely, if ever, elucidated in popular science accounts of Everettian QM. Usually, the only caveat highlighted goes along the lines of "as long as it doesn't violate known laws of physics, it will happen." This dispels the idea that there are parallel universes where gravity is different or some other Lewisian modal worlds where dragons exist but does nothing to explain why MWI does not permit people to walk through walls in extremely low-weighted worlds. Afterall quantum tunneling is a thing, and as MWI is presented in pop-sci even ridiculously negligible probabilities are realized in some branches.

 

[PeterDonis]

Usually, the only caveat highlighted goes along the lines of "as long as it doesn't violate known laws of physics, it will happen."

Yes, but we don't actually know that all the things described meet that condition. For example, we don't know that the known laws of physics actually permit people to tunnel through walls, even with very low probability. We know electrons can tunnel through barriers, but people are not electrons.

Also, even the criterion as you state it is too broad. The actual criterion is that only the things that are included with nonzero amplitude in the actual wave function of the universe will happen. There is no reason to believe that everything that is possible according to the laws of physics has a nonzero amplitude in the actual wave function of the universe. Of course we don't know the actual wave function of the universe so we don't know which things actually have nonzero amplitudes in it and which don't. But that still doesn't justify the claim that everything that is possible according to the laws of physics will actually happen in some branch in the MWI.

 

[romsofia]

Is there really no review/textbook, which just explains the Everett approach in a clear physicists' way as is done for orthodox QT, which I find way better (as long as one leaves out the collapse postulate and other oddities of the Copenhagen-interpretation mixtures) in just postulating the complete theory, including the probabilistic meaning of the quantum state right from the beginning, instead of pretending to derive it by just introducing it somehow assuming it through the "backdoor"?

DeWitt attempts to do this in his book "The global approach to quantum field theory I" in chapter 8 (QUANTUM THEORY OF MEASUREMENT), chapter 9 (INTERPRETATION OF THE QUANTUM FORMALISM I) and chapter 12 (INTERPRETATION OF THE QUANTUM FORMALISM II).

DeWitt goes above my head at times, so I haven't really sat down and worked through what he puts down, but it was his intent in this chapters.

 

[LostInSpaces]

Yes, but we don't actually know that all the things described meet that condition. For example, we don't know that the known laws of physics actually permit people to tunnel through walls, even with very low probability. We know electrons can tunnel through barriers, but people are not electrons.

I agree; I am merely explaining my hypothesis of why MWI causes so many people to think that "Everything that can happen will happen". I don't blame them, as this is how it is often depicted. We know particles can tunnel through barriers, and people and barriers are made of particles, so it is natural to extrapolate that indeed people can also tunnel through walls by this logic.

 

[Nugatory]

does nothing to explain why MWI does not permit people to walk through walls in extremely low-weighted worlds. Afterall quantum tunneling is a thing, and as MWI is presented in pop-sci even ridiculously negligible probabilities are realized in some branches.

That’s true of all interpretations, not just MWI, and the answer is the same: There’s not a lot of operational difference between the statements “X cannot happen” and “The probability of X happening is less than 10^-10000 per trial”.

It is somewhat perplexing to me that the probabilistic nature of QM’s macroscopic predictions gets so much attention, yet no one cares about the probabilistic basis of statistical mechanics and all of thermodynamics.

 

[berkeman]

We know particles can tunnel through barriers, and people and barriers are made of particles, so it is natural to extrapolate that indeed people can also tunnel through walls by this logic.

This means nothing without a video...

 

[OCR]

This means nothing without a video...

OK, then. . . .

Mysterious Cube

.

 

[LostInSpaces]

That’s true of all interpretations, not just MWI, and the answer is the same: There’s not a lot of operational difference between the statements “X cannot happen” and “The probability of X happening is less than 10^-10000 per trial”.

It is somewhat perplexing to me that the probabilistic nature of QM’s macroscopic predictions gets so much attention, yet no one cares about the probabilistic basis of statistical mechanics and all of thermodynamics.

Sure, however, "Every branch is realized" is the crux here. In single-world interpretations, such low probabilities just do not happen at all; ever, there's not enough space-time in existence, so naturally, they can be entirely discarded. It's not only that it rarely happens; it does not happen. I believe people's grasp of probability vanishes when they are told that it does indeed happen, even if it is only to an infinitesimal portion of future observers, hence threads like this.

 

[GarberMoisha]

This is the result of the mode of thinking in which quantum mechanics is supposed to underly everything. You get quantum paradoxes all the way up to human scales. Cats, Moons, people walking through walls, Wigner's friends, etc.
You don't get these if you consider that both classical and quantum behavior are not fundamental but are distinct aspects of something else that is matter.

 

[gentzen]

Sure, however, "Every branch is realized" is the crux here. In single-world interpretations, such low probabilities just do not happen at all; ever, there's not enough space-time in existence, so naturally, they can be entirely discarded. It's not only that it rarely happens; it does not happen. I believe people's grasp of probability vanishes when they are told that it does indeed happen, even if it is only to an infinitesimal portion of future observers, hence threads like this.

Sean Carroll is good at explainig why this way of thinking about MWI is a mistake (i.e. he agrees with you, and tries to explain why MWI should not change your probability based decisions -- or expectations).

Max Tegmark manages to get this wrong in the worst possible way:

https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032.pdf

Read the shortish paper. It's quite informative and addresses several misconceptions and criticisms.

This paper says more about its author (and his ideas about mathematics) than about the MWI. And what it actually says about MWI (IV.B) is worse than merely being wrong.

 

[Nugatory]

You don't get these if you consider that both classical and quantum behavior are not fundamental but are distinct aspects of something else that is matter.

We don’t need to go that far. If we consider quantum behavior to be fundamental, classical behavior for large collections of particles appears (analogous to the way that the ideal gas law emerges for macroscopic collections of molecules when we take Newton’s laws as fundamental).

The difficulty (which bothers some more than others) with considering quantum mechanics to be fundamental is not that it predicts that “strange things happen here” - it doesn’t. The difficulty is closing the gap between a prediction of various outcomes and the experience of exactly one outcome.

 

[vanhees71]

But isn't this as fundamental an observational fact as it is in classical physics? If we do a double-slit experiment with electrons, we just prepare a beam of electrons (or many single electrons) hitting the double slit with a pretty well defined momentum and then register, on which point of a screen far enough away from the double slit. It's a basic observational fact that for any electron we get "one pixel" registering one electron (where "a pixel" is just a macroscopically small region on a pixel detector, photoplate, etc.). According to QT where each individual electron is registered is random, and the probability distribution function is given by Born's rule from the calculated wave function at the place where we register the electrons. These are the simple observational facts we describe probabilistically with QT.

Of course, you can always ask, whether the necessity for a probabilistic description is due to some ignorance about the state of the electron in this situation, i.e., that there are maybe "hidden variables", whose determination would also determinate precisely the spot, at which we'll register a specific single electron. What's ruled out by many Bell-test experiments is that such a hidden-local-variable model can be made deterministic (realistic = all observables always take determined values) and local (space-like separated events cannot be causally connected).

Whether there may be some future deterministic theory describing everything in Nature, nobody can know, but the given empirical evidence is completely described by Q(F)T, except that there is no satisfactory QT which takes into account the gravitational interaction (or, if one takes the geometrodynamical paradigm of GR literally a QT of spacetime itself). IMHO that's the big open problem of contemporary physics and not some interpretational issues of QT, which are all solved theoretically (with relativsitic local QFT describing everything except the gravitational interaction) and consolidated empirically (with the long overdue Nobel prize of last year).

 

[GarberMoisha]

We don’t need to go that far. If we consider quantum behavior to be fundamental, classical behavior for large collections of particles appears (analogous to the way that the ideal gas law emerges for macroscopic collections of molecules when we take Newton’s laws as fundamental).

The difficulty (which bothers some more than others) with considering quantum mechanics to be fundamental is not that it predicts that “strange things happen here” - it doesn’t. The difficulty is closing the gap between a prediction of various outcomes and the experience of exactly one outcome.

If QM as it is known today were fundamental, you'd expect to get random detections here and there.
Instead, you get chairs and tables which have never been part of QM.
It can't be reformulated to be about chairs. Best you can do is say "it is important what we can say about nature, not what nature is".
It's dubious if you'd ever move forward if you instist on getting chairs from probabilities.