My definition of consciousness - non recursive

[Tam Hunt]

Apeiron, I think you are ignoring a key feature of the universe in your version of process explanation: yourself. Under your arguments thus far you are simply ignoring experience (subjectivity). Everything you've talked about thus far is explanation of the behavior of matter and information, which could at least in theory be exactly the same in the proverbial "zombie universe." I know - more than I know anything, literally - that I am not a zombie. I assume you are not a zombie. Accordingly, a comprehensive explanation of the universe would need to include an explanation of experience. Yours does not.

Experience, in my discussion thus far, can be thought of as a separate stuff (ontological category), and I've suggested that perhaps information itself is synonymous with experience, thus any theory of information systems and flows would necessarily be a theory of experience. I've also suggested that experience can be thought of as a property of all matter. These aren't really exclusive theories, unless we are very strict with our philosophizing. I'm not at this point decided as to which approach is better. But I do know that either of these approaches does at least explain in some manner a rather key feature of our universe: experience.

Discussion of genes, neurons and words is certainly important, but these are all part of the "easy problem." They simply go to how matter and information move. Without the key addition of explaining how mind and matter relate, we are left with only half an explanation of the universe.

 

[apeiron]

It is your choice to bang your head against the wall of the hard problem. If you insist on reifying experience, then you will always be troubled by its "existence".

I see it the other way round. My knowledge of social constructionism, psychophysics and neurology have shown me just how much this "solid thing" of an experiencing self breaks up into a complex process. Knowledge of the actual science does help dissolve that good old sense of mystery. Few people can even give an accurate account of "what it is like to dream", "what it is like to remember". People make grand claims about their subjective selves, yet they cannot even describe what is taking place.

And before jumping on the information theory bandwagon, it is worth understanding what that is all about. Simply the atomisation of global form. It is about accounting for form (ie: process, organisation, structure, systemshood) in terms of a substance ontology.

Again, it is falling into the trap of treating form as substance rather than seeing form as equally fundamental. Equally fundamental as a modelling perspective - we don't want to fall into that other elephant trap of dualism either.

So you are making all the familiar beginner's mistakes in consciousness studies.

You have to remember that what happened in science was that consciousness was a forbidden subject for decades. Then when it was allowed back in again in the early 1990s - largely because brain scanners came along and it suited many people to drum up a hunt for the neural correlates of consciousness to get these wonderful new machines and research empires funded - most people had forgotten what Victorian thinkers had already realized.

The community started from scratch, from scientific naivety. Thus we had Chalmers and Hameroff (and Crick and Edelman). We had a cartoon divide into the two opposing "schools of thought" science always requires to look as though it permits credible debate.

On the one hand, there were those shouting the slogan, hard problem means all your solutions are only the easy answers. On the other side were the reductionists who claimed no hard problem existed.

Both positions are childish extremes. If you want to get away from the simplicities of dualism vs monadism, you have to rise up another dimension to the triadic world of systems science, pansemiosis and hierarchy theory! The place where middles are no longer excluded, but instead bounded.

 

[SDetection]

to Dmitry67:
Hi, do you have more examples of conscious experiences ?.
thanks.

 

[Tam Hunt]

Apeiron, I love your consummate confidence. But I'd suggest you read a little more consciousness studies from before the 1990s before you conclude that considering experience real is reification. For example, maybe actually read some of Whitehead's work? I recommend his Process and Reality. It's difficult but worth the slog. His is a highly sophisticated TOE that actually includes the rather important half of our universe that I label "experience" - following Griffin's terminology. It is not reification to conclude that experience exists. Frankly, I don't see how any thinking person can conclude such - pardon the pun. Whitehead harps much on the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, so he's well attuned to the trap of reification. But you, my friend, seem to have gone off the deep end away from ification of anything.

It's also good to be cognizant of the distinction between experience and self/identity. I struggled mightily with Hoftstadter's works, in which he follows the Dennett view that consciousness doesn't exist. You seem to be echoing much of what Hoftstadter and Dennett have written. The mistake/confusion I finally realized was that Hoftstadter and Dennett are using the word "consciousness" to mean what I call self/identity. I agree with H/D that the self is largely an illusion - it's another one of these slippery terms that isn't really an all or nothing quality; rather, it's a quantitative "matter of degree" something. I am largely the same person I was a second ago, but just a little different as my body and thoughts have changed. I'm barely at all the same person I was when I was three and really all I have in common with that person is my name and some shared memories.

Experience, however, is quite different. Experience is instantaneous and doesn't actually require memory to exist. Self/identity is, however, durationally fattened experience.

Anyway, it seems highly unlikely that we're going to convince each other of our views, but I do appreciate the dialogue. I would also appreciate some links or titles for works along the lines of the semiotic/information process approach you've been discussing. You've mentioned Peirce, but I suspect there are many others you could refer me to.

 

[apeiron]

Thanks for recommending Whitehead. It sits on my shelf about six foot away. Yes I have read it. As I said, there is a lot I liked about it.

Authors I would recommend, off the top of my head...

Ulric Neisser
Stan Salthe
Stephen Grossberg
Walter Freeman
Lev Vygotsky
Alexander Luria
Fritjof Capra
Ludwig von Bertalanffy
Robert Rosen
Howard Pattee
Ilya Prigogine
Robert Ulanowicz
Humberto Maturana

 

[apeiron]

Experience is instantaneous and doesn't actually require memory to exist.

How can you talk such garbage? Where is your evidence that experience is instant? As I'm sure you know from your extensive research, the fact that it is non-instant was about first fact that got psychology going - Donders and Wundt ring any bells with you?

 

[baywax]

If scientists are able to fight apoptosis(programmed cell death), our human bodies may become nearly eternal.

Sorry buddy... cancer mutation beat us to the punch. That's why cancer cells are called immortal cells, they've shut off apoptosis. If you want to be a walking, talking, ever expanding tumour for eternity... be my guest!

 

[Tam Hunt]

Apeiron, thanks for the reading suggestions - could you narrow your recommendations a tad?

Re experience as instantaneous, I wasn't as clear as I should have been: "instantaneous" in this context means "occurring in an instant," not the mathematical sense of instantaneous. So experience may at least in theory be quantized, though I suspect there are different quantizations for each type of experience. For example, a subatomic particle's quantum of experience is probably many orders of magnitude shorter than an ant's, which is probably a good order of magnitude shorter than human experience. This is the case because by the time a higher level "actual occasion" (with a "drop of experience" to use Whitehead's phrase) may be realized, as the product of many levels of constituent actual occasions, the informational "prehensions" take a bit longer to complete (in the "satisfaction"). So, in sum, experience is instantaneous in terms of each actual occasion's satisfaction. Self/identity is the apparent continuity of experience, but it is in my view a matter of degree, not one of kind. This is what I meant by self/identity is durationally fattened experience.

 

[apeiron]

Apeiron, thanks for the reading suggestions - could you narrow your recommendations a tad?

That was the narrow version.

For example, a subatomic particle's quantum of experience is probably many orders of magnitude shorter than an ant's, which is probably a good order of magnitude shorter than human experience.

Oh my gawd!