D H said:
We use digital computers to approximate solutions to systems of differential equations. They do not solve them.
If an analytic solution is possible, a (digital) computer is as capable as a scientist to solve it. And if not, then it might just be that no exact solution exists -- not for you, not for the computer, not for nature. Indeed, such a solution corresponds to hypercomputation (at least in some cases). Take the gravitational many body problem: if you had an exact solution, you could solve the halting problem. Why? Because you can build a computer out of such a system (IIRC, a three body system suffices), and with your analytic solution, could find out for any given evolution of the system whether it ever reaches some halting state.
They give answers that are very close to a solution. Way back in the day, scientists used analog computers that at least conceptually could yield exact solutions to systems of different equations.
Conceptually, yes, if you neglect finite measurement precision. In practice, analog computers work maybe to three or four digits precision.
You are assuming that the universe is computable and then using that assumption to prove that the universe is computable. That of course is not a valid line of reasoning.
I just observe that every process in the universe (that we've come across so far, at least) can be arbitrarily well approximated using computational means -- i.e. that no matter how big my magnifying glass, I could not observe any deviation that I could not in principle compute. That reality then is computable is just the most conservative hypothesis to go with. The real numbers might have seemed a natural choice when they were first introduced into physics; however, from today's perspective, with the benefit of a theory of computation, they seem like almost alchemistic constructs.
And I'm still not sure I get in what way you claim that Newtonian mechanics, etc., are non-computable theories. One can completely recast these theories in terms of Turing machines, or partial recursive functions from initial to final values. That they are formally defined over the reals plays no role, as everything we do with them happens entirely within a computable subset thereof; and neither does the fact that they involve differentiation, which is in the end just a limit, which exists precisely if it is computable. In the end, anything that can be reduced to manipulating symbols on a sheet of paper according to a certain set of rules is computable, and I don't think there's any theory that can't be thus reduced.