I agree with your assertion that my 'red' may not be the same as yours (for instance, the subjective color that I associate with a light wavelength of 500 nm, you may associate with a light wavelength of 700 nm). I don't see how this is really relevant to my argument, though. So long as what we both agree to call 'red' is a subjective phenomenon of consciousness, my argument holds.Originally posted by Royce
You do not know RED. You and I and everyone else were taught or told that this color is red when we were toddlers. It is arguable that we saw red but did not know that it was called red. Red is an intersubjective experience. There is no way that I can know that the red that I perceive is the same red that you or anyone else perceives.
Again I agree, but subjectivity at least is made an intelligible phenomenon if we abstain from the assumption that objective reality is non-mental in nature.There is no bridge between objectivity and subjectivity other than assumption and faith, not religous faith but faith as in an unproven and unprovable belief that intersubjectivity supports objectivity.
I actually have addressed this point earlier in the thread:This is not a valid necessary assumption. When a human being's heart stops pumping blood the being is no longer conscious. I, therefore, conclude that the heart is the seat of consciousness. When a human being loses too much blood even though the heart is still bumping s/he becomes unconscious; therefore, I conclude that my first concluision was in error and it is blood that is the seat of consciousness. It is the same with blood glucose levels and body temperature as well as numerous other things.
It seems to me that consciousness is more than a brain being present but and entire system. I am pointing out that it is very easy to make assumptions about things that we are so familiar with and so much a part of our consciousness. Red is not red but what we were told is called red.
That the brain is the seat of consciousness is only an unsupported assumption. If we can not even know what consciousnes is how can we assume we know where it originates? The brain may be a necessary part of consciousness but so is blood, heart, lungs, kidneys, heat etc.
Remove a brain from a body, the body is no longer conscious but even if we supply all of the environmental requirements for the brain, is it conscious, science fiction not withstanding? We do not know. We may be able to montor activity but is it conscious? It is the same with your computer.
It is indeed important to acknowledge the context of the entire living system when we talk about consciousness. But within the system, we can still talk about component parts performing individual functions while tacitly acknowledging their dependence on the functioning of the entire system. For instance, it is common knowledge that the heart is responsible for pumping blood. But without the proper signals from the brain, the heart would not pump blood. Should we therefore conclude that it is improper to say that the heart pumps blood? Similarly, we say the brain produces consciousness. Now, it would not be able to do so without the proper context of a healthily functioning body; but it is clear from mountains of evidence of brain lesion studies, brain stimulation studies, etc., that we can say that the brain produces consciousness in the same way we can say that the heart pumps blood.Once we get to the question of a sufficiently detailed computer simulation of a brain, we are making a further assumption-- that it does not matter if we replace the physical organization of neurons in the context of the brain in the context of the body with the vastly different physical organization of processors and memory chips in the context of a computer.
If we accept that the brain produces consciousness, then we must attribute its production of consciousness to certain physical characteristics of the brain. However, as it is not yet clear which physical characteristics of the brain play a part in producing consciousness and which are irrelevant, it is correspondingly unclear which can be abstracted away (such as in the case of a computer).