xwolfhunter
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I know that this book is both fundamentally flawed and an extremely important book. I got it for Christmas, and I kind of view it like a whetstone for my mind. I'm taking my time and I won't turn the page unless I understand everything beforehand. I've been on the same page for a little bit, though, and I want someone who is familiar with it to help me out a little. I got the rough draft version, so I think it's partly that, but anyway.
I'm in the introduction, at the point where he discusses propositional functions, and he says, "Let ##\phi x## be a statement containing ##x## and such that it becomes a proposition when ##x## is given any fixed determined meaning. Then ##\phi x## is called a "propositional function"; it is not a proposition, since . . . it really makes no assertion at all." (Due to the ambiguity of ##x##). Later on the same page he says "When we wish to speak of the propositional function corresponding to "##x## is hurt," [in other words, ##\phi x##, which is, according to him . . . a propositional function . . .] we shall write "##\hat{x}## is hurt." Thus "##\hat{x}## is hurt" is the propositional function and "##x## is hurt" is an ambiguous value of that function."
Ignoring the contradiction in definition, the structure as I see it is we have some variable ##x##, which can take the form of anything, potentially, but is never in and of itself a proposition. Then we have ##\phi##, the functional variable, which is essentially a proposition that describes nothing. When we apply this to ##x##, we get ##\phi x##, which is the "propositionization" of ##x##, and the completion of ##\phi##, giving it something to describe. But still at this point, ##\phi x## is not a proposition, since it speaks of nothing in particular, though a specific member of nothing in particular. So far everything is in terms of a variable ##x##. Now from the functional variable's side, saying nothing of ##x##, we can define ##\phi \hat{x}## as the collection of all possible values of ##x## applied to ##\phi##. ##x## itself has absolutely nothing to do with ##\phi \hat{x}##, because ##\hat{x}## is an apparent variable, while ##x## is a free variable - right? Or . . . do we say ##\phi \hat{x}## is a propositional function, and ##\phi x## is a propositional function of ##x##? Also, what exactly is ##\phi \hat{x}##? It's not a proposition, but I don't think it's a variable proposition either, since it . . . has . . . no . . . variable? We can't say ##\phi \hat{x}## is true, because ##(x) \cdot \phi x## is what we'd use to . . . or is ##\phi \hat{x}## always true regardless . . .
I think I'm like right on the verge of exact comprehension here, but the book is not written for the layperson, which I very much am, so a little elucidation would be very much appreciated.
I'm in the introduction, at the point where he discusses propositional functions, and he says, "Let ##\phi x## be a statement containing ##x## and such that it becomes a proposition when ##x## is given any fixed determined meaning. Then ##\phi x## is called a "propositional function"; it is not a proposition, since . . . it really makes no assertion at all." (Due to the ambiguity of ##x##). Later on the same page he says "When we wish to speak of the propositional function corresponding to "##x## is hurt," [in other words, ##\phi x##, which is, according to him . . . a propositional function . . .] we shall write "##\hat{x}## is hurt." Thus "##\hat{x}## is hurt" is the propositional function and "##x## is hurt" is an ambiguous value of that function."
Ignoring the contradiction in definition, the structure as I see it is we have some variable ##x##, which can take the form of anything, potentially, but is never in and of itself a proposition. Then we have ##\phi##, the functional variable, which is essentially a proposition that describes nothing. When we apply this to ##x##, we get ##\phi x##, which is the "propositionization" of ##x##, and the completion of ##\phi##, giving it something to describe. But still at this point, ##\phi x## is not a proposition, since it speaks of nothing in particular, though a specific member of nothing in particular. So far everything is in terms of a variable ##x##. Now from the functional variable's side, saying nothing of ##x##, we can define ##\phi \hat{x}## as the collection of all possible values of ##x## applied to ##\phi##. ##x## itself has absolutely nothing to do with ##\phi \hat{x}##, because ##\hat{x}## is an apparent variable, while ##x## is a free variable - right? Or . . . do we say ##\phi \hat{x}## is a propositional function, and ##\phi x## is a propositional function of ##x##? Also, what exactly is ##\phi \hat{x}##? It's not a proposition, but I don't think it's a variable proposition either, since it . . . has . . . no . . . variable? We can't say ##\phi \hat{x}## is true, because ##(x) \cdot \phi x## is what we'd use to . . . or is ##\phi \hat{x}## always true regardless . . .
I think I'm like right on the verge of exact comprehension here, but the book is not written for the layperson, which I very much am, so a little elucidation would be very much appreciated.
), but I wouldn't say that this book is "flawed". Or at least, not in the sense of being wrong. It's only that this approach turns out to be too complicated for practical purposes. Today we have a much simpler and more practical system called ZFC.