Psi-epistemic arguments against reality of quantum states

In summary, The conversation discusses an argument against psi-ontic interpretations made by Spekkens in Section 2.1. The argument states that if someone hands you a particle in state x+ or y+ and you cannot tell the difference with certainty from a subsequent measurement, it is puzzling that you cannot necessarily tell the difference if those were 2 different ontic states. This is taken as an argument against psi-ontic interpretations. However, it is questioned whether ontic states should be perfectly distinguishable from a single measurement and if this argument holds weight. The conversation also mentions similar issues with other arguments against psi-ontic interpretations in the section and clarifications are requested. The paper being discussed has been published in an open access
  • #1
msumm21
218
16
I was just reading a paper <predatory publisher reference deleted>

There is an argument (originally by Spekkens), in Section 2.1, that is supposed to be against psi-ontic interpretations. As I understand it, it's that if someone hands you a particle in state x+ or y+ you cannot tell the difference with certainty from a subsequent measurement. Although I realize this is true, the argument continues to say that, if those were 2 different ontic states then it's puzzling that you cannot necessarily tell the difference, and therefore taken as an argument against psi-ontic interpretations. This latter part is what I don't understand. Is there some reason to think that ontic states should be perfectly distinguishable from a single measurement? Why would this argument hold weight?

I have similar issues with the other arguments against psi-ontic interpretations in this section. Any clarifications would be much appreciated.
 
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  • #2
msumm21 said:
I was just reading a paper

There is an argument (originally by Spekkens), in Section 2.1, that is supposed to be against psi-ontic interpretations. As I understand it, it's that if someone hands you a particle in state x+ or y+ you cannot tell the difference with certainty from a subsequent measurement. Although I realize this is true, the argument continues to say that, if those were 2 different ontic states then it's puzzling that you cannot necessarily tell the difference, and therefore taken as an argument against psi-ontic interpretations. This latter part is what I don't understand. Is there some reason to think that ontic states should be perfectly distinguishable from a single measurement? Why would this argument hold weight?

I have similar issues with the other arguments against psi-ontic interpretations in this section. Any clarifications would be much appreciated.
Has that paper been published yet in a mainstream peer-reviewed journal? If not, it may not be an acceptable reference for starting a thread on the PF...
 
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  • #3
Yes, looks like both this paper and the paper this specific section references were peer reviewed.
 
  • #4
msumm21 said:
Yes, looks like both this paper and the paper this specific section references were peer reviewed.
Great! Please post the links to the peer-reviewed papers and we can keep this thread open for discussion. :smile:
 
  • #5
From the Mentor discussion about this thread, it appears that the paper has not been published by a reputable source. Thread will remain closed until the OP can PM me a valid link for discussion. Thank you.

It was published in an open access journal which is not on the TR master journal list. It is also not on Beal's list of predatory publishers.
 

What is a psi-epistemic argument against the reality of quantum states?

A psi-epistemic argument is a philosophical argument that challenges the traditional interpretation of quantum mechanics, which posits that quantum states are physically real. Instead, psi-epistemic arguments propose that quantum states are merely a mathematical representation of our knowledge or information about a system.

How do psi-epistemic arguments challenge the reality of quantum states?

Psi-epistemic arguments suggest that the uncertainty and randomness observed in quantum systems are not inherent properties of the system itself, but rather a reflection of our limited knowledge or information about the system. This challenges the idea that quantum states are physically real and raises questions about the nature of reality.

What evidence supports psi-epistemic arguments?

One of the main pieces of evidence for psi-epistemic arguments is the fact that quantum mechanics allows for non-local correlations, where the state of one particle can instantly affect the state of another particle regardless of distance. This is seen as problematic for the idea of physical reality, as it suggests that information is somehow being transmitted faster than the speed of light.

What are the implications of psi-epistemic arguments?

If psi-epistemic arguments are true, it would mean that our understanding of the physical world is limited by our knowledge and observations. This challenges the idea of an objective reality and raises questions about the role of consciousness in creating reality.

Are there any counterarguments to psi-epistemic arguments?

Yes, there are several counterarguments to psi-epistemic arguments. One is that the non-local correlations observed in quantum mechanics can be explained by hidden variables, which are unobservable properties that determine the state of a system. Another counterargument is that psi-epistemic arguments rely on a subjective interpretation of probability, whereas the traditional interpretation of quantum mechanics uses a more objective approach.

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