There is some discussion of Rosenbergs „A Place for Consciousness“ (APFC) in the December issue of Psyche. All articles are available in the World Wide Web. See http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/" 1) William S. Robinson has some „Doubts on Receptivity“. It may be only a trivially truth that effectiveness and receptivity are logical compliments of one another. There is no new idea in this as there is in the logical relation of Northness and Southness. An obvious difference is that for Rosenberg receptive properties are connective relations while effective properties can be one-place. As far as I see the duality between law of nature and disposition is far more similar to the conceptual connection between receptivity and effectiveness. Rosenberg himself calls the effective properties "effective dispositions". He refrains to call his receptive properties laws of nature or instances of laws of nature, but at least in his example of a toy Newtonian physics the level two individuals correspond to instances of Newton’s laws. I'm sure that both not each regularity of nature corresponds to law of nature and not all laws of nature correspond abstractions of receptive properties. But I suppose that each receptive property corresponds to at least one law of nature. (See Rosenberg's hierarchy of Humean, nomic and causal mesh of the facts. Each mesh includes and refines the previous. See chapter 11 of APC.) This does not solve Robinson's doubts since one of the two concepts. Many think that dispositions are reducible to laws of nature, or vice versa. If it is like that, they cannot be two sides of the wall of causality. In the second part of his essay Robinson recognizes the binding function of receptive properties: Receptive properties constitute individuals. But this only helps to reformulate his triviality problem in another way. You may collect some effective connections of some individuals and rename them as common receptivity. The question remains. There is no positive argument as required by Robinson in APFC. Rosenberg proposes a model how this could be possible. His idea is that the constraints of a level N receptivity cannot be reconstructed by level N individuals and their effective properties. Given only these effective properties there is too much undetermined. No receptive connection without real constraint to the lower level effective properties. (One may call this an emergence of a new individual (of level N+1 or not. The counterexample mentioned by Robinson would not work with this kind of emergence.) 2) Jennifer McKitrick gives a more detailed analysis and criticism in „Rosenberg on Causation“. Dispositions are for McKitrick intrinsic properties of individuals and may exist even if a disposition is never manifested. For a relation to exist there have to be at least two objects. Therefore, a relation cannot be a dispositional property. But Rosenberg calls his receptive properties on the one side connective and relational properties and on the other side receptive dispositions. - I think Rosenberg could accept McKitrick’s supposition concerning the intrinsicallity of dispositions: Again the hierarchical structure of individuals may provide some help. Insofar the receptivity of the many level N individuals is on focus no one can see how their shared receptive property may be dispositional. Of course it is not intrinsic to any one of these level N individuals but intrinsic to them. But it may be an intrinsic and dispositional property of the new constituted level N+1 individual. 3) McKitrick dislikes the idea of receptive powers as connections. She does not see (or at least she does not value) its positive contribution on the Theory of Causal Significance. Receptive properties seem to be beyond the real of scientific investigation. She accepts that they have to be introduced on conceptual reasons. But why not prefer the simple solution without relational properties? – I try to answer: Rosenberg may say that this would be a trivial understanding of receptivity (to use the terms of Robinson). This trivial understanding does not correspond to logical necessity of a concept of receptivity. Besides, Rosenberg perhaps could resist on having the really simpler concept of causality. 4) McKitrick further thinks that receptive properties that are needed to bind effective properties are faced to a version of the “third man problem”. - I answer: Again the hierarchy of individuals may stop the regress. If there is nothing further to constrain and the reality is determinate there is no further receptive property necessary to bind anything. 5) The hierarchical structure of individuals is a big problem for McKitrick. On Rosenberg’s account individuals of lower levels that are parts of an individual of a higher level are not actual as long as the higher level individual constraints them. This makes problems (i) conceiving of binding and causal activity in non actual realms and (ii) for the individuation of properties. Ad (i): Conceiving non actual entities as conceiving actual entities independent of their environment does not very much, as McKitrick suggests. This puts them only from real space to possibility space, from one environment into another. – But why not, I would ask, take non actual individuals as unconstrained individuals as Rosenberg suggests. A kidney in the hand of a surgeon one second before he transplants it to a new body is not constraint to clean blood because it not constrained by the rest of an human body to do its proper function. (This model says: There is no actual kidney in the time before the transplantation but only a possible kidney.) The talk non actuality as considered independent of environment can be refined by saying: independent of the constraints of higher level individuals. Ad (ii): Suppose there is a positive charge in the actual world. The following counterfactual would be true in Rosenberg’s theory: This makes problems with the identity conditions for properties - I think like McKitrick that a haecceitas of properties will not be a good candidate for the identity conditions. I do not think that there is a relation of identity between the determinate and the determinable property. I do not really see McKitrick’s problem. I would say If this instance of positive charge were not bound to other properties, it would not be an instance at all. 6) In section 4.1 McKitrick supposes that effective dispositions are of no need of a carrier. Her own theory of causation and the attempts of Mumford and Mulnar also make this point. Unfortunately, McKitrick does not introduce these theories and I do not know them. In addition, she does not show how these theories disprove Rosenberg’s argument for the carrier theory.