Quantum Mechanics and Determinism?

[Tournesol]

(as I said, I can program a computer with those criteria,
but it does not follow that a computer with such criteria will possesses UR).

It doesn't follow that it doesn't.

I do not accept that sufficiently advanced computers cannot have FW. How can you be sure they
don't ? If you are appealing to some futher X-factor, then you
need to state what it is.

What you need to do is to establish the
sufficient conditions for UR, and then to show that your model meets those conditions. This you have not done.

I have done both.

If your thesis is that the Darwinian model possesses UR, then I suggest that my iRIG/dRIG example under the heading The Problem
with Indeterminism in post #3 of this thread falsifies your thesis.

I have answered that objection:

Real Randomness and Pseudo-randomness: The difference
A pseudo-random numbers is a mechansim (usally an algorithm) that spits out numbers deterministically. They are deemed to be
pseudo-random so long as they are reasonably unpredictable and evenly distributed. Detecting a pseudo-random number generator
as such depends on how much of its output you have in relation to how complex it is. (wikipedia article)
Real Randomness and Pseudo-randomness: objectivity
Some people claim it is impossible in principle to empirically detect the difference between real, intrinsic randomness and
pseudo-randomness. Whilst initially plausible, this is in fact doubtful as sophisticated procedures like the Aspect experiment show.
Even if it is true, the main thrust of the argument is that a free will is possible if indeterminism is possible, not that
indeterminism-based free will is actually true. The possibillity of indeterminism-based free will is thus established even if
the truth of indeterminsim based free-will is epistemically inaccessible. "it is not necessarily true" is no rebuttal to "it is
possible".

Real Randomness and Pseudo-randomness: subjectivity
A variation on that argument has it that substituting pseudo-randomness for real randomness in the brain would make no subjectively
detectable difference. It is difficult to see how anyone could be sure at the time of writing. There is considerable disagreement
about how and to what extent subjective consciousnes relates to the physical. Whether a physical system is random or deterministic
has a physical basis -- it is part of the total physical situation. Physicalism requires only that consciousness supervenes on
the physical, not that it supervenes on any particular aspect of the physical, so it is physicalistically allowable for the
difference between real- and pseudo-randomness to be subjectively detectable. As ever, it should be born in mind that the
claim "naturalistic libertarian free will is possibly true" is not contradicted by scenarios that claim naturalistic libertarian
free will is possibly false", only be the claim that it is actually false.

Real Randomness and Pseudo-randomness: necessity
Yet another variation on the same objection has it that real randomness is not actually necessary to solve the "engineering" problem -- that pseudo-randomness would have been just as good. As stated that is true, buit it is not very relevant. Nature might have evolved a pseudo-random-number generator in the brain, but that doesn't mean She did. It might have been "easier" to take afvantage of the thermal noise present in all systems. In any case, the usual response applies. The modality is wrong. To say that our thesis might not have been true does not mean it is actually false. And in any case, it is only a claim to the effect that something is possible.

Please could you explain how the Aspect experiment allows us to distinguish between intrinsic randomness and pseudo-randomness?

It establishes the non-existence of one class of hidden variables, local hidden
variables. A "hidden variable" approach to QM is basically a claim that it is pseudo random.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tournesol
Even if it is true, the main thrust of the argument is that a free will is possible if determinism is possible, not that
indeterminism-based free will is actually true. The possibillity of indeterminism-based free will is thus established even if the
truth of indeterminsim based free-will is epistemically inaccessible. "it is not necessarily true" is no rebuttal to "it is possible".

Oh really, Tournesol, now you are employing the supernaturalistic tactic of “I cannot show that my explanation actually works, or that
it is even coherent, in practice, but you also cannot prove that I am wrong, therefore there is a possibility I might be right”.

As stated it is perfetly valid. How else does one argue for a possibility ?

That’s a desperate and naïve move which does not lend any credibility at all to your thesis. Such a move is the last resort of the
person who has run out of rational argument – “you can’t prove me wrong, therefore I may be right, therefore I am justified in my belief” – this tactic can be used to “justify” a belief in absolutely anything which is even remotely logically possible (eg solipsism). If you wish to resort to this tactic then there is no point in continuing with rational discussion, because it simply comes down to “I believe it – so there”.

The claim "it is possible therefore it is true" is invalid. However, I am not making that claim.
You are ignoring important details.

If free will entails UR, then I claim (as per post #3) that you have NOT shown that UR entails indeterminism. All you can show
(I believe) is the following :

EITHER (a) both models possesses UR, OR (b) neither model possesses UR, OR (c) UR is epiphenomenal.

The fact that something is indetectable does not mean it doesn't exist.
If FW depends on indeterminism, and indeterminism is an indetectable fact, then FW
is an indetectable fact. There are indetectable facts, such as how many
children Lady macbeth had. You argument is based on a false inference.

And I am *not* conceding that indeterminism *is* indetectable.

It *might* be indetectable. In that case, the substantiveness of my
claim depends on the detectability of indeterminism. But the claim
anyway explicitly depends ont the existence of indeterminism. The
claim that X is possible generally depends on other possibilities.
It is no objection to a possibility claim to point that out.

As with so many of your other obejctions, it would make
sense if I were claiming FW necessarily exists.

A variation on that argument has it that substituting pseudo-randomness for real randomness in the brain would make no subjectively
detectable difference. It is difficult to see how anyone could be sure at the time of writing.

At the end of the day, we cannot be “certain” of anything. To follow your latest “defence” of your thesis to its logical conclusion,
I cannot be sure that solipsism is false, and I cannot be sure that the supernaturalists are wrong (I have no way of proving it).

That is a straw-man. I was not talking about solipsism, I was talking the question of how consciousness
supervenes on the physical.

But
I certainly do not believe solipsism is true, and I do not accept as true the supernaturalist explanation for free will (and neither
do you), simply because I cannot prove them false.

The question is what is possibe.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Tournesol
As ever, it should be born in mind that the claim "naturalistic libertarian free will is possibly true" is not contradicted by
scenarios the claim naturalistic libertarian free will is possibly false", only be the claim that it is actually false.
Santa Claus, Tooth Fairies, Leprechauns, Tokoloshes, etc etc are also all possibly true – but I don’t believe in them either.

You shouldn't because there is no prima-facie evidence. There is prima facie
evidence of FW, as I explain at the beginning of http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html

Your claim up to now was NOT that UR is “possibly true”, it is the stronger claim that the Darwinian model is a mechanism which
can actually create free will (and hence UR). But you have not demonstrated, by any rational or objective argument, that your
model actually creates UR, you simply believe that it does, in the same way that my baby daughter once believed in the Tooth
Fairy. Forgive me if I don’t share your faith.

The model fulfils my criteria for UR. If you have other criteria, you need to say what they are.

The Aspect experiment test for local hidden variables.

But it did not rule out non-local hidden variables.

I did not claim it provide final proof of phsyical indeterminism. It *does* show
that physical indeteminism can be investigated. Bell's Theorem was
quite unexpected when it was first published. Something equally unexpected might
be published tomorrow.

QM may indeed be pseudo-random – we just don’t know for sure (and nor will we
ever know for sure – because the HUP places a limit on our epistemic horizon, and there IS no way to prove that an event is genuinely
and ontically, as opposed to epistemically, random).

Whether the HUP itself is epistemic or ontic is open to question.

 

[moving finger]

Hi Tournesol

Apologies for delay in reply - been on vacation for 2 weeks.

(as I said, I can program a computer with those criteria, but it does not follow that a computer with such criteria will possesses UR).

It doesn't follow that it doesn't.

The only rational way to correctly conclude that an agent possesses UR is (a) to agree the necessary & sufficient conditions for UR and (b) to demonstrate that the agent meets those conditions. In absence of such a demonstration, it would simply be a matter of faith (not of science, and also not of philosophy) whether an agent possesses UR or not.

I do not accept that sufficiently advanced computers cannot have FW. How can you be sure they don't ? If you are appealing to some futher X-factor, then you need to state what it is.

FW entails UR. If you wish to claim that an agent possesses FW by virtue of possessing UR, the onus is on you to show how (ie in what way) we can distinguish between an agent which possesses UR, and an agent which does not. Otherwise we are simply left with “the agent possesses UR simply because I claim it does”. My argument is that UR is a (naturally) incoherent concept (it entails infinite regress) – the only route to UR is via supernaturalism.

See : http://www.geocities.com/alex_b_christie/Routes.pdf

What you need to do is to establish the sufficient conditions for UR, and then to show that your model meets those conditions. This you have not done.

I have done both.

You have not, as far as I can see, established the necessary & sufficient conditions for UR and shown that your model can satisfy these conditions. If you think you have done this, could you please point out exactly where?

Some people claim it is impossible in principle to empirically detect the difference between real, intrinsic randomness and pseudo-randomness. Whilst initially plausible, this is in fact doubtful as sophisticated procedures like the Aspect experiment show.

The Aspect experiment shows nothing of the sort. Could you explain why you think it does?

The possibillity of indeterminism-based free will is thus established

The possibility of indeterminism-based free will has not been established. Indeterminism leads simply to…… indeterminsim. You have not demonstrated how this equates with free will (since free will entails UR, and you have not shown how indeterminism gives rise to UR).

Please could you explain how the Aspect experiment allows us to distinguish between intrinsic randomness and pseudo-randomness?

It establishes the non-existence of one class of hidden variables, local hidden variables. A "hidden variable" approach to QM is basically a claim that it is pseudo random.

It does not establish the non-existence of non-local hidden variables. Thus it does not establish the non-existence of pseudo-randomness. The world could indeed be (non-locally) pseudo-random, and we have no way of knowing that it is not – the Aspect experiment does not rule out pseudo-randomness.

If FW depends on indeterminism, and indeterminism is an indetectable fact, then FW is an indetectable fact.

How do you know that FW depends on indeterminism if both FW and indeterminism are both indetectable facts? Your premise that FW depends on indeterminism is simply that – a premise. It’s like claiming :

Premise : pink fairies depend on Santa Claus
Premise : Santa Claus is an indetectable fact
Conclusion : pink fairies are indetectable facts

Which is a totally useless argument (it can be applied to derive any conclusion we wish), since neither the premises nor the conclusion can be in any way validated.

There are indetectable facts, such as how many children Lady macbeth had.

Do you mean the historical Lady Macbeth, or the Shakespearean character? Why would you believe the number of children borne by the historical Lady Macbeth is an indetectable fact? That the number of children borne by a fictional character (Shakespeare's portrayal of the Macbeth's is factually inaccurate) is indetectable is a function of the fact that the number is ontically indeterminate, it is not an indetectable "fact" - it is a "non-fact" which is therefore not quantifiable by definition.

Interesting that you should bring up the subject of Macbeth's descendants. I am of the Farquharson clan, which emerged as a clan from Macbeth's G G G G grandson Archibald Finley in 1236. The Finley clan had been outlawed by the English after Macbeth's death at the hands of Duncan's son (assisted by those damned English).

Santa Claus, Tooth Fairies, Leprechauns, Tokoloshes, etc etc are also all possibly true – but I don’t believe in them either.

You shouldn't because there is no prima-facie evidence. There is prima facie evidence of FW

There is plenty of prima facie “evidence” for these and other supernatural phenomena if you look for it, and interpret the evidence the way you want to. I could claim your alleged “prima facie evidence of free will” is in fact only evidence that some people believe they have free will, and not evidence that free will actually exists.

Bell's Theorem was quite unexpected when it was first published. Something equally unexpected might be published tomorrow.

Yes. And pigs might fly. As a physicist I recently read remarked :

Be open-minded : But not so much that your brain falls out

(Jim Al-Khalili)

Whether the HUP itself is epistemic or ontic is open to question.

That’s exactly what I’ve been saying – there is no way we can know for sure. Whether one believes the world is intrinsically deterministic or indeterministic is a matter of faith, not science. But this question is irrelevant in this context, because no matter what one believes about indeterminism, there is no coherent naturalistic mechanism (either deterministic or indeterministic) which gives rise to UR, hence to free will.

Best Regards

 

[selfAdjoint]

FW entails UR. If you wish to claim that an agent possesses FW by virtue of possessing UR, the onus is on you to show how (ie in what way) we can distinguish between an agent which possesses UR, and an agent which does not. Otherwise we are simply left with “the agent possesses UR simply because I claim it does”. My argument is that UR is a (naturally) incoherent concept (it entails infinite regress) – the only route to UR is via supernaturalism

I agree with you. The strong "libertarian" definition of free will is unverifiable, and therefore a matter of faith. what do we conclude from that?

 

[moving finger]

I agree with you. The strong "libertarian" definition of free will is unverifiable, and therefore a matter of faith. what do we conclude from that?

I would go further and say that the notion of libertarian free will is not only unverifiable - it is (naturalistically) incoherent (ie there is no way that we can explain or model such a form of free will using a naturalistic approach - the only way to derive such a free will is via appeal to supernaturalism).

The (so-called Darwinian) model proposed by Tournesol provides for rational unpredictability in behaviour, but (and this part Tournesol does not seem to accept) libertarian free will is not simply equated with "rational unpredictability" - it also requires ultimate responsibility as a necessary condition. And ultimate responsibility entails infinite regress - it is not something that any naturalistic model or explanation can possibly achieve. Tournesol seems to hold fast to the hope that maybe someone, somewhere, someday, can come up with a naturalistic mechanistic explanation of how we can overcome the obstacle of infinite regress - of how free will can pull itself up by its own hair from the swamp of nothingness (as Nietzsche graphically put it). As I said, it's also possible that pigs can fly (and I'd prefer to bet on flying pigs).

Best Regards

 

[selfAdjoint]

Tournesol seems to hold fast to the hope that maybe someone, somewhere, someday, can come up with a naturalistic mechanistic explanation of how we can overcome the obstacle of infinite regress - of how free will can pull itself up by its own hair from the swamp of nothingness (as Nietzsche graphically put it). As I said, it's also possible that pigs can fly (and I'd prefer to bet on flying pigs).

Well I wouldn't deny that hope; you haven't firmly SHOWN that UR is incoherent, and so denying would just be "atheism of the gaps"; claiming to refute a position based on a contingent deficit in theory.

 

[moving finger]

Well I wouldn't deny that hope; you haven't firmly SHOWN that UR is incoherent, and so denying would just be "atheism of the gaps"; claiming to refute a position based on a contingent deficit in theory.

Of course - hope springs eternal as they say - and there is no law of the universe which says humans cannot believe in hopeless causes. In the final analysis one is left only with premises. I cannot prove that a mechanism which does not exist is an impossible mechanism, all I can do is to show that there is no naturalistic way such a mechanism can work - because to work it would need to pull itself up by its own non-existent bootstraps. There may be some supernatural way such a thing is possible, I cannot prove there is not.

I cannot prove solipsism is false. I cannot prove that ultimate responsibility does not arise from some supernatural means. I also can't firmly show that Santa Claus, the tooth fairy, tokoloshes and leprechauns don't exist (partly because one cannot prove supernatural events are impossible). I simply choose to use premises which do not require such supernatural explanations as part of my understanding of the world. And the premise of free will is an unnecessary premise in my philosophy.

Best Regards

 

[Tournesol]

MF

it also requires ultimate responsibility as a necessary condition. And ultimate responsibility entails infinite regress

Given your definition of freedom as being freedom from all
outside inlfuences. However, I am operating on the
definition. However , I define FW as
"the power or ability to rationally choose and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances".

So the "infinite regress" objection is essentially a straw man.

 

[moving finger]

Hi Tournesol

I define FW as "the power or ability to rationally choose and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances".

So the "infinite regress" objection is essentially a straw man.

Are you saying that your version of free will does not entail ultimate responsibility?

If so, this sounds more like the compatibilist version of "free will" (which is compatible with determinism) rather than libertarian free will.

Best Regards

 

[Tournesol]

Hi Tournesol
Are you saying that your version of free will does not entail ultimate responsibility?

No, I am saying it doens't entail an infinite regress

If so, this sounds more like the compatibilist version of "free will"

Of course not, I explicitly argue against compatiblism.

 

[moving finger]

Hi Tournesol

No, I am saying it doens't entail an infinite regress

UR does indeed entail infinite regress, as shown here :

http://www.geocities.com/alex_b_christie/Swamp.pdf

UR is not a "pre-existing property" of mass/energy - except perhaps in some extremist supernatural theories which might posit UR as a fundamental property inherent in matter, in the same way that Princeton physicists have laughably suggested that "free will", if it exists at all, must also exist at the quantum level (ie if humans have free will then so too do fundamental particles).

Unless you wish to suggest that UR is a property inherent in matter, then (if UR exists at all in some agents), it must emerge or be created via some process within the agent. There is no naturalistic process whereby UR can be created, hence our only way of getting UR is either via infinite regress, or via some unknown supernatural process (as explained in the link above).

Could you show how the infinite regress implicit in UR can be avoided? In other words, could you show how UR is created within an agent? To do this, you will need to (i) establish the necessary & sufficient conditions for UR, then (ii) show that the agent satisfies these conditions.

If we cannot show either (a) that UR exists within an agent, or (b) propose some credible hypothesis as to how UR might be created within an agent, then any belief in the existence of UR is an issue of faith, not of science or philosophy.

On a separate but related point, could you explain how your definition of FW differs from the "free will skeptic" position? A free will skeptic (such as myself) would say that the fact that an agent can rationally choose and consciously perform certain actions (ie act deterministically), some of which are not necessarily brought about inevitably by external circumstances (ie some of them may have indeterministic causes), is completely compatible with a simple mixture of determinism and indeterminsim, can be easily modeled by a simple machine, but does not satisfy the necessary conditions for libertarian free will by virtue of the fact that it is silent on the issue of UR.

Best Regards

 

[Tournesol]

Unless you wish to suggest that UR is a property inherent in matter, then (if UR exists at all in some agents), it must emerge or be created via some process within the agent. There is no naturalistic process whereby UR can be created, hence our only way of getting UR is either via infinite regress, or via some unknown supernatural process (as explained in the link above).

An agent is responsible if the have control over their actions. They don't
have to have contol over their control (ad infinitum). Your argument is like
saying you don't know something unless you know that you know it,and
know that you know that you know it, ad infinitum. It is just an
entirely artifical problem. Nothing *requires* such a regress.

Yo just need to know. And you just need self-control.

To look at it another way, if no-one has UR, then no-one is morally
responsible. Is that something you really believe ?

Could you show how the infinite regress implicit in UR can be avoided?

What infinite regress ?

It isn't implicit, any more than knowing-that-you-know is implicit
in knowing.

The conscious rational state I am in today needs to be connected with
the states i was in yesterday and tommorow, but it odens't need 100% connection. I don't need to have full conscious, rational control from the moment I was born. It can "fade in". As of course it does, developmentally. You might say that without 1005 ratioanl self control
at all times, I don't have 100% moral responsibility. Well, perhaps
I don't. Perhaps no-one does. The tendency to
think in terms of absolutes is part of the old, supernatural way
of thinking.

In other words, could you show how UR is created within an agent?

Minimally, an agent has UR if there are objective
grounds for subjecting that agent to praise and blame
in order to modify their behaviour. We balme the assassin,
not the gun. You speak about UR as though it is some
mystical force.

To do this, you will need to (i) establish the necessary & sufficient conditions for UR, then (ii) show that the agent satisfies these conditions.

Which I have:-

UR has two main components. (1) a Casual Originative Power, the ability to do something that is not the inevitable outcome of external influences, and (2) Rational Self-Control.

The point about Origination is that we hold some entities repsonsible and not others. For compatiblists, that is a mere convention, for libertarians it must have an objective basis. The basis is the ability to intentionally originate actions. We do not blame the gun for the murder because guns do not spontaneously kill people. We praise the artist, not her brushes. The murderer does have the ability to intentionally originate actions.

Likewise, we do not attribute moral responsibility to entities that lack Rational Self Control even if they can "do the unexpected" -- that includes mentally troubled humans as well as unstable isotopes!

Ideally, UR should have an objective explanation (rather than a conventional one, like deeming certain pieces of paper to be "money"). For naturalists, it should have ane explanation grounded in physics. The hypothesis of indeterminism can fulfil the role of an explanation of Causal Originative Power aspect of UR as well as being the obvious explanation for AP.

An indeterministic cause is an event which is not itself the effect of a prior cause. Thus, if you trace a cause-effect chain backwards it will come to a halt at an indetermistic cause; the indeterministic cause stands at the "head" of a cause-effect chain. Thus, such causes can pin down the UR, the originative power, of agents.

There are two important things to realize at this point:

Firstly, I am not saying that indeterministic causes correspond one-to-one to human decisions or actions. It takes billions of basic physical events to produce an action or decision. The claim that indeterminism is part of this complex process does not mean that individual decisions are "just random". (As we expand here). We will go onto propose that there are other mechansims which filter out random impulses, so that there is rational self-control as well as casual originative power, and thus both criteria for UR are met.

Secondly, I am also not saying that indeterminism by itself is a fully sufficient criterion for agenthood. If physical indeterminism is widespread (as argued here), that would attribute free will to all sorts of unlikely agents, such as decaying atoms. Our theory requires some additional criteria. There is no reason why these should not be largely the same criteria used by compatibilists and supercompatibilists -- rule-following rationallity, lack of external compulsion, etc. Where their criteria do not go far enough, we can supplement them with UR and AP. Where their criteria attribute free will too widely to entities, our supplementary criteria will narrow the domain.

If we cannot show either (a) that UR exists within an agent, or (b) propose some credible hypothesis as to how UR might be created within an agent, then any belief in the existence of UR is an issue of faith, not of science or philosophy.

"If".

On a separate but related point, could you explain how your definition of FW differs from the "free will skeptic" position? A free will skeptic (such as myself) would say that the fact that an agent can rationally choose and consciously perform certain actions (ie act deterministically), some of which are not necessarily brought about inevitably by external circumstances (ie some of them may have indeterministic causes), is completely compatible with a simple mixture of determinism and indeterminsim, can be easily modeled by a simple machine, but does not satisfy the necessary conditions for libertarian free will by virtue of the fact that it is silent on the issue of UR.

Says who? If you do something of your free will , it is your responsibility --
that is practically a tautology. The point of interest is that
indeteminism provides both the Elbow Room necessary
for freedom and the causal origination necessary for UR, for
the buck to stop with agents. (And, no, it isn't
"just randomness" because of the SIS).

You seem to be defining UR in some way different from myself, Dennett,
kane, etc.

"to be ultimately responsible
for an action, the agent must be responsible for anything that is a sufficient reason (condition, cause or motive) for the action’s occurring. If, for example, a choice issues from, and can be sufficiently explained by, an agent’s character and motives (together with background conditions), then to be ultimately responsible for the choice, the agent must be at least in part responsible by virtue of past voluntary choices or actions for having the character and motives he or she now has (Kane(a) p 130)."

"According to Kane, in order for us to be responsible for our actions, we must be at least partly responsible for the sufficient causes that move us to action."

http://www.morris.umn.edu/academic/philosophy/hallthesis.html

 

[Tournesol]

The only rational way to correctly conclude that an agent possesses UR is (a) to agree the necessary & sufficient conditions for UR and (b) to demonstrate that the agent meets those conditions. In absence of such a demonstration, it would simply be a matter of faith (not of science, and also not of philosophy) whether an agent possesses UR or not.

So? I have given the N&S conditions, and since my theory is naturalistic, it is all testable in theory.

Originally Posted by Tournesol
I do not accept that sufficiently advanced computers cannot have FW. How can you be sure they don't ? If you are appealing to some futher X-factor, then you need to state what it is.

FW entails UR.

You deny that elsewhere...

If you wish to claim that an agent possesses FW by virtue of possessing UR, the onus is on you to show how (ie in what way) we can distinguish between an agent which possesses UR, and an agent which does not. Otherwise we are simply left with “the agent possesses UR simply because I claim it does”. My argument is that UR is a (naturally) incoherent concept (it entails infinite regress) – the only route to UR is via supernaturalism.

I have answered the regress issue elsewhere. If libertarianism is false, agents will still
possess responsibility in a limited (semicompatilbist) sense. Libertariansim provides
a fuller picture, which support the idea that we do indeed produce or generate our
actions in some sense, rather than beign yet another link inthe chain
of C&E.

You have not, as far as I can see, established the necessary & sufficient conditions for UR and shown that your model can satisfy these conditions. If you think you have done this, could you please point out exactly where?

here:-

"UR has two main components. (1) a Casual Originative Power, the ability to do something that is not the inevitable outcome of external influences, and (2) Rational Self-Control."

Some people claim it is impossible in principle to empirically detect the difference between real, intrinsic randomness and pseudo-randomness. Whilst initially plausible, this is in fact doubtful as sophisticated procedures like the Aspect experiment show.

The Aspect experiment shows nothing of the sort. Could you explain why you think it does?

Pseudo-randomness means hiden variables. The Aspect experiment rules out one class of HV theories.

The possibillity of indeterminism-based free will is thus established
The possibility of indeterminism-based free will has not been established. Indeterminism leads simply to…… indeterminsim. You have not demonstrated how this equates with free will (since free will entails UR, and you have not shown how indeterminism gives rise to UR).

yes I have:-

"The point about Origination is that we hold some entities repsonsible and not others. For compatiblists, that is a mere convention, for libertarians it must have an objective basis. The basis is the ability to intentionally originate actions. We do not blame the gun for the murder because guns do not spontaneously kill people. We praise the artist, not her brushes. The murderer does have the ability to intentionally originate actions".

"Likewise, we do not attribute moral responsibility to entities that lack Rational Self Control even if they can "do the unexpected" -- that includes mentally troubled humans as well as unstable isotopes!"

"Ideally, UR should have an objective explanation (rather than a conventional one, like deeming certain pieces of paper to be "money"). For naturalists, it should have ane explanation grounded in physics. The hypothesis of indeterminism can fulfil the role of an explanation of Causal Originative Power aspect of UR as well as being the obvious explanation
for AP."

"An indeterministic cause is an event which is not itself the effect of a prior cause. Thus, if you trace a cause-effect chain backwards it will come to a halt at an indetermistic cause; the indeterministic cause stands at the "head" of a cause-effect chain. Thus, such causes can pin down the UR, the originative power, of agents".

Please could you explain how the Aspect experiment allows us to distinguish between intrinsic randomness and pseudo-randomness?

By ruling out one class of hidden variables.
In conjunction with a good reason to rule out non-locality, it would form
a complete reason to reject determinism. we already have fairly
good reaosn, in that relativity is local, and non-locla HV theories
like Bohm's are difficult to relativis, which is why
they are rejected by most physicists.

It establishes the non-existence of one class of hidden variables, local hidden variables. A "hidden variable" approach to QM is basically a claim that it is pseudo random.

It does not establish the non-existence of non-local hidden variables. Thus it does not establish the non-existence of pseudo-randomness. The world could indeed be (non-locally) pseudo-random, and we have no way of knowing that it is not – the Aspect experiment does not rule out pseudo-randomness.

You do not know whether or no we have a way of knowing establishing randomenss over pseudo
randomenss. Bell's paper, on which the Aspect Expereiemtn ws based, came as a surprise
to the physics community. As I have explained, an good reason to reject non-locality
will seal the deal. You do no know whether or not such an expereiment will be
performed or how. It is you who are engaging in wishful thinking.

If FW depends on indeterminism, and indeterminism is an indetectable fact, then FW is an indetectable fact.

How do you know that FW depends on indeterminism if both FW and indeterminism are both indetectable facts?

GOFCA. Good Old Fashioned Conceptual Analysis. Physicsts know that gravitons have
spin 2, even thogh one jhas never been detected. How do you think they do that?

Your premise that FW depends on indeterminism is simply that – a premise. It’s like claiming :

Premise : pink fairies depend on Santa Claus
Premise : Santa Claus is an indetectable fact
Conclusion : pink fairies are indetectable facts

Which is a totally useless argument (it can be applied to derive any conclusion we wish), since neither the premises nor the conclusion can be in any way validated.

It's a hypotehtical arguemnt. Everythign is a hypothesis until it is put into pratice, e.g
"if we build a big enough rocket, we can fly to the moon".

(None of this, BTW, is related to the claim that FW is incoherent. Undetecability is not
incoherence. Not that I am in any way conceding the undetecability point).There are indetectable facts, such as how many children Lady macbeth had.

Do you mean the historical Lady Macbeth, or the Shakespearean character? Why would you believe the number of children borne by the historical Lady Macbeth is an indetectable fact?

Can you detect it?

That the number of children borne by a fictional character (Shakespeare's portrayal of the Macbeth's is factually inaccurate) is indetectable is a function of the fact that the number is ontically indeterminate, it is not an indetectable "fact" - it is a "non-fact" which is therefore not quantifiable by definition.

Interesting that you should bring up the subject of Macbeth's descendants. I am of the Farquharson clan, which emerged as a clan from Macbeth's G G G G grandson Archibald Finley in 1236. The Finley clan had been outlawed by the English after Macbeth's death at the hands of Duncan's son (assisted by those damned English).

So can you detect it? If you have inside information, the philosophy community had better
find another stock example of an indectable fact.

Santa Claus, Tooth Fairies, Leprechauns, Tokoloshes, etc etc are also all possibly true – but I don’t believe in them either

And Higgs bosons, and extraterrestrial life, and a cure for cancer...

But at least you have conceded that FW is possibly true...

You shouldn't because there is no prima-facie evidence. There is prima facie evidence of FW

There is plenty of prima facie “evidence” for these and other supernatural phenomena if you look for it, and interpret the evidence the way you want to.

if you interpret it, it isn't prima facie.

I could claim your alleged “prima facie evidence of free will” is in fact only evidence that some people believe
they have free will, and not evidence that free will actually exists.

I dae say you would.
A solipsist would say that sensory evidecne is only evidence that people
mistakenly believe in an exteranl world... PF evidence must be treated as true by until proven
false.

Bell's Theorem was quite unexpected when it was first published. Something equally unexpected might be published tomorrow.

Yes. And pigs might fly. As a physicist I recently read remarked :

So nobody is ever going to make a startling discovery again, ever, ever ,ever.
That is a pretty startling discovery, Dr Christie. Or is it just an opinion ?

Be open-minded : But not so much that your brain falls out
(Jim Al-Khalili)

You seem to have run out of arguments.

That’s exactly what I’ve been saying – there is no way we can know for sure.

Then we cannot knwo whether randomenss is provable or not.

Whether one believes the world is intrinsically deterministic or indeterministic is a matter of faith, not science.

Unless is is proveable. Which you don't know, one way or the other.

But this question is irrelevant in this context, because no matter what one believes about indeterminism, there is no coherent naturalistic mechanism

Incoherent means self-contradictory. You have not shown a contradiction in my theory. You are
just saying that you don't like it, you are not going to believe it, it goes against your opinions,
etc.

 

[moving finger]

Hi Tournesol

An agent is responsible if the have control over their actions. They don't have to have contol over their control (ad infinitum).

If we wish to claim that the agent has ultimate control over its actions, then yes they do have to have control over their control. (If someone else is in "control of my control", then in an ultimate sense I am not in fact in control of my actions therefore cannot claim to be in ultimate control)Taking your claim literally, then a simple thermostat is responsible by virtue of the fact that it controls the temperature of a room. In the “responsible simpliciter” sense this is of course quite correct, a thermostat is indeed responsible for controlling the temperature of a room. But it does not possesses ultimate responsibility, precisely because it does not have “control over its control” (ad infinitum).

Your argument makes the same mistake as the confusion between “responsibility simpliciter” and “ultimate responsibility”. An inanimate machine can be responsible for an action, but that does not mean it possesses ultimate responsibility. A thermostat controls the temperature of a room, but that does not mean that it is in ultimate control (because the control it exerts is determined by a pre-existing design and programme which are not under the thermostat's control).

To look at it another way, if no-one has UR, then no-one is morally responsible. Is that something you really believe ?

First define moral responsibility. If you mean “ultimate moral responsibility” then the concept is incoherent (hence no-one possesses ultimate moral responsibility – and yes, I do believe this). But moral responsibility without the “ultimate” qualification, like responsibility simpliciter, is quite coherent and does exist.

Could you show how the infinite regress implicit in UR can be avoided?

What infinite regress ?

Read the paper that you pasted the link to in your last post :

http://www.morris.umn.edu/academic/philosophy/hallthesis.html

This paper clearly explains the nature of the infinite regress.

If I am to be ultimately responsible for my state N, then it follows that I must also be ultimately responsible for my state N-1, the causally antecedent state to N. But then I must also be ultimately responsible for my state N-2, the causally antecedent state to N-1, and so on ad infinituum. To avoid this regress you need to explain how it can come about that I can be held ultimately responsible for my state N in the case where I am NOT ultimately responsible for the causally antecedent state N-1. Suggesting that state N is not fully causally determined and has some indeterministic component does not generate ultimate responsibility.

(and suggesting that I need only be "partially ultimately responsible" rather than fully responsible for an action, whatever partial responsibility might mean, makes no difference to the injfinite regress argument, as shown towards the end of this post - you cannot generate "partial UR" from "zero UR" any more easily than you can generate "full UR" from "zero UR")

The conscious rational state I am in today needs to be connected with the states i was in yesterday and tommorow, but it odens't need 100% connection. I don't need to have full conscious, rational control from the moment I was born. It can "fade in". As of course it does, developmentally.

How does it “fade in”? By what process can a system which is not ultimately responsible for its actions at one moment in time then become ultimately responsible at a later moment in time? How can it come about that I can be held ultimately responsible for my state N if I am NOT ultimately responsible for the causally antecedent state N-1? I agree conscious responsibility simpliciter “fades in” as conscious control fades in – but again we must not confuse responsibility simpliciter with ultimate responsibility.

In other words, could you show how UR is created within an agent?

Minimally, an agent has UR if there are objective grounds for subjecting that agent to praise and blame in order to modify their behaviour.

Sorry, Tournesol, but this does not show “how UR is created within an agent” – it simply describes how we arbitrarily assign responsibility simpliciter to agents, and how (some of us) assume that this responsibility is also somehow “ultimate responsibility”. You have not shown how (ie in what way) UR is created, or how (ie in what way) we can detect such UR (as opposed to simply assuming that it exists). An agent does not need to possesses UR in order to be responsible simpliciter for an action, and it does not need to possesses UR in order to modify its behaviour following praise or blame for its actions. It can also be 100% deterministic and we could still subject it to praise and blame in order to modify its behaviour (but then, even though it still meets with your description above, I guess you would NOT claim that it possesses UR).

Thus I ask again, could you show how UR is created within an agent?

You speak about UR as though it is some mystical force.

Indeed it is – UR is an incoherent notion therefore can arise only via supernatural means – isn’t that what a mystical force is?

To do this, you will need to (i) establish the necessary & sufficient conditions for UR, then (ii) show that the agent satisfies these conditions.

UR has two main components. (1) a Casual Originative Power, the ability to do something that is not the inevitable outcome of external influences, and (2) Rational Self-Control.

Are you suggesting that these conditions are necessary & sufficient (N&S) for UR? In other words, any agent which meets these conditions therefore possesses UR? I could in principle build a fancy thermostat which possesses “rational self-control”, with an added internal random number generator implanted to ensure that at least some of the thermostat’s behaviour is not “the inevitable outcome of external influences”. Such a machine would meet your above N&S conditions - does it follow that it possesses UR?

If we cannot show either (a) that UR exists within an agent, or (b) propose some credible hypothesis as to how UR might be created within an agent, then any belief in the existence of UR is an issue of faith, not of science or philosophy.

"If".

As explained above, you have not shown that UR exists or is created within any agent (when I asked you to show how UR is created within an agent, you simply described an assumption). When I asked for the necessary & sufficient conditions for UR, your reply implies that a suitably modified thermostat would possesses UR. Your argument is based simply on an assumption that UR exists, with inadequate coherent evidential justification or rational support. That’s why I call it an issue of faith. That’s why the “If” – because you have not shown that belief in the existence UR is anything more than faith.

On a separate but related point, could you explain how your definition of FW differs from the "free will skeptic" position? A free will skeptic (such as myself) would say that the fact that an agent can rationally choose and consciously perform certain actions (ie act deterministically), some of which are not necessarily brought about inevitably by external circumstances (ie some of them may have indeterministic causes), is completely compatible with a simple mixture of determinism and indeterminsim, can be easily modeled by a simple machine, but does not satisfy the necessary conditions for libertarian free will by virtue of the fact that it is silent on the issue of UR.

Says who?

Says me. Your definition of free will is :

"the power or ability to rationally choose and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances".

An agent does not need to possesses UR in order to act with free will according to the above definition. It only needs to choose rationally and to consciously perform actions (which action can be purely deterministic and does not entail UR), and have some internal indeterministic component (which also does not entail UR) which ensures that not all of its actions are brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances. Where does UR come into it at all? In other words, your definition of free will does not require, it does not entail, UR. And without UR, your definition is not a form of free will that would be acceptable to a libertarian.

You seem to be defining UR in some way different from myself, Dennett, kane, etc.

Not at all. My argument works for UR as defined by Kane, as shown below.

"According to Kane, in order for us to be responsible for our actions, we must be at least partly responsible for the sufficient causes that move us to action."

(here we assume that in the above "responsible" means "ultimately responsible")

And what about the causes of those causes?
Adding the qualification “at least partly” doesn’t change the argument.

If I am not (at least partly) UR for the state N-1 which is the sufficient cause of state N, then how can I possibly be (at least partly) UR for state N? (Kane agrees that I cannot).

But if I am to be (at least partly) UR for the state N-1, then I must also in turn be (at least partly) UR for the sufficient causal state N-2… and so on.

How do you avoid the infinite regress of (partial) UR? To do this, you will need to show how you can generate partial UR from a starting state of zero UR…….. can you? If you cannot show how it is done, your belief in UR is an article of faith and not of philosophy or science (which unfortunately then puts you in the supernaturalistic camp).

By the way, thank you very much for the link at http://www.morris.umn.edu/academic/philosophy/hallthesis.html

This paper clearly agrees that UR does indeed lead to infinite regress - perhaps you should read it yourself? This is one of the main conclusions of the paper :

Kane’s own theory of freedom does not seem to meet the UR condition. His notion of Self-Forming Actions seems to be inherently flawed. Kane tries to use SFAs to evade the problem of regression concerning the origins of our act. However, Kane’s theory does not overcome the regress problem. Kane’s theory does not give and adequate account of how agents can gain responsibility-grounding control.

I am simply claiming the same for your "theory".

Incoherent means self-contradictory.

Not at all.

Incoherent means “it doesn’t hang together and make clear, rational sense”. Someone who is incoherent is someone who is unable to think or express their thoughts in a clear or orderly manner.

A self-contradictory statement might be called incoherent (but this is arguable), but incoherent statements are not necessarily self-contradictory.

Best Regards

 

[moving finger]

Whether one believes the world is intrinsically deterministic or indeterministic is a matter of faith, not science.

Unless is is proveable. Which you don't know, one way or the other.

But I do know – it follows quite naturally from the HUP.

Can we prove the world is or is not completely deterministic? No, the HUP shows that this is impossible (ie there are limits to our knowledge of the world, thus there may be some deterministic relationships, such as hidden variables, which are in principle undetectable).

Can we prove the world is or is not at least partly indeterministic? No, again the HUP shows that this is impossible. Any indeterminism we think we observe may simply be a result of epistemic indeterminability (as opposed to ontic indeterminism), as a consequence of the limitations in our knowledge of the world.

Conclusion : Neither determinism nor indeterminism can be proven either true or false.

Best Regards

 

[selfAdjoint]

Any indeterminism we think we observe may simply be a result of epistemic indeterminability (as opposed to ontic indeterminism), as a consequence of the limitations in our knowledge of the world.

Finger, if we hypothesize that quantum uncertainty is epistemic, then this is just a technological, contigent limitation. Look what happened to the similar "diffraction limitation" in optics.

 

[moving finger]

Finger, if we hypothesize that quantum uncertainty is epistemic, then this is just a technological, contigent limitation. Look what happened to the similar "diffraction limitation" in optics.

is it? surely not if it's limited by the HUP - if the HUP is a genuine fundamental principle then I don't see how it can be circumvented?

Unless Afshar is correct of course, and complementarity is not all it's cracked up to be?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afshar_experiment

But I'm not a physicist - could you briefly describe the diffraction limitation issue, and why it's not a limitation after all? Or point me to a website so I can educate myself?

Best Regards

 

[selfAdjoint]

is it? surely not if it's limited by the HUP - if the HUP is a genuine fundamental principle then I don't see how it can be circumvented?

Unless Afshar is correct of course, and complementarity is not all it's cracked up to be?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afshar_experiment

But I'm not a physicist - could you briefly describe the diffraction limitation issue, and why it's not a limitation after all? Or point me to a website so I can educate myself?

Best Regards

Diffraction limitation is an old rule from optics, based on a wave theory of light, which is correct for this purpose, that says that with light of a given frequency, and therefore fixed wave length, you can't "resolve" (i.e. see clearly) objects shorter than the wave length (there's a factor in there I'm ignoring). Microscopists were driven by this to use shorter and shorter wavelengths, culminating in the celebrated electron diffraction microscope which uses the Compton wavelength of electrons. But in recent years clever work with "nonlinear media" has demonstrated powerful violations of diffraction limitation.

My point was that if you assume the UP is epistemic, i.e "We can't observe the particle perfectly because our observation disturbs it", this ignores the possibility that we could, perhaps using entanglement as Einstein, Posolski, and Rosen suggested, observe it without disturbing it. Althhough Heisenberg motivated his concept using epistemic considerations he actually derived it using the Fourier transform relationship of the momentum and position wavefunctions from quantum theory.

 

[moving finger]

Diffraction limitation is an old rule from optics, based on a wave theory of light, which is correct for this purpose, that says that with light of a given frequency, and therefore fixed wave length, you can't "resolve" (i.e. see clearly) objects shorter than the wave length (there's a factor in there I'm ignoring). Microscopists were driven by this to use shorter and shorter wavelengths, culminating in the celebrated electron diffraction microscope which uses the Compton wavelength of electrons. But in recent years clever work with "nonlinear media" has demonstrated powerful violations of diffraction limitation.

thanks selfAdjoint - that's interesting , I will investigate more! It's always good to learn new stuff.

My point was that if you assume the UP is epistemic, i.e "We can't observe the particle perfectly because our observation disturbs it", this ignores the possibility that we could, perhaps using entanglement as Einstein, Posolski, and Rosen suggested, observe it without disturbing it. Althhough Heisenberg motivated his concept using epistemic considerations he actually derived it using the Fourier transform relationship of the momentum and position wavefunctions from quantum theory.

Ahhh, I see what you mean about epistemic now. I did not mean epistemic in the practical measurement sense "the observation disturbs the system being observed", I meant epistemic in the in-principle measurement sense "it is in principle impossible to simultaneously know both the position and momentum of a quantum object, becasue these properties are complementary properties". I'm not very good at QM, but my understanding is that this somehow arises from the QM formalism being in Hilbert space, whereas position and momentum measurements are done in "real" space?

Best Regards

 

[selfAdjoint]

Ahhh, I see what you mean about epistemic now. I did not mean epistemic in the practical measurement sense "the observation disturbs the system being observed", I meant epistemic in the in-principle measurement sense "it is in principle impossible to simultaneously know both the position and momentum of a quantum object, becasue these properties are complementary properties". I'm not very good at QM, but my understanding is that this somehow arises from the QM formalism being in Hilbert space, whereas position and momentum measurements are done in "real" space?

Yes it's true that the formalism says you can't know position and duration precisely at the same time. The easiest way to see this is that the separate wave functions for the two are Fourier transforms of each other in the formalism, and the Fourier transform (adding up pure waves of higher and higher frequency) has a limitiation in representing sharp measurements.

But it is the sociological culture of experimentalists to challenge Big Theory, and for example the delayed choice quantum eraser experiment is claimed by its authors to violate the limitation of wave/particlee complementarity, which is closely related to the UP. Since the experiment can be well-described in the QM formalism, I don't see how this claim can be true, but it shows which way the wind is blowing. The UP could turn out to be a scale dependent, contingent property; true enough at our scales but not "all the way down". I certainly don't assert that this is so, and I will throw a hex at anyone who tries to quote me that way :). But I don't think the current state of the formalism is sufficiently aere perrenis to support philosophical conclusions.

 

[moving finger]

The UP could turn out to be a scale dependent, contingent property; true enough at our scales but not "all the way down". I certainly don't assert that this is so, and I will throw a hex at anyone who tries to quote me that way :). But I don't think the current state of the formalism is sufficiently aere perrenis to support philosophical conclusions.

Throwing foreign stuff at me, huh? Did you mean aere perennius, which according to google means "more lasting than bronze"?

I could argue the current state of ANY formalism of ANYTHING is not sufficiently aere perennius to support ANY philosophical conclusions (except perhaps for cogito, ergo sum) - but such a position would be pointless.

As I think we have discussed several times before, all rests on premises (or axioms). And all premises (and axioms) can be challenged. Hence nothing is certain.

I could be a brain in a vat. But that premise doesn't figure in my philosophy (not because I know it is false, but because that way (like solipsism) lies nothingness).

Best Regards

ps I checked up in my Griffiths - I remembered correctly (and the following seems to suggest that it is indeed aere perennius) :

(The HUP inequality) is a consequence of the decision by quantum physicists to use a Hilbert space of wave packets in order to describe quantum particles, and to make the momentum wave packet for a particular quantum state equal to the Fourier transform of the position wave packet for the same state. In the Hilbert state there are, as a fact of mathematics, no states for which the widths of the position and momentum wave packets violate the inequality.

(from Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, p22/23)

 

[Tournesol]

All facts of physics are deduced form facts of mathematics. There is no
way of bypassing the maths to get at reality-in-the-raw.

 

[moving finger]

All facts of physics are deduced form facts of mathematics. There is no way of bypassing the maths to get at reality-in-the-raw.

Your analysis seems back to front. Physical facts are not "deduced from" mathematics, they are "described by" mathematics. Mathematics is a language, not a source of physical facts. To suggest that physical facts are "deduced from" mathematics is rather like suggesting that historical facts are "deduced from" the English language.

To describe any "fact of physics" we need to use a language for that description. It just so happens that the language of mathematics is well suited to the decription of 3rd person perspectives on the physical world. What you call a fact of physics is thus simply a mathematical description of the world from that perspective.

But when it comes to 1st person perspectives on conscious perception, the language of mathematics does not work. For me, my experience of seeing the colour red is a fact of physics (just as much as the fact that apples fall to the Earth is a fact of physics), but my conscious perception is not describable using mathematics. It's a 1st person fact, inaccessible to 3rd person investigation.

Best Regards

 

[selfAdjoint]

but my conscious perception is not describable using mathematics. It's a 1st person fact, inaccessible to 3rd person investigation.

What, Never?

Suppose somebody came up with an algorithm that reliably generated predictions of your first-person experiences as perceived by you? This might req

 

[moving finger]

What, Never?

Suppose somebody came up with an algorithm that reliably generated predictions of your first-person experiences as perceived by you? This might req

Several problems prevent this.

To predict some X using mathematics requires that the X be somehow objectively quantified or parameterised. My experience of the colour red is not something that can be objectively quantified or parameterised in terms of anything else.

What perspective is the prediction to be made from? It is impossible to accurately predict "my conscious experience of the colour red" assuming the perspective of someone else, because "my conscious experience of the colour red" includes me as part of that experience (ie its not a 3rd person perspective experience, its a 1st person subjective experience). The only way to predict my experience of the colour red is therefore to include me as part of the prediction - in which case we are not into prediction any more, we are into full-scale modelling, or perfect replication of the experiencing agent. Of course it is possible to replicate the experiencing agent, and if this is what you mean by algorithmic prediction then of course this is possible - but it's no longer a mathematical model or description, it's a carbon copy. But even a carbon copy would not perfectly replicate my conscious experience, because that carbon copy occupies a different position in spacetime to the position that I occupy (hence a different perspective on the world), and from the moment of creation its conscious experience and mine would begin to diverge.

Best Regards

 

[selfAdjoint]

Soorry, I couldn't finish my last post.

You are presumably the authority on what you experience. Now I believe that experience in anyone case is governed by only a finite number of parameters. After all, your brain is finite. You can't detect these parameters or see how they combine because of the "Metzinger horizon", but suppose there was a mechanism that you could hook up to that would detect them and generate some particular "red" in your consciousness, using some algorithm derived from its analysis of your natural workings. You could tune it yourself and see how it compared with your natural perception. Wouldn't that satisfy you? Or do you say this is fundamentally impossible?

 

[Tournesol]

Your analysis seems back to front. Physical facts are not "deduced from" mathematics, they are "described by" mathematics.

It's called the theory-ladenness of observation.

Mathematics is a language, not a source of physical facts. To suggest that physical facts are "deduced from" mathematics is rather like suggesting that historical facts are "deduced from" the English language.

Physical facts are derived from the mathematical
descriptions used in thories which have been tested
aposteriori. They are not deduced apriori.

To describe any "fact of physics" we need to use a language for that description. It just so happens that the language of mathematics is well suited to the decription of 3rd person perspectives on the physical world. What you call a fact of physics is thus simply a mathematical description of the world from that perspective.

It remains the case that there is no justifcation for the claim
that particles have real but unobserved (simultaneous) momenta and positions.
They cannot be obseved, and they are not in the formalism.

But when it comes to 1st person perspectives on conscious perception, the language of mathematics does not work. For me, my experience of seeing the colour red is a fact of physics (just as much as the fact that apples fall to the Earth is a fact of physics), but my conscious perception is not describable using mathematics. It's a 1st person fact, inaccessible to 3rd person investigation.

Why not, if it is a fact of physics ?

 

[Tournesol]

To predict some X using mathematics requires that the X be somehow objectively quantified or parameterised. My experience of the colour red is not something that can be objectively quantified or parameterised in terms of anything else.

Why not? Nothing has intrinsically unique properties under physicalism,
just complex combinations of a few basic properties like mass and
charge.

What perspective is the prediction to be made from? It is impossible to accurately predict "my conscious experience of the colour red" assuming the perspective of someone else, because "my conscious experience of the colour red" includes me as part of that experience (ie its not a 3rd person perspective experience, its a 1st person subjective experience).

Physicalistically speaking "you" are entirely describable form a 2rd person
PoV, given sufficient resources, and so is any (literal) perspective you might
have.

The only way to predict my experience of the colour red is therefore to include me as part of the prediction - in which case we are not into prediction any more, we are into full-scale modelling, or perfect replication of the experiencing agent.

Which is possible in principle.

If physicalism is true.

Of course it is possible to replicate the experiencing agent, and if this is what you mean by algorithmic prediction then of course this is possible - but it's no longer a mathematical model or description, it's a carbon copy. But even a carbon copy would not perfectly replicate my conscious experience, because that carbon copy occupies a different position in spacetime to the position that I occupy (hence a different perspective on the world), and from the moment of creation its conscious experience and mine would begin to diverge.

In ways which are predictable, in principle, if physicalism is true.

 

[moving finger]

Soorry, I couldn't finish my last post.

You are presumably the authority on what you experience. Now I believe that experience in anyone case is governed by only a finite number of parameters. After all, your brain is finite. You can't detect these parameters or see how they combine because of the "Metzinger horizon", but suppose there was a mechanism that you could hook up to that would detect them and generate some particular "red" in your consciousness, using some algorithm derived from its analysis of your natural workings. You could tune it yourself and see how it compared with your natural perception. Wouldn't that satisfy you? Or do you say this is fundamentally impossible?

This is possible - but it's only part of the equation.

My conscious experience of the colour red is a combination of the sensory input plus my consciousness. By "generating some particular red in my consciousness" you are not using an algorithm that "generates my conscious experience of red ex nihilo", you are using an algorithm that "generates an experience of red within my pre-existing consciousness" (which is quite a different thing).

You can easily generate an experience of red within my pre-existing consciousness - just put a red ball in my field of view. But you cannot generate my conscious experience of red ex nihilo, except by re-creating my conscious self ex-nihilo.

Best Regards

 

[selfAdjoint]

You can easily generate an experience of red within my pre-existing consciousness - just put a red ball in my field of view. But you cannot generate my conscious experience of red ex nihilo, except by re-creating my conscious self ex-nihilo.

You seem to be saying here that modular brain functionality has nothing to do with consciousness, that consciousness is some kind of monad where the entire thing has to couple to the function and no analysis is possible.

Do you believe this or am I misinterpreting you?

 

[moving finger]

You seem to be saying here that modular brain functionality has nothing to do with consciousness, that consciousness is some kind of monad where the entire thing has to couple to the function and no analysis is possible.

Do you believe this or am I misinterpreting you?

I have no idea how you arrive at this conclusion from my posts. Could you show your line of reasoning?

I believe consciousness is a unitary process which is an emergent property of certain physical systems.

If by "monad" you mean an indivisible, impenetrable unit of substance viewed as the basic constituent element of physical reality (as in the metaphysics of Leibnitz, in which case a monad is fundamental as opposed to being emergent) then how do you get from "I believe consciousness is a unitary process which is an emergent property of certain physical systems" to "consciousness is some kind of monad"?

Here is an anlaogy : Think of a unitary state, which is a state or country that is governed constitutionally as one single unit, with one constitutionally created legislature. Change the constitution or the legislature, and you still have a unitary state but it is now functioning as a slightly different unitary state. But none of this implies that there is a "monad" or indivisible basic constituent of statehood. None of the constituent parts of the unitary state contain anything we could describe as "a monad of statehood" within them. The state emerges as a consequence of the way the constituent parts are put together and work together. Consciousness emerges in an analogous way.

The entire conscious experience is indeed coupled with the experiencer, subject and object are inextricably bound up together (object here in the sense of the consciously perceived phenomena, subject in the sense of the created self within the process of consciousness which is supposed to be perceiving these phenomena), all perfectly consistent with the explanatory model proposed by Metzinger. This phenomenon of consciousness can be described and analysed "from the outside " (studies of behaviour and of the neural correlates of consciousness), but we have no language (mathematical or otherwise) with which to describe or analyse it "from the inside". Why do we have no language? Because a conscious experience is an "internal 1st person view" of a unitary process and it cannot by definition be broken down into constituent parts of subject and object, and thus by definition is not amenable to such analysis. Unitary process - not monad.

You know what your conscious experience of "seeing red" is like for you, but can you describe this conscious experience to someone else?

Best Regards