Quantum Mechanics without Measurement

  • #251
DevilsAvocado said:
Wow, this is a crazy world... me just thought you could not find the dar*ed thing. :biggrin:

BTW, not to be discussed in this forum but if you search strangerep's posts in BTSM he lists some attempts to construct LHV theories in which the LHV cannot have a probability distribution defined over them.
 
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  • #252
stevendaryl said:
In measure theory, you have a set (the sample space, maybe? I forget the terminology) of possibilities. Then you have real numbers (the measures) associated with certain subsets of that set. There is no guarantee that every set of possibilities has an associated measure. (The Banach-Tarskii paradoxical partition of the sphere is an example of the use of nonmeasurable sets). Since Bell's theorem involves probabilities (or correlations, which are defined in terms of probabilities), the terms in the inequality may not be defined if you have nonmeasurable sets. So the proof fails because of a technicality.

Ah, thanks! Me brain works now! :thumbs:
 
  • #253
atyy said:
Since you are in both frameworks, the choice of framework which is part of what you are should be in the framework. So in which framework do you make which subjective choice?

He doesn't need to be completely in any framework. One framework may be a superset of another. So the answer can be one, neither or both. It don't matter.

Frameworks are designed to describe quantum systems. Conceptually, the observer isn't important in this interpretation.

I'd argue that, since there are quantum processes taking place in the brain, it's impossible for the entire observer to exist in a single framework and that this causes no problems for the interpretation, since an observer plays no significant role in a measurement. That really is the realm of the CI and the later Relational Interpretation.
 
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  • #254
atyy said:
Since you are in both frameworks, the choice of framework which is part of what you are should be in the framework. So in which framework do you make which subjective choice?

I don't really understand the question. My brain might have states S1, S2, S3, ... in which I'm thinking about different things. S1 might be the state in which I'm computing probabilities according to framework F1. S2 might be the state in which I'm computing probabilities according to framework F2.

A framework is a choice of which observables have definite values at which times. So if my brain state is an observable, then there might be some frameworks in which I have a definite brain state at each moment, and some in which I'm in a superposition of brain states.

The framework does not determine which brain state I'm in, it only determines the fact that my brain state has a definite value (or not).
 
  • #255
atyy said:
BTW, not to be discussed in this forum but if you search strangerep's posts in BTSM he lists some attempts to construct LHV theories in which the LHV cannot have a probability distribution defined over them.

Thanks atyy, but there is this quite effective "Anyone-Who-Questions-Bell-Vaccine", which is worth about US$1.1 million at the moment... and before anyone is even close receiving the money, too much reading might be wasted time... (no offense) :wink:
 
  • #256
DevilsAvocado said:
You mean like the wavefunction? It will 'automatically' generate a different 'pattern' with one vs. two slits?
That's my understanding.
 
  • #257
Thanks Doc
 
  • #258
stevendaryl said:
I don't really understand the question. My brain might have states S1, S2, S3, ... in which I'm thinking about different things. S1 might be the state in which I'm computing probabilities according to framework F1. S2 might be the state in which I'm computing probabilities according to framework F2.

A framework is a choice of which observables have definite values at which times. So if my brain state is an observable, then there might be some frameworks in which I have a definite brain state at each moment, and some in which I'm in a superposition of brain states.

The framework does not determine which brain state I'm in, it only determines the fact that my brain state has a definite value (or not).

A brain state S must be defined with respect to a framework. In which framework is your brain in state S1 in which you are computing probabilities according to framework 1? Can your brain be in state S2 in framework 2 in which you are calculating things using framework 1?
 
  • #259
atyy said:
A brain state S must be defined with respect to a framework.

That doesn't seem at all correct to me.

Let's ridiculously oversimplify and assume that there are a discrete set of things that a person could be thinking about: subject 1, subject 2, etc. There are corresponding brain states S_1 in which the person is thinking about subject 1, S_2 in which he is thinking about subject 2, etc.

Then there might be an observable, the brain state, which corresponds to an operator \hat{S} that has eigenvalues \lambda_1, \lambda_2, ... and satisfies the
equation:

\hat{S} | S_j \rangle = \lambda_j |S_j \rangle

Now, we could make up another operator, \hat{T} that mixes brain states. For example, suppose it works like this:

\hat{T} |S_j \rangle = \alpha_j |S_{j+1} \rangle + \beta_j |S_{j-1} \rangle

for some complex constants \alpha_j and \beta_j

A framework consists of a choice of observables at particular times. So to simplify, let's consider a single moment of time. So there might be framework \mathcal{F}_1 which uses observable \hat{S} at that moment, and framework \mathcal{F}_2 which uses observable \hat{T}.

So let's consider a brain that is thinking about framework \mathcal{F}_1. Maybe that corresponds to brain state |S_1\rangle. Maybe a brain that is thinking about framework \mathcal{F}_2 is brain state |S_2\rangle

So a person in brain state S_1 would use framework \mathcal{F}_1 and compute such and such a probability that \hat{S} = \lambda_1 and would compute such and such a probability that \hat{S}= \lambda_2. So within framework \mathcal{F}_1, you can analyze the probability that you might have chosen framework \mathcal{F}_2 to think about.

The framework does not determine which brain state you are in. The framework determines which observables have definite values. It doesn't determine what those values are.

So there are two different levels of "worlds" in CH: The choice of which framework, and the choice of which history within a framework.

In which framework is your brain in state S1 in which you are computing probabilities according to framework 1?

Well, the way I defined things above, brain states have definite values only in framework \mathcal{F}_1. Within that framework, the brain could be in states |S_1\rangle, |S_2\rangle, |S_3\rangle, etc.. But the brain cannot be in the state

\alpha |S_1\rangle + \beta |S_2\rangle

because the framework \mathcal{F}_1 makes brain states definite.

Can your brain be in state S2 in framework 2

The way I've set things up, brain states only have definite values in framework \mathcal{F}_1. So it doesn't make sense to talk about having state |S_2\rangle in framework \mathcal{F}_2. You can talk about being in some superposition of states,though.

in which you are calculating things using framework 1?

The way I've set things up, having a definite value for the question of "which framework are you using" means having a definite brain state. Only in framework \mathcal{F}_1 do you have a definite brain state. So only within framework \mathcal{F}_1 can you calculate probabilities according to framework \mathcal{F}_2 (or \mathcal{F}_3, etc.)
 
  • #260
atyy said:
Can your brain be in state S2 in framework 2 in which you are calculating things using framework 1?

If it is possible to describe the state of an entire brain in a single framework, then yes.

The vast majority of a brain (the classical part), certainly does fit into a single framework and yes, this can be used to think about other frameworks. You're doing it now! Well... maybe not, but certainly quantum physicists do.
 
  • #261
DevilsAvocado said:
Thanks atyy, but there is this quite effective "Anyone-Who-Questions-Bell-Vaccine", which is worth about US$1.1 million at the moment... and before anyone is even close receiving the money, too much reading might be wasted time... (no offense) :wink:

You keep interpreting what people are saying as "questioning Bell". Nobody questions the theorem, and nobody questions the predictions of quantum mechanics. The issue is over how to interpret the theorem, and quantum mechanics.

A resolution that uses nonmeasurable sets isn't really going to win any prize money, because constructing a nonmeasurable set is not something you can really do.
 
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  • #262
stevendaryl said:
That doesn't seem at all correct to me.

Let's ridiculously oversimplify and assume that there are a discrete set of things that a person could be thinking about: subject 1, subject 2, etc. There are corresponding brain states S_1 in which the person is thinking about subject 1, S_2 in which he is thinking about subject 2, etc.

Then there might be an observable, the brain state, which corresponds to an operator \hat{S} that has eigenvalues \lambda_1, \lambda_2, ... and satisfies the
equation:

\hat{S} | S_j \rangle = \lambda_j |S_j \rangle

Now, we could make up another operator, \hat{T} that mixes brain states. For example, suppose it works like this:

\hat{T} |S_j \rangle = \alpha_j |S_{j+1} \rangle + \beta_j |S_{j-1} \rangle

for some complex constants \alpha_j and \beta_j

A framework consists of a choice of observables at particular times. So to simplify, let's consider a single moment of time. So there might be framework \mathcal{F}_1 which uses observable \hat{S} at that moment, and framework \mathcal{F}_2 which uses observable \hat{T}.

So let's consider a brain that is thinking about framework \mathcal{F}_1. Maybe that corresponds to brain state |S_1\rangle. Maybe a brain that is thinking about framework \mathcal{F}_2 is brain state |S_2\rangle

So a person in brain state S_1 would use framework \mathcal{F}_1 and compute such and such a probability that \hat{S} = \lambda_1 and would compute such and such a probability that \hat{S}= \lambda_2. So within framework \mathcal{F}_1, you can analyze the probability that you might have chosen framework \mathcal{F}_2 to think about.

The framework does not determine which brain state you are in. The framework determines which observables have definite values. It doesn't determine what those values are.

So there are two different levels of "worlds" in CH: The choice of which framework, and the choice of which history within a framework.

So in framework 1, you could be calculating things using framework 2?
 
  • #263
atyy said:
So in framework 1, you could be calculating things using framework 2?

Yes.
 
  • #264
atyy said:
So in framework 1, you could be calculating things using framework 2?

Sure. The question "What is the probability of history H_1 according to framework \mathcal{F}_2?" is a purely mathematical question. I can ask it about any framework and any history.
 
  • #265
stevendaryl said:
Sure. The question "What is the probability of history H_1 according to framework \mathcal{F}_2?" is a purely mathematical question. I can ask it about any framework and any history.

But if I am using framework 2, I cannot be using framework 1.
 
  • #266
atyy said:
But if I am using framework 2, I cannot be using framework 1.

Not at the same time, but at different times, you certainly can. You can calculate using framework 1, and then when you're done, you can calculate using framework 2.
 
  • #267
stevendaryl said:
Not at the same time, but at different times, you certainly can. You can calculate using framework 1, and then when you're done, you can calculate using framework 2.

But framework 1 says I am using framework 2. I guess there is no inconsistency, since it doesn't say I am using framework 1. But that means if I am using framework 2, I cannot know it (to know it I have to use framework 1)?
 
  • #268
atyy said:
But framework 1 says I am using framework 2.

I don't agree with that. A framework doesn't say what happens, it says a set of possible things that might happen. A framework is (or determines) a set of possible alternative histories.

So the history "I calculate probabilities using framework A" and "I calculate probabilities using framework B" are two alternative histories in the same framework. An example of a history in a different framework would be "I am in a superposition of using framework A and using framework B"
 
  • #269
stevendaryl said:
I don't agree with that. A framework doesn't say what happens, it says a set of possible things that might happen. A framework is (or determines) a set of possible alternative histories.

So the history "I calculate probabilities using framework A" and "I calculate probabilities using framework B" are two alternative histories in the same framework. An example of a history in a different framework would be "I am in a superposition of using framework A and using framework B"

Let's say I am using framework 2. Is that statement made in framework 1 or framework 2?
 
  • #270
This is level of abstraction problem again.

It really doesn't matter which framework your brain is in, so long as you don't try to draw inferences from its quantum state in conjunction with another quantum system.

I don't even know how you'd draw inferences from your own brain's quantum state regardless of any other quantum system.
 
  • #271
atyy said:
Let's say I am using framework 2. Is that statement made in framework 1 or framework 2?

If framework 1 has definite values for the observable of "which framework am I using", then "I am using framework 2" is a possible history of framework 1.
 
  • #272
stevendaryl said:
If framework 1 has definite values for the observable of "which framework am I using", then "I am using framework 2" is a possible history of framework 1.

But if I am using framework 2, then I cannot use framework 1. But I must use framework 1 to know I am using framework 2. Therefore I cannot know I am using framework 2 when I am using framework 2. But to use a framework by definition is to know that I am using the framework. So I cannot be using framework 2. Isn't this a direct contradiction?
 
  • #273
atyy said:
But if I am using framework 2, then I cannot use framework 1. But I must use framework 1 to know I am using framework 2. Therefore I cannot know I am using framework 2 when I am using framework 2. But to use a framework by definition is to know that I am using the framework. So I cannot be using framework 2. Isn't this a direct contradiction?

I'm not sure if this is intentional, but you're using the word "using", in 2 different contexts here. Try rewriting this without using it and clarify what you mean by it in each instance. It's obscuring what's actually going on here.
 
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  • #274
craigi said:
I'm not sure if this is intentional, but you're using the word "using", in 2 different contexts here. Try rewriting this without using it and clarify what you mean by it in each instance. It's obscuring what's actually going on here.

I am using framework 2. If I am using framework 2, then that statement makes sense only in framework 1. But if I am using framework 1, I cannot be using framework 2.
 
  • #275
atyy said:
I am using framework 2. If I am using framework 2, then that statement makes sense only in framework 1. But if I am using framework 1, I cannot be using framework 2.

Another important question here is - what makes you think that these frameworks are incompatible?

The single framework rule permits you to draw logical inferences by combining statements from multiple compatible frameworks.
 
  • #276
craigi said:
Oh... and another point... what makes you think that these frameworks are incompatible?

There are always incompatible frameworks, so we can just pick framework 2 to be one which is incompatible with framework 1.
 
  • #277
atyy said:
There are always incompatible frameworks, so we can just pick framework 2 to be one which is incompatible with framework 1.

That's not true. This problem doesn't arise in the classical world. The entire classical world can be divided into any number of frameworks, all of which are compatible.

Incompatible frameworks only arise when certain quantum properties of a system are described based upon them.
 
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  • #278
atyy said:
But if I am using framework 2, then I cannot use framework 1. But I must use framework 1 to know I am using framework 2.

That doesn't make any sense to me. Look, right now, I'm typing at a computer. I don't need a framework to tell me that. I could use a framework to answer the question: "What is the probability that I would be typing at a keyboard at time t1, given that such and such was true at time t0?"

The framework that I'm typing about may have nothing to do with the question of the probability that I would be typing at a keyboard. I don't have to live on the moon in order to compute what the surface gravity would be.
 
  • #279
stevendaryl said:
That doesn't make any sense to me. Look, right now, I'm typing at a computer. I don't need a framework to tell me that. I could use a framework to answer the question: "What is the probability that I would be typing at a keyboard at time t1, given that such and such was true at time t0?"

The framework that I'm typing about may have nothing to do with the question of the probability that I would be typing at a keyboard. I don't have to live on the moon in order to compute what the surface gravity would be.

But that means that the statement "I am typing at a computer" is a statement that is real, even though it is not a statement in any framework.
 
  • #280
atyy said:
But that means that the statement "I am typing at a computer" is a statement that is real, even though it is not a statement in any framework.

Why do you say that? A framework is a set of possible histories. "I am typing at a computer" is a possible history. So there is a framework in which that is a possible history.

Anyway, I don't see why you think there is any difference between "I am typing at a computer" and "I am typing at a computer, trying to figure out probabilities according to framework \mathcal{F}_2". If the first can be "real", then so can the second.

What do you think "Using framework \mathcal{F}_2" means? To me, it means that I'm trying to solve a particular mathematics problem, which is to compute probabilities for a particular set of histories, using the Rules of Quantum Mechanics. None of those histories have to be "real" for me to be able to do that calculation. None of them have to be about me.
 
  • #281
stevendaryl said:
Why do you say that? A framework is a set of possible histories. "I am typing at a computer" is a possible history. So there is a framework in which that is a possible history.

I wrote "But that means that the statement "I am typing at a computer" is a statement that is real, even though it is not a statement in any framework. " in response to "Look, right now, I'm typing at a computer. I don't need a framework to tell me that."

stevendaryl said:
Anyway, I don't see why you think there is any difference between "I am typing at a computer" and "I am typing at a computer, trying to figure out probabilities according to framework \mathcal{F}_2". If the first can be "real", then so can the second.

There's a difference, because "I am typing at a computer" makes sense in one framework. However, "I am using framework 2" makes sense only in framework 1.

stevendaryl said:
What do you think "Using framework \mathcal{F}_2" means? To me, it means that I'm trying to solve a particular mathematics problem, which is to compute probabilities for a particular set of histories, using the Rules of Quantum Mechanics. None of those histories have to be "real" for me to be able to do that calculation.

A framework is just a classical stochastic process, so in that framework, one history is real each time you "run the experiment".

stevendaryl said:
None of them have to be about me.

But can they be about me? If they cannot, then the measurement problem is not solved.
 
  • #282
atyy said:
But can they be about me? If they cannot, then the measurement problem is not solved.

Can you define yourself in terms of particle properties? If so, then sure, you can use CH to describe yourself.

At least the classical part of you, will fit into a single framework and all frameworks for the measurements you make on quantum systems will be compatible with it, but not necessarily with each other.

Does CH address why observers can only make probablistic predictions on quantum systems, despite unitary evolution of their wavefunctions? Nope. It offers nothing on this subject.

You'll need to turn to dBB or MWI and interpretations related to it for that one.
 
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  • #283
stevendaryl said:
You keep interpreting what people are saying as "questioning Bell". Nobody questions the theorem, and nobody questions the predictions of quantum mechanics. The issue is over how to interpret the theorem, and quantum mechanics.

Really? Nobody questions anything? That's weird, how about this:

stevendaryl said:
My original statement was motivated by EPR and Bell's proof, and there I know (because Pitowsky wrote a paper about it) that nonmeasurability can avoid the conclusion.

Nobody questions anything?? Well, it sure looks like you're claiming that there is a possibility to avoid the conclusion of Bell's theorem.

And your friend Pitowsky, is writing papers titled "Resolution of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and Bell Paradoxes", where he claims:

"There is, however, a logical possibility that there is nothing wrong with the locality principle, and the violation of Bell's inequality indicates rather a limitation in the mathematical theory of probability. [...] The purpose of this article is to turn this logical possibility into a physical model that explains the observed frequencies on the basis of the validity of the locality principle."

Problem:
  • Pitowsky never got the Nobel Prize in Physics for his physical Local Realism.

  • Instead, he was refuted on a half page, two months after the publication in 1982, where it is concluded;
    "The inequality shows that the statement is inconsistent with quantum mechanics."
stevendaryl said:
A resolution that uses nonmeasurable sets isn't really going to win any prize money, because constructing a nonmeasurable set is not something you can really do.

So why on Earth are you claiming that this "can avoid the conclusion", when it's completely meaningless??

It looks like we are walking on a very thin line here, and so called "interoperations" that includes words like "LHV", "Classical", "Local Realism", "more natural than QM", etc, is not interpretations but a new theory contradicting QM and Bell's theorem and if the poster can't provide at least one peer reviewed paper, backing up these sensational claims (worth US$1.1 million + instant global fame) with rigorous proofs, well... it's quite clear that this is a violation* of the forum rules.

(Please do not question "the words", I can provide a bunch of quotes & links, but prefer not to, anyone following this thread has seen it several times)

*This is exactly why atty wrote "BTW, not to be discussed in this forum". Get it?

To avoid closure of this thread, my recommendation is that you, or any other, writing about "non-measurable LHV theories", etc, clearly states that this is just a game of words (or in best case mathematics), that has nothing to do with Bell's theorem and real science. I can guarantee you that there are other readers of this thread that knows less about these things than you and me, and they will get the wrong picture, and we are not supposed to contribute to this kind of confusion in this forum.

Thanks.
 
  • #284
atyy said:
I wrote "But that means that the statement "I am typing at a computer" is a statement that is real, even though it is not a statement in any framework. " in response to "Look, right now, I'm typing at a computer. I don't need a framework to tell me that."

I don't need a framework to tell me that, but that doesn't mean that it isn't included as a part of a framework.

A framework is just a classical stochastic process, so in that framework, one history is real each time you "run the experiment".

The sense in which a framework is a classical stochastic process is just that there is a set of possible histories, and there is a way to compute probabilities for any history in the set. There isn't necessarily a notion of "real" or of "running the experiment".


But can they be about me? If they cannot, then the measurement problem is not solved.

Sure. Histories can be about you, to the extent that we can say that you are a quantum system and your states correspond to projection operators.
 
  • #285
DevilsAvocado said:
Really? Nobody questions anything? That's weird, how about this:

That isn't questioning Bell's theorem. A theorem always has assumptions and a conclusion. It's valid if it is impossible for the assumptions to be true and the conclusion to be false. Nobody here is questioning the validity of Bell's theorem (I'm not saying that nobody does, but nobody in this thread). The issue is exactly what are the assumptions that the theorem relies on, and is it possible to construct a model that doesn't make those assumptions.

"There is, however, a logical possibility that there is nothing wrong with the locality principle, and the violation of Bell's inequality indicates rather a limitation in the mathematical theory of probability. [...] The purpose of this article is to turn this logical possibility into a physical model that explains the observed frequencies on the basis of the validity of the locality principle."

Yeah, he identified that Bell's theorem implicitly makes assumptions about measurability, and Pitowsky's model doesn't satisfy those assumptions.

Problem:
  • Pitowsky never got the Nobel Prize in Physics for his physical Local Realism.


  • The Nobel Prize is never given for something that speculative. It was a toy model.
 
  • #286
DevilsAvocado said:
It looks like we are walking on a very thin line here, and so called "interoperations" that includes words like "LHV", "Classical", "Local Realism", "more natural than QM", etc, is not interpretations but a new theory contradicting QM and Bell's theorem and if the poster can't provide at least one peer reviewed paper, backing up these sensational claims (worth US$1.1 million + instant global fame) with rigorous proofs, well... it's quite clear that this is a violation* of the forum rules.

It seems that you are accusing me of things that I haven't said. You are saying that Pitowsky's article has this character? Pitowsky responded to the article you linked to, although it cost me $25 to see the response.

To avoid closure of this thread, my recommendation is that you, or any other, writing about "non-measurable LHV theories", etc, clearly states that this is just a game of words (or in best case mathematics), that has nothing to do with Bell's theorem and real science.

I don't agree with that, but I will not protest, if you want to close the thread.
 
  • #287
Thread closed for Moderation...
 
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