Question on the probabilistic nature of QM

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Discussion Overview

The discussion centers on the nature of randomness in quantum mechanics (QM) and whether quantum phenomena can be considered genuinely random as opposed to merely appearing random due to insufficient information. Participants explore the implications of quantum mechanics' probabilistic nature, particularly in relation to classical interpretations of randomness and determinism.

Discussion Character

  • Debate/contested
  • Conceptual clarification
  • Exploratory

Main Points Raised

  • Some participants question the interpretation of "genuine randomness" in QM, suggesting it may stem from a lack of understanding of underlying factors that could influence outcomes.
  • Hidden variable theories are mentioned as a way to account for determinism in quantum mechanics, but Bell's theorem indicates that many such theories cannot reproduce QM predictions.
  • Gleason's Theorem is referenced as a foundational result that supports the probabilistic framework of QM, implying that classical probabilities cannot fully describe quantum phenomena without introducing contextuality.
  • There is a suggestion that the terms "genuine randomness" and "fundamental determinism" may be misused or misunderstood, with calls for empirical tests to substantiate claims of either nature.
  • Some participants express skepticism about the notion of "true randomness," proposing that it may simply reflect a belief in probability as a fundamental aspect of physical theory.
  • Concerns are raised about the implications of labeling quantum mechanics as "genuinely random" versus classical mechanics as "genuinely deterministic," with calls for clarity in definitions and their applicability to the universe.

Areas of Agreement / Disagreement

Participants do not reach a consensus on whether quantum mechanics is genuinely random or if it can be interpreted through deterministic frameworks. Multiple competing views remain regarding the nature of randomness and determinism in both quantum and classical contexts.

Contextual Notes

Limitations in the discussion include the dependence on interpretations of quantum mechanics, the ambiguity surrounding the definitions of randomness and determinism, and the unresolved status of various mathematical and theoretical frameworks.

  • #91


the problem with the probability in quantum physics is that it actually is not "rock bottom". if it were it would not cause so many troubles.

the problem is the equations of motion of any quantum theory provide a totally deterministic and even local theory. in a sense this part if very classic. but on top of that comes the probability (and non-local) part when one starts to measure. thus the probability arises somewhere in between of a deterministic theory sandwich at micro (QM equation of motion) and macro level (classical physics). because the theory lacks a well defined mechanism to provide when the collapse exactly happens it is very hard to tell the probability and the deterministic elements apart (you don't know when exactly the QM equations of motion become invalid and you have to apply the collapse instead).
 
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  • #92


Ken G said:
Gleason's theorem is a theorem about the theories of physics that can match observations, yet the "curtain" is an image about the connection between theories and reality. I think that is what you are not following there-- you are not distinguishing our theories from the way things "really work." I realize this is because of your rationalistic bent, you imagine that things really work according to some theory, and our goal is to either find that theory, or at least get as close as we can. That's a fine choice to make, rationalists abound who make that choice, and some get Nobel prizes pursuing it. But it's why you won't understand non-rationalists who don't think the world actually follows theories, because theories are in our brains, and the world is not beholden to our brains, only our language about the world is. The world is doing something that closely resembles following theories, but every time we think we have the theory it follows, we discover not just that the theory has its domain of applicability, but much more: we discover that the ontological constructs of the theory are completely different in some better theory. Why would we imagine that will ever not be true?

Hi Ken

I have said it before and I will say it again. You are a wonder. Thats exactly it and exactly why I don't get it.

Reading you is like reading Wittgenstein - at first you say no he can't be right but you think about it a bit more and you realize he has a point. You may still not agree with him (and I don't) but he has a point.

Thanks
Bill
 
  • #93


Thanks bhobba, as you know my goal is not to change your mind, because your view is as valid as anyone else's, but merely to clarify the alternatives.
 
  • #94


Ken G said:
Yes, the goal of science is to penetrate the shroud of mystery, but it's not to remove the shroud, because behind one shroud of mystery is always another. We are not trying to pull down that "curtain" you speak of, because there will always be a curtain, and there is supposed to be a curtain-- our goal is to get past as many curtains as we can. That may sound disturbing, but isn't it more disturbing to imagine an end to the curtains?

I would love to pull down the curtain, only to find another, and if you got the opposite impression it wasn't my aim. But it's disturbing to me that this may be the last curtain.
 
  • #95


Ah, I see, you are not worried that we will pull this curtain down to find none behind it, you are worried we'll never pull this one down. Who knows, maybe we will, but I think it might take a better theory about how our minds process sensory information. If there's a universal wave function, we won't understand it until we understand where our consciousness inhabits it, and if there's no universal wave function, then we still have to understand why our perceptions are as if there were invariant collapses in one.
 
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