Ontoplankton
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marcus said:The point about the scientific community is they can get agreement by empirical tests.
they arent like theologians who split up into various parties and sects and schools of thought
The universe does not care about how we think social communities should work. It is under no obligation to provide us with ways to prove or disprove everything we would like to. If the most fundamental theory is one that makes no very specific predictions on what we will find (other than that we'll find a universe consistent with the existence of observers), then this is simply something we will have to accept. Anything else is just wishful thinking.
Of course, maybe this theory is wrong. If Smolin's black hole theory predicts specific things that the anthropic principle doesn't, then that counts in favor of it; but there are many things to take into account (such as: how plausible is his mechanism that generates a universe slightly different from ours? how strong is the evidence for eternal inflation?), and I have no way to judge all of these. Maybe Smolin's theory and the mono-vacuum versions of string theory will be falsified in the future; maybe in the future, the eternal-inflation-plus-anthropic-principle theory will the only one that predicts a universe with observers at all. In that case, we should accept it until we do find something better, and in the mean time, it should be taken seriously as a possibility.
But Onto, you have not yet exhibited anything weird about what Smolin says!
I exhibited a few weirdnesses in my first post in this thread.
I'm finding it difficult to criticize specific claims by Smolin, because I don't agree with the Popperian framework he places everything in. In fact, I can feel my brain shrinking as I think about falsificationism, right at this moment!
It's true that the anthropic scenario isn't falsifiable, but that doesn't mean it isn't testable in a more general sense. Any time a different theory predicts something specific about the universe not already implied by the existence of observers, that counts against the anthropic scenario; it makes it less plausible, just not impossible. Any theory that's consistent with any possible observation is unfalsifiable; there are more of such theories than you would expect. Smolin's black hole theory is one of them, because it has a varied multiverse where each universe has different laws. The difference between Smolin's theory and the anthropic scenario is that in Smolin's theory the worlds whose laws and constants are such that they don't allow for observers are "very rare" (though there are infinitely many of them!), rather than "common but empty anyway". I'm not sure that this should matter.
Anyway: IIRC Smolin calls his theory "falsifiable" even though it only makes probabilistic predictions (it's logically consistent with all sorts of physics, but some sorts of physics are more common because they produce more black holes), and at the same time calls the anthropic scenario "unfalsifiable" because it only makes probabilistic predictions (it's logically consistent with all sorts of physics, but some sorts of physics are more "typical" of the kind you would expect to see as an observer). The way to deal with probabilistic predictions is Bayesian probability theory. There are very difficult issues in how to deal with observational selection effects and with infinities in a Bayesian framework, but they're not the difficulties that Smolin talks about.
There's a whole literature on all this stuff, and it looks to me like Smolin hasn't read it.
IMHO, it all depends on whether Smolin's black hole claims hold up under further tests, and on how much more (or less) specific the region (in law-space) of black-hole-maximizing universes turns out to be compared to the region of observer-generating universes. It looks to me like Smolin may have a case for his theory, but his grounds for rejecting the alternative completely are wrong.
