So equilibrium is the big picture in a very real sense.

[apeiron]

My main arguments here aren't against you. It's to try to motivate the evolutionary reasoning to others and show that there is a coherent line of thought behind it, it's not just a "anything goes" attitude.
/Fredrik

You correctly argue the ideas rather than the person. That is obvious.

I still feel a flaw in your approach is this strong urge to locate observers.

It seems the natural thing to do as humans are supposed to be the cannonical observers and meaning makers. And we are pretty located as minds. We look outwards to the wide world.

But to generalise the notion of observation as a physical one, I think we have to expand the local in the direction of the maximally global.

This is the semiotic approach. Observation becomes something happening "everywhere" in the system, in the universe (and now only the most local, or the supra-global, can escape this constraining gaze).

Your approach is Peircean in moving from vague possibility to concrete dyadic interactions. But then there is the third step of a sum over a whole space of such dyads, such acts of information equilibration.

 

[Fra]

I still feel a flaw in your approach is this strong urge to locate observers.

Ok I think I see what you mean, but I think you are assuming something that I don't do.

I have not really explained my position here in detail. Sometimes you have to use some words, like local. But in my view space is emergent relative to the observer. And to a given observer "local" pretty much conincides with what is "actual". Ie. the distance measure we are talking about here is rather defined in terms of deviation from what's known. The space construction in my view by construction puts the priors of one observers at the center in the sense that any observers sees himself as "the center of the universe". The possibilities defines a kind of hypothesis space, where the distances are defined by means of information divergence, a bit like information geometry, but not quite.

So the localisation of OTHER observers relative to the self, is sort of a measure of the expected disagreement. The distance between two observer, is a measure of the amount of information that needs to be changed to bring them in agreement.

I am not assuming the existence of a 4D spacetime. So the entire notion of locality and location is of course much more complex. I didn't attempt to explain any of this in this thread. It's probably a topic on it's own.

The fact that different observers, sees their own spacetime, can also be reformulated by a third observer so that they exist in a common spacetime, but where forcing their views relative to a common spacetime, instead implies physical interactions like distorsions of spacetime.

/Fredrik

 

[ConradDJ]

As to “logical possibility” – I’m not sure what to make of that. Does it just refer to what a certain person is capable of imagining? – like “golden mountain”. You take certain aspects of your actual experience and rearrange them to produce something counterfactual? Anyhow that’s what I meant by calling it “derivative”. Usually, I think, to say something is “logically possible” implies that it is not in fact possible, at least not here and now.

In any case, to me the significant issue is what’s really possible, in some given situation. In this sense, possibility is something that changes, as the actual situation changes. What is possible at one moment may not be remotely possible in the next.

We’re used to thinking about the world as a set of facts, and thinking about how the facts change, over time – in classical physics, for example. We don’t have well-developed concepts for describing possibility-structures or understanding how they change. But quantum physics gives us at least an example of a description that includes both possibility (wave-function) and actuality (preparation, measurement) as distinct components.

I think the basic picture is – in a given situation, there is a certain structure of possibilities; and then, through some sort of interaction, a subset of these possibilities gets selected as “actually happening”. That narrows down the scope of possibility – many events that might have happened, may now have become forever impossible. At the same time, the narrowing of possibility makes what can happen in the future more specific – new information has been added, new facts have been established, once and for all. On the basis of these facts, this new situation, new possibilities can arise that may never have been possible before.

So I agree –

The space of the possible is then neither really large nor smaller than the space of the actual. It is larger in having more that is potential. And smaller in being undiffentiated...

And as to this question –

In biology, a seed could grow into a tree with an infinite variety of branching patterns. But once a tree has grown, it is stuck with its history of branching. So were those microstates actually "in" the seed as countable variety. Or were they just a smear of vague potential?

I don’t necessarily think of possibility-structures as consisting of well-defined “microstates” – but in any case, counting alternative states is generally not sufficient to describe how the possibilities relate to each other. Depending on the situation, some may be more probable than others, and some may be more or less compatible with others. In QM, for example, the wave function describes a complex mathematical “shape” of possibilities that changes over time in predictable ways. And when a measurement “collapses” the wave function, it never produces a single, factual state, but rather changes the shape of the possibility-structure. If you measure the position of a particle, you narrow down the range of possible positions, at a certain moment, and at the same time broaden the range of its possible momentum-states.

Likewise in evolutionary biology, gene frequency is a significant measure, but certainly not a complete description of the possibility-structure represented by a species' gene-pool in a specific environment.

 

[ConradDJ]

I still feel a flaw in your approach is this strong urge to locate observers.

It seems the natural thing to do as humans are supposed to be the cannonical observers and meaning makers. And we are pretty located as minds. We look outwards to the wide world.

But to generalise the notion of observation as a physical one, I think we have to expand the local in the direction of the maximally global.

This is the semiotic approach. Observation becomes something happening "everywhere" in the system, in the universe (and now only the most local, or the supra-global, can escape this constraining gaze).

Your approach is Peircean in moving from vague possibility to concrete dyadic interactions. But then there is the third step of a sum over a whole space of such dyads, such acts of information equilibration.

I think I'm more on Fredrik's side in this respect. I’m not yet clear about what his scenario of “inference” and “action” might eventually look like in connection with physics... but I think he’s very much on the right track in trying to conceptualize physics from a local standpoint, inside the web of ongoing real-time relationships.

It’s true that another perspective is also needed. Even though the only world anyone or anything can actually “experience” is its own local world, from its own point of view in the moment, what “experience” does is to connect us with other beings, in interaction that goes both ways. So in some sense we do need to “transcend” our own perspective, to conceptualize the world beyond the here and now of our experience.

But I think the traditional way of doing this – leaping to a “global” perspective, “seeing” the world from no point of view – fails to illuminate what’s really going on. On the contrary, I think it has a built-in tendency to objectify the world, to treat it as something that exists in itself over time. Not that this “objective” view is wrong, but I don’t think it gets to what’s fundamental in the relationship-structure of the world.

I tend to think of the“Peircean” approach you describe as neo-Hegelian – in that it interprets the world in terms of dynamic relationships between ideas (e.g. “form” / “substance”). I’m trying to find the right language to understand what happens in dynamic relationships between individual things, between people, or between atoms... physical and communicative relationships, rather than what seem to me metaphysical ones. So I trust your philosophical intuition, and I think you have a very clear notion of the conceptual challenges we face, at this point -- and you’re developing this kind of language to respond to it. But I’m having a hard time buying into the language itself.

I think the way to go here is maybe not from the “local” to the “supra-global”... maybe instead, from the standpoint of an isolated observer looking out at the universe, to the concept of one point of view participating in communicative relationships with other points of view. Moving from “subjective” to “inter-subjective”, rather than to a viewpoint that stands outside the world altogether.

 

[apeiron]

So the localisation of OTHER observers relative to the self, is sort of a measure of the expected disagreement. The distance between two observer, is a measure of the amount of information that needs to be changed to bring them in agreement. /Fredrik

OK, sounds more like my kind of thinking again. We could say the world, following the second law, wants to be "flat" - equilibrating its information, its differences, its geometric wrinkles through cooling/expansion.

So particles, which are hot to various degrees, are observers. When they "catch sight of each other", there is a change of energy exchange/deflection/attraction. On average, the differences are constrained or smoothed away.

The vacuum itself becomes the unobserved. It is too flat, too cool, for interactions. There is virtual activity of course. But this is sub-threshold, inside the Planckian limit for an approach to thermal and geometric flatness.

It is a way of thinking that seems to remove the need for inflation - the universe through mutual constraint becomes self-flattening.

It also seems to lead to dark energy. Inside the Planckian limit, there is still a residual free (because unobserved) action, a cosmological creep.

Is this part of your scheme too?

 

[Fra]

OK, sounds more like my kind of thinking again. We could say the world, following the second law, wants to be "flat" - equilibrating its information, its differences, its geometric wrinkles through cooling/expansion.

So particles, which are hot to various degrees, are observers. When they "catch sight of each other", there is a change of energy exchange/deflection/attraction. On average, the differences are constrained or smoothed away.

The vacuum itself becomes the unobserved. It is too flat, too cool, for interactions. There is virtual activity of course. But this is sub-threshold, inside the Planckian limit for an approach to thermal and geometric flatness.

It is a way of thinking that seems to remove the need for inflation - the universe through mutual constraint becomes self-flattening.

It also seems to lead to dark energy. Inside the Planckian limit, there is still a residual free (because unobserved) action, a cosmological creep.

Is this part of your scheme too?

I can tell that we share some traits in the reasoning, but it's also clear that it's easy to misunderstand any attempt of description given that the state of the ideas are currently immature.

I do not fully follow your arguments, but to just acknowledge a fuzzy connection without again diverging from each other(which I find unnneccessary at this point), my scheme certainly leads to an interpretation/connection of the cosmological constant, and a very simply intuitive idea explains why it's close to zero, but not entirely zero.

I tried to see if anyone else connected to this last year in this thread
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=239414, it at least briefly elaborates on the conceptual connection.

But this is all very brief. In that thread I was trying to convey a conceptual connection, rather than explain in detail the mathematics (which I will keep for maturation until it can fly).

/Fredrik

 

[apeiron]

As to “logical possibility” – I’m not sure what to make of that. Does it just refer to what a certain person is capable of imagining? – like “golden mountain”. You take certain aspects of your actual experience and rearrange them to produce something counterfactual? Anyhow that’s what I meant by calling it “derivative”. Usually, I think, to say something is “logically possible” implies that it is not in fact possible, at least not here and now.

I think this makes it clear that possibility~actuality is being treated as being about the constructible, and so lacks this second aspect many of us are also concerned to model - the constraints.

So I can construct a golden mountain by adding together the components of gold and mountain. That seems perfectly plausible as a possible construction.

But realities are also constrained by the need to be self-consistent as causal wholes. There are reasons why some possible constructions don't get constructed. So a golden mountain becomes implausible as a possibility in a world that is constrained by the wider facts of planetary geophysics.

In fact, we can perhaps say that only that which perfectly balances the two opposed and complementary causal "forces" - bottom up construction and top down constraint - gets to exist, gets to become actual.

Too much construction is unbalanced (which is where golden moutains fall down). And too much constraint would also lack balance. But where geophysics equilibrates with stellar atomic debris, what was generally possible can equilibrate with what is locally available and then mountains of rock are what become the actual.

Modal logic would be an example of an unbalanced language for making statements about reality as it is all loaded with construction (and runs into insane contortions to avoid facing up to the lack of a matching theory of constraints).

In QM, for example, the wave function describes a complex mathematical “shape” of possibilities that changes over time in predictable ways. And when a measurement “collapses” the wave function, it never produces a single, factual state, but rather changes the shape of the possibility-structure.

Another important point. The old photon passing through a succession of polarising filters story. This is a very constraints-based view. You can confine - narrow down the options - yet not completely control.

Again, reality has two aspects. The observer bearing down to create local measurements. The locally-measured exploiting any freedoms still left unconstrained. Like a wriggling bag of eels.

 

[apeiron]

But I think the traditional way of doing this – leaping to a “global” perspective, “seeing” the world from no point of view – fails to illuminate what’s really going on. On the contrary, I think it has a built-in tendency to objectify the world, to treat it as something that exists in itself over time. Not that this “objective” view is wrong, but I don’t think it gets to what’s fundamental in the relationship-structure of the world.

I agree that we need to move from the god's eye externalist view to what is being called "Internalism".

So for example, here is a statement by Matsuno on what he understands by this...

"Internalism has some antecedents in phenomenology, the thinking of J. J. von
Uexküll, and the autopoiesis model of Maturana and Varela. Current major thinkers include
Koichiro Matsuno, and Yukio-Pegio Gunji, Otto Rössler, and Stanley N. Salthe. Salthe’s
helpful overview of internalism1 states that internalism becomes necessary if we try to make a science which begins with the fact that we are inside, as participants in, the universe that we are studying. Internalism applies to such advanced technological situations as cosmological knowledge in the face of the finite speed of light (we cannot get outside the universe, or see it whole) and operationalism, as well as to the situation of a newborn infant trying to manage in the world."
http://stl.recherche.univ-lille3.fr/sitespersonnels/rahman/geneticspreface3.pdf

Stanley Salthe's scalar hierarchy is worth studying as it spells out the link between observer scale and event-horizon like effects.

http://www.harmeny.com/twiki/pub/Main/SaltheResearchOnline/HT_principles.pdf

Basically, to an observer at a scale that is in the middle of things, looking upwards to events of larger scale, they would eventually become so big as to fill the whole field of view and so become the unchanging static backdrop (kind of like how our universe is so big, we cannot see its curvature, or its other domains, if these exist).

Likewise, looking down in scale, things may be very dynamic and fast changing, a sea of events, but to us it becomes just a generalised blur. So again, it becomes a static constant. An event horizon. The QM realm may seethe with activity, but it looks like just a flat limit state from sufficient distance.

So this is what a fully dynamic reality looks like to an observer of intermediate scale. Even if the extremes of scale are also dynamic, they come to look static for complementary reasons.

This is a powerful metaphysical insight. But not sufficiently general I believe. I want to extend the idea to observers over all possible scales. A scalefree version of semiosis.

But it perhaps helps explain that I am taking an internalist approach. I just don't want to be stuck with observers of some particular scale. The truths of the model have to be more general than how things look from the middle of the "observer created" system.

I tend to think of the“Peircean” approach you describe as neo-Hegelian – in that it interprets the world in terms of dynamic relationships between ideas (e.g. “form” / “substance”).

Agreed. And I use substance~form, and other traditional metaphysical dichotomies like chance~necessity, stasis~change, because they are familiar arguments. But they are not very mathematical. So they are really just a crutch along the way to the final correct language.

The mathematical terms I would use are based on the dichotomisation of scale (so local~global). And then a second one based on the dichotomisation of development (which is vague~crisp).

Scale is a mathematical notion - spatiotemporal scale would just an example of the geometric idea.

And to make the idea of vague~crisp properly mathematical, I have suggested instead we invoke symmetry. So the vague is absolute symmetry and the crisp is absolute asymmetry. We go from the wholly unbroken via some symmetry-breaking (some dichotomisation) to the wholly broken (the crisply dichotomised).

The two things then link as the crisply dichotomised is in fact dichotomised in the "directions" of the most local and the most global. Connecting us neatly to hierarchy theory - another mathematical notion.

So yes. Peirce was a metaphysician and I too find it useful to talk publicly in terms of familiar metaphysical language. Stuff we can look back 2600 years and trace the threads of thought.

But the aim is to be thoroughly modern and mathematical. The maths of scale - fractals, renormalisation group, criticality, etc - is actually all very recent stuff. Symmetry too is recent maths. But I believe that ultimately a scale dichotomy and a symmetry dichotomy will be able to capture everything we need to do systems modelling. One axis (symmetry-breaking) to measure a system's development, a second to measure its broken equilibrium (its broken scale). The synchronic and diachronic views.

This would be a huge simplification you realize. All those many metaphysical dichotomies reduced to just two properly mathematical ones - symmetry and scale.

The complication then is that this is an account of fundamental reality. The baseline description of what exists. But then we also have to be able to model complexity - things like life and mind. We build on the ground of what is fundamental, but now we are going in yet another direction.

This is why Salthe introduced a second hierarchy, the specification hierarchy. (Though he has recently attempted to mainstream his jargon by calling them the compositional and subsumptive hierarchies - a wrong move I feel).

Anyway, once you have a new systems model of simplicity, then you also have the separate exercise of extending it to be able to model stuff like the human mind. Actual intermediate scale observers. The extensions are commonsensical though - already worked out pretty much. The foundations are where the hard work has to take place.

 

[ConradDJ]

... I want to extend the idea to observers over all possible scales. A scalefree version of semiosis...

The mathematical terms I would use are based on the dichotomisation of scale (so local~global). And then a second one based on the dichotomisation of development (which is vague~crisp)... The two things then link as the crisply dichotomised is in fact dichotomised in the "directions" of the most local and the most global.

I believe that ultimately a scale dichotomy and a symmetry dichotomy will be able to capture everything we need to do systems modelling. One axis (symmetry-breaking) to measure a system's development, a second to measure its broken equilibrium (its broken scale). The synchronic and diachronic views.

This would be a huge simplification you realize. All those many metaphysical dichotomies reduced to just two properly mathematical ones - symmetry and scale.

Apeiron – thank you... I’m starting to get a clearer picture of where you think all this is headed.

I see that with “construction” you have in mind what I was calling the given actuality – what we have in hand to work with, what we can count on at any point, the set of more or less definite facts. And by “constraint” you have in mind what I was calling the possibility-structure, the “shape” of what can happen in a given situation.

I appreciate it that you’re not trying to absorb the one concept into the other, but describing some sort of dynamic relationship between them, that must pertain to any kind of system that actually manages to exist in the world. It seems that you’re trying to work out the basic “logic” – in Hegel’s historical/dialectical sense – through which all this operates.

And I hope you understand that by comparing this with Hegel, I’m not meaning to be derogatory! – it’s just that he was the first to project the task of philosophy in this way... imagining that the fundamental, timeless principles of logic – rightly understood as oppositional, dialectical and creative, rather than static – could ultimately account for all the particularities of the world’s history, at every stage. There never was a grander intellectual ambition.

What I like most about this is the sense that “existence” isn’t just a matter of “A exists” vs. “A doesn’t exist” – like an on-off switch. “To exist” – physically, biologically, or in the way human beings exist – always involves a complex functionality. And what makes the work of conceptualizing it so difficult is that it’s impossible for us not to take this functionality for granted, to begin with. It’s so much a part of everything we see and do and depend on for our own existence. So where science is an exploration into unknown territory, I think of philosophy as an exploration of the all-too-well known, a quest to discover the obvious, by learning how not to take for granted what’s most basic.

My own sense of where this quest leads is a little different – I tend to imagine an accidental, historical emergence of distinct functionalities, rather than in terms of an overall dynamic logic. But we do need some sort of conceptual structure as a guide.

 

[apeiron]

What I like most about this is the sense that “existence” isn’t just a matter of “A exists” vs. “A doesn’t exist” – like an on-off switch. “To exist” – physically, biologically, or in the way human beings exist – always involves a complex functionality. And what makes the work of conceptualizing it so difficult is that it’s impossible for us not to take this functionality for granted, to begin with. It’s so much a part of everything we see and do and depend on for our own existence.

Yes this would be Hegelian. Though I never really took to Hegel as there are a number of clumsinesses in his articulation of the ideas. As well as the unhelpful entanglement with Christian theology.

But in talking of antecendents, I will normally say Anaximander, Hegel, then Peirce.

And yes, the liberating change is to be released from the strait-jacket of binary either/or.

We drive ourselves mad thinking everything must be this (thesis) only to find it is now equally plausible that everything is that (antithesis). We have created a philosophical game that apparently can't be won (but can endlessly swing like a pendulum - so good from an academic career point of view as there are always two sides to every argument).

But once we instead move on to synthesis, the realisation that this duality is fundamental, then we enter a new intellectual realm. A new door opens. The issue then becomes to understand how dualities are related. What is the logic of synthesis - the logic of systems in themselves?

My own sense of where this quest leads is a little different – I tend to imagine an accidental, historical emergence of distinct functionalities, rather than in terms of an overall dynamic logic. But we do need some sort of conceptual structure as a guide.

This stiil sounds roughly Peircean to me. The dynamic logic - the synthesis of complementaries - is something that only develops or emerges from the "accidental". What clearly and crisply exists at the end was only something that was vaguely or potentially possible at the beginning.

So the difference between us here I believe is that you are seeing local substance - what you call the given actuality - as a pre-existent crisp variety. There is a bunch of stuff that just is, like Epicurus's rain of atoms. Then some accident - like one atom deviating from its path - sets off a chain reaction of self-organisation. There is a seed event that sparks the phase transition to some more globally ordered state.

Now where I switch things around is to put the local and the global, your given actuality and your possibility-structure, as the jointly emergent outcomes of the whole process of development. I am removing the implied "before and after" temporal distinction (which is also an issue in Hegel's thesis and antithesis). The small and the large, the substances and the form, actually appear at the same time, the same rate.

Which is why a second new kind of axis is needed to chart the developmental aspects of what is going on. This is where the vague~crisp distinction fits.

The given-actuality and the possibility-structure would be both originally unexpressed potentials. They would (hidden) aspects of the one symmetry. Then a symmetry breaking would release them into crisp thesis~antithesis being. The flower bud would unfold.

We need to disentangle the notion of what exists from how it develops. It just does not make sense to start with the "something that does exist", even if we try to make it as small as imaginably possible (the quantum fluctuation - in what? - that started the big bang), or alternatively, as large as possible (the god that made the world, constrained it to be).

Existence (or persistence) implies a creation, it implies a process. Some can accept existence as a brute fact perhaps. But generally we try as hard as possible to push the question to the edge of what we can see. So reduce it to smallness, or largeness. Barely there fluctuations or omnipotent gods.

But this is not the way to get beyond "existence". Changing observational scale will only emphasise different aspects of what we see concretely exists. It is an act that keeps us in the "time slice" of our world, and is not taking us backwards to its deeper origins.

Instead, to erase existence, we have to learn to fold back together what has been broken. We have to seek out the two complementaries that we see have emerged and so restore in our minds the symmetry that their existence correctly implies. This is what it means to move back from the crisp towards the vague.

Bouncing from large to small keeps us within the crisply developed system. We can of course make such a motion - going from the small to the large via construction, and from the large to the small via constraint. These are legitimate paths observers can take to model their worlds.

But there is then a "fourth dimension" - yet another orthogonal space. And it is the dimension of development. The one where we instead oscillate between the vague and the crisp. We are no longer moving about inside a realm of scale but witnessing the birth of scale itself.

 

[vectorcube]

The question here is whether possibilities have constrained or unconstrained existence. Is everything that is possible also actual, or is reality a selection process that reduces the space of the possible to a smaller space of what is actual.

So what is the matter. Lewis thesis is that all logically possible worlds actually exist.
So if true, then it answers your question.

Examples of selection processes here would be Feynman integrals, Darwinian evolution, phase transitions. A self-organisation is imposed on prior freedoms.

So? For any selection process P, you can always ask "why P?". Best way to avoid the question is modal realism!

Lewis's modal realism is one of those crank ideas that is impossible to refute in its own terms and dazzles impressionable kids. It is not a philosophically useful notion in this discussion.

It is pretty useful. First, it offers a reductive explanation of modality. Second, it offers to answer all questions related to the choices, and design for the universe. No more "why this equation?" etc.

Best thing about kids is that they don` t have any common sense. They can judge an idea based on it merits. This is good for learning modern physics. Every old guy seen to think nature need to align with their common sense, and that is why they never make any useful discovery, because thing that is common sense don` t need to be questioned.

An essential aspect of the multiverse hypothesis is that it posits a realm of universes which are all in causal connection - even if it is just the tiny initial branching instant of the big bang. Even the many worlds approach of QM has connection between the worlds, before they branch.

So? I can ask why all these universes are governed by the rules of QM, and not CM.

But Lewis just suggests an infinite collection of unconnected logically possible, so therefore separately actual, worlds.

So?

There are no connections between worlds so constraint does not come into it. Though Lewis would be mute about why the same, or even similar, laws would prevail across his infinite collection.

Not at all. Two laws that are the same in two possible world is possible, because it is logically possible!

Lewis's contrived version of modal logic is not a thesis as it explains nothing. It is untestable by definition.

Untestability does not at all mean lewis ` s possible world is not real. A thesis that is not testable could also be true.

 

[apeiron]

Untestability does not at all mean lewis ` s possible world is not real. A thesis that is not testable could also be true.

On those grounds I may as well be a Catholic. Let's stick to what can be falsified.

 

[vectorcube]

On those grounds I may as well be a Catholic. Let's stick to what can be falsified.

1+1=2 is not falsifiable, but it is still true. In fact, there are planty of instances that are not falsifiable, but true. Metaphysics by it` s very nature is unfalsifiable, so you think it is all falses? Rediculous!

Modal realism, or some from of it may very well be true, if you don t believe in design.

 

[ConradDJ]

Just to stick my oar in again... This way of interpreting “possibility” in terms of alternative actualities just bypasses what’s ontologically meaningful – and to me fundamental – in the concept.

I suppose “modal realism” means that if I say, “I might have gone to China last year” – that’s equivalent to saying “I went to China in a different universe”...? Whether this is falsifiable or not, it’s completely uninteresting to me. A basic fact about my existence, from my point of view, is that I only live in this universe.

Another basic fact is that every second I’m alive, there’s possibility all around me. My physical environment consists just as much of real, live possibilities for what can happen next, as actual facts. In the only sense that’s important to me, possibility is about the moment – this world “in real time.”

Our intellectual tradition has – with very few exceptions – built its conceptual framework on the ability to imagine the world as if we weren’t in it... as if it were an object we could see from apoint of view “outside” of space and time.

When we look at the world from that “objective” standpoint, all we see is the actuality of things (and perhaps, limits to that actuality... “indeterminacy” / “vagueness”). The world looks like a body of given fact, laid out along a time-line. Some of which is “back there” in time, in the past, and some of which is still “ahead of us” in the future. The future facts we call “possible” and we can’t know about them yet... but we still imagine them as actualities, future facts -- "what's really going to happen."

From that point of view, we can just as easily think about alternative facts in other universes.

But the world we actually live in, moment to moment, is not just a body of fact. Physically, it seems to be some kind of system that creates facts in the present moment – anyhow that’s what I believe, and there’s certainly a lot of evidence for that point of view. The only world any of us actually experiences is the world of this ongoing moment, of creating new facts – any other point of view is derivative from this.

So my point is that from an “existential” viewpoint, which is all any of us really has, the concept of “possibility” means something very different from a set of “alternative actualities”. What happens in the moment not only “selects” certain alternatives as the ones that actually happen – that become the basis for all future happening – but constantly updates (and sometimes revolutionizes) the structure of what can happen in the world.

So to me “possibility” refers to a basic aspect of the living, physical presence of the world in the moment, in that it’s always opening up something new, and often unexpectable.

“Logical possibility” is not meaningless, but it misses the point of something actually being possible and becoming possible in the here and now.


Apeiron – I don’t mean to ignore your notes on “dynamic logic” above, but there’s a lot there to digest, and it takes my slow brain a long time to work out anything like an adequate response. But I assume when you talk about the “dimension of development” you have in mind something like this ontological concept of becoming-possible. "Live" possibility as opposed to facts sitting out there in the future.

 

[vectorcube]

Just to stick my oar in again... This way of interpreting “possibility” in terms of alternative actualities just bypasses what’s ontologically meaningful – and to me fundamental – in the concept.

I suppose “modal realism” means that if I say, “I might have gone to China last year” – that’s equivalent to saying “I went to China in a different universe”...? Whether this is falsifiable or not, it’s completely uninteresting to me. A basic fact about my existence, from my point of view, is that I only live in this universe.

Another basic fact is that every second I’m alive, there’s possibility all around me. My physical environment consists just as much of real, live possibilities for what can happen next, as actual facts. In the only sense that’s important to me, possibility is about the moment – this world “in real time.”

Our intellectual tradition has – with very few exceptions – built its conceptual framework on the ability to imagine the world as if we weren’t in it... as if it were an object we could see from apoint of view “outside” of space and time.

When we look at the world from that “objective” standpoint, all we see is the actuality of things (and perhaps, limits to that actuality... “indeterminacy” / “vagueness”). The world looks like a body of given fact, laid out along a time-line. Some of which is “back there” in time, in the past, and some of which is still “ahead of us” in the future. The future facts we call “possible” and we can’t know about them yet... but we still imagine them as actualities, future facts -- "what's really going to happen."

From that point of view, we can just as easily think about alternative facts in other universes.

But the world we actually live in, moment to moment, is not just a body of fact. Physically, it seems to be some kind of system that creates facts in the present moment – anyhow that’s what I believe, and there’s certainly a lot of evidence for that point of view. The only world any of us actually experiences is the world of this ongoing moment, of creating new facts – any other point of view is derivative from this.

So my point is that from an “existential” viewpoint, which is all any of us really has, the concept of “possibility” means something very different from a set of “alternative actualities”. What happens in the moment not only “selects” certain alternatives as the ones that actually happen – that become the basis for all future happening – but constantly updates (and sometimes revolutionizes) the structure of what can happen in the world.

So to me “possibility” refers to a basic aspect of the living, physical presence of the world in the moment, in that it’s always opening up something new, and often unexpectable.

“Logical possibility” is not meaningless, but it misses the point of something actually being possible and becoming possible in the here and now.


Apeiron – I don’t mean to ignore your notes on “dynamic logic” above, but there’s a lot there to digest, and it takes my slow brain a long time to work out anything like an adequate response. But I assume when you talk about the “dimension of development” you have in mind something like this ontological concept of becoming-possible. "Live" possibility as opposed to facts sitting out there in the future.

Well, you can feel "uninterested" about what goes on in other possible worlds. It is by the way a metaphysical claim. This means, these possible worlds cannot tell you how to live, or what gets you up in the morning.

 

[ConradDJ]

Well, you can feel "uninterested" about what goes on in other possible worlds. It is by the way a metaphysical claim. This means, these possible worlds cannot tell you how to live, or what gets you up in the morning.

Just so. At least we're on the same page here.

 

[ConradDJ]

Apeiron – now I am going to attempt a response to your long post above.

We have created a philosophical game that apparently can't be won (but can endlessly swing like a pendulum - so good from an academic career point of view as there are always two sides to every argument).

I’m with you there!

But once we instead move on to synthesis, the realisation that this duality is fundamental, then we enter a new intellectual realm. A new door opens. The issue then becomes to understand how dualities are related. What is the logic of synthesis - the logic of systems in themselves?

Yes... this is the basic question. But though it’s a word I also use a lot, the problem with discussing “systems” is the tendency to conceive them as objects “in themselves” – i.e. to envision them “from outside”.

Systems theory from this point of view works well when it comes to biology (or, of course, computer science). Biological organisms are in fact “objects” we can put on our desks or under our microscopes and observe “from outside”... and biological species and ecologies are essentially made out of organisms. So although there are very complex relationships involved, we can go a long way toward understanding this sort of system without making a fundamental shift in intellectual perspective. There are still profound challenges, because we need to develop much better tools for analyzing systems of relationships that operate at biological levels of complexity.

But when it comes to physics, or to understanding human beings, there is an even deeper issue, which is that the “systems” involved exist only “from inside”. What we call human “consciousness”, for example, or the physical world. As soon as we try to describe “consciousness” as if it were the attribute of an object, i.e. of the brain or the human organism, we’re way off track. The nature of the human mind can only be conceptualized within a system of communicative relationships, and I believe the same is true in physics.

That is, biology is about systems of things, “objects” – whereas to understand the rest of our world at the same depth that we understand biology, we need a way to think about systems of relationships. These operate with profoundly different principles, I believe.

When we say “system”, it’s easy to assume we’re talking about both the things and their relationships. But this is a conceptual illusion – because our intellectual tradition has given us a marvelous array of sophisticated tools for describing and analyzing things, and has had almost nothing to say about their relationships. A thing is something that exists “from outside”, but relationships – in the fundamental sense – exist only “from inside” – for the things that are in the relationship.

So the difference between us here I believe is that you are seeing local substance - what you call the given actuality - as a pre-existent crisp variety. There is a bunch of stuff that just is, like Epicurus's rain of atoms. Then some accident - like one atom deviating from its path - sets off a chain reaction of self-organisation. There is a seed event that sparks the phase transition to some more globally ordered state.

Now where I switch things around is to put the local and the global, your given actuality and your possibility-structure, as the jointly emergent outcomes of the whole process of development. I am removing the implied before and after temporal distinction (which is also an issue in Hegel's thesis and antithesis). The small and the large, the substances and the form, actually appear at the same time, the same rate.

This is a very interesting point of view – to me this kind of stretch of conceptual imagination is what philosophy is really about. However I’m not going along with you yet. I think the issue is that I have a deep distrust of this local/global dichotomy.

If you look at the physical world “from inside”, there is no “global” dimension – the same is true of human existence. There are certain kinds of “wholeness” to our experience of the world, and to the physical world itself that we experience. But our philosophical tradition began with a mental leap beyond any possible experience, to a vision of the world as a whole – “to pan” already with Thales, Anaximander’s “apeiron”, Heraclitus’ “logos” and “cosmos”, Parmenides’ “on” and Plato’s “ontos on”.

This is what I believe you mean by “global” – and you take confidence in your schema from the fact that this dichotomy of particular vs. universal does go all the way back to the origins of philosophy, as the ever-present theme of the whole tradition.

I distrust it for the same reason. Not that I think it’s wrong to see the world in terms of this dichotomy – everything we’ve been able to learn about the world is built on it. But I don’t trust it, because I believe there’s a side of the world that can’t be seen or understood at all from the viewpoint of this mental leap “outside the world”... i.e. how the relationships work, what happens between things that opens up new possibilities for what can happen. Something is "vague" or "crisp" from the standpoint of something else -- so what kind of structure is it that makes these two things matter to each other?

As “logical intellects” we may be able to operate in terms of the particular / universal dichotomy, but as human beings, the basic dichotomy has to do with being ourselves in a world of relationships with others. This was Kierkegaard’s “existential” critique of Hegel. Leaping beyond our “local” existence to an abstract universal reality was an evolutionary breakthrough for human thought. But another breakthrough is needed.

Anyhow, the dichotomy that matters most to me is that between things and their relationships with each other, some of which are local, some long-distance, but none “global”. The aspects of “wholeness” in our experience have to do with the way our relationships make a real-time context for each other – it’s the wholeness in the notion of the local “environment”, or the wholeness of a human life. But there is nothing here that’s “universal” except in our imagination.

Again, it’s obviously not wrong to imagine the whole “cosmos”, the “universe” and its basic principles. It’s amazing how far we’ve come with that kind of thinking, since the days of the pre-Socratics. But to the extent we objectify the world, we lose sight of what I think is most fundamental in how things relate to each other – the real creative process that we experience “from inside” the system “in real time.” As to that, it seems to me we’re still essentially at a pre-Socratic stage of intellectual development, struggling to find the right concepts just to get going.

Existence (or persistence) implies a creation, it implies a process. Some can accept existence as a brute fact perhaps. But generally we try as hard as possible to push the question to the edge of what we can see...

We have to seek out the two complementaries that we see have emerged and so restore in our minds the symmetry that their existence correctly implies. This is what it means to move back from the crisp towards the vague.

To give you the last word – You’re working toward an idea of where possibility comes from in the world – for me also this is the basic question. Your “dimension of development” – a way of describing the creative nature of time.

 

[tauon]

Are they the same size or is the realm of the possible larger than the realm of the actual?

to say is that there is no way of saying which one is "larger": that you cannot form an order operation between possible and actual. that seems a bit counter-intuitive as the actual is also possible.

but this also depends on what meaning does "size" in this context have...

the most intuitive thing to say it that there are more possible realities than actual ones, so if P is the set of possible realities, and A the set of actual realities than we can safely say(?) that A⊆P.

We see this in arguments over whether maths (taken as a map of all possible worlds) is larger than all actual worlds. So does math = reality or is math > reality?

well, this one is (imo) easier: math is not a map of all possible worlds- there are possible worlds not mappable by math (maybe we exist in one as it is). furthermore, maybe there are worlds that math describes, and they're not actual. all in all, if M is the set of all worlds mathematics describes and R the set of all "real/actual" worlds, it seems evidently true to say that:

¬(M⊆R) && ¬(R⊆M)

The same fundamental question arises with the many world interpretations of quantum theory, with multiverse approaches to cosmology, and with information theoretic approaches generally (as in Turing and Tegmark).

1) So is anything that is possible, also going to be actual?

2) Or is there always going to be more that is possible than can be actual? Why.

maybe, maybe not... trivial answers, but (imo) intellectually honest answers... I'd really love to see anyone successfully justify a definite yes or no to either of the questions.

Possible things := Things that are logically possible

how did you arrive at the "possible = logically possible" equivalence?
to clarify: what arguments do you have that the rules of logic are in fact the rules that "determine" the possible?

actually, it seems the general trend in this thread was to restrict possible to logically possible:to say that the only possible possible is the logically possible... why?

 

[vectorcube]

Just so. At least we're on the same page here.

...and i hope you are not suggesting that the only use of philosophy has to motivate the human condition in some way, becaue otherwise, you can pretty much subtract the whole of science, math becaue they can neither motivate the human condition, or help you attract the oppose sex.

...And just so we are in the same page, there are theoritical reasons for thinking that some sort of modal realism is true.

 

[apeiron]

But I assume when you talk about the “dimension of development” you have in mind something like this ontological concept of becoming-possible. "Live" possibility as opposed to facts sitting out there in the future.

First, it is good to be reminded of "how it seems" to us as human observers. Creativity, purpose, meaning, an unchangeable past and an indefinite future, are all part of that experience. So have to be explained as part of any Theory of Everything. Science has produced some very useful partial models - simple views made simple because of what they could manage to leave out - but people can't think it is job done.

And on possibility, it is the sense that the future is in some ways predicted by its own present state - there will be more of the same - but that there is also an irreducible element of material creativity or surprise.

This too can be viewed as a local~global distinction. Globally, reality is a network of constraints. So generally, what will happens is predictable. But this is constraints not a strait-jacket of deterministic control.

Then locally, what exists is the product of constraints. Locally, we would say there potentially exist an infinity of degrees of freedom. Locally, things are vague. But global constraints suppress most of those degrees of freedom and so shape up the local grain of scale. Events form. In the manner we know from QM. So locally, there is an irreducible material creativity. Events are decohered but they express that local indeterminancy.

Having said that, I have to add that this is a hierarchy theory approach based on spatiotemporal scale. So global means largest scale in space and time. Local means smallest in space and time. And because it is a relational view, a self-organising view, it is coherent interaction, action gone to equilibrium, which actually defines the scale. So a light cone view. The global scale for our universe is the visible universe. A view which spans about 14 billion years of time and 90 billion lightyears of space. And the local scale is defined by Planck time and distance.

Which means that the global moment exists far to either side of any local moment, both in temporal and spatial extent.

So...

global moment >______________________________________>


local moments . .. ... . . ... . . . .. . .. . . ... . . .. .


Again a view which is about events within a context. That context (which is the laws, the constraints) itself could be changing or developing. But it would look static and fixed in practice for observers within the system.

So you have local continual development from possibility nested within a global continual development of possibility. But we can understand why the global scale looks pretty static and eternal to us.

 

[octelcogopod]

I think the answer is pretty simple.. There is a lot more that is possible than is actual.

There can be a blue, red, yellow version of me. There can be a version of me with a red hand and a blue finger, a blue hand and red finger, a yellow hand a blue finger etc, and so it goes on for eternity.

In essence, if there was as much actual stuff as possible, then it would mean every possible configuration of everything would exist, from all the way down on the smallest scales to the biggest scales.
I imagine what we see in the universe is a very small sample of what is actually possible.

 

[apeiron]

That is, biology is about systems of things, “objects” – whereas to understand the rest of our world at the same depth that we understand biology, we need a way to think about systems of relationships. These operate with profoundly different principles, I believe.

In fact the clearest thinking on systems issues that I came across was from theoretical biologists such as Rosen, Pattee, Salthe, Ulanowicz.

Rosen called it relational biology in fact...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Rosen

In neuroscience, or complexity theory, for example, the issues are still treated at a much more naive level. Biology has in fact always been at the cutting edge here.

When we say “system”, it’s easy to assume we’re talking about both the things and their relationships. But this is a conceptual illusion

Yet I think there is a reason why some kind of dichotomy must be the case. So if it is not objects~relations, then we just need to find better terminology.

However I’m not going along with you yet. I think the issue is that I have a deep distrust of this local/global dichotomy.

I have tried to explain why the global would look like a fixed static context from our view inside even if it is actually a creative and developing process. The global could still change, but it would be changing in ways outside our vision.

This is exactly like the visible universe. Over the event horizon, the universe is expanding supra-luminally (we would believe). But we cannot see that. Or really be sure of anything else at that over the horizon scale.

So global in this sense is not "everything" in some external, god-like view which would see what lies over horizons. Instead it is an active and process definition of globality. In fact, a more limited one. One that is limited by the nature of observation from within the system.

Yes, you would be correct to be suspicious of anything that smacks of a external view of what is. But this is why this hierarchy theory based approach (the classic text for me is Evolving Hierarchical Systems by Stan Salthe) is in fact an internalist ontology. The observers have horizons. And in fact, just two horizons. One in the direction of global spatiotemporal scale and one in the direction of local spatiotemporal scale.

This is now a fact of physics. GR defines the lightcone and QM the Planck grain. We can actually quantify what would otherwise be a qualitative argument here. We are not just doing metaphysics but physics.

This is what I believe you mean by “global” – and you take confidence in your schema from the fact that this dichotomy of particular vs. universal does go all the way back to the origins of philosophy, as the ever-present theme of the whole tradition.

For me, it was the other way round. I learned the science and then was surprised to find that it was also ancient metaphysics. So in referencing Peirce, Hegel, Anaximander and Tao, I would be just giving credit where credit is due. But as I say, the maths to do this properly is still being invented.

Anyhow, the dichotomy that matters most to me is that between things and their relationships with each other, some of which are local, some long-distance, but none “global”. The aspects of “wholeness” in our experience have to do with the way our relationships make a real-time context for each other – it’s the wholeness in the notion of the local “environment”, or the wholeness of a human life. But there is nothing here that’s “universal” except in our imagination.

This is tricky, I agree. But global in this sense means everywhere. It is like the notion of temperature. Locally, we see a lot of variety in molecular kinetics, but globally, there is a single macrostate, a single average, that prevails across the system. So we are talking about a global equilibrium state.

This is how the "same thing" can be everywhere within a system, and yet it exists at no particular scale in the usual sense. You could make a small sample, or a large sample, of an ideal gas and find the same pressure and temperature, the same "global" or ambient properties.

So this is global in a special technical sense. One more scientific than metaphysical I hope. And also an internalist definition too.

 

[apeiron]

I think the answer is pretty simple.. There is a lot more that is possible than is actual.

There can be a blue, red, yellow version of me. There can be a version of me with a red hand and a blue finger, a blue hand and red finger, a yellow hand a blue finger etc, and so it goes on for eternity.

In essence, if there was as much actual stuff as possible, then it would mean every possible configuration of everything would exist, from all the way down on the smallest scales to the biggest scales.
I imagine what we see in the universe is a very small sample of what is actually possible.

Yes, it would seem that construction from local objects would make possible an infinite variety of configurations. But then, to be realistic, we have to ask also, well under what circumstances would such mixtures develop? For every colour combination, there would have to be some world that made you that way for its reasons. Now can we also just multiply these whole worlds endlessly as Lewis's modal realism, or Tegmark, or Everett, or whoever, so happily suggest? That is the further issue at the heart of these discussions.

Objects by their nature can be freely combined in many possible ways.

But can principles - physical laws, global constraints, whatever we prefer to call them - be invented with equal freedom? Well, probably not if self-consistency, for example, is one of the defining characteristics of world-level laws or principles.

This is already implicit in modal logic which wants to at least limit the ensemble of possible worlds to those which are "logical" - ie: self-consistent. Illogical worlds are not part of the ensemble.

The systems view is then about the nature of self-consistency across a whole ensemble. In some way - as vectorcube acknowledges with his algorithm seeking a fundamental law - we would expect and hope that just one law, one principle, in fact prevails across all possible worlds. So they are really in fact all part of the one actual world.

 

[apeiron]

to say is that there is no way of saying which one is "larger": that you cannot form an order operation between possible and actual. that seems a bit counter-intuitive as the actual is also possible.

but this also depends on what meaning does "size" in this context have...

the most intuitive thing to say it that there are more possible realities than actual ones, so if P is the set of possible realities, and A the set of actual realities than we can safely say(?) that A⊆P.

The position I would actually want to argue towards is that indeed "size" cannot be measured in usual scale terms (larger or smaller). Instead the proper metric is degree of symmetry.

The relationship of the possible to the actual is as a process of development/selection. Choices are taken (and so many more choices are not taken). There is a reduction involved.

And it is about a phase transition rather than a motion from smaller to larger or vice versa. So go backwards in development, and you find your surroundings becoming increasingly symmetric - vague being a useful and historical word we can also use.

So the space of possibilities is neither larger nor smaller than the space of the actual, it is instead vaguer, it has a higher state of symmetry. If we want to measure it, that is how we must measure it.

well, this one is (imo) easier: math is not a map of all possible worlds- there are possible worlds not mappable by math (maybe we exist in one as it is). furthermore, maybe there are worlds that math describes, and they're not actual. all in all, if M is the set of all worlds mathematics describes and R the set of all "real/actual" worlds, it seems evidently true to say that:

¬(M⊆R) && ¬(R⊆M)

And now I have just supplied an argument about how large and small are not the correct ways of measuring the relative "size" here.

But what I would add (Rosen made good arguments here in his work on modelling relations) is that the relevant maths itself should only be crisp, never vague. You will probably be pleased to hear that!

So even if we want to also model the vague, the space of possibilities, we would have to do it using crisp concepts. Which again is why symmetry is good to use here. It is in fact a very crisp or black and white map. Not smudged and grey - as metaphysics is often accused of being.

how did you arrive at the "possible = logically possible" equivalence?
to clarify: what arguments do you have that the rules of logic are in fact the rules that "determine" the possible?

actually, it seems the general trend in this thread was to restrict possible to logically possible:to say that the only possible possible is the logically possible... why?

I don't think modal logic, for example, could define possibility in such a final fashion. But the systems approach, I argue, does.

I've sketched out the basis for the way it does - by modelling the space of the possible in broad and crisp terms, and then also the selection mechanism which acts upon that space.

But you may be right in the sense that part of this position would be that - via selection - there is now the possibly actual, and the impossibly actual.

So some things are somehow possibilities that could come to be (because they can pass through the filter of global self-consistency, the global or systems' level act of selection). While other things were merely possibly possible (in some vague way) and never likely (in hindsight) to have got through such an emerging self-filtering process of development.

Your head is probably spinning at this nesting of ideas but it seems like the idea of virtual particles. The vacuum is a condensate alive with fluctuating actions (the possibly actual). However only some actions can cross the threshold to become actually possible - classical scale events, decohered actions.

So vagueness is like this kind of quantum ground state. It is full of every possible fluctuation. But it is generally all self-cancelling. Only a very limited number of fluctuations break through this Planckscale filtering to become crisply actual events - happenings that are woven into the spatiotemporal fabric of the universe and so part of its actual progressive history.

 

[octelcogopod]

Yes, it would seem that construction from local objects would make possible an infinite variety of configurations. But then, to be realistic, we have to ask also, well under what circumstances would such mixtures develop? For every colour combination, there would have to be some world that made you that way for its reasons. Now can we also just multiply these whole worlds endlessly as Lewis's modal realism, or Tegmark, or Everett, or whoever, so happily suggest? That is the further issue at the heart of these discussions.

Objects by their nature can be freely combined in many possible ways.

But can principles - physical laws, global constraints, whatever we prefer to call them - be invented with equal freedom? Well, probably not if self-consistency, for example, is one of the defining characteristics of world-level laws or principles.

This is already implicit in modal logic which wants to at least limit the ensemble of possible worlds to those which are "logical" - ie: self-consistent. Illogical worlds are not part of the ensemble.

The systems view is then about the nature of self-consistency across a whole ensemble. In some way - as vectorcube acknowledges with his algorithm seeking a fundamental law - we would expect and hope that just one law, one principle, in fact prevails across all possible worlds. So they are really in fact all part of the one actual world.

Yeah, which also brings the question, do we really know why everything is the way it is, and do we know what the smallest most fundamental law is and how flexible it is?
All the possible configurations of everything in the universe must come down to one principle, and this principle guides what is possible.
Some things that are possible never occur because the actual creates a chain of events that makes it impossible after some time for the possible to happen.
It is possible for a mountain to explode into pieces, or for the Earth to split in half, but since actual events have lead up to where we are now, these events will not happen without a cause, and that cause is predetermined by every other cause before it (ie determinism)

So in a way, the possible is the same as the actual, except the possible can only happen if an actual event chain makes it so.
But then if an event was possible, why didn't it happen? Was it ever really possible?
If reality is narrowing its options everyday and excluding possible events, what controls which events could happen? If it's all deterministic then it was never possible to begin with.
Maybe possible events are just a side effect of us being conscious and creative.. We can understand other ways the universe may have unfolded if other conditions were in place.

 

[ConradDJ]

I have tried to explain why the global would look like a fixed static context from our view inside even if it is actually a creative and developing process. The global could still change, but it would be changing in ways outside our vision...

So global in this sense is not "everything" in some external, god-like view which would see what lies over horizons. Instead it is an active and process definition of globality. In fact, a more limited one. One that is limited by the nature of observation from within the system.

I see your point – that “global” does not necessarily imply “universal” in the absolute sense of the philosophical tradition. You’re thinking about what’s effectively universal, what can be taken as the maximal scale of uniformity, from some particular point of view.

This restores a "balance" (as you said somewhere) to the dialectic of universal and particular... giving them in a sense equal weight.

One of the things I most appreciate about your viewpoint is your sense that for a dichotomy to be truly basic, the two sides have to respect each other, so to speak – they have to need something from each other, and yet be profoundly different, “asymmetrical”. This paradigm feels like it’s about genuine relationships... even if it’s describing relationships between ideas rather than between individuals.

And it makes a lot of sense to me to think of systems not only in terms of causality ("local construction"), but also constraint. But where do these constraints really come from?

Objects by their nature can be freely combined in many possible ways... But can principles - physical laws, global constraints, whatever we prefer to call them - be invented with equal freedom? Well, probably not if self-consistency, for example, is one of the defining characteristics of world-level laws or principles.

To me, the concept of “global consistency” or even “logical self-consistency” seems like a fall-back position, a default rather than a strong explanation. Even if we’re speaking of what’s effectively, practically universal, from a specific viewpoint, rather than some absolute universal logic. Yes, systems are constrained by being in the same world together... but I would try to understand these constraints in terms of their relationships rather than conceiving them just as a matter of scale.

My sense of “hierarchy theory” – which I’m only just learning about – is that it’s looking for evolutionary principles that apply to systems generally. That’s good – but I think it’s critical to take into account that physical systems, biological systems and human systems operate in three radically distinct relationship-contexts. The constraints ultimately come from the functionality that makes each of these contexts possible.

In biology, there are of course important constraints imposed by the physical and ecological environment. “Global” has a literal meaning here, since on a long enough time-scale, the planetary environment evolves as a whole, and that effects the local conditions of every species.

But the fundamental constraints in biology are given by the fact that organisms have to reproduce themselves. This is the basic functionality that opens up the possibility of life. Once you have self-replicating systems, then you get internal constraints requiring that these systems maintain themselves long enough to reproduce, and also external constraints from the environment to which these systems have to adapt.

So to me the key issue is identifying the basic functionality that makes it possible for a particular sort of system to evolve. The key functionality should be obvious, because it underlies everything and happens everywhere. E.g. there is no such thing as a living organism (or even something like a prion or a virus) that does not reproduce itself.

The deep problem is that it can be so obvious that it gets taken for granted. Before Darwin, everyone knew that living organisms reproduce – but it took decades of debate after Darwin’s ideas became well-known, before people began to see how much is implied in that "simple" functionality of self-replication.

Now every physical system is involved in a web of real-time relationships that “measures” it’s characteristics and communicates that information to other systems. And QM tells us that the characteristics of physical systems are only determinate insofar as they are actually determined in this context of communicative interaction.

So it seems clear to me that I need to try to understand what’s required to make this kind of communications / measurement functionality work – and that these special requirements, rather than more abstract logical or structural principles – are likely to be the “ultimate source of constraint” that explains why the physical world is built the way it is.

 

[ConradDJ]

All the possible configurations of everything in the universe must come down to one principle, and this principle guides what is possible.

This is a very beautiful and very ancient idea, going back to Heraclitus and the Greek “physikoi”. And physicists are maybe the only ones who still appreciate the depth and beauty of this idea, the logos that “steers all things through all.”

Some things that are possible never occur because the actual creates a chain of events that makes it impossible after some time for the possible to happen...

But then if an event was possible, why didn't it happen? Was it ever really possible?

To me the basic lesson of quantum theory is that possibility is real – in other words, yes, at one time each of many alternatives is genuinely possible, just as possible as any of the others... and then something happens in a moment that changes the situation, makes a choice. Very tiny accidents can (rarely, but sometimes) make a difference to the course of history.

I think this is just as profound an idea as that of the logos... perhaps just as beautiful, if we can understand it properly. We live in a world that’s somehow both grounded in very deep unchanging principles, and also sensitive to the smallest random events. It’s as though systems of every kind can evolve only by balancing on this knife-edge between fixed order and chaos – as though “possibility” in the deepest sense exists neither in fixed givenness, nor in complete randomness, but only where the two meet, in the moment.

 

[ConradDJ]

From the OP:

1) So is anything that is possible, also going to be actual? Why?

2) Or is there always going to be more that is possible than can be actual? Why.

I would answer (2). Because that's how evolution works -- by generating possibilities.

Anything that succeeds in existing, in this world, will be something that something else made possible. And will also be something that’s likely to be able to create new possibilities beyond itself.

 

[apeiron]

One of the things I most appreciate about your viewpoint is your sense that for a dichotomy to be truly basic, the two sides have to respect each other, so to speak – they have to need something from each other, and yet be profoundly different, “asymmetrical”. This paradigm feels like it’s about genuine relationships... even if it’s describing relationships between ideas rather than between individuals.
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Exactly. Perhaps it is my poor choice of words to favour "dichotomy". Others like Kelso are talking about complementaries. Or Haken used synergistic. There is also mutuality.

I stick to core greek jargon as this is the central thread of western thought development. It makes it easier to track the places where our ideas branched. But like hierarchy, dichotomy has picked up many negative connotations in our culture. To stratify or to cut in two seem very "old fashioned" when people prefer the apparent flatness networks and worlds based on one-ness.

And it makes a lot of sense to me to think of systems not only in terms of causality ("local construction"), but also constraint. But where do these constraints really come from?
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Constraints are built by local construction of course. It is a mutual story as what happens at the lower scale has to be the kind of thing that then builds the kind of upper scale which constrains in the ways that produce the necessary lower scale actions. It is a closed and circular tale - except across scale. A strange loop as Hofstadter put it.

Each has to be able to make the other, and so there can be systems-level self consistency. The constraints are constructed, and the constructing is constrained.

The big switch in thinking is probably getting the idea that the local grain would, if unconstrained, be doing anything. Its freedoms would be unbounded (so vague). But in trying to do all things at once, constraints emerge. Only some things can actually get done (the others conflicting or cancelling).

This is classic phase transition stuff. Dipoles want to point in all directions, but can't as they would conflict. So a globally constraining magnetic field emerges which then lines up all the dipoles.

But the fundamental constraints in biology are given by the fact that organisms have to reproduce themselves. This is the basic functionality that opens up the possibility of life. Once you have self-replicating systems, then you get internal constraints requiring that these systems maintain themselves long enough to reproduce, and also external constraints from the environment to which these systems have to adapt.

That would be the definition of complex systems (rather than simple ones) - the ability to create their own boundary conditions. To be systems unto themselves.

So the simple system in this case would be the second law of thermodynamics. Life has no control over that, and is in fact completely entrained by it. However life exists by its ability to constrain metabolism - a cell is a membrane that constrains chemistry, and further constrains those equilibrium processes through enzymes and physical channels.

Now every physical system is involved in a web of real-time relationships that “measures” it’s characteristics and communicates that information to other systems. And QM tells us that the characteristics of physical systems are only determinate insofar as they are actually determined in this context of communicative interaction.

So it seems clear to me that I need to try to understand what’s required to make this kind of communications / measurement functionality work – and that these special requirements, rather than more abstract logical or structural principles – are likely to be the “ultimate source of constraint” that explains why the physical world is built the way it is.

Again, hierarchy theory should be as general as we can make it. It should be a maths of scale that accounts for a dichotomisation of causality (as local construction matched to global constraint) in any kind of system - simple or complex. So it should apply to physics and to biology.

But within hierarchy theory, we would then need to capture that secondary difference between the fundamentally simple and the emergently complex.

What worries me here is that you might be thinking of "ultimate constraint" in terms of some particular micro-physical model. Once more, to move this intuitive picture to the level of maths, we need to frame the truths of systems logic at a level more general than even QM or conscious brains or whatever.

QM would have to be an example of the maths.

The second point is that you also want to focus on relationships rather than scale. This sounds like my comment earlier that networking sounds cooler than hierarchies.

Relationships are important, but just the step along the way. In the Peircean scheme, we start with monadic fluctuations, that result in dyadic relations, which then get summed across to produce figure-ground style hierarchical scale.

Relating itself becomes stratified. You get local interaction happening against a backdrop of everything globally interacting. So relating at extremes of scale. And when that happens, the relationship across scale - between the local and globa - becomes crystallised as local construction in interaction with global constraint.

 

[ConradDJ]

But like hierarchy, dichotomy has picked up many negative connotations in our culture. To stratify or to cut in two seem very old fashioned when people prefer the apparent flatness networks and worlds based on one-ness.

I have no problem with these terms, if we understand hierarchy as the result of evolutionary processes, rather than as something fixed in the structure of the world from the start.

And dividing the world in two, conceptually, seems to me to be the basic step in any attempt to understand the world at a foundational level... going back to creation myths, long before philosophy got going.

The thing is, there are at least a few profoundly different ways of doing this – projecting an ultimate ontological dichotomy at the basis of things. There are mythologies in which Life and Death are asymmetrical antitheses, that “take turns” and give rise to each other – an image from myth that Anaximander drew on. There are those in which Earth and Sky are essentially equal partners that define each other in a stable, ongoing relationship that generates all that grows up between them. Then Philosophy itself grew up by developing a new kind of dichotomy, between Reality and Seeming, in which only one side has any truth at all, and the other is just a sort of common mistake.

This one-sided dichotomy reached its peak historically with neo-Platonism, and still finds new expressions all the time in New Age “one-ness” thinking – and also in positivistic notions of science as the accumulation of facts and theories that don’t really need any deeper ground.

But the Western intellectual tradition has reinvented itself over and over again, in Medieval and modern times, by finding new ways to express genuine ontological Difference within the framework of the concept of the One Reality... bringing more and more of our historical existence back into the dimension of what’s fundamentally “real”. Hegel, with his creative notion of logical dichotomy – imagining he could generate all of history out of “Yes” and “No”... a very remarkable thought.

So I see your emphasis on dichotomy as appreciating the deep “two-sidedness” of the world. But I don’t see dichotomy per se as a principal, a starting-point... rather as the fundamental expression of any particular stage in the evolution of relationships.

The second point is that you also want to focus on relationships rather than scale. This sounds like my comment earlier that networking sounds cooler than hierarchies.

Relationships are important, but just the step along the way. In the Peircean scheme, we start with monadic fluctuations, that result in dyadic relations, which then get summed across to produce figure-ground style hierarchical scale.

Yes, I’m looking for a way of thinking in which dyadic relationships are the starting-point, and are ultimately what underlie the evolving structure of things. They are (for me) what our existence is ultimately made of, what our actual experience of the world consists in, how all this works.

The goal of ancient philosophers was to achieve a certain state of mind, an “autarchy” or independence of intellectual perception, by identifying their own true being with the One Reality – the independence of Aristotle’s “thought thinking itself”, his conception of God. They succeeded to a remarkable degree in establishing an “intellectual” mindset that nowadays we all take for granted... an ability to think from a standpoint utterly removed from daily life and personal relationships. (A viewpoint vectorcube has been expressing forcefully in several recent threads.)

As for me, both my parents were philosophers, and I literally grew up with the language of abstract ontology. I have the deepest respect for the intellectual viewpoint we inherit from our tradition, but my sense is that this point of view has reached its limit quite some time ago.

The problem is that the standpoint of intellectual detachment is so natural to us, by now, that we can write books of existential philosophy and develop “internalist” perspectives on the world, without really shifting our mental perception. So I’m trying to find some leverage – specifically in the dichotomy between things and their real-time, one-on-one relationships.

For me the abstract big-picture is – things get to be what they are, only in and from their relationships with each other. And as new kinds of things become possible, so do new kinds of relationships between those things. So the basic structure has to do with the stages of this back-and-forth evolution, of things in relationships. It’s not a logical structure, based on a logical dichotomy, but a structure of what happens by accident in an existing context of relationships.

There’s a lot in your post above that makes sense to me, especially about the “mutual story”. I feel a real depth in your approach – I think we share an intuition of what this is all about, though you express it in a kind of “logical idealist” language and I insist on trying to be “existential” about it.

But the basic question for both of us seems to be – where does possibility come from, in our world? In that possibility isn’t "just given" any more than actuality is – something is going on here that makes new things possible, all the time. And we think we can learn to make it understandable somehow.