apeiron
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ConradDJ said:So I see your emphasis on dichotomy as appreciating the deep “two-sidedness” of the world. But I don’t see dichotomy per se as a principal, a starting-point... rather as the fundamental expression of any particular stage in the evolution of relationships.
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Dichotomisation is certainly not the starting point, just the transition, and hierarchies are the destination.
So it seems sensible that all causal stories would follow a three step pattern: a before, a during, an after. There was (1) a state of some kind, there was (2) a change for some reason, then there was (3) a new state of some kind.
So my argument has been that (1) is a state of vagueness, (2) is a process of dichotomisation, and (3) is a hierarchical outcome when what has been divided has also mixed. Two things in interaction make three things altogether.
This is the basic insight of Anaximander and Peirce. Not so much Hegel of course.
ConradDJ said:an ability to think from a standpoint utterly removed from daily life and personal relationships. (A viewpoint vectorcube has been expressing forcefully in several recent threads.)
Perhaps that can be said of some of the people Vectorcube quotes.
ConradDJ said:But the basic question for both of us seems to be – where does possibility come from, in our world? In that possibility isn’t "just given" any more than actuality is – something is going on here that makes new things possible, all the time. And we think we can learn to make it understandable somehow.
And vagueness is not this kind of ocean of pure possibility?
I think it is safe to apply a precursor argument to establish what must have come "before". We can reason that whatever we find now must have once been somehow in that original state.
So what do we find now? Well we find something for a start, rather than nothing, or everything.
And we find that that something is also highly dichotomised, highly asymmetric. As you say, philosophy is all based on complementary dualisms, opposites which arise out of the negation of each other. There are many dozens - one~many, local~global, substance~form, stasis~flux, discrete~continuous, atom~void...on and on...
So to recover the origins of our world, we should attempt to reverse what we find, go backwards in a way that steadily erases it. If our world evolved, then to find its initial conditions we must devolve it.
So from asymmetry we would go to symmetry. What was broken gets reunited. This is exactly the thought path taken by Anaximander.
Thus possibility is the unbrokenness of a symmetry. That is the basis of our model. The idea of a state of infinite symmetry.
Of course, people will want to say if the start was a symmetry, well who cooked that up? That too would seem to require a prime mover.
But vagueness, as far as it is possible to imagine such a thing, does seem the kind of thing that can "just be" because it isn't really there. It is the everything and nothing.
Imagine you are rowing a boat on a mist shrouded lake. You paddle hard. But you might have traveled a long way, or no where at all. As far as you can visibly tell. If your motion could have been anything, then what has actually happened seems vague. From an internalist perspective - which is part of what we assume for this way of looking at reality anyway.
So when action looks the same as inaction, you do have everything and nothing. But when scale arises, when a dichotomy of event and context emerges, the fog lifts and a boat's motion can be judged against a reference frame. It become crisply a something.
In a reference frame, we can count the multiple possibilities - the total ensemble of microstates. In the boat example, with no fog, we can see that the boat underwent motion x, and also count every other not-x possibility - all the other possible actions that did not take place because we went in that direction, at that rate, and in no other.
But in vagueness, the other microstates cannot be counted. They are symmetric. They are indistinguishable. In the fog, all actions look the same so we can no longer stack the not-x's up against the putative x. There is no possibilities (in the usual sense of countable microstates, an ensemble) in vagueness, only pure unbroken potential.
It is not easy to convey what vagueness means it seems. But I find when you get it, it clicks right into place. It is just a very different concept to any we would normally encounter in modern anglo-saxon education.
Louis Kauffman wrote this very helpful paper on x/not-x.
http://www2.math.uic.edu/~kauffman/Peirce.pdf