The Logic that Suggests all Serious Physicists Believe in God

[Les Sleeth]

. . . having a fallible epistemological privilege, provisionally accepted as scientific knowledge) is far from being enough to claim that God exists and that all would be rational people should believe this (as unfortunately lifegazer do-by the way he's very active now on a skeptic site I frequent trying to persuade them, in vain of course :-) ). Of course this by no means amount to say that a God does not exist or that people do not have the right to believe, as an entirely personal choice, in a personal God.

Metacristi, your thinkng is lucid, as always. When I made up this thread, the mentor (Hypnagogue) wrote me privately that it wasn't clear that my point was logic, and now I agree. I don't think anything I reasoned in the opening post adds up to the conclusion (physicists must believe in God). What I was trying to do in a lighthearted way was suggest that there seems to be no "absolute foundation" to what science deems substantial.

I was trying to ask, isn't it more logical to posit some sort of base substance of which everything is a form of? Instead, everyone started talking about God, which I see as my fault for not being straightforward with my point.

I've been trying to prepare a new thread that asks if neutral monism (or a variation of it) has theoretical possibilities. Maybe you comment there when I get it ready.

 

[metacristi]

Metacristi, your thinkng is lucid, as always. When I made up this thread, the mentor (Hypnagogue) wrote me privately that it wasn't clear that my point was logic, and now I agree. I don't think anything I reasoned in the opening post adds up to the conclusion (physicists must believe in God). What I was trying to do in a lighthearted way was suggest that there seems to be no "absolute foundation" to what science deems substantial.

I was trying to ask, isn't it more logical to posit some sort of base substance of which everything is a form of? Instead, everyone started talking about God, which I see as my fault for not being straightforward with my point.

I've been trying to prepare a new thread that asks if neutral monism (or a variation of it) has theoretical possibilities. Maybe you comment there when I get it ready.

I hope I understood you better this time...Lifegazer's philosophy is a form of idealist monist pantheism not too far from the 'Brahman-Brahma' set of the hindus, identified with God (we existing in God's mind, 'all that is'). The crux of the matter is that in this approach the 'ultimate substance' has the property of being conscious, that only God exist (or alternatively that we are God too). This is enough far from merely suggesting that a form of monism (which does not necessarily imply a conscious being) could be true or accepting provisionally a form of monism as fallible scientific knowledge. This is why I interpreted your question as bringing God into equation.

Today we cannot talk of a 'single substance', moreover as you observed even the classical, common sense, notion of substance seems to have lost meaning at quantum level. However we can still identify matter with 'quantum fields', though devoided by its common sense meaning. Unfortunately even here we cannot talk of a single form of quantum fields. Not yet at least. Thus we cannot talk yet of a monism.

From all we know currently, there is no good reason to 'to posit some sort of [single] base substance of which everything is a form of' as being provisional scientific knowledge. Maybe after successfuly developping a theory of everything achieving superunification (but it is not at all granted that a TOE will support monism). Of course it is still logically possible that monism is correct, I find this metaphysical thesis meaningful. If monism is held entirely as a philosophical doctrine, without epistemological claims (that it has to be introduced in science) I see no problem.

As about the foundations of science, well, as Popper put it well, the foundations of science lie on a swampy terrain, science is always provisional and corrigible. Even its basic assumptions (one of them is realism) are not incorrigible. Indeed both the foundationalist and coherentist theories of knowledge have serious problems, basically we cannot talk of sure knowledge developed step by step from a set of premises known to be true (the dream of Aristotle).

But from a scientist's standpoint though idealism cannot be rejected we just have more logical reasons now to prefer realism as a corrigible basis for science (well a weak form of realism, in my view not all fruitful unobservables posited by our successful scientfic theories do exist in reality). So even if we exist in reality in God's mind in the light of current situation logic indicate the actual assumptions/theories of science (accepted provisionally/considered corrigible) as having the most 'pro' arguments; thus they are accepted, at least for the moment, as the standard of knowledge (though of course a postmodernist or a supporter of Feyerabend will disagree).

 

[spicerack]

pardon my intrusion so late in the piece and even the relevence of my post but I'd always thought 2 things can occupy the same space just not at the same time ?

The logic seems to me that science cannot discount God as a first cause and that all serious physicists are on a quest to rule out that scenario

BTW Les I thought you were a bit harsh on loseyourname and that it was totally uncalled for. Expect karmic repercussions you big meanie

 

[Royce]

Les, I know your writing well enough to know that you were just teasing. Your post was well done and I enjoyed it. I just added my own confusion into the mix. It seems to me that all physicist have to have multiple personalities to deal with classic Newtonian physics, quantum physics and relativity all at the same time as None of them are completely compatible with the other.

I made the mistake not too long ago of saying that classical physics had been shown to be wrong. I was immediately and properly chastised for committing such an unpardonable sin. It seems that Newtonian physics is 100% complete and absolutely correct..er...ah...most of the time. Relativity is 100% absolutely complete and correct ...er...ah some of the time and that
Quantum physics is 100% absolutely complete and correct all of the time but nobody understands it and it doesn't matter because it doesn't effect anything in the real (macro) world anyway. (I'm paraphrasing what I have read here and other places.) It seems that the more I read and understand the more confused, ignorant and yes naive I become. Anyway good job and I look forward to your new thread.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I hope I understood you better this time...Lifegazer's philosophy is a form of idealist monist pantheism . . .

I liked Lifegazer's passion, but I was truly and totally kidding about suggesting he was right. I oppose idealism everytime I see it.

From all we know currently, there is no good reason to 'to posit some sort of [single] base substance of which everything is a form of' as being provisional scientific knowledge. Maybe after successfuly developping a theory of everything achieving superunification (but it is not at all granted that a TOE will support monism).

It's true we have no scientific basis for promoting any sort of monism since no such single substance has been observed. The point I'll make in my thread (if I ever get it done), however, will be that the only thing that makes the monistic substance appear is when it concentrates sufficiently. Before that it is dispersed far too finely to ever be observed by the rather "substantial" machinery (including our own senses) we employ to help us observe.

Of course it is still logically possible that monism is correct, I find this metaphysical thesis meaningful. If monism is held entirely as a philosophical doctrine, without epistemological claims (that it has to be introduced in science) I see no problem.

Agreed, except for one small point. As I've stated a great many times here at PF, there are people who've learned to quiet their mind to the point that they become aware of a sort of bright, omnipresent "substance." We might, in the sense of the phenomenologist's eidetic reflection, consider those meditators as having valid epistemological input.

However, the problem is that few who debate here know anything about this, and so I've been quite unsuccessful in getting that admitted as evidence for substance monism. So I agree that a monistic discussion will have to be primarily a philosophical exercise given the lack of epistemological consensus among the participants here.

 

[Les Sleeth]

BTW Les I thought you were a bit harsh on loseyourname and that it was totally uncalled for. Expect karmic repercussions you big meanie

Possibly, but it's too late to edit it, and I doubt if you know the history of our interaction. We've not been getting along. Besides the reasons I stated above, I haven't cared for his responses to myself and others I've considered insulting or downright nasty. At this point I feel intolerant, so maybe the best thing would be for he and I to steer clear of each other.

 

[Les Sleeth]

It seems that the more I read and understand the more confused, ignorant and yes naive I become.

Ahh, the voice of wisdom.

I look forward to your new thread.

I thought it would easier to lay it out than it's turning out to be. I'll work on it today and see what happens.

 

[metacristi]

Agreed, except for one small point. As I've stated a great many times here at PF, there are people who've learned to quiet their mind to the point that they become aware of a sort of bright, omnipresent "substance." We might, in the sense of the phenomenologist's eidetic reflection, consider those meditators as having valid epistemological input.

However, the problem is that few who debate here know anything about this, and so I've been quite unsuccessful in getting that admitted as evidence for substance monism. So I agree that a monistic discussion will have to be primarily a philosophical exercise given the lack of epistemological consensus among the participants here.

This is an interesting topic Les, do mystical experiences have any sort of epistemological value (at least a purely subjective, personal one)? In the late 1920s (before returning to England) Wittgenstein discussed exactly this problem with Schlick and Carnap, two of the most important logical positivists (in private, not at the meetings of the Vienna Circle).

At the time the Vienna Circle members were studying Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' and were interested to hear from the man himself if their interpretation was correct. Well it resulted that while both parts agreed that verificationism can make the demarcation between [sense/nonsense + science/metaphysics] and that it is incoherent to talk of a purely private language Wittgenstein sustained additionally that mystical experiences are meaningful (possible expressing an absolute truth, the ultimate level of reality, God) though they cannot be expressed in words. That is that the experiences are meaningful/real for the experiencer but the language translations of the experiences are meaningless!

Carnap wrote in his memoirs that it was surprised to hear this from him, they had believed previously that Wittgenstein shared their view that religion as whole is meaningless, pure fictional metaphysics, including private experiences. It has to be said that the members of the Vienna Circle were already at that time supporters of physicalism which reject strong psychologism, holding that everything, even subjective experiences, [must] be interpreted via physical processes. This positivistic stance regarding mystical experiences/subjective experiences is strongly held in almost its entirety even today by a majority of skeptics/atheists (I've experienced this myself on different forums :-) ). They hold that all rational people should identify the so called 'mystical experiences' with brain functioning, nothing more than mere illusions without any epistemological content. This even if the subjective/theistic interpretations are only provisionally accepted by the percievers, entirely on a strictly personal basis (that is there is no claim that they [the 'theistic' interpretations] are part of science or that all rational people should believe the same).

Personally I cannot share their optimism here, as matter of fact science does not have yet a clear answer (what is consciousness?, we are rather at the beginning of our quest). Reliabilism (the actual scientific method 'worked' very well previously being very reliable whilst subjective experiences are usually not reliable) is not enough to claim that we have the good answer/later orthodox science will give an answer or that all rational people should interpret their subjective experiences with necessity on the line of scientific orthodoxy. So in my view mystical experiences do have epistemological content at least for the perciever (preferable held as fallible, basically counting as their personal research 'program') though in any case can we say that such experiences are enough to accept their theistic interpretation inside actual science.

 

[CaptainQuaser]

Logic is Illogical

Logic by its very nature is constrictive and inadequate. It is a human concept that tries to justify the universe. To believe that a lump of mass that is infinitely small in the scope of the universe if able to create logical constructions to understand the universe is preposterous. Than to go further and assume there is a creator and assume to can logically prove or disprove its existence is, well, illogical.

Using your precious logic we assume that you cannot fit more stuff in a container than it is able to hold.

There is more universe out there than there is sub-atomic particles in your brain, let alone neurons.

Knowledge of the universe cannot fit in your brain.

Any logical conclusions based on the universe will be made on inadequate data and false or unsubstantiated assumptions. Because our ability to test the universe is infinitely small, therefore our margin of error must be infinitely large.

Therefore, we can’t actually know anything. Just like in the quantum world, knowledge is never true, it’s just more likely to be true than false in the familiar circumstances it is applied to.

 

[Tournesol]

There is more universe out there than there is sub-atomic particles in your brain, let alone neurons.

Knowledge of the universe cannot fit in your brain.

So much for redundancy.

 

[Paul Martin]

Knowledge of the universe cannot fit in your brain.

Seems true enough to me.

A more striking example might be to wonder if the knowledge of how to build so many variations of a spider web, depending on unpredictable circumstances, can fit in the brain of the spider. Some of those spider brains are pretty small. Or whether the knowledge of how to migrate thousands of miles can fit in the brain of a Monarch butterfly, which is also pretty small.

In light of this, it seems to me that we should not rule out the possibility that knowledge is not resident in the brain after all. Just as the music and program content that comes out of a radio is not resident in the radio.

Paul

 

[selfAdjoint]

Seems true enough to me.

A more striking example might be to wonder if the knowledge of how to build so many variations of a spider web, depending on unpredictable circumstances, can fit in the brain of the spider. Some of those spider brains are pretty small. Or whether the knowledge of how to migrate thousands of miles can fit in the brain of a Monarch butterfly, which is also pretty small.

In light of this, it seems to me that we should not rule out the possibility that knowledge is not resident in the brain after all. Just as the music and program content that comes out of a radio is not resident in the radio.

Paul

The spider does not have to have knowledge of all possible webs to build one, any more than a planet has to solve differentiial equations in order to move in its orbit. The spider has a little web-building program in its brain. Different sppecies of spider have slightly different different programs, and the result of "running" those programs, given all the immediate variables each differnet time, gives a slightly different web, but belonging to that species' style.

We don't have to have all the knowledge in the world, only enought to live our lives. Our brains can hold a lot of knowledge; Chou En-Lai was trained in classical Chinese literature, so he had in his brain full identifiers of some 50 to 100,00 characters, with interpretative detail, and he was also a talented politician, who had in his brain about the same number of people's names, bios, and greet information (wife's name, current job, last job, evaluation as a party member, etc.). That's a bunch of data, and he not only held it in his 10^10 synapses but he could retrieve any item to consciousness in a fraction of a second.

 

[Paul Martin]

The spider does not have to have knowledge of all possible webs to build one, any more than a planet has to solve differentiial equations in order to move in its orbit. The spider has a little web-building program in its brain. Different sppecies of spider have slightly different different programs, and the result of "running" those programs, given all the immediate variables each differnet time, gives a slightly different web, but belonging to that species' style.

If you have some programming experience, which I suspect you do, take some time to watch a few spiders build their webs. Then try to design a "little web-building program" that would do the same thing. Then come up with an explanation of how that program might be stored in that little brain and how it got programmed in the first place.

I expect that your explanation for how the program got written will be that it evolved by trial and error in myriad spiders over eons of time and the programs that worked best propagated into successive generations. Now try to imagine if that technique could really work for software development. It doesn't make sense to me. I suspect there is quite a bit more going on.

We don't have to have all the knowledge in the world, only enought to live our lives. Our brains can hold a lot of knowledge; Chou En-Lai was trained in classical Chinese literature, so he had in his brain full identifiers of some 50 to 100,00 characters, with interpretative detail, and he was also a talented politician, who had in his brain about the same number of people's names, bios, and greet information (wife's name, current job, last job, evaluation as a party member, etc.). That's a bunch of data, and he not only held it in his 10^10 synapses but he could retrieve any item to consciousness in a fraction of a second.

With your understanding of information storage and retrieval technology, can you explain how synapses can serve that function? It doesn't make sense to me. And even if we could identify the information storage mechanisms in the brain, I think there is still a great mystery about how the mechanism got programmed. Hardware and data are one thing; functioning software is quite another. (Don't forget to consider that however that programming gets done, it varies considerably between individuals and it is very adaptable to experience of and damage
to the organism and brain.)

Paul

P.S. BTW, how come you didn't answer my question about observations of irrational real number values in nature? It was a real question.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I expect that your explanation for how the program got written will be that it evolved by trial and error in myriad spiders over eons of time and the programs that worked best propagated into successive generations. Now try to imagine if that technique could really work for software development. It doesn't make sense to me. I suspect there is quite a bit more going on.

You never heard of genetic programming ? http://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~nd/surprise_96/journal/vol4/cs11/report.html ?

 

[Fliption]

You never heard of genetic programming ? http://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~nd/surprise_96/journal/vol4/cs11/report.html ?

I actually think Paul has a very good point. I wouldn't say that I believe "something else is going on" just yet. I'm still open to the possibilities. It shouldn't be surprising that there are things like genetic programming going on. The question is, what has it gotten us? The response that says it took billions of years for nature to create what it has, doesn't seem like a very good response because in the computer world it seems we could speed up the process of mutation/selection way beyond that of nature. The limit here is computing power not the speed of mother nature.

I don't think there is any doubt that natural selection works and that if used in computers it could result in something. The question is "Can it alone explain life as we know it?". If it can then it seems these computer programs ought to be performing miracles very soon.

 

[Tournesol]

Or there was never anything miraculous about life in the first place.

 

[Fliption]

Or there was never anything miraculous about life in the first place.

When used as a figure of speech, it is quite appropriate as a characterization of life.

 

[jackle]

I’ve quoted science writer Paul Davies before writing in his book Superforce about energy, “When an abstract concept becomes so successful that it permeates through to the general public, the distinction between real and imaginary becomes blurred. . . . This is what happened in the case of energy. . . . Energy is . . . an imaginary, abstract concept which nevertheless has become so much a part of our everyday vocabulary that we imbue it with concrete existence.”

I don't know who Paul Davies is, but assuming he holds the opinions common to most physicists he is probably stating that Energy is a human concept.

...

If energy is a thought, mass is a thought. A thought requires a thinker.

But at this stage in your logic chain, the thinkers are probably already known, people, particularly physicists.

The thinker proposed powerful enough to manifest the universe is God.

God would have to have a concept of energy because of the way the universe behaves. I'm sure it wouldn't be the same as ours though.