US Predator Drone Attacks: Illegal Under International Law?

[SW VandeCarr]

A UN official has said that US predator drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan could be illegal. Can a country serve as a base for a non-state entity which is organizing attacks against another country and nevertheless be protected under international law? Can a country which is the target of these attacks (the US) be at war (under international law) with a non-state entity? If so, what about the country hosting (willingly or unwillingly) the non-state entity?

http://www.newser.com/story/72741/un-to-us-drone-attacks-couldbe-unlawful.html

 

[Office_Shredder]

The main concern is that these attacks are being conducted at the whim of the CIA, which is a non-military organization.

 

[russ_watters]

Both the article and the above two posts offer exceedingly thin explanation of what the issue is here. The article says:

...arbitrary executions, extrajudicial executions...

...which suggests the Predator attacks are somehow intended to be executions of criminals outside the legal system, but provides no explanation of what that really means or why they would think that.

Countries at war use airplanes to drop bombs on their enemies. This is not a new concept and certainly isn't illegal. Could someone explain what the issue is here?

 

[russ_watters]

Can a country serve as a base for a non-state entity which is organizing attacks against another country and nevertheless be protected under international law?

I assume you are talking about Pakistan hosting Al Qaeda, but in any case: violating an international law does not mean forfeiting all protection under other international laws. This should be an obvious and universal concept regarding the law.

Can a country which is the target of these attacks (the US) be at war (under international law) with a non-state entity?

Certainly.

If so, what about the country hosting (willingly or unwillingly) the non-state entity?

What about them? Are you asking if we are at war with Pakistan? We aren't. We have approval for these attacks.

Anyway, I don't see what any of this has to do with the article...

 

[Ygggdrasil]

Perhaps this can clarify the debate:

the disclosure in 2010 by news organizations that Anwar al-Awlaki had been added to the C.I.A. kill list shifted the terms of the legal debate in several ways. He is located far from hostilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the perpetrators of 9/11 are believed to be hiding, and he is an American citizen. The notion that the government can, in effect, execute one of its own citizens outside a combat zone, with no judicial process and based on secret intelligence, makes some legal authorities deeply uneasy.

In a June 2010 report to the United Nations Human Rights Council, Philip Alston, the United Nations special representative on extrajudicial executions, said that the growing use of armed drones by the United States was undermining global constraints on the use of military force, and warned that the American example would lead to a chaotic world as the new weapons technology inevitably spread.

Mr. Alston called on the United States to exercise greater restraint in its use of drones in places like Pakistan and Yemen, outside the war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq, and proposed a summit meeting of "key military powers" to clarify legal limits on such killings.

(source: http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_aerial_vehicles/index.html)

The issue here is not the targeted killing of targets in Afghanistan and Iraq. The issue is whether these instruments of war should be allowed to be used outside of combat zones (for example, in Pakistan and Yemen). Is permission from the host government sufficient (as is the case in Pakistan)? Should targeted killings outside of combat zones be considered assassinations (prohibited by US executive order)? Against non-state entities can the entire world be considered a combat zone?

Many of these questions have important implications for global security and military policy, so it is prudent to raise some of these questions before UAV technology becomes more widespread. This is especially important because UAV attacks have been criticized for causing excessive civilian casualties.

(edit: Alson's report is available here: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf)

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Are you asking if we are at war with Pakistan? We aren't. We have approval for these attacks.

True. But suppose Pakistan didn't give permission and made no effort to suppress Al Qaeda. In your opinion, would the US have grounds to declare war on Pakistan? (I'm not asking if we should, given the political situation, but would we have legal grounds to do so?)

Anyway, I don't see what any of this has to do with the article...

The article is only part of the topic. IMO this is not an issue of extrajudicial execution, which is how the UN adviser is looking at it, but a case of waging war against an organized enemy that attacked the US. I agree we can wage war against a non-state actor and therefore we can operate under the laws of war which would allow us to kill Al Qaeda operatives any way we can, unless they surrender. This inevitably entails "collateral' deaths and damage. We should try to minimize this (and this requires good intelligence), but this is war.

 

[russ_watters]

Perhaps this can clarify the debate:

Thank you, that's helpful. Some of the points:

The issue here is not the targeted killing of targets in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Ok...

The issue is whether these instruments of war should be allowed to be used outside of combat zones (for example, in Pakistan and Yemen).

That's a misnomer. The "combat zone" is wherever combat is taking place. That some of the generals are directing the combat from locations not near where most of the other combat is taking place is irrelevant. That we can launch and/or control bombing missions from 10,000 miles away from where the bombs are dropped is a luxury that we have chosen to utilize and one that our enemy would take advantage of more often if they could.

Is permission from the host government sufficient (as is the case in Pakistan)?

Yes. Otherwise, we'd be at war with Pakistan.

Should targeted killings outside of combat zones be considered assassinations (prohibited by US executive order)?

No. Killing a commander in a military conflict is not ever an assassination. Caveat: the executive order prohibiting assassinations is a mistake and a silly, empty statement.

Against non-state entities can the entire world be considered a combat zone?

Again, "combat zone" is wherever the bombs go off. This is ridiculously obvious and has always been true in warfare. People are screwing with the definitions of warfare concepts when they argue otherwise.

Many of these questions have important implications for global security and military policy, so it is prudent to raise some of these questions before UAV technology becomes more widespread.

These questions are a red herring, raised as a generic complaint against the concept of warfare, not a legitimate concern about how the combat operations are being carried out. Case in point:

This is especially important because UAV attacks have been criticized for causing excessive civilian casualties.

That is a completely separate issue with no business in this discussion.

Now I will say this: a big part of the "problem" here is that the lack of war has made people in the West lose their guts when war does rear its ugly head. As a result, people are forgetting or learning incorrectly how war works. And that includes our leadership, which is currently dangerously mixing the concepts of war and justice. Allowing these concepts to be overlapped is dangerous to soldiers, dangerous to civilians and dangerous to the integrity of the judicial system. We need to stop doing it.

 

[russ_watters]

True. But suppose Pakistan didn't give permission and made no effort to suppress Al Qaeda. In your opinion, would the US have grounds to declare war on Pakistan?

Absolutely. Countries are responsible for what is going on in their terrirtory. We'd also have grounds to attack Al Aqeda in Pakistan without declaring war on Pakistan, essentially daring them to declare war on us.

IMO this is not an issue of extrajudicial execution...

There is no such thing as "extradjudicial execution".

...but a case of waging war against an organized enemy that attacked the US. I agree we can wage war against a non-state actor and therefore we can operate under the laws of war which would allow us to kill Al Qaeda operatives any way we can, unless they surrender. This inevitably entails "collateral' deaths and damage. We should try to minimize this (and this requires good intelligence), but this is war.

Agreed.

 

[WhoWee]

The article is only part of the topic. IMO this is not an issue of extrajudicial execution, which is how the UN adviser is looking at it, but a case of waging war against an organized enemy that attacked the US. I agree we can wage war against a non-state actor and therefore we can operate under the laws of war which would allow us to kill Al Qaeda operatives any way we can, unless they surrender. This inevitably entails "collateral' deaths and damage. We should try to minimize this (and this requires good intelligence), but this is war.

...and let's not forget, this is Obama's War.

 

[Office_Shredder]

People seem to be missing the point. Even if we're allowed to conduct war against a non-state enemy anywhere in the world, the rules of war are quite strict on the necessity of uniformed military units being in combat. A civilian CIA agent conducting a drone strike is the issue here, not who he's shooting or where he's shooting the guy

 

[russ_watters]

Just realized an obvious error:

That we can launch and/or control bombing missions from 10,000 miles away from where the bombs are dropped is a luxury that we have chosen to utilize and one that our enemy would take advantage of more often if they could.

Our enemy is doing the same thing as we are! That's the whole point of this line of discussion! What is asymetrical is that we are capable of targeting the enemy in his faraway hiding spot and he is not* capable of doing the same to us.

*Well, 9/11 and the half dozen or so failed attempts afterwards notwithstanding. Most of those attacks were non-specific and not targeted at the military command structure, though, so they aren't really the same.

 

[russ_watters]

People seem to be missing the point. Even if we're allowed to conduct war against a non-state enemy anywhere in the world, the rules of war are quite strict on the necessity of uniformed military units being in combat. A civilian CIA agent conducting a drone strike is the issue here, not who he's shooting or where he's shooting the guy

Oh, the issue is who is pulling the trigger, not who is being shot? Didn't see that...

...what is "a civilian CIA agent?" Is the CIA a civilan agency? I've never thought of it as one. Certainly, a cia agent infiltrating an enemy wouldn't be treated as a civilian. It says in the wiki on the CIA that it is a civilian intelligence agency, but then defines it quite specifically to not be a law enforcement agency. It is paramilitary.

So could you please explain what laws of war exist that have something to say about the CIA conducting predator attacks.

I remain at a loss here. I keep hearing inuendo that **something** untword might be going on, but I have yet to hear an explanation of exactly what the issue is.

 

[russ_watters]

Since I'm still at a loss here, I'm doing some more of my own research. Here's a wiki article on the prevous subject: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIA_tr...ties#Clandestine_intelligence.2Fcovert_action

While the US has had a series of Presidential Executive Orders banning assassinations, none of those Orders actually defined assassination.[54] Using dictionary rather than statutory definition, a common definition is "murder by surprise for political purposes". Jeffrey Addicott argues that if murder is generally accepted as an illegal act in US and international law, so if assassination is a form of murder, the Orders cannot be making illegal something that is already illegal.

This goes to what I said before about that executive order being a "silly, empty statement."

The Hague and Geneva Conventions did not consider non-national actors as belligerents in general war. The Conventions do consider spontaneous rising against invasion and civil war as having lawful combatants, but there are much more restrictions of the status, as legal combatants, of fighters who came to a war from an external country. This discussion will not address the controversial issue of illegal combatants, but, following Addicott's reasoning, assumes that violence, in defense to an attack, is legal under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Note that before the attackers in the September 11, 2001 attacks were identified, the US invoked the NATO treaty, without objection, as a member state that had been attacked. "In the War on Terror, it is beyond legal dispute that the virtual-State al-Qa’eda terrorists are aggressors and that the United States is engaging in self-defense when using violence against them."

So that addresses the issue of whether members of Al Qaeda can simply be considered military targets (which is why, IMO, we need to stop arresting them).

Black and others became advocates of arming the Predator with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles to try to assassinate Bin Laden and other Qaeda leaders. But there were both legal and technical issues. Tenet in particular was concerned about the CIA moving back into the business of assassination. And a series of live-fire tests in the Nevada Desert in summer 2001 produced mixed results.

In June 2001, at a test site in Nevada in the US, CIA and Air Force personnel built a replica of Bin Laden's villa in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The Predator controllers tested aiming and firing a Predator missile at the house, and post-strike analysis showed it would have killed anyone in the targeted room. The significance of this demonstration was called a "holy grail" by one participant. A weapon now existed which, at long range, could kill Bin Laden shortly after finding him. Practice runs proved reliable, but, according to the Washington Post, the Bush Administration refrained from such action. On September 4, a new set of directives called for increasing pressure against the Taliban until they either ejected al Qaeda or faced a serious threat to their continued power. No decision on using this capability had reached President Bush by September 11.[53]

Interesting that we looked into arming the Predators specifically to go after Bin Laden before 9/11.

Unfortunately, the article doesn't really go any further into any legal issues with either the targets or the trigger-pullers. Still not seeing what the issue is, I'm forced to go back to those bringing it up to explain yourselves further.

 

[russ_watters]

Here's a CIA article that discusses some of what we are talking about: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol5no2/html/v05i2a10p_0001.htm

 

[russ_watters]

Here's a news article with more detail, as well as a link to the full report. It seems that second angle isn't in play: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/02/AR2010060201713.html

Alston said some commentators have argued that CIA personnel involved in drone killings are committing war crimes because, unlike the military, they are "unlawful combatants." But, he said, "this argument is not supported" by international humanitarian law.

But here are the concerns he had:

"It is an essential requirement of international law that States using targeted killings demonstrate that they are complying with the various rules governing their use in situations of armed conflict," Alston said in a news release. "The greatest challenge to this principle today comes from the program operated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. . . . The international community does not know when and where the CIA is authorized to kill, the criteria for individuals who may be killed, how it ensures killings are legal, and what follow-up there is when civilians are illegally killed."

It almost sounds like he's saying that the US government needs to be continuously briefing the UN on her activities and rules of engagement in the war on terror. I'll need to read the report to see what the justification of that is, but at face value it seems preposterous.

 

[Proton Soup]

i was under the impression that the geneva convention generally treated non-uniformed combatants as unprotected. a CIA operative is a spy, has no rights, and you can shoot him on sight (or maybe you'd prefer something a little more creative).

 

[russ_watters]

Here's a direct link to the paper: http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/unreport060210.pdf

It is an excellent read. It discusses the theoretical issues at great length and covers everything discussed already in this thread. However, the only beef the author really has is that his office isn't being kept informed:

The failure of States to comply with their human rights law and IHL obligations to
provide transparency and accountability for targeted killings is a matter of deep concern. To
date, no State has disclosed the full legal basis for targeted killings, including its
interpretation of the legal issues discussed above. Nor has any State disclosed the
procedural and other safeguards in place to ensure that killings are lawful and justified, and
the accountability mechanisms that ensure wrongful killings are investigated, prosecuted
and punished. The refusal by States who conduct targeted killings to provide transparency
about their policies violates the international legal framework that limits the unlawful use of
lethal force against individuals.149
88. Transparency is required by both IHL150 and human rights law.151 A lack of
disclosure gives States a virtual and impermissible license to kill. [emphasis added]

The reason no state has ever provided transparency on this issue is that transparency is an unreasonable request. Here's the request:

Among the procedural safeguards States must take (and disclose) with respect to
targeted killings in armed conflict are:
• Ensure that forces and agents have access to reliable information to support the
targeting decision.152 These include an appropriate command and control structure,153
as well as safeguards against faulty or unverifiable evidence. 154
• Ensure adequate intelligence on “the effects of the weapons that are to be used …
the number of civilians that are likely to be present in the target area at the particular
time; and whether they have any possibility to take cover before the attack takes
place.”155
• The proportionality of an attack must be assessed for each individual strike.156
• Ensure that when an error is apparent, those conducting a targeted killing are able to
abort or suspend the attack. 157

The reason it is preposterous, as I said above, to require this is obvious: Disclosing such information is harmful to the war effort and puts American lives and security in danger.

 

[russ_watters]

i was under the impression that the geneva convention generally treated non-uniformed combatants as unprotected. a CIA operative is a spy, has no rights, and you can shoot him on sight (or maybe you'd prefer something a little more creative).

That's true, but unprotected does not mean illegal. Intelligence agents are in a different class altogether from normal legal uniformed and illegal unconventional combatants.

 

[BobG]

i was under the impression that the geneva convention generally treated non-uniformed combatants as unprotected. a CIA operative is a spy, has no rights, and you can shoot him on sight (or maybe you'd prefer something a little more creative).

There's two issues that are questionable under the Geneva convention.

1) Using the CIA, or other civilian, non-uniform force, as a combat force technically violates the Geneva convention. The only affect UAVs have on this issue is that they make the identity of the operator a trivial point. The operators are nowhere near the combat area, whether the UAVs are operated by military personnel or civilian personnel.

Personally, I think that particular article is a little out synch, both with military operations today, and the history of military operations in general. If that article actually succeeded in banning mercenaries from a war, it would probably be for the first time in history.

2) Targeting individuals so far from the combat area does start to look like assassination. I'm not sure how you draw the line on that today, considering terrorist operations, modern warfare, etc. For example, sending a team of snipers to the US to the operating center for the UAVs and picking off operators as they drive home from work - assassination or legitimate targets?

It's an issue that's far from cut and dried and it may depend on who is being targetted. Targetting Taliban leaders far from the combat may be assassination. Targetting al-Qaeda leaders may not. I can see why someone would raise the issue, since it's definitely becoming harder to define just where the battlefield is.

 

[Office_Shredder]

To me, this is the beginning and end of the issue.

Beyond that, legalities be damned, there is no sane way to go to war in that region, and these strikes seem to be moderately effective. Call it assassination, and sign me up for a double shot of it down the throat of enemies. An effective assassination is worth a LOT, and can prevent, or start a war depending on how it is accomplished and who is targeted. Such a powerful tool is too valuable to be set aside. This is the reality of asymmetric warfare.

What's the difference between a CIA agent using a predator drone to kill an enemy leader and a terrorist attacking the white house with a suicide vest? Both are non-uniformed combatants fighting off the front line.

In WWII German submarine operators sunk civilian vessels on sight, and when their admiral was later tried for that crime hi defense was that the alllies were doing it also. He was let off

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Dönitz#Nuremberg_War_Crimes_Trials

*

Among the war-crimes charges, Dönitz was accused of waging unrestricted submarine warfare for issuing War Order No. 154 in 1939, and another similar order after the Laconia incident in 1942, not to rescue survivors from ships attacked by submarine. By issuing these two orders, he was found guilty of causing Germany to be in breach of the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936[4]. However, as evidence of similar conduct by the Allies was presented at his trial, and with the help of his lawyer Otto Kranzbühler, his sentence was not assessed on the grounds of this breach of international law[4].

On the specific war crimes charge of ordering unrestricted submarine warfare Dönitz was found "[not] guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against British armed merchant ships", because they were often armed and equipped with radios which they used to notify the Admiralty of attack[4][22] but the judges found that "Dönitz is charged with waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the Naval Protocol of 1936 to which Germany acceded, and which reaffirmed the rules of submarine warfare laid down in the London Naval Agreement of 1930... The order of Dönitz to sink neutral ships without warning when found within these zones was, therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, violation of the Protocol... The orders, then, prove Dönitz is guilty of a violation of the Protocol... the sentence of Dönitz is not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international law of submarine warfare."[4][23]

His sentence on unrestricted submarine warfare was not assessed, because of similar actions by the Allies. In particular, the British Admiralty on 8 May 1940 had ordered that all vessels in the Skagerrak should be sunk on sight; and the statement by Admiral Chester Nimitz, wartime commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, that the U.S. Navy had waged unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific from the day the U.S. entered the war. Thus although Dönitz's was found guilty of waging unrestricted submarine warfare against unarmed neutral shipping by ordering all ships in designated areas in international waters to be sunk without warning, no additional prison time was added to his sentence for this crime[4].

How do our charges against Al-Qaeda members as "unlawful combatants" hold up when we conduct the exact same type of warfare? From what I understand that's the biggest question mark

 

[lawtonfogle]

What's the difference between a CIA agent using a predator drone to kill an enemy leader and a terrorist attacking the white house with a suicide vest? Both are non-uniformed combatants fighting off the front line.

Easy, it is us verses them. The same difference between someone who commits high treason and some big name American heroes, us vs. them.

The problem comes when people try to hold the moral ground after going down to the enemies level. You are going to have to either choose the moral high ground or the efficient combat techniques. You can try to choose both, and with enough propaganda, fool enough people, but in the end, you end up only justifying the enemy in their own eyes (and remember, justifying the enemy in their own eyes keep their recruitments up, regardless of if it is good justification).

How do our charges against Al-Qaeda members as "unlawful combatants" hold up when we conduct the exact same type of warfare? From what I understand that's the biggest question mark

While there are likely legal loop holes and technicalities which will protect our side (and also the public willing to over look contradictions in favor of America), it will be hard to justify it. Propaganda will get enough of the population to think one way, and confuse those seeking to find out what is really going on. The few left will be a mix of 'the crazies' and people who will be viewed as one of 'the crazies' regardless of if they are.

 

[Proton Soup]

There's two issues that are questionable under the Geneva convention.

1) Using the CIA, or other civilian, non-uniform force, as a combat force technically violates the Geneva convention. The only affect UAVs have on this issue is that they make the identity of the operator a trivial point. The operators are nowhere near the combat area, whether the UAVs are operated by military personnel or civilian personnel.

Personally, I think that particular article is a little out synch, both with military operations today, and the history of military operations in general. If that article actually succeeded in banning mercenaries from a war, it would probably be for the first time in history.

2) Targeting individuals so far from the combat area does start to look like assassination. I'm not sure how you draw the line on that today, considering terrorist operations, modern warfare, etc. For example, sending a team of snipers to the US to the operating center for the UAVs and picking off operators as they drive home from work - assassination or legitimate targets?

It's an issue that's far from cut and dried and it may depend on who is being targetted. Targetting Taliban leaders far from the combat may be assassination. Targetting al-Qaeda leaders may not. I can see why someone would raise the issue, since it's definitely becoming harder to define just where the battlefield is.

i would assume that they are legitimate targets.

and speaking of which, if there's really a bunch of terrorists running around here just waiting to strike, I've never understood why they don't just attack the civilian support structure for the military here in the states. it's generally not all that well-protected, and would cause a massive amount of mayhem. makes me wonder.

 

[Office_Shredder]

Guys, I wasn't talking about a moral issue, I was talking about a legal one. And you can say laws don't matter all you want, but they can come back to bite you in the ***. How would you feel if Osama Bin Ladin was arrested but then let free because his actions are ruled similar to those of the CIA with predator drones (and before you say that can't happen, it has happened, I brought it up in my previous post)

 

[mheslep]

People seem to be missing the point. Even if we're allowed to conduct war against a non-state enemy anywhere in the world, the rules of war are quite strict on the necessity of uniformed military units being in combat. A civilian CIA agent conducting a drone strike is the issue here, not who he's shooting or where he's shooting the guy

i was under the impression that the geneva convention generally treated non-uniformed combatants as unprotected. a CIA operative is a spy, has no rights, and you can shoot him on sight (or maybe you'd prefer something a little more creative).

That the drone operator is out of uniform seems to me to be irrelevant unless and until the operator becomes somehow in view of or in contact with the enemy. The US President and many of his subordinates (e.g. Sec Defense) do not where a uniform, yet they also directly control military operations without accusations of treaty violations due to that fact.

 

[mheslep]

2) For example, sending a team of snipers to the US to the operating center for the UAVs and picking off operators as they drive home from work - assassination or legitimate targets?

Legitimate, just as bombing the civilian factory that makes drones would be legit. Does not seem to be a close question to me.

 

[russ_watters]

What's the difference between a CIA agent using a predator drone to kill an enemy leader and a terrorist attacking the white house with a suicide vest? Both are non-uniformed combatants fighting off the front line.

Very little difference, and I don't think the second would be illegal.

In WWII German submarine operators sunk civilian vessels on sight, and when their admiral was later tried for that crime hi defense was that the alllies were doing it also.

Note that purposely targeting civilians is no longer an acceptable practice in warfare.

How do our charges against Al-Qaeda members as "unlawful combatants" hold up when we conduct the exact same type of warfare? From what I understand that's the biggest question mark

You're not making proper comparisons - you're giving examples of some things that are similar, but not considering examples where they are different. Al Qaeda uses a lot of illegal tactics that we don't use (such as purposely targeting civilians). That's what makes them unlawful combatants.

None of that has any relevance to whether the CIA is doing anything illegal.

 

[russ_watters]

1) Using the CIA, or other civilian, non-uniform force, as a combat force technically violates the Geneva convention.

Which one? That wasn't the opinion of the writer of the paper for the UN, as quoted earler.

2) For example, sending a team of snipers to the US to the operating center for the UAVs and picking off operators as they drive home from work - assassination or legitimate targets?

I agree with the others: that's a really easy question and straightforward example.

 

[russ_watters]

To me, this is the beginning and end of the issue.

Beyond that, legalities be damned, there is no sane way to go to war in that region, and these strikes seem to be moderately effective. Call it assassination, and sign me up for a double shot of it down the throat of enemies. An effective assassination is worth a LOT, and can prevent, or start a war depending on how it is accomplished and who is targeted. Such a powerful tool is too valuable to be set aside. This is the reality of asymmetric warfare.

I agree that some rules of warfare are silly/unenforceable/dangerous/counterproductive/signed-off on and ignored with a wink and a nod.

Osama bin Laden is not an officer of a foreign military power, and if you really think there is the slightest intent to take him alive, you're deluded.

You have that backwards. Bin Laden is an officer of a foreign military power and therefore the intent is not to take him alive.

 

[russ_watters]

and speaking of which, if there's really a bunch of terrorists running around here just waiting to strike, I've never understood why they don't just attack the civilian support structure for the military here in the states. it's generally not all that well-protected, and would cause a massive amount of mayhem. makes me wonder.

It would accomplish very little toward the war effort and doesn't support their goals anyway.

 

[russ_watters]

What foreign military power is he a part of?

Al Qaeda. It is a lot of things, including a military force.

He's simply a quasi-national criminal, no different from other psychopaths...

He is that as well.