What is the basis for ethical realism and why is it important?

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Ethics are grounded in the necessity of maintaining life, as values arise from our relationship with what benefits or harms living organisms. The discussion emphasizes that ethical theories should be based on objective knowledge and facts, particularly in fields like medicine, where normative actions are derived from empirical evidence. Happiness is posited as the ultimate goal, suggesting that actions leading to less suffering and more happiness are moral, aligning with utilitarianism. However, the debate raises questions about the subjectivity of happiness and the existence of universal moral values, with some arguing that morality is shaped by individual perspectives and societal constructs. Ultimately, the conversation highlights the complexity of deriving objective moral standards from subjective human experiences.
  • #51
Moridin said:
For example, theft is the simultaneous assertion and rejection of universal property rights, which cannot stand.

Well, that's one opinion.

Its way more complicated than that however.

First, it must be agreed that property rights exist.
Second, it must be agreed that a particular object belonged to a particular person
Third, it must be agreed that another person took possession of that object in a way that implied ownership, when ownership was not indeed transfered.

Individual property rights is a relatively new concept.
Its easy to claim ownership on all sorts of grounds.
There are all number of different levels of possession.

Ultimately it becomes a matter of legal consensus, not really morality.
 
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  • #52
The problem with utilitarisnism is that it says that it may be right to kill innocent people.
 
  • #53
Moridin said:
No, it is moral realism. Moral realism means that the validity of moral statements depend on reality, whereas moral relativism says morality is arbitrarily subjective.

Precisely as I said. If you apply values to your moral propositions based on subjective opinion it is moral relativism.
 
  • #54
Moral realism is established in the moment you can show that evverybody should value something. That people disagree is not an argument as long as the proof is valid. I came with this proof in the OP.
 
  • #55
superwolf said:
Moral realism is established in the moment you can show that evverybody should value something. That people disagree is not an argument as long as the proof is valid. I came with this proof in the OP.

Thing about proofs is they depend on premises. Different premises, different logical results.

Your argument from life is incomplete. Most life that has existed, never lived long enough to procreate, and all life ends in death. If you take a representative sample of all life that ever lived on planet earth, your conclusion would be that life values death, above all else. Some just achieve that goal quicker than others. Procreation is therefore immoral.
 
  • #56
superwolf said:
Moral realism is established in the moment you can show that evverybody should value something. That people disagree is not an argument as long as the proof is valid. I came with this proof in the OP.

So you determine what other people should value? And exactly what value they should attach to it? Its one thing to say that everyone does or should value something (generally everyone values their own life for instance, easy argument) its a whole other issue to determine precisely what value should be placed upon that thing. Consistent relative values between different factors in moral propositions is necessary to an objective rule of measure.
 
  • #57
Everyone should value life, therefore ethical realism is true.
 
  • #58
TheStatutoryApe said:
Precisely as I said. If you apply values to your moral propositions based on subjective opinion it is moral relativism.

No, that is by definition moral realism, since the morality part is objectively true, even if the underlying values are relative. Morality is not equal to values.
 
  • #59
JoeDawg said:
Well, that's one opinion.

Its way more complicated than that however.

First, it must be agreed that property rights exist.
Second, it must be agreed that a particular object belonged to a particular person
Third, it must be agreed that another person took possession of that object in a way that implied ownership, when ownership was not indeed transfered.

Individual property rights is a relatively new concept.
Its easy to claim ownership on all sorts of grounds.
There are all number of different levels of possession.

Ultimately it becomes a matter of legal consensus, not really morality.

Not at all. Any statement that simultaneously reject and affirm the existence of jaxyplonk is an invalid position, even if we know nothing about jaxyplonk.
 
  • #60
TheStatutoryApe said:
So you determine what other people should value? And exactly what value they should attach to it? Its one thing to say that everyone does or should value something (generally everyone values their own life for instance, easy argument) its a whole other issue to determine precisely what value should be placed upon that thing. Consistent relative values between different factors in moral propositions is necessary to an objective rule of measure.

Values are the functional equivalent to biological needs. But as stated earlier, even if values where subjective, that which we should do to fulfill values (= morality) is not. It is true that in order for my car to function, I ought to change the oil in my car. This is objectively true, even if other people do not value their cars. This is what individualist morality (as oppose to collectivist morality) is about.
 
  • #61
Moridin said:
Not at all. Any statement that simultaneously reject and affirm the existence of jaxyplonk is an invalid position, even if we know nothing about jaxyplonk.

Thats the problem with abstractions, they don't really exist in any measurable way.
Universals are just opinions, they have no solid foundation.
 
  • #62
Moridin said:
Values are the functional equivalent to biological needs. But as stated earlier, even if values where subjective, that which we should do to fulfill values (= morality) is not. It is true that in order for my car to function, I ought to change the oil in my car. This is objectively true, even if other people do not value their cars. This is what individualist morality (as oppose to collectivist morality) is about.

Moral realism states that moral propositions are objectively true or false independant of subjective opinion. If the objective truth in a moral proposition is changed by the subjective values placed upon the factors in the moral proposition it is no longer objective and no longer moral realism.

A living organism needs nutrients to continue living.
This is not a moral proposition or dilemma, it is simple fact. The moral proposition or dilemma comes into play only when you begin to consider the relative value of the resource nutrients versus the continued life of the organism and these two things relative to outside circumstances.
The use of facts in moral propositions, of itself, does not constitute moral realism. All moral philosophys include facts in their moral propositions and then resolve those propositions based on a measure of value; absolute value in the case of absolutism, objective value in the case of realism, and subjective value in the case of relativism.
These are part and parcel to the definitions of each philosophy.
 
  • #63
superwolf said:
Ethics are our theories on morals, and morals are what we should do. But why do we need ethics? The human being is a living organism, and we have to choose between life and death. Maintaining life depends on certain actions. It is the existence of life that gives rise to values, because it is only for living entities that things can be good or evil.

Values express our relationship to things that benefit or hurt a living organism. To say that something is of value for an organism, is to say that it maintains the life of an organism. For instance, when we say that water is valuable for a plant, we are saying that water supports the life of the plant, which is an undisputable fact.

Ethics therefore have a fundament in empiri. The sphere of values is therefore not separated logically from the sphere of facts. Normative considerations can therefore be derived from facts. Several specific sciences care about normative considerations. In medicine, for instance, prescribes those actions that should be carried out to maintain health. But for the decisions of the doctor to be vaild, they must be bassed on objective knowledge, facts about human nature though physiology, anatomi, etc. Ethics is therefore a normative science.

A normatiive consideration is to say that we must act in a certain way to obtain a given target. A doctor should do X if he wants to cure his patient. In the same way, ethics are theories about what we should do to obtain Y. We therefore have to find what this target is that we want to obtain. What should we value more than anything? If we don't know this, we get a problemm motivating actions, solving conflicts, something Immanuel Kant knew perfectly well.

Happiness is the ultimate goal. I have therefore proven that those actions that lead to less suffering and more happiness, relative to other choices, are the moral ones. Utilitarianism is true.

It is important to note that this is not only about the consequence of the action for the external environment, but also for the very person that acts. Ethical theories are therefore objective.

Although the word ethics describes the rules, morals and accepted conducts of the human species, in that these conducts maintain life and liberty among them, I don't think ethics is a phenomenon confined to living systems alone.

Ethics is a description of balances between actions and elements. It is true that ethics serves to continue life but if you are able to extrapolate the functions of ethics to non-living systems, you'll see that the checks and balances of ethics have also made it possible for the universe in general to survive.

I personally equate ethics with the efficiency of any system. If a system, living or not, doesn't maintain a certain set of ethics... as in ethical conduct between elements or actions... then the system proves itself to be inefficient and is soon extinct.

The laws of nature are the ethics of the universe whereby the laws of humans are the simple imitations thereof. We do our best to establish congruent and consistent ethics to maintain an efficient system of societies and cultures. We lose some and we gain some... while the universe has had considerably longer to naturally select those laws that have let it survive for so long.
 
  • #64
TheStatutoryApe said:
Moral realism states that moral propositions are objectively true or false independant of subjective opinion. If the objective truth in a moral proposition is changed by the subjective values placed upon the factors in the moral proposition it is no longer objective and no longer moral realism.

This is clearly false. Even if you don't value your car, the conditional "if you value your car, you ought to change the oil when it needs to". This is not something that varies between people or cultures. It is not the case that cars do not worth without oil in Iraq, but not in the United state.

The use of facts in moral propositions, of itself, does not constitute moral realism. All moral philosophys include facts in their moral propositions and then resolve those propositions based on a measure of value; absolute value in the case of absolutism, objective value in the case of realism, and subjective value in the case of relativism.
These are part and parcel to the definitions of each philosophy.

You are confusing value and morality here. They are not the same.
 
  • #65
Let me make the following argument against moral relativism with the reformers dilemma. By moral relativism I mean the position: "that which is moral is determined by culture".

1. If moral relativism is valid, then all moral reformers are mistaken.
2. It is not the case that all moral reformers are mistaken.
3. Moral relativism is invalid.

It is clear that if moral relativism is valid, then any societal moral climate is valid within that culture and the moral reformer is challenging the true moral values of his culture. It seems also quite impossible to deny the second premises, because it means you have to hold things as slavery and the Holocaust as morally correct and that the moral reformers who challenged these beliefs where morally wrong. Thus, it follows, that moral relativism is invalid.

To get out of this argument one can simply accept the position of moral realism or simply plunge further into irrationality by holding morality as an entire philosophy to be intellectually vacuous / cognitively meaningless. The reason I say this is because in a rational argument, moral nihilists have to make arguments that presuppose things along the line of "you ought to hold as true that it is true that it can never be true that you ought to hold anything as true" and other self-contradictory beliefs.

Now, I consider moral absolutism in the theistic sense to be just as absurd as moral relativism and there are many arguments against such as moral philosophy, such as the (atheistic) presuppositional argument from morality, the Euthyphro dilemma etc.
 
  • #66
Moridin said:
This is clearly false. Even if you don't value your car, the conditional "if you value your car, you ought to change the oil when it needs to". This is not something that varies between people or cultures. It is not the case that cars do not worth without oil in Iraq, but not in the United state.
"A car engine needs oil to operate properly" is not a moral proposition. Rewording this and tossing in the qualifier "If you value your car" does not change this.
"It is wrong to kill" is a moral proposition. If the value placed upon "life" and the value placed upon what could theoretically be gained or lost by taking that life are based on subjective opinion then any truth or fallacy in the proposition is subjective/non-objective/relative.
Moral realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:
-Ethical sentences express propositions.
-Some such propositions are true.
-Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism

Moridin said:
You are confusing value and morality here. They are not the same.
In its second, normative and universal sense, morality refers to an ideal code of conduct, one which would be espoused in preference to alternatives by all rational people, under specified conditions. In this "prescriptive" sense of morality as opposed to the above described "descriptive" sort of sense, moral value judgments such as "murder is immoral" are made. To deny 'morality' in this sense is a position known as moral skepticism, in which the existence of objective moral "truths" is rejected.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morality
A personal and cultural value is a relative ethic value, an assumption upon which implementation can be extrapolated.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Values

Morality is dependant upon values. Without values moral propositions can not be true, false, or in any way meaningful. To make claims as to the possible truth, fallacy, or meaning of moral propositions is to make claims about values.

Moridin said:
Let me make the following argument against moral relativism with the reformers dilemma. By moral relativism I mean the position: "that which is moral is determined by culture".

1. If moral relativism is valid, then all moral reformers are mistaken.
2. It is not the case that all moral reformers are mistaken.
3. Moral relativism is invalid.

It is clear that if moral relativism is valid, then any societal moral climate is valid within that culture and the moral reformer is challenging the true moral values of his culture. It seems also quite impossible to deny the second premises, because it means you have to hold things as slavery and the Holocaust as morally correct and that the moral reformers who challenged these beliefs where morally wrong. Thus, it follows, that moral relativism is invalid.
I have already shown the fallacy in this argument. There is no moral prescriptive in moral relativism. If you think there is then please find a standard definition that says so and show it to me. There are many moral relativists and they all are possessed of their own moral codes, some of which may contain the belief of non-intervention, but by the very definition of moral relativism there is no right or preferred moral code.
Even if we accept the assertion that a moral relativist is possessed of the moral imperative to accept validity of any moral code and the right of its adherents to act upon it then logically the relativist accepts the validity of their own moral code and their right to act upon it aswell. I can not damn you for doing what you believe you should do, but I can damn myself for not doing what I believe I ought to do. The argument taken to its full logical conclusion invalidates itself.
The idea that 'the nazi or slaver possesses a "right" to act and the relativist has the "right" to interefer is contradictory' is not a problem for relativists, it is a problem for those looking at relativism through other than a relativist perspective. You are saying that relativism is invalid because realism invalidates it.

The notion that statements about morals are themselves moral statements is absurd. I may as well say that statements about mathematics (ie "Math is hard") are equivalent to mathematical statements (ie "1+1=2").

And to try to fully bring all of our realist vs relativist arguments together
Moridin said:
That is not a prescriptive, but descriptive statement. But yes, all prescriptive statements are ultimately morally descriptive statements, since they prescribe an attitude to claims.
A prescriptive statement is not by definition moral in nature. A prescriptive statement sets down a rule and a rule can be moral, itellectual, mathematical, artistic, scientific, mechanical, linguistic, logical, ect. A rule can be subjective: based on opinion and belief, or a rule can be objective: based on observation and reason. If you believe all such rules are moral in nature than I suggest we simply stop discussing this since I do not wish to read the dictionary according to Moridin so we can understand one another.
 
  • #67
If moral values are subjective then moral realists will arrive at different conclusions as to what is moral. Since moral realists do not all agree on what is moral or why an act is moral, how is this any different from moral relativism besides in theory? The end result is still that morality is unique to the values of the individual, and those values are influenced by the culture they live in.

The proof posed for the invalidity of moral relativism is false. Moral relativism does not have objectively true or false moral statements so a moral reformer is not correct or mistaken objectively. The rest of the argument falls apart because the premise cannot be confirmed. The proof attempts to hold moral relativism to a moral realist standard. In effect, it basically says that if moral realism is true then moral relativism is false. Though if it is true that values are objective then the proof would make a moral realist position invalid because any moral reformer would then be mistaken and the proof assumes that all of them aren't.

I don't think any philosophy is factually correct. They are logical structures attached to uncertain premises like "everyone should value life". While I agree with that statement, and I could see how a logical argument could be made that valuing life would benefit our survival, I don't see how this in itself is a factual statement independent of the desired result of survival. Unless someone claims that the survival of life is important to the universe, and not just to the conscious beings that value living, then I don't see how utilitarianism, or any other philosophical argument, can claim to be completely objective. They can only claim to be reasoned in accordance with an accepted premise. The premise may be true or not, but if it were fact then there would be no reason to ponder that argument philosophically. It would be science.
 
  • #68
Moridin said:
1. If moral relativism is valid, then all moral reformers are mistaken.

This is patently false. Moral relativism means there is no objective truth, so no one can be 'mistaken'.

Everyone simply has an 'opinion', based on their subjective experience. Some people, quite a lot, will have similar experiences(this is where cultural relativism comes in) and therefore share certain 'opinions'.

By saying that two conflicting opinions must imply one is 'mistaken', you are simply claiming that objective morals exist. And while this may be true, you have not shown any way one could logically determine what is objectively moral.

Not even science deals with 'truth' objectively, it attempts to be as objective as possible, but science is about evidence and probability. All of which is perspective dependent and relativistic. Objectivity is an ideal, objectivism is idealism.
 
  • #69
TheStatutoryApe said:
"A car engine needs oil to operate properly" is not a moral proposition. Rewording this and tossing in the qualifier "If you value your car" does not change this.

Never argued it was. All I am arguing is that "if you value your car, you ought to change the oil" is a (true) moral proposition. Try to pay attention.

"It is wrong to kill" is a moral proposition.

This is not a moral proposition since it does not refer to any real life values or empirical facts.

If the value placed upon "life" and the value placed upon what could theoretically be gained or lost by taking that life are based on subjective opinion then any truth or fallacy in the proposition is subjective/non-objective/relative.

That is like saying that the facts of science are arbitrarily subjective just we value investigation into that particular field. Furthermore, some core values are objective since they are the functional equivalent to biological needs.

Morality is dependant upon values. Without values moral propositions can not be true, false, or in any way meaningful. To make claims as to the possible truth, fallacy, or meaning of moral propositions is to make claims about values.

No, just like making scientific fact claims is not to make claims about values.

I have already shown the fallacy in this argument. There is no moral prescriptive in moral relativism.

Yes there is, since moral relativists has to assert that "you ought to hold moral relativism as valid" when they attempt to enter a rational debate. If you think they don't have to do this, then you must agree that moral relativism is intellectually indefensible in a rational debate. I have explained this at least a half a dozen times, yet you refuse to listen. Why is that?

There are many moral relativists and they all are possessed of their own moral codes, some of which may contain the belief of non-intervention, but by the very definition of moral relativism there is no right or preferred moral code.

No, that is moral nihilism. Moral relativism means that a moral proposition is true within a culture if and only if it is supported by a culture.

I can not damn you for doing what you believe you should do, but I can damn myself for not doing what I believe I ought to do. The argument taken to its full logical conclusion invalidates itself.

But that is of course a form of moral realism, not moral relativism.

The idea that 'the nazi or slaver possesses a "right" to act and the relativist has the "right" to interefer is contradictory' is not a problem for relativists, it is a problem for those looking at relativism through other than a relativist perspective.

Not at all. From the position of a relativist, the Holocaust is morally good since the Nazi culture held it as morally virteous.

The notion that statements about morals are themselves moral statements is absurd. I may as well say that statements about mathematics (ie "Math is hard") are equivalent to mathematical statements (ie "1+1=2").

No one has said that statements about morals are themselves moral statements, but the moment you try to make any claims in a rational debate, you are actually making a moral prescription, such as "you ought to hold the position that the Holocaust is an historical fact because of x.y and z.

A prescriptive statement is not by definition moral in nature.

How absurd. That is like claiming that a mathematical statement is not by definition mathematical in nature.

A prescriptive statement sets down a rule and a rule can be moral, itellectual, mathematical, artistic, scientific, mechanical, linguistic, logical, ect.

No a prescriptive statement is about true preferable behavior, that is, morality.

If you believe all such rules are moral in nature than I suggest we simply stop discussing this since I do not wish to read the dictionary according to Moridin so we can understand one another.

You are just upset because I have demonstrated that your position cannot get off the ground because it instantaneously undermines itself. Tough luck. :)
 
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  • #70
JoeDawg said:
This is patently false. Moral relativism means there is no objective truth, so no one can be 'mistaken'.

Again, no. That is moral nihilism, not moral relativism. If you cannot understand the difference between these two positions, I suggest that you step away from this conversation. Cheers.

Everyone simply has an 'opinion', based on their subjective experience.

Is that an objective fact, or simply your opinion? If it is a fact, then it is not the case that everyone just have opinions. If it is simply your opinion, we can brush it of without consideration. It is like this all forms of relativism instantly self-destructs on deployment.

By saying that two conflicting opinions must imply one is 'mistaken', you are simply claiming that objective morals exist. And while this may be true, you have not shown any way one could logically determine what is objectively moral.

Yes I have. I have even stated examples of true moral propositions, such as you ought to prefer consistency over inconsistency, truth over falsehood etc. If consistency is not objectively preferable over inconsistency, you must consistently apply a procedure called inconsistency, which is self-refuting.

Not even science deals with 'truth' objectively, it attempts to be as objective as possible, but science is about evidence and probability. All of which is perspective dependent and relativistic. Objectivity is an ideal, objectivism is idealism.

Are you really claiming that science is an arbitrary social construction? Are you really so dogmatic about your relativist religion that you dare to stoop to such lows like calling science relative to defend your worldview? Kind of sad, really.
 
  • #71
Moridin said:
No, that is moral nihilism. Moral relativism means that a moral proposition is true within a culture if and only if it is supported by a culture.
Nihilism states that no moral proposition is valid. Moral relativism states that the validity of any moral proposition is based upon a number of subjective elements including, but not limited to, culture. Relativism does not propose the rightousness of any moral proposition except on the basis of subjective opinion. In other words "right" and "wrong" are not objectively real attributes. So any assertion that relativism ascribes the value of "good" "right" "true" to any moral proposition is patently false. Please read some definitions.
Moral nihilists assert that morality does not exist, and subsequently there are no moral values with which to uphold a rule or to logically prefer one action over another.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nihilism
In philosophy moral relativism is the position that moral or ethical propositions do not reflect objective and/or universal moral truths, but instead make claims relative to social, cultural, historical or personal circumstances.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism

Moridin said:
But that is of course a form of moral realism, not moral relativism.
Again incorrect and you should read some definitions. Moral realism proposes the reality of objective moral truths (or facts) in which case a moral proposition can be falsified. If you believe you cannot falsify (or validate) anothers moral proposition then you are not a moral realist.
Look back to my last post for a quote and link where you can find a definition of moral realism.

Moridin said:
Yes there is, since moral relativists has to assert that "you ought to hold moral relativism as valid" when they attempt to enter a rational debate.
As I have already pointed out this is not a moral prescriptive. You have asserted it is but not defended the position, only continually made the assertion and continually said that any prescriptive is moral in nature, again without defense. Please show me a definition of prescriptive that includes terms specific to morality.
2. Making or giving injunctions, directions, laws, or rules.
...
1. laying down rules
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/prescriptive

"Law" and "rule" are not automatically moral terms since there are many "laws" and "rules" that are not at all moral in nature. There are rules in art, rules in mathematics, rules in logic, ect. Are these rules all moral in nature? If not then please give your reasoning as to why the intellectual prescriptive in moral relativism is in fact moral in nature instead of just continually making the assertion.


You apparently do not know the standard definitions for the philosophy you argue for, the philosophy you argue against, and the terms you are using in your argument.

L2 definitions, kthxbye
 
  • #72
Moridin said:
Again, no. That is moral nihilism, not moral relativism.
Moral nihilism denies that anything can be said to be moral or immoral. That is NOT what I was saying. Moral relativism defines what is moral based on context without objective or absolute standard. What I have said is well within the bounds of moral relativism.
Is that an objective fact
No.
or simply your opinion?
Within moral relativism, opinions have weight within their context, but not objectively, nor outside their context. The limits of that context can vary, from the individual up to the level of a society. Nihilism means they don't have any weight at all.
such as you ought to prefer consistency over inconsistency
From a relativist point of view, it simply depends on context. I value consistency when it benefits me and not when it doesn't.
If consistency is not objectively preferable over inconsistency, you must consistently apply a procedure called inconsistency
No, that would be objectively valuing inconsistency. You are refuting yourself based on your objectivist prejudices, not relativism.
Are you really claiming that science is an arbitrary social construction?
Well first you would have to tell me what you mean by science, I doubt we agree, and then you would have to define 'arbitrary social construction'. Defining science can be tricky... and I have no idea what you mean by the other.

Oh, and if you insist on continuing with this insulting tone, don't bother.
 
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  • #73
The two of you are basically just quoting Wikipedia (an invalid source in a rational argument) and stating that according to your relativist position, it is objectively morally true that one ought to hold that moral relativism is true. Utterly self-contradictory and absurd. I've pointed out this again and again, but it seems that your ideological barriers prevent you from seeing this.

Moral relativism means that if something is seen as morally true from within a culture, then that something is morally true with respect to that culture. Moral nihilism means that it is meaningless to speak of moral propositions as valid or invalid.
 
  • #74
Moridin said:
and stating that according to your relativist position, it is objectively morally true that one ought to hold that moral relativism is true.
I have stated no such thing. You're the one who keeps bringing in an objective (or rather your own) standard.
Moral relativism means that if something is seen as morally true from within a culture
No, that's cultural relativism. Context, and it can be defined differently, is the only necessity for relativism. Subjectivism is a form of relativism that deals entirely with the individual.
Moral nihilism means that it is meaningless to speak of moral propositions as valid or invalid.
Yes. But that is not what we are discussing.
 
  • #75
Moridin said:
The two of you are basically just quoting Wikipedia (an invalid source in a rational argument)
We have primarily been arguing over definitions. I believe yours are wrong, I explained why, and I even provided sources of definitions that support my argument.
You, as you have done here, have only made assertions with no explinations for why or sources to support your assertions.
Wiki is better than nothing and nothing is what you have brought to the table.

Moridin said:
and stating that according to your relativist position, it is objectively morally true that one ought to hold that moral relativism is true. Utterly self-contradictory and absurd. I've pointed out this again and again, but it seems that your ideological barriers prevent you from seeing this.
We have pointed out to you that you are misrepresenting our argument. We have explained why. You have rejected and deflected any argument by continuely referring back to your own assertions without so much as an explination.

Your whole argument has been "I am right and you are wrong" except with more hot air in it.
I can do the same.

I am right. You are wrong.
/thread
 
  • #76
JoeDawg said:
I have stated no such thing. You're the one who keeps bringing in an objective (or rather your own) standard.

No, that's cultural relativism. Context, and it can be defined differently, is the only necessity for relativism. Subjectivism is a form of relativism that deals entirely with the individual.

Yes. But that is not what we are discussing.

Yes you have stated it again and again simply by making an argument. I have, again and again explained the logical underpinnings of rational discourse and how it forces you to presuppose moral realism.

To state that moral relativism is true in a rational debate is equivalent to make the statement "there exists an objectively valid reason as to why moral relativism ought to be considered valid". So to advocate moral relativism is a rational debate is utterly contradictory and self-detonates on deployment, just as claiming that it is true that no truth exist, or trying to verbally communicate an argument that says that all language is meaningless.

Every time you make a prescriptive statement, you are in fact appealing to moral realism.
 
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  • #77
TheStatutoryApe said:
We have primarily been arguing over definitions.

So you are saying, in fact, that there exists an objectively valid reason why I ought to hold that this is primarily an argument over definitions? Well, that is an admission of moral realism, so you are refuting your own position.

I believe yours are wrong

So you are saying, in fact, that there exists an objectively valid reason why I ought to hold that you believe that my definitions are wrong? Well, that is an admission of moral realism, so you are refuting your own position.

I explained why

So you are saying, in fact, that there exists an objectively valid reason why I ought to hold that you have explained why? Well, that is an admission of moral realism, so you are refuting your own position.

and I even provided sources of definitions that support my argument.

So you are saying, in fact, that there exists an objectively valid reason why I ought to hold that you have provided sources of definitions that support your argument? Well, that is an admission of moral realism, so you are refuting your own position.

You, as you have done here, have only made assertions with no explanations for why or sources to support your assertions.

So you are saying, in fact, that there exists an objectively valid reason why I ought to hold that the above argument is true? Well, that is an admission of moral realism, so you are refuting your own position.

Wiki is better than nothing and nothing is what you have brought to the table.

Argument from (dubious) authority.

Furthermore, So you are saying, in fact, that there exists an objectively valid reason why I ought to hold that the above argument is true? Well, that is an admission of moral realism, so you are refuting your own position.

We have pointed out to you that you are misrepresenting our argument.

So you are saying, in fact, that there exists an objectively valid reason why I ought to hold that the above argument is true? Well, that is an admission of moral realism, so you are refuting your own position.

We have explained why.

So you are saying, in fact, that there exists an objectively valid reason why I ought to hold that the above argument is true? Well, that is an admission of moral realism, so you are refuting your own position.

You have rejected and deflected any argument by continuely referring back to your own assertions without so much as an explination.

So you are saying, in fact, that there exists an objectively valid reason why I ought to hold that the above argument is true? Well, that is an admission of moral realism, so you are refuting your own position.

Your whole argument has been "I am right and you are wrong" except with more hot air in it. I can do the same. I am right. You are wrong. /thread

So you are saying, in fact, that there exists an objectively valid reason why I ought to hold that the above argument is true? Well, that is an admission of moral realism, so you are refuting your own position.

How can you not see the utter contradiction in your belief system? Every time you make a even a single statement in rational discussion, you are making a morally prescriptive statement as clearly demonstrated above. If I claim that the Holocaust is an empirical fact in a rational discussion, I am making the moral prescriptive statement that if you wish to remain rational, you ought to hold the Holocaust as an empirical fact.

This is not that hard to understand, so I suspect that it is your dogmatic ideology that lies in the way. Maybe you don't want to be held accountable for your own actions? Moral relativism is ultimately a form of epistemological relativism.

Since this is a rational discussion, any attempts to argue against this position actually proves my point, since you would have to presuppose moral realism in order to attack it, which is a formal fallacy called the stolen concept fallacy. The difference between your position and mine is that I don't steal concepts, you do.
 
  • #78
Maybe we should just start over with the basics and see if there is any disagreement there, because -- believe it or not -- I truly want to understand your position.

When we enter into a rational argument (and this is very important), we have to presuppose certain things, such as

the existence of truth
the meaningfulness of language
the reliability of the senses
truth is better than falsehood
consistency is better than inconsistency

and a long list of other necessary presuppositions we must hold in order to make a rational debate possible. Now, if one, for whatever reason, choose to argue against any of these foundational and necessary presuppositions, one is actually undermining one's own position. If I declare that it is truth that no truth exist, I have undermined my own argument. I have stolen the concept of truth and tried to force it to do my bidding in my attempt to deny the existence of truth. We see that anyone who argues that it is true that no truth exist is merely deluding themselves and is not really worth the time.

Similarly, if I argue that all language is meaningless by using language myself, I am actually stating that my own argument is meaningless. You either understand my argument (in which case all language is not meaningless, or my argument is meaningless and void itself.

If consistency is not better than inconsistency, you have to consistently apply a rule called inconsistency and we again see the contradiction. If falsehood is to be preferred over truth, then I obviously cannot prefer that position since I hold it to be true. If I write a letter to you and them mail it with the postal service, wherein I have written that you are blind and your mail never gets delivered, then the very act of sending that letter refutes the argument inside it.

To sum up: when entering into a rational discussion, we have some necessary presuppositions that we must hold as valid and any attempts to argue against them implicitly accepts them, thereby undermining itself.

Do we have any specific disagreement about this idea?
 
  • #79
Moridin said:
Every time you make a even a single statement in rational discussion, you are making a morally prescriptive statement as clearly demonstrated above.
As asserted above. I have treated this position and you have only continued the assertion with no explinations or aguments.

Again

I am right. You are wrong.
/thread

We can do this until the thread gets locked if you'd like. Or you can actually pay attention to my arguments and respond to them with something other than the mere assertion that they are wrong. I do not feel like rewriting them all over again so you can read back if you feel like it.
 
  • #80
Moridin said:
To state that moral relativism is true
I'm not stating that as an objective fact.
And I see no valid yardstick for objective morals.

Its my opinion. And you have yet to show how any opinion becomes objective. One can certainly strive for objectivity using a variety of methods. But you haven't shown any way one could be certain what is morally true in an objective sense. Given the fact I am limited by my context, others appear to have very different points of view, and appear just as limited; moral relativism is simply a rational position to take, not true in any absolute or objective sense, just a reasonable position to hold, given a complete lack of access to objective/absolute truth.

Again you don't seem to understand the difference between epistemology and ontology. Whether objective or absolute morals ACTUALLY EXIST, somewhere out there, is beside the point.

Day to day reality is much easier to view with some 'reasonable sense' of objectivity, but even that is contextual. Morality is even thinner, and really, hardly seems more than just emotions.

Oh, and repeating yourself is not a valid way to support an argument.
 
  • #81
Moridin said:
the existence of truth
We disagree on what truth is, not whether it exists.
the meaningfulness of language
Langauge is only meaningful to a person who understands the words, and the context of what was said. Outside that context, its just scribbles and noise.
the reliability of the senses
Which may or may not equate to the value we put on sense data.
truth is better than falsehood
Assuming one can tell the difference, we still disagree on what truth is.
consistency is better than inconsistency
The value we put on something, the better/worse, has no direct equivalence here to consistency. Human's consistently die within a certain span of years, most people put value on the living part and would be quite happy to accept an inconsistently long life. Consistency is often valued more, but it has no implicit 'better' value.

Its been consistently observed, that one can't derive an ought from an is. Which is much worse apparently for you, than it is for me.
 
  • #82
TheStatutoryApe said:
As asserted above. I have treated this position and you have only continued the assertion with no explinations or aguments.

Again

I am right. You are wrong.
/thread

We can do this until the thread gets locked if you'd like. Or you can actually pay attention to my arguments and respond to them with something other than the mere assertion that they are wrong. I do not feel like rewriting them all over again so you can read back if you feel like it.

So you mean there exists an objectively valid reason as to why the above ought to be considered valid? If then, you are contradicting your own position. Every time to make a statement, you are asserting that moral realism is true.

I have restated my explanation over and over again, but your cognitive dissonance gets in the way of seeing it, apparently. So I will restated it (again) for clarification: advancing any argument in a rational discussion presupposes moral realism, since you are implicitly making the morally prescriptive statement that you ought to hold whatever argument you present as valid.

This is basic stuff.
 
  • #83
JoeDawg said:
I'm not stating that as an objective fact. And I see no valid yardstick for objective morals. Its my opinion.

Well, if it is just your opinion (rather than a truth claim) that moral realism is false, then it holds no more relevance in a rational debate than screaming that blue is the most beautiful color over the table.

If you cannot provide any objective support for your argument, you have given up a rational debate and I win. Thanks.
 
  • #84
JoeDawg said:
We disagree on what truth is, not whether it exists.

Langauge is only meaningful to a person who understands the words, and the context of what was said. Outside that context, its just scribbles and noise.

Which may or may not equate to the value we put on sense data.

Assuming one can tell the difference, we still disagree on what truth is.

The value we put on something, the better/worse, has no direct equivalence here to consistency. Human's consistently die within a certain span of years, most people put value on the living part and would be quite happy to accept an inconsistently long life. Consistency is often valued more, but it has no implicit 'better' value.

Its been consistently observed, that one can't derive an ought from an is. Which is much worse apparently for you, than it is for me.

So you hold that it is true that no truth exists, that all language is meaningless, that the senses are not capable of accuracy, that falsehood is better than truth and that inconsistency is better than consistency? Didn't you read my justification of these? All of those positions listed are utterly contradictory.

If you think it is true that no truth exists, you are asserting a truth, ergo truth exists.
If you think that all language is meaningless, then the sentence you used to argue it is also meaningless. Alternatively, your statement is meaningful, but then naturally incorrect since it was deemed as meaningful. Ergo, language is meaningful.
If you think that the sense are not capable for accuracy, then you are unable to accurately read the text I write. But since you continue to respond to my arguments you have to presuppose the validity of the senses.
If you think falsehood is better than truth, you cannot prefer the statement "falsehood is better than truth", since that statement is true. You would have to prefer "truth is better than falsehood" in order to remain consistent, but that very move makes your position inconsistent.
If you think inconsistency is preferable than consistency, you have to consistently apply the rule called inconsistency, which is utterly contradictory.

Do you agree that a rational debate forces you to presuppose certain things as true? Do you understand why a contradiction means the downfall of a position in a rational debate?
 
  • #85
I'm quite sure this won't help; but still...

Moridin said:
So you hold that it is true that no truth exists, ...

Since he denied this right at the start of what you are quoting, that's a swing and miss.

Moridin, you have been taking all truth statements as moral statements, which is invalid. Everytime someone makes any claim, you are taking that as an implicit claim that you "ought" to accept that claim, and then you take that as an objective "ethical" or "moral" claim. That's invalid. It is possible for someone to make claims that they feel "ought" to be accepted by a rational personal, without insisting that it is a moral imperative.

You are continually using this invalid confusion to avoid engaging the actual argument. It is a logically consistent position to hold that there is no objective ethical standard for moral behaviour, and that there IS an objective rational standard for concluding this.

You have not shown any inconsistency, so far. You have merely mixed up rationality with ethics.

Cheers -- sylas
 
  • #86
Moridin said:
I win. Thanks.
This more than anything seems to be your problem. You don't have any interest in understanding what I or anyone else has said. Your entire effort seems, almost pathologically, focused on telling others what they 'really' think, while ignoring what they have actually said, in an effort to make yourself feel superior. There is nothing rational about that, that's pure ego.

A rational exchange of ideas is not about 'winning'.
Its about learning, and maybe on a good day, expanding your own worldview.

You have not understood what I have said, you have not represented my point of view in any fair or serious way, and you haven't offered anything more than a dogmatic repetition of your own ethical preferences.

You're welcome.
 
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  • #87
Moridin: please note this post...
sylas said:
Moridin, you have been taking all truth statements as moral statements, which is invalid. Everytime someone makes any claim, you are taking that as an implicit claim that you "ought" to accept that claim, and then you take that as an objective "ethical" or "moral" claim. That's invalid. It is possible for someone to make claims that they feel "ought" to be accepted by a rational personal, without insisting that it is a moral imperative.
I have already asked you to explain and defend your position on this multiple times. You've ignored my requests and continued asserting it as fact.
 
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