this thread got lost. What struck me about it when I looked back at it is that f-h had a number of thoughtful criticisms of RQM. For me, there was too much going on, too much distraction and noise in my own head, to pay careful attention at the time.
So I want to review some f-h posts on this thread.
#5
f-h said:
I see, I'm quite familiar with RQM by now and will just give my own personal perspective here. There are two analogies that drive it, galillean and special relativity, which both say that different observer descriptions on something particular might not agree, that the valid statements are "relational".
What is critically missing from RQM is synchronisation. Due to this RQM is IMO best understood as an account of why the formalism of QM, which escapes any consistent onthological interpretation, even as relational data, is still consistent epistemologicaly for all observers.
#8
f-h said:
Well, the question is, are we done if we keep saying let's throw away the excess baggage and take quantum states as epistemological.
Imagine we have three systems A, B and C. A and B meassure C. Now if A meassures what B has meassured with respect to C it will find it consistent with it's own meassurement of C. So will B with respect to A. What they will find if the epistemological states are all there is is not related at all.
So B might observe that itself and A have found C to be in state c_1 while A might find that B and itself have found C in state c_2. There is no paradox here of course.
But in this sense this complete "epistemologisation" of physics implies an extreme solipsism.
If we "synchronise" the different experiences we get something equivalent to collapse again.
In this sense it shows first and foremost that physical predictions are insensitive to the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, but I wouldn't really call RQM an interpretaion of QM.
#9 HURKYL:
I think you're still thinking externally.
I think you're imagining "Okay, A did his experiment, and saw this". And "B did her experiment, and saw that". And you, from your external viewpoint, are comparing things.
But if you do things internally, it all works out. You perform an experiment in which A and B meet to compare notes.
It's (IMHO) easy to see that the formalism predicts the only possible outcome is that A and B agree on what they saw.
#10 F-H:
Hurkyl, yes, this is correct.
But outlawing all external thinking is precisely the extreme soliplism I was talking about.
#11 HURKYL:
I meant my post to counter your assertion that we have to add in something called "synchronization", and that it's equivalent to collapse.
I assert it's already in the formalism, and doesn't involve collapse.
#12 F-H:
Hmmm...
What I meant is that if there is a third system D asking A and B what they saw it will find that A and B saw the same thing, but the problem remains that what A saw might be different from what B saw, because what they saw has reality only with respect to themself and not with respect to D.
I don't see a mechanism in the formalism that does what you say. Could you elaborate?
#18
f-h said:
...According to RQM you do not synchronise... Not synchronising does NOT lead to paradoxes, only indigestion and vertigo.[/color]
#21
f-h said:
Hurkyl, I agree with what you say. It doesn't touch my point. I wasn't pointing out a physical question that would require collapse (in this sense) to be consistent. I was pointing out what to me appears to be a characteristic feature of an RQM universe: Universal soliplism.
There is nothing in RQM as presented so far that prevents A from seeing green, B from seeing red, and D from seeing A and B see yellow. And E from seeing A, B see magenta and seeing D seeing A and B see magenta and so on and so on ad inf.
Each of the physical questions asked is consistently answered, every observation is consistent with every observation of an observation.
But the price is the disconectedness of all the experiences/information each system acquires about the other systems.
#22
Hurkyl said:
Yes there is. It is physically impossible for \omega to see A see green, and to see B see red, and to see D see A and B see yellow, and so on ad inf.Of course, I know you know that. But you're missing the point -- you don't give up "connectedness of experience/information". What you do give up is the ability to perform the sort of classically inspired external manipulations that you need to use to arrive at the conclusion of a "disconnected experience/information."(At least, if my initial perception of these papers is accurate)
#23
f-h said:
"Yes there is. It is physically impossible for \omega to see"
But that's not what I said.
I'll have to ponder this more, I know that what you say is what they are claiming to do, but to me it looks like the way they are doing it leads to the disconnectedness I described.
#32
f-h said:
Hmmm... RQM is supposed to solve the problem of interpretation of QM, not the problem of time in Quantum Gravity.
While in some sense these seem to be related problems they are very clearly distinct. Particularly there is a whole body of work on relational time spawned by Rovellis concepts of partial and complete Observables and evolving constants of motion, including perhaps most notably so far Dittrich's Thesis, but these work with any odd interpretation of quantum mechanics (or in Dittrichs case it's mostly classical).
The overarching philosophical idea is relationality, but it's different uses should not be confused...
I think f-h has clearly described---without a lot of extra words---the key point of resistance to RQM.
self-Adjoint called it something like "de-objectifying"
I would try to say it this way: There is nothing in the QM formalism that represents reality----there is no mathematical surrogate for the real world.
f-h calls it sometimes the abandonment of "synchronicity" and sometimes he calls it "EPISTEMOLOGIZATION" which means that QM has been turned into a theory of knowledge----of the information that an observer has about the world----that it gives a model of WHAT STATEMENTS we can make, not a model of what nature "is".
Curiously, Neils Bohr already said this: QM is not about nature, it is about what we can SAY about nature.
there is in nature nothing corresponding to a hilbert with operators, there is no wavefunction---that is something which, as Asher Perez said, we merely imagine.
To me this sounds very much NOT SOLIPSIST.
and it does not give me vertigo. But to f-h it sounds solipsist and gives him vertigo! This is a really interesting difference in attitude!
I do not say f-h is wrong to react this way. I want to further explore this difference in gut reaction.
I think the difference probably comes from one's PRIOR EXPECTATIONS. I never expected that QM should be "ontological" and tell me what the natural world truly consists of.
My basic philosophy is ANTI-SOLIPSIST. There is one real natural world. If we cannot agree about what is there and not there (when we get together and discuss it) then THERE IS SOMETHING WRONG with us.
rovelli says this: if we are together in the same place and I see and elephant and you dont, then there is something wrong. Solipsism means SOLUS IPSUS "only himself". I don't think of my own mental constructs as specially valid, I count on there being other observers that I can talk to and come to consensus.
what I don't think is that agreement is guaranteed by some objectified intellectual machinery. there is nothing that one can turn the crank of and have the answer come out. There is one real natural world, but it eludes MODELING BY A SINGLE UNIVERSALLY VALID MODEL. this is one of the delightful things about it. like men think women are----the more you keep asking questions trying to pin her down the more she changes like shakespeare's soldier Enobarbus said about Cleopatra-----her infinite variety.
that is one of the fun things.
so I think QM being epistemological is par for the course and very much in line with nature and the world being ONE and really there.
(the thing which we don't ultimately model but, when we get together and examine it, we can agree on certain basic statements about, or else there is something wrong with us, and which would be naive to expect can be modeled entirely of water or of fire, or air, or of hilbert, or complexvalue wavefunctions whatever)
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Age cannot wither her, nor custom stale
Her infinite variety. (Act 2 Scene 2)