Royce said:
First it is their physicalist paradigm that the mind does not exist but is only a property of the physical brain function that makes them try with this convoluted theory to make the relatively simple processor responsible for human mentality and consciousness.
I find it ironic that you are accusing me of physicalist dogma when you should know I'm an anti-physicalist! Of course the mind exists, and no, I do not believe that everything about the mind is reducible to physical facts. In particular, I believe that physicalism can only account for structural and functional facts, and that subjective experience cannot be reduced to structural and functional facts alone.
But the mind modulo subjective experience is nothing but a set of structures and functions, and so a physical perspective does not face the same kind of in-principle difficulties in accounting for these aspects of the mind. Now, in principle, it could nonetheless be the case that not all of the structural and functional facts about mind could be accounted for by a physicalist perspective-- in particular, if the sort of OBEs described by loseyourname really do exist, we will have another dilemma for physicalism. But scientifically ascertaining the existence of this sort of non-local information transfer in human minds has been notoriously elusive, and science is our best epistemological tool for investigating objective phenomena. (Acquisition of information about the world by means of OBEs would constitute an objective phenomenon.) If our best epistemological tool cannot readily confirm the existence of a phenomenon whose alleged character flies in the face of everything we otherwise know about the objective world, we must retain significant doubts as to its true nature.
They have yet to discover how the physical brain brings all of these processes together to form the concept of a chair that is universal to all chairs regardless of shape, size color and type. Maybe this is where Plato's forms come in.
There is as of yet no definitive and meticulously detailed account of how the brain forms concepts, but we already have identified the general mechanism. Concepts are sets of fuzzy categories with rich patterns of interrelations and overlaps, and just this sort of thing can be modeled on a computer using computational neural networks. Computational neural networks, of course, are just computational models of how neurons in the brain function and interact. There is not as much of a mystery here as you would like to believe.
If our perceptions were not reality but an inaccurate model then what we have discovered, learned, and know of the physical world scientifically would not be nearly so accurate, verifiable or useful. Nor would one discovery lead to even more theories and discoveries.
I only claimed that our perceptions are a model of the world, not the world itself; I said nothing about their accuracy. Our perceptual models of the world must be accurate at least to the extent that they allow us to thrive (in the sense of survival and reproduction) in a competetive and unforgiving environment. But at the same time, our perceptual mechanisms are easily given over to illusions, inaccurate representations of things as they actually are. This is a plain fact, and I hope I do not have to ennumerate the many ways in which this can happen. That our perceptual mechanisms can be easily fooled in the proper circumstances in no way implies that we should not have the capacity to do good science.
It seems to me that they are over complicating the issue and throwing in a bunch of extra steps just so they can rationalize and justify it to fit the physicalist view point. Where is Occam's Razor when you need it. As they say; "If you hear hoof beats in the American West don't go looking for zebras."
This is not about Occam's Razor at all. It's about consistency with the evidence. You might say that quantum physics is only a needless complication of Newtonian physics, but the simple fact is that those complications are required if we are to honor the experimental evidence we have. Likewise, naive realism is plainly inconsistent with the evidence from the cognitive sciences, and so it must be rejected and replaced with a more complicated view that accommodates all the evidence.
So far as I know, I am always aware that I am asleep and dreaming. I also usually know when I am awake and my perceptions are real or not real because of optical illusions or sensory distortions. This comes from experience and my personal experiences are my ultimate test for reality.
If you're having a dreaming experience and you're aware you're dreaming, that does not change the fact that you are inhabiting a rich perceptual space that is more or less distended from the influence of your environment. The point is that we can find ourselves experiencing perceptual spaces in a large variety of conditions, only a subset of which correspond to the objective world. The simplest explanation is just that it's our brain activity which constructs these perceptual worlds.
My locus of consciousness does not lie in a perceptual model of the body. It is usually in my head behind my forehead but I can at times move it, not outside my body but to various location within my body.
Your locus of consciousness lies in your
perceptual model of your head, behind your
perceptual model of your forehead. You're again espousing naive realism here, which is a view as plainly untenable as the view that the Earth is flat, due to its inability to accommodate known facts. For further arguments, see
here and
here.
Such reports are accurate and verifiable. Now you question the veracity of me and people you know nothing about because it doesn't fit your preconceived model of the physical brain.
I did not categorically deny the veracity of the reports in your initial post. I said that even if they were true, they could find explanations consistent with what we know about how the world works. This point was contrary to your claim that these reports could find
no explanation other than the one you offered.
The veracity of stronger cases of OBE phenomena, like the kind loseyourname described, is a stickier issue. If such cases are so readily verifiable, why do we consistently find conflicting results from scientific studies? The failure of such phenomena to be readily verified by science is not necessarily a death knell-- perhaps their occurence depends on conditions that we do not understand and hence cannot control for-- but it certainly is grounds for retaining a healthy skepticism. Susan Blackmore's
account of her thirty-year history of researching paranormal phenomena, and her eventual rejection of them, seems telling here.
I knew that this challenge was coming and I've been here before. I also know the futility of arguing with a physicalist view point. I am a realist and I don't believe that it is naive. It is the physicalistic view point that ignores so much data, experience and information because it doesn't fit the physicalist paradigm.
Again, the tack I'm taking here is not a physicalist one. I am not a physicalist, but I am completely comfortable offering the line of argument I've presented here.
As for your view, it quite simply is the view that is called "naive realism" in philosophy. It has acquired that pejorative name for a reason.
As for the issue of data-- nothing is being
ignored here. I'm not covering my ears shouting "la la la!" What I'm doing is considering possible explanations for the phenomena you're talking about. That's not ignoring data, it's
interpreting it.
I have said it so many times before and will keep right on saying it until even I won't listen any more. There is so much more to reality than merely the physical and the physical cause and effect. You/they say ideas are not physical but are only the effect of physical processes. How then can anyone come up with a new idea, create something never seen, nor heard, nor read before or a new theory of a reality that he cannot and does not perceive but just some cause and effect subjective model created electrochemically in his physical brain cells?
Simple-- the computational dynamics of the neurons of the brain. We have internal models of the world that we build through experience, and we have faculties of reasoning and intuition-- both conscious and unconscious-- that continuously draws from and operates upon those models. The general schema is not unlike a system of axioms (the model of the world) operated upon by a set of rules of inference (reasoning/intuition) in order to generate novel propositions. There is nothing fundamentally mysterious here.