morrobay said:
For a science and engineering based forum I sure did not expect so many replies to be in defense and denying the reckless attitudes of management and executives at Boeing. While disregarding the engineers and pilots facts and experience...Again I'm actually baffled at the replies here.
Use this as a sign that you need to re-examine your approach, because the problem here is that you aren't taking the issue seriously enough. You provided a source you know is bad, didn't provide the name of any law, criteria for violating it, evidence that it was violated or precedent from other similar crimes. Heck, you and your source basically say that Boeing execs should be put in jail
based on public outcry. That's pretty much the opposite of what our legal system is after when it comes to justice.
It is extremely rare for engineers, construction workers, etc. to be jailed in the US for making mistakes, because the level of negligence required is very tough to prove.
And I also did not expect to have to repeat what has been presented in the technical thread.
No, this thread is about the legal ramifications, so you should be presenting a
legal case. But not for nothing, the way you summarize the technical issue isn't very accurate/complete:
That even seems to be common knowledge: This new design /engine position created essentially a new aircraft - with a tendency to pitch up. So the software engineers jury rigged the system. Boeing did not give the pilots adequate retraining in order to save money /time. Consequently the pilots in the two crashes were fighting the software for control of the plane.
In that description, you didn't make any mention of the malfunctions that happened, which is kind of a big omission. Saying the system was "jury rigged" implies that the entire system was fundamentally flawed to begin with and the band-aid itself should never have even been applied, and that the band-aid itself is what caused the crashes. That's nonsense. The plane flew fine when everything was working. The engineering issue here is primarily about how the systems (including the pilots) dealt with a broken part. There were three issues:
1. The part that broke (the angle of attack indicator) didn't have a robust backup and hadn't for many years because it wasn't considered important enough to back up. This had never presented a problem before. That's a failure to recognize a changing risk.
2. With the AOA indicator broken, the MCAS software did a bad job of dealing with the bad input. That's poor software design and testing.
3. It was expected that pilots would easily recognize such an issue as being very similar to something they were already trained for, and fix it. That's insufficient training (and recognition of it).
If *any* of these three parts of the system had been designed better, these planes would not have crashed. The primary issue that led to this was overconfidence/complacency. That's not criminal negligence.