LeonhardEuler said:
I do not see how a force can be defined over all space. A force has been defined as the derivative of the momentum, so in order for a force to exist, so must a momentum. How can the force then be defined over empty space?
I agree that in a certain way, a force cannot exist without the thing that it is applied to. It doesn't bother me to call the thing a force even when it's not applied to an object, but if it does bother you, than you can call it something else, for example, a "potential force". To produce such a "potential force" field, one can imagine, for example, physics being conducted in the midst of a moving fluid. The fluid induces a force on anything you put in it. One can imagine the force as existing even without an object indicating it.
There is another reason for preferring a force field over a potential but it's kind of subtle. Potentials are always relative. That means that if you take a situation and change the potential everywhere by increasing it by some constant, the result is equivalent to the original situation. This means that if potentials are the ontological reality, then they must have built into them some sort of arbitrariness. But arbitrariness reeks of mathematical artifact.
One can take a quantum mechanical problem defined with a potential energy and redefine the potential energy by adjusting it up or down by a constant. While the result will give the same calculations for all observable measurements, it is not the same situation. In particular, changing the overall potential has the effect of modifying the energies of the particles, and this changes the frequencies of their wave functions. The transformation of a problem by changing the basis of the potential energy amounts to a sort of "gauge transformation", and it is discussed in section 2.6 of Sakurai's classic undergraduate text on QM:
http://theory.itp.ucsb.edu/~doug/phys215/ss/
By the way, I should note that Sakurai's book includes a discussion of the interaction between gravity and quantum mechanics that is in violent disagreement with my understanding of QM and relativity in that it attributes to quantum mechanics, rather than standard relativity theory, the concept that gravitational potential will effect clocks. That is, his book claims a QM effect by performing a calculation that ignores relativistic effects. But that's another story.
So if one desires a potential energy to be the ontological element of reality, then one must define the zero potential. This is kind of ugly. By contrast, if one assumes instead that the force fields are the ontological item, then forces can be defined in a purely local manner that is immune to the gauge transformations associated with changes in potential.
Also, I should mention that the option of making arbitrary potential energy changes is present only in the nonrelativistic quantum theory. In relativity, there is a natural definition for the potential energy of the object and so one can't consider these sorts of gauge changes.
It's kind of interesting that the gauge freedom that is present in non relativistic quantum mechanics as described by Sakurai disappears when one converts to a relativistic theory. This suggests that the gauge freedom that is present in E&M and in the gauge theories of particle theory will also disappear when put into a more unified form.
LeonhardEuler said:
Thank you CarlB for your post, which I found particularly informative. Earlier you mentioned that a force could be defined as the gradient of a potential. Now that the Bohmian interpertation gives a method for computing with such a field it seems less unimportant, even if the interpertation is non-standard. Above I was talking about a definition of force as the derivative of the momentum. Are these two definitions equivalent to one another?
I guess they're sort of equivalent, but...
LeonhardEuler said:
It seems like it would be a useful relation to have that the gradient of the potential is the derivative of the momentum because, if you're only looking for the momentum, it reduces the partial differential equation of Shrodinger's equation to an ordinary one.
Unfortunately, this won't be true because even in the absence of any potential, a particle will still possesses local momentum that can change with time. For example, if one begins with a particle localized in free space around the origin (say by a Gaussian), and if one examines the momentum density at some point away from the origin, one will find that the momentum is directed away from the origin. Another way of putting this is to note that free particles tend to spread out.
The conversion to ordinary DEs is especially interesting in the case of the Dirac equation, but that's a subject for another day. Oh what the heck.
First, note that modern particle theories assume that mass is a derived attribute of particles. That is, it takes left and right handed particles to make a single massive particle, and if you turn off the mass interaction (i.e. the Higgs), you end up with massless Dirac equations for the two halves. But if the massless Dirac equation:
[tex]\gamma^\mu \partial_\mu \psi = 0[/tex]
is true, then so is:
[tex]\gamma^\mu \partial_\mu e^\psi = 0[/tex]
In other words, modern particle theory can only distinguish between fields and their exponents (or logarithms) by considering the probability interpretation of the field. That is, [tex]|\psi|^2[/tex] is assumed to be a probability density, which makes it impossible for [tex]|e^\psi|^2[/tex] to also be such. On the other hands, statistical mechanics tells us that probabilities should be given by
[tex]p = e^{-\frac{kE}{T}}[/tex]
This all suggests that the natural choice for the ontological element corresponding to an electron wave function should be [tex]ln(\psi)[/tex] rather than the usual [tex]\psi[/tex]. That is, the ontological function should be something that acts like an energy which exponentiates to a probability rather than a probability itself. This makes Plank's constant into a sort of Boltzmann constant. And since the massless Dirac equation (which defines a natural equation for a wave function satisfying relativity) is satisfied by both [tex]\psi[/tex] and [tex]\pm ln(\psi)[/tex], one should assume that it is [tex]-ln(\psi)[/tex] that is the ontological object.
Stochastic mechanics is related to what I am talking about here, but I do not think that they put it in the terms I have.
Carl