A stronger proof of nonlocality, or what?

[martinbn]

I believe I answered such questions in my "Bohmian mechanics for instrumentalists".

Yes, but my impression is that you argue that there has to be something real that is classical like position. Then you cannot say that reality and classicality have nothing to do with each other.

 

[Fra]

I think that reality has nothing to do with classicality. For instance, dreams and hallucinations, which are not real, are equally classical.

It seems we get into discussions on definition of real. Then what does " classical mean"? classical mechanics?

Id say my dreams are real experiences realized by the physics of my brain, but they often violate classical mechanics. So in what sense are dreams classical?

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

Trying to calibrate terms...

in my "Bohmian mechanics for instrumentalists".

Do you take the "non-perceptible" items that are "thinking tools" and provides explanatory value within a theoey as what is real?

/Fredrik

 

[Demystifier]

Yes, but my impression is that you argue that there has to be something real that is classical like position. Then you cannot say that reality and classicality have nothing to do with each other.

Impression is the key word.

 

[Demystifier]

Do you take the "non-perceptible" items that are "thinking tools" and provides explanatory value within a theoey

Yes.

as what is real?

Not necessarily.

 

[Demystifier]

It seems we get into discussions on definition of real. Then what does " classical mean"? classical mechanics?

Id say my dreams are real experiences realized by the physics of my brain, but they often violate classical mechanics. So in what sense are dreams classical?

By classical I mean not quantum. To explain dreams in terms of physical processes in the brain, one does not need quantum physics.

 

[Fra]

Are your solipsist HV "classical", but "not real" by that terminology?

And not observable(in QM terminology)?

/Fredrik

 

[Morbert]

The one referred to in the first post of this thread. It discusses a thought experiment of the Wigner-friend type, which manipulates the quantum state of the measuring apparatus and concludes that, if quantum mechanics is applicable to the measuring apparatus as to any other quantum object, then the minimal purely instrumental interpretation of QM is wrong. But the actual experiment has not been performed(*), and probably will not be in a near future, so a pure instrumentalist, like you, does not need to worry.

(*) An experiment has been performed in which a true measuring apparatus is replaced with a single qubit, obviously because a single qubit is much easier to manipulate in a way needed for the experiment.

The implication in bold is too strong for a takedown of instrumentalism, as instrumentalists can readily describe a measurement apparatus quantum mechanically. A better statement would be something like: If measurement data are not sufficiently classical, then the purely instrumental interpretation of QM is wrong.

I.e. We can reject the notion that there are superobservers, but still be fine with describing the measurement apparatus quantum mechanically. QM descriptions don't entail superobservers, and it's the superobservers that would cause an issue for instrumentalists.

 

[Demystifier]

Are your solipsist HV "classical", but "not real" by that terminology?

Just the opposite, it is quantum and real, in the same sense in which particle trajectories in Bohmian interpretation are quantum and real.

And not observable(in QM terminology)?

It's not an observable, in the sense that it is not described by an operator in the (rigged) Hilbert space, if that's what you meant.

 

[Fra]

Just the opposite, it is quantum and real, in the same sense in which particle trajectories in Bohmian interpretation are quantum and real.

Are you thus conceptually "ok" with considering something "real" that different observers fail to agree upon, because its "solipsistic" in nature?

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

If the presumed map of reality "explains" why perceptables like detctor clicks happen?

Then what motivates/infers this map of reality in the first place? Isnt that inferred FROM detector clicks? thus arent these indistinguiahable events quite primary? Rather begging to be explained in terms of something else?

What is it we should explain, and in terms of what? For me the heart of the empirical meaauremnt thery is that the map should be "constructable" from pereceptables witha minimum of ad hoc structures

/Fredrik

 

[Demystifier]

Are you thus conceptually "ok" with considering something "real" that different observers fail to agree upon, because its "solipsistic" in nature?

Yes. For example, if I dream that I can fly, then my ability to fly is not real, but the fact that I have this dream is real.

 

[Demystifier]

If the presumed map of reality "explains" why perceptables like detctor clicks happen?

Then what motivates/infers this map of reality in the first place? Isnt that inferred FROM detector clicks? thus arent these indistinguiahable events quite primary? Rather begging to be explained in terms of something else?

What is it we should explain, and in terms of what? For me the heart of the empirical meaauremnt thery is that the map should be "constructable" from perceptables with a minimum of ad hoc structures

In principle, I could agree. But the history of physics teaches us that non-perceptibles can have a strong explanatory power. For example, Boltzmann explained thermodynamics in terms of non-percetible atoms. Denying atoms by Mach made sense at that time, but denying atoms today would seem too radical.

 

[vanhees71]

Just the opposite, it is quantum and real, in the same sense in which particle trajectories in Bohmian interpretation are quantum and real.It's not an observable, in the sense that it is not described by an operator in the (rigged) Hilbert space, if that's what you meant.

Now we are back at this endless debate, what's "real". You have to define, what you mean by the term "realism", so that one can know what you are talking about. Obviously, since Bohmian trajectories are not observable, for you something non-observable can be real. That's a very strange notion of "real" for me ;-).

 

[gentzen]

Now we are back at this endless debate, what's "real". You have to define, what you mean by the term "realism", so that one can know what you are talking about. Obviously, since Bohmian trajectories are not observable, for you something non-observable can be real. That's a very strange notion of "real" for me ;-).

No, we are not, because Demystifier just clarified that his "solipsist HV" are just as real or unreal as Bohmian trajectories. And saying that Bohmian trajectories are real is independent of that endless debate too, because that is also just a clarification on the level of the theory, similar to saying that electric fields are real, but vector potentials are not.

 

[Demystifier]

Now we are back at this endless debate, what's "real". You have to define, what you mean by the term "realism", so that one can know what you are talking about. Obviously, since Bohmian trajectories are not observable, for you something non-observable can be real. That's a very strange notion of "real" for me ;-).

In realistic interpretations, the word "real" (or ontic) is a primitive notion, its meaning is taken intuitively and cannot be precisely defined in terms of something more elementary.

Likewise, in instrumental interpretations, the word "instrument" (or measuring apparatus) is a primitive notion, its meaning is taken intuitively and cannot be precisely defined in terms of something more elementary.

Some physicists, like me, don't like the idea that measuring apparatus is primitive, so they replace it with another primitive notion that seems more acceptable to them. Different interpretations take different concepts as primitive. It's a matter of personal preference which concept makes more sense as a primitive concept that will not be defined precisely.

It is logically impossible to completely remove primitive concepts. Any definition of a concept uses some words, which one may want to define in terms or other words, which one may want to define in terms of other other words, which ..., but eventually this has to stop somewhere and leave some words undefined. The words that are left undefined are called primitive.

 

[Fra]

In principle, I could agree. But the history of physics teaches us that non-perceptibles can have a strong explanatory power. For example, Boltzmann explained thermodynamics in terms of non-percetible atoms. Denying atoms by Mach made sense at that time, but denying atoms today would seem too radical.

The flow I entertain is

(1) perceptibles -> abduction of best explanation = non-perceptibles ~ agents map of reality

(2) The map of reality guesses the future has as a guiding value to the agents actions. So the agents follows the map... wether right or wrong. This means noone denies the map, or questions the map as its already by construction optimal. A variant of your "non-perceptibles have strong explanatory power. It explains litteraly at least the agenta actions. To thate tent i can agree.

The question is... what is the process by which the input evolves the map. This for me the heart of the matter.how the map evolves in reaponse to percetiples. And that different have slightly different maps are not one bit strange. Their maps are "real" in your sense..

So of the bohmian picture of HV and whatever deteemines their evolution is to be associated to the observers "map" then its getting in harmony with how i view the agents microstructure [which encodes the"map"]

/Fredrik